

**APRIL 2019, VOLUME 10,
NUMBER 1 (17)**

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES



INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL ON EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

International Scientific Journal on European Perspectives

EDITOR: Milan Jazbec

ASSISTANT EDITOR: Nataša Šuštar B.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Matej Accetto (Católica Global School of Law, Portugal) • **Dennis Blease** (University of Cranfield, UK) • **Vlatko Cvrtila** (University of Zagreb, Croatia) • **Vladimir Prebilič** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) • **Albert Rakipi** (Albanian Institute for International Studies, Albania) • **Erwin Schmidl** (University of Vienna, Austria) • **Vasilka Sancin** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) • **Uroš Svete** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) • **Katja Zajc Kejžar** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) • **Jernej Zupančič** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) • **Mitja Žagar** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia) • **Jelica Štefanović Štambuk** (University of Belgrade, Serbia)

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Murat Bilhan (Istanbul Kultur University, Turkey) • **Erhard Busek** (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, Austria) • **Mustafa Cerić** (University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) • **Victor Jackovich** (Jackovich International, USA) • **Jacques Rupnik** (Centre for International Studies and Research, France) • **Goran Svilanović** (RCC, Bosnia and Herzegovina) • **Savo Kentera** (Centre for International Relations, Montenegro)

EDITORIAL OFFICE ADDRESS

European Perspectives is a peer-reviewed international scientific journal, published twice a year (in April and October) by International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies – IFIMES. Views expressed in contributions are those of authors and do not represent views of their respected institutions, unless specified otherwise.

IFIMES has Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN since 2018.

International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies - IFIMES, Vošnjakova ulica 1, P.O.Box 2795, SI-1001 LJUBLJANA, Slovenia, E-mail: ifimes@ifimes.org, www.ifimes.org

More information about the journal on website:

www.europeanperspectives.org

Manuscripts should be forwarded to the Assistant Editor by email on office@europeanperspectives.org.

Indexed in: International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)

ISSN 1855-7694



EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL ON EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1 (17) APRIL 2019

Published by International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies - IFIMES.

IFIMES has Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN since 2018.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL ON EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1 (17) APRIL 2019

Letter from the Editor	5
GUEST VIEW	
NATO at Seventy: between yesterday and tomorrow <i>Jamie Shea</i>	9
ARTICLES	
Digital diplomacy: aspects, approaches and practical use <i>Viona Rashica</i>	21
Brain drain – current conditions and perspectives <i>Ljupcho Kevereski and Bisera Kostadinovska-Stojchevska</i>	41
Eighty years since the midnight diplomatic pact: an overture to the Second World War <i>Polona Dovečar</i>	65
Diplomacy and family life: co-existence or burden? <i>Dragica Pungaršek</i>	93
Individualism as a determinant of successful diplomats through the engagement of stereotyped sportspersons <i>Milan Jazbec</i>	115

BOOK REVIEWS

NATO and the Western Balkans: from neutral spectator
to proactive peacemaker **143**

Niall Mulchinock

Viona Rashica

Essays on the statehood and political development of
Bosnia and Herzegovina **148**

Mirko Pejanović

Polona Dovečar

General Submission guidelines **153**

Letter from the Editor

Quoting world known historic years means drawing inspiration from the time past and trying to learn lessons from it. Hence we pick up from the last century two such importing years connected to the current one.

Firstly, we commemorate 80 years since the beginning of the WW2, the most devastating conflict in the history of Homo sapiens, and secondly, we take note of the end of the Cold War 30 years ago, a revolution without a revolution. Two different milestones, but one and the same message: the advancement of mankind should rest on avoiding military conflicts and on using peaceful means to solve them. It would take more than one single issue of this journal to dwell on the utility of this mantra. We think that the 70th anniversary of the NATO Alliance fits in this context.

This issue - April 2019 - follows the so far editorial outlook. With our second issue with the new publisher we continue to present, discuss and bring experiences from the European integration process primarily, not only to the region of the Western Balkans but broadly as well as to promote young authors.

Hence, also this issue brings five articles and two book reviews. Hopefully our audience would be pleased with the academic offer, be it in printed or in digital version.

The first article focuses on digital diplomacy, a highly current and growing trend in diplomatic practice, but also theory. Being increasingly present in the diplomatic modus operandi some see it as an outstanding part of the new public diplomacy. The promising author dwells inter alia on its origin and definition as well as on most used digital platforms.

Our second contribution discusses the ever phenomena of a brain drain, with a particular view to young and talented persons. It refers to the outflow of the most educated, gifted, talented, creative potential pos-

sessing top competencies. The authors alarmingly claim that brain drain is not determined primarily by material-existential and social reasons.

The third paper brings to our attention the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. It is the Pact that led directly to the WWII 80 years ago. The author uncovers the diplomatic dynamics behind the scene and quotes on German diplomatic reporting from Moscow to Berlin. Diplomacy in being.

The fourth one dwells on a highly current topic in postmodern diplomacy: the relation between diplomatic and family life. Is this supposed to be a burden or an advantage? The respected author found herself in both roles, as a diplomat and a spouse, but as a non-career diplomat, elaborates on her experience, draws many open questions and offers some hints.

Also the last piece of examination is innovative: the author looks at the correlation between sportspersons and diplomats, both being individualists. Through this research frame he brings into focus the stereotype that Slovenes are individualists as far as their successes in sport are concerned. An interesting piece of policy endeavor with challenging findings.

The first book review elaborates on the role of NATO in the Western Balkans, pointing out its evolution from a neutral spectator to a proactive peacemaker, and the second one elaborates on the statehood and political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a complex country with an ultimate goal, the EU membership.

Last but not least, the recent Guest View contemplates seven decades of the NATO's existence and activities, while arguing that contemporary security risks demand swift, efficient and coordinated responses. International structures have to develop new ways of responding.

Finally, a careful reader will notice our bellow intonation: Slovenia is preparing for its second Presidency of the EU Council, having in mind the Congress of Ljubljana that took place two centuries ago. Diplomacy rests on tradition. See you in autumn.

Ljubljana, April 2019

M. J.

From the Congress of Ljubljana 1821 to the Presidency of the EU Council 2021

guest view

NATO at Seventy: between yesterday and tomorrow

Jamie Shea

NATO at Seventy: between yesterday and tomorrow

Jamie Shea¹

2019 is a year rich for anniversaries, all of which having lessons for the age in which we now live.

In June we mark the 75th anniversary of the D Day landings on the beaches of Normandy. It recalls the horrors of classic warfare between what we today would call peer to peer competitors. In the first month following D Day more soldiers died than in all the wars fought by the western powers since 9/11. On average 27.000 people died every day during the Second World War which makes the casualties of the NATO countries in Afghanistan and Iraq during the last 15 years seem relatively modest by comparison. D Day was certainly a useful reminder not to stumble into another “total war” between super-armed major powers ever again.

Later in June we mark the 20th anniversary of the end of the Kosovo air campaign. It is a reminder of an age of greater optimism back in 1999 when the NATO countries believed in interventions to protect human rights and hold violent regimes to account. After the disillusionment of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, Kosovo shows that stabilisation operations and nation building can be successful if supported by adequate resources, a comprehensive approach in which all the major international institutions work together and the political will to stay the course. Unfortunately by the time Syria descended into civil war in 2011 this will have largely dissipated.

Also in June we mark the centenary of the Treaty of Versailles that formally brought the First World War to an end. This war witnessed the worst carnage in human history up to that point and yet the peace that followed isolated major powers such as Germany and Russia, was not

¹ Jamie Shea is a Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe, a Brussels-based think tank. Previously he was a senior official with NATO (1980 to 2018).

supported by the only power able to guarantee it – namely the United States – and failed to provide Europe with an effective collective security system based on the League of Nations that could keep revisionist ambitions in check.

Finally in November comes the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was a moment of euphoria and hope in European history when barriers came down and the peoples of Europe were not only liberated but also reunited. The unification of Germany proved not to be the end of the process of European integration but marked a new, more dynamic phase. It brought hope that the long divided western and eastern halves of the continent could come together in a common sharing of liberal democratic values and standards; and that this closer union would make the EU into an autonomous and powerful actor on the world stage.

In short, these four anniversaries recall what could happen to Europe when its member states got the politics wrong and what it was capable of achieving when it got the politics right. Now back in 2019, Europeans are confronting a world which is losing all its familiar bearings and collapsing rapidly around them. The events that will dominate the anniversary recollections in 50 or 100 years hence are being shaped as we speak. They are a reflection of the new security environment and the challenges it is imposing on governments and populations alike.

In the first place is the disappearance of the four pillars on which Europe's security after the Second World War rested.

The first was the nature of the Soviet Union as the west's principal adversary. It was mainly a status quo power as far as Europe was concerned, happy to hold on to its sphere of influence in the east but ready to accept peaceful co-existence with the rest of the continent. It accepted the logic of deterrence and when its periodic threats were countered (as in the euro-missile crisis of the early 1980s), it was ready to negotiate and entangle itself in transparency measures and arms control agreements. It also was fragile economically and in irreversible decline. It was weighed down by expensive overseas commitments and was ready to reform and liberalise in the hope of solving its internal problems. This gave the west an increasing leverage over it. The Soviet Union could only compete realistically in the military sphere but in the nuclear age it had to be risk averse. NATO therefore could meet this

challenge through deterrence and wait out the demise of its adversary without having to engage in a costly and even catastrophic conflict.

The second pillar was the relative stability of the international system. Despite a number of conflicts and crises, the period after 1945 marked the heyday of the liberal multinational order. The western based institutions increased their roles and their memberships. As trade increased massively, globalisation pulled countries closer together but also required common rules, such as in the WTO and G8 and G20, to manage. New norms also appeared in the security field as UN doctrines such as the responsibility to protect put limits on national sovereignty and legitimised interventions to safeguard human and minority rights. For the first time since Nuremberg the perpetrators of atrocities could be tried by international tribunals serving not only the cause of justice but also future deterrence.

A third pillar of stability was the willingness of the one superpower, the United States, to underwrite this system both through financial and military means, as well as active engagement in the key institutions that symbolised but also structured this order. It did this not only because of formal treaty obligations (as in NATO) but because it recognised that upholding the order served its key economic and security interests. Otherwise and alone in the world the United States would lose over time its position as the leading power. Allies needed to be protected but they also provided the United States with support and legitimacy for its own operations. So burden sharing worked both ways. To relieve the burdens on itself the United States was constantly pressing its European allies to do more and spend more; but it also recognised that if the Europeans were to do this in a cost-effective way they would need to form their own security and defence union and become less dependent on the United States. But Washington saw this as a challenge to NATO and its own leadership role. So it grumbled about free-riding allies but largely lived with the status quo.

Finally, and organised in NATO, the Europeans only had to focus on one challenge in one place at one time. During the Cold War this was the Soviet Union. Then in the 1990s the former Yugoslavia as it collapsed into separate states and ethnic conflicts. After 9/11 came the turn of Afghanistan. With all three challenges NATO was not only dealing with an immediate threat but also convinced that defeating this threat would in itself produce a better world, safer for the democra-

cies and building bridges across ethnic, religious and ideological divides. So the immediate challenge held the key to what President H.W. Bush described as the “New World Order”. One challenge in one place at one time gave NATO’s member states time to build consensus, to figure out the best strategies through trial and error and to concentrate their resources on one particular campaign.

As Europeans face up to the next seventy five years the question is whether these four pillars of stability will endure. The evidence so far is that they will not. This does not mean that the cause of European integration is lost or that NATO, like all previous alliances, will disappear, even in the longer term. But it does mean that a period of luck in European history is now over. Both the EU and NATO will need to work much harder in future, and more creatively and strategically, to sustain the security and prosperity that our citizens have come to take for granted.

To begin, the international system is far less stable and predictable than in the past. The major military powers are revisionist in that they all find the system rigged against them. The United States feels cheated by ungrateful allies; Russia feels excluded; China sees a west that is trying to shut out its products and constrain its natural rise as a world power and civilisation. The perception of countries like Russia, China or Iran is of a west in decline. This encourages these countries to be assertive and even to take risks to probe the weaknesses and responsiveness of the democracies. Competition becomes the new constant. It has seeped into all the classic domains, such as land, sea and air, and also into the new domains, such as cyberspace, outer space and the information and communications space exemplified by the Internet and the social media. Competition means that powers that used to be apart both geographically and functionally are now in constant friction with each other as old spheres of influence are contested and new ones are in the process of forming. As war between major powers remains too risky, given the destructiveness of modern weaponry, challenges in this domain have to be gradual until one side has achieved a clear technological edge and decisive margin of superiority over its rivals.

For now this also means the return of arms races as the major powers push ahead to exploit new technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, automation and robotics and quantum computing. Here speed and synergy for both offensive and defensive opera-

tions across all domains, both traditional and new, and making command and control seamless from one domain to another, has become the key to success in modern warfare.

More competition has produced a more contested environment in which more players are gaining the technology and more cheaply to join the fray. If they do not acquire the power to inflict mass destruction, they at least have the capacity to disrupt their adversaries and act as spoilers. Unsurprisingly the security strategies of both the EU and NATO as well as the individual member states today list numerous adversaries and strategic competitors as well as a mix of state and non-state actors, such as cyber hackers, organised crime syndicates, terrorist groups and militias. The ranking order of these threats and players can change quickly and go from an abstraction such as terrorism or climate change, to a specific state, such as Russia, China, Iran or North Korea. Many of the sub-state actors, such as Al Qaeda or the Somali pirates, have been around for some time already. Yet the return of great power antagonisms after years of striving for great power cooperation in dealing with common threats like terrorism, pirates or climate change has been sudden and brutal.

NATO is once again balancing Russia and the EU has been imposing comprehensive sanctions against this important trading partner for the past 5 years. Both institutions are also closely following China which the EU recently proclaimed is as much a competitor as a partner. It is not that NATO sees a major role for itself in Asia but rather that China is already a European power and in economic, technological, diplomatic and cultural ways. This has already induced certain EU member states to block EU declarations criticising China for its policies on human rights or vis a vis Hong Kong. Beijing may not threaten European security in the direct, military manner of Moscow; but it increasingly affects the choices of allied governments more than Russia is capable of doing. After all, security is as much about freedom of choice and the ability to withstand coercion as it is about protection from physical harm.

The flip side of multiple adversaries is multiple dependencies. Economic wealth and technological innovation or investments no longer come primarily from the partners that are providing your security. Whereas the United States has proved to be a steadfast albeit often critical partner in NATO, even increasing its force levels in Eastern Europe, it has become a major disruptor of EU integration, championing

Brexit, imposing tariffs on EU exports and even describing the EU as a threat. Yet it is largely the same countries that are involved in both organisations. This forces allies into difficult choices and balancing acts, as seen in the debate in Europe whether to cut new energy deals with Russia or to embrace or reject Chinese tech giants such as Huawei as a provider of fifth generation telecommunications equipment.

At the same time, the new dependencies in technology, energy, communications or critical infrastructure ownership make hybrid warfare much more attractive as a means of competition and gaining leverage. Hybrid campaigns sow dissent and undermine public trust in conventional politics. They polarise public opinion and spread conspiracy theories as a simple explanation and solution for complex problems. The very notion of truth becomes confused and seemingly beyond reach as every event is surrounded by dozens of different theories and interpretations. Hybrid activity has the benefit of stealth and deniability. If successful, it can gain the objectives of war without the risks. It is often difficult to attribute hybrid activity that hides behind false flags and multiple layers of collusion between states and proxies. Moreover much of this activity is legal as when China buys European ports or Russia manipulates western social media companies to boost its narratives. Hybrid activity can produce high gains for its perpetrators at an acceptable level of risk.

Great power competition plays out along the east-west axis in Ukraine, Georgia and Central Asia, in the south where Russia and China are increasingly active in Africa and the Middle East, and even closer to home in the western Balkans where the EU has been reluctant to open its doors to Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Russia and China have concluded security, training and economic agreements with a number of states. Both present themselves as more reliable than the west and less demanding when it comes to human rights and democratic standards. They laud authoritarianism and managed democracy as a better guarantee of stability and long term development. Dealing with the problems of the south, such as terrorism, uncontrolled migration and weak state structures and endemic corruption would already constitute a major problem for both the EU and NATO. But the growing presence of Russia and China in these regions, combined with the pressures from the east and unrelenting hybrid campaigns, add an unwelcome further layer of complexity.

The situation is complicated still further by the unpredictable and constantly gyrating nature of US foreign policy in the era of President Donald Trump. It keeps the allies in a constant state of anxiety as to whether the United States will remain engaged or suddenly disengage. This cannot be solely about burden sharing because the United States today has historically low levels of troop deployments in Europe and the Middle East, and it is reducing the already very modest number that it has in Africa. The entire campaign against ISIS cost just 5 American combat fatalities as the local partners of the United States did the bulk of the fighting. The irony is that Washington is questioning the value of its security commitments when they have never been cheaper in manpower or finance to uphold.

The challenge facing the NATO allies as the alliance embarks on the eighth decade of its existence is to manage complexity as the long term and defining characteristic of the strategic environment. After decades spent facing adversaries – whether in Moscow, Belgrade, Baghdad, Kabul or Tripoli, who were well inferior to the west, NATO is now up against much tougher opponents.

China and Russia have learned the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their autocracies are well entrenched with much tighter forms of surveillance, media domination and social control. They are much more integrated into the global economy giving them more levers of influence. Sanctions against them exact a heavy price in markets lost by the western powers. China and Russia have learned that power is not about having more resources than the democracies but about being able to marshal their own, lesser resources more effectively. It is also about being willing and able to move decisively to exploit openings while the democracies hesitate. China and Russia are up against a much less cohesive west than during the Cold War or for twenty five years after it. Rather than find their place in the traditional western order, they are tempted to rewrite the rules and impose their own distinct order. This involves a better marshalling of those countries that were anti-western in the first place as well as attempts to prise away from the western camp countries that were on its periphery. We see this in Russia's courting of Serbia and Turkey and China's pressure on countries recognising Taiwan to withdraw that recognition.

Beijing and Moscow cannot be defeated by a quick and relatively painless air or ground campaign as happened to NATO's adversaries in the

1990 to 2011 timeframe. The alliance now has to dig in for the long haul and use its resources far more efficiently to contain its new great power rivals, confront them when they cross certain red lines, but also seek to cooperate with them when it is safe and practical to do so. With the four pillars of stability now gone, and in a more crisis prone international system, NATO will need to combine a deft handling of the day to day issues with a long term strategy to constrain its rivals and push them back towards cooperation. This will put a premium on leadership.

It also carries four particular strategic implications.

The first is that the Alliance has to be able to fight multi-domain warfare. Exploiting the new domains of cyber, AI, data fusion and outer space, where hostile activity can be conducted all the time because it is below NATO's Article 5 mutual defence clause, adversaries will try to defeat NATO in the electro-magnetic spectrum before tanks, artillery and fighter aircraft come into play. The preparation for the war has become the war itself.

The United States is already moving in this direction, but it needs to engage its allies on how NATO can mainstream the new technologies throughout its force posture. The risk is of a digital divide in the alliance in which a minority of allies have acquired the new technologies and have integrated their command and control seamlessly across all the six domains while the majority have neither acquired the technologies nor tried to think through the ways to use them. As a result they will be able to fight only limited, low intensity engagements.

NATO also needs to make its exercises more demanding and incorporate the lessons learned faster into its operational procedures and organisation. The alliance needs a Senior Group of scientific advisers who can make policy makers understand earlier and better the impact of technological change by drawing more on private sector expertise and contributions. Declaring space as a domain of operations would be a good move in this direction.

The second implication is in the area of hybrid or grey zone warfare. This activity may be difficult to attribute but it is planned and intentional and as such constitutes hostile behaviour. It cannot be tolerated lest it invite still more hybrid attacks. So both NATO and the EU need to respond robustly and consistently. Only in this way can some

form of deterrence be established over time. This will also be a culture change for NATO in particular because it means taking lots of smaller decisions all the time rather than very big decisions only once a decade or so. We should remember that Article 5, the mutual defence clause, was invoked only once in NATO's first seventy years and then in response to a terrorist attack that it was not designed for. Generating solidarity in response to lesser affronts may be more difficult than when facing existential military threats. Moreover devising a playbook of mainly civilian and economic measures will be new for an alliance that is more accustomed to military contingency planning. NATO will need good situational awareness to respond adroitly and not be drawn into unwanted escalation.

The third implication is the relationship between burden sharing and European defence integration. The United States is calling on Europe to do more and spend more. This is justified but it can be properly achieved only if Washington wholeheartedly supports the current EU efforts to develop its own capabilities and to pool its research and development programmes through such schemes as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund. These initiatives can reduce the high degree of duplication and give the Europeans more capacity for autonomous action. The EU's problems are in its immediate neighbourhood, from Ukraine, to the Western Balkans, Libya and the Sahel. The United States is not going to stabilise these regions. On the contrary it is seeking to reduce its footprint in the Middle East and Africa. Yet the United States has a vital interest in the EU succeeding in this venture. So instead of seeing the goal of European Strategic Autonomy as something anti-American or a threat to the primacy of NATO, Washington needs to get behind them as Europeans will accept higher defence spending if they believe this serves their own priorities and interests. After all, the EU is the only emerging power that is intrinsically friendly to the United States unless Washington forces it to go in another direction

Finally, the alliance needs to think and plan for the long term. China and Russia are good at this and they do not allow themselves to be blown easily of course. NATO by contrast has become adept at responding to immediate crises in line with the news cycle and the different security interests of its member states. This means shifting priorities and a loss of breadth and focus.

The creation of an Intelligence Division in NATO HQ bringing together civilian and military inputs has greatly improved the alliance's ability to understand Russia and China and to analyse their moves real time. This facilitates NATO's messaging and signalling and helps to identify diplomatic openings. A long term approach can also help NATO to be less reactive and taken by surprise, as with Russia's recent moves in the Middle East. The alliance can learn to apply its own diplomatic and military instruments to better effect. Yet above all the first step is to stop giving China and Russia free and easy victories through the west's own self-inflicted divisions and wounds.

The lessons of the twentieth century are that no catastrophe or triumph was ever inevitable. Everything depended on decisions that political leaders took for better or for worse. Certainly today the west is on the back foot in a way that few would have predicted when the Berlin Wall came down and we proclaimed the "End of History" thirty years ago. But this does not mean that the illiberal autocracies are set to dominate the twenty first century. There is no evidence that they can durably out-perform the democracies or make humankind happier and more prosperous. They can win only if we let them by losing faith in the liberal order that we constructed so patiently in the years following the Second World War and which NATO and the EU have so successfully nurtured and expanded. But we cannot continue to live off the heritage of the past. We need a different transatlantic relationship and a different NATO and EU to take us safely through the next seventy five years. The time to deliver on the necessary reforms is now. Tomorrow is already too late.

Digital diplomacy: aspects, approaches and practical use

Viona Rashica

Brain drain – current conditions and perspectives

Ljupcho Kevereski and Bisera Kostadinovska-Stojchevska

Eighty years since the midnight diplomatic pact: an overture to the Second World War

Polona Dovečar

Diplomacy and family life: co-existence or burden?

Dragica Pungaršek

Individualism as a determinant of successful diplomats through the engagement of stereotyped sportspersons

Milan Jazbec

Digital diplomacy: aspects, approaches and practical use

Viona Rashica¹

ABSTRACT

Digital diplomacy is considered as the one of the major trends of the twenty-first century in diplomatic communication, the role and importance of which is growing with extraordinary speed. The main purpose of this paper is to highlight the features of this form of new public diplomacy. For the realization of the research are used qualitative methods, based on recent literature that is related to international relations and diplomacy, especially public diplomacy, as well as the credible internet sources within which there are valuable data about the characteristics of digital diplomacy. The results show that digital diplomacy has become an essential element for realizing the foreign policy of the states and also for the development of various diplomatic activities of other international actors. Whereas the conclusions of the research aim to contribute to the increasing knowledge about the general characteristics of digital diplomacy, by providing important information for the definition, origin, goals, effectiveness, the most used digital platforms, and its benefits and risks.

KEY WORDS: Digital diplomacy, globalization, international actors, digital platforms

POVZETEK

Digitalna diplomacija velja za enega glavnih trendov enaindvajsetega stoletja pri diplomatskem komuniciranju, katerega vloga in pomen naraščata z izjemno hitrostjo. Glavni namen tega prispevka je osvetliti značilnosti te oblike nove javne diplomacije. Za uresničitev raziskave se uporabljajo kvalitativne metode, ki temeljijo na novejši literaturi, ki je povezana z mednarodnimi odnosi in diplomacijo, zlasti javno diplomacijo, ter na verodostojnih internetnih virih, v katerih so dragoceni podatki o značilnostih digitalne diplomacije. Rezultati kažejo, da je digitalna diplomacija postala bistven element za uresničevanje zunanje politike držav in tudi za razvoj različnih diplomatskih dejavnosti drugih mednarodnih akterjev. Zaključki raziskave želijo prispevati k povečanju znanja o splošnih značilnostih digitalne diplomacije z zagotavljanjem pomembnih informacij za opredelitev, izvor, cilje, učinkovitost, najbolj uporabljene digitalne platforme ter njene koristi in tveganja.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Digitalna diplomacija, globalizacija, mednarodni akterji, digitalne platforme

1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Viona Rashica is a PhD Candidate of Political Science at the South East European University, Tetovo, Republic of the North Macedonia. E-mail address: vionarashica@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION

The paper treats one topic which is about a very important form of the postmodern diplomacy and today's public diplomacy, known as digital diplomacy. The latter one is characterized by a great influence on the realization of diplomatic practices by the international actors, providing also an influential space for ICT, the Internet and social media, which are at the same time its basic elements. The main research purposes of the paper are these: To clarify the definition and goals of digital diplomacy, to describe its evolution from the last years of the twentieth century to the present day, to explain the main points of its effectiveness, to emphasize the most used digital platforms by digital diplomats and to classify the main benefits and risks of digital diplomacy. The research question of the paper is: Why digital diplomacy is considered an essential element for the realization of diplomatic activities? While the hypotheses of this paper are these: Social media represent the basis of digital diplomacy; if benefits and risks of digital diplomacy would be placed in scale, the benefits will raise up, arguing enough that digital diplomacy is very beneficial for the realization of diplomatic activities.

Therefore, to give the research question the right answer and to identify the raised hypotheses, the paper is divided into seven chapters. The second chapter explains what digital diplomacy is and the third one describes its evolution from e-diplomacy to instaplomacy. The fourth chapter highlights the main points of the effective digital diplomacy, while the fifth one gives a ranking of the most used digital platforms by digital diplomats. The sixth and the seventh chapters are very special, because within them are information about the classification of the most important benefits and risks of digital diplomacy. This paper has an explanatory, descriptive, analytical and comparative nature, and for its realization are used qualitative methods, relying in the latest literature and the credible internet sources that are related to international relations and the field of diplomacy.

THE DEFINITION AND GOALS OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

An excellent opportunity to begin bridging the change management gap in diplomatic theory is offered by the recent spread of digital initiatives in foreign ministries, which probably can be described as nothing less than a revolution in the practice of diplomacy (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2015, p.201), bringing to light a new form of public di-

plomacy, the digital one. Digital diplomacy is a form of new public diplomacy, which uses new information and communication technologies (ICT), the Internet and social media as means for strengthening diplomatic relations between international actors (states, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and others). The main differences of new public diplomacy with the classical one lie in a greater access to information, greater interaction among individuals and organizations, and greater transparency (Chakraborty, 2013, p.37).

The usage of websites by foreign ministries, embassies and international organisations is now a standard practice. Social media has become diplomacy's significant tool, which provides a platform for unconditional communication, and has become a communicator's most powerful tool (Twiplomacy, 2017). Thanks to them world leaders can communicate with massive audiences around the world in unimaginable ways and the list of social media is growing at extraordinary speed. There are other e-tools, which are important for digital diplomacy like blogs², which are immensely popular and wikis, which are nowadays more frequently used for internal purposes, such as knowledge management. This worldwide embrace of online channels has brought with it a wave of openness and transparency that has never been experienced before.

Digital diplomacy cannot flourish in the bureaucratic framework of conventional foreign ministries. It thrives in a work environment that stimulates informal teamwork, creativity, innovation and out-of-the-box thinking. It is entirely supported in soft power, increasing lobbying opportunities for different issues, creating favorable spaces for the involvement of non-state actors in global governance, and resulting with cooperation between all the international actors. There are five principles that characterize impactful digital diplomacy: Listening, which means that actively monitoring online conversations is a critical step towards developing an impactful digital diplomacy, prioritization, which states that no digital strategy can succeed without clearly defined short-term and long-term objectives, hybridization, which emphasizes that digital outputs and outcomes cannot be allowed to substantially diverge or contradict objectives set for traditional diplomacy, engagement, which shows that key advantage of digital diplomacy is the possibility of directly reaching large audiences in real time, and adaptation, which highlights that digital diplomats do not operate in a static environment as their actions are constantly influenced, shaped

2 Blog is a regularly updated website or web page, typically one run by an individual or small group that is written in an informal or conversational style.

and constrained by the actions of other digital players (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018, pp.698-701). The main goals of digital diplomacy are: Knowledge management, the successful realization of public diplomacy, information management, consular communications and response in disaster situations, internet freedom or the creation of specific technologies to keep the internet free and open, external resources and policy planning (Adesina, 2016).

FROM E-DIPLOMACY TO INSTAPLOMACY

Digital diplomacy emerged after the end of the Cold War when democracy and its values were spreading in the former communist countries and when people's access to international information was highly increasing. The development of ICT and the media triggers and promotes the increasing public interest in information on government foreign policy activity, thus enabling and encouraging the influence of the public on shaping foreign policy (Jazbec, 2010, p. 60). The first developments of digital diplomacy belong to 1992, when at the Earth Summit³ in Rio de Janeiro for the first time civil society emails were used for lobbying in negotiations, as well as in Malta at the same time was founded the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, as the first unit for computer applications in diplomacy (DiploFoundation Blog, 2017).

The next milestone was the WikiLeaks scandal of 2010 in which WikiLeaks⁴ published 250,000 diplomatic cables sent between US missions and Washington, which taught diplomats that secrets can hardly exist in the digital age, or do not exist at all. Digital diplomats and scholars have often viewed the Arab Spring⁵ as the origin of digital diplomacy. Indeed the revolts that swept through the Middle East in 2011, and that saw the fall of Egyptian President Mubarak⁶, were a for-

3 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, the Rio Summit, the Rio Conference, and the Earth Summit, was a major United Nations conference held in Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June in 1992.

4 WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library that was founded by its publisher Julian Assange in 2006. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying and corruption. It has so far published more than 10 million documents and associated analyses.

5 The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across North Africa and the Middle East in the late 2010s.

6 Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak was a former Egyptian military and political leader who served as the fourth president of Egypt from 1981 to 2011. On 13 April 2011, Mubarak and both of his sons (Alaa and Gamal) were detained for 15 days of questioning about allegations of corruption and abuse of power. Mubarak was then ordered to stand trial on charges of negligence for failing to halt the killing of peaceful protesters during the revolution. These trials began on 3 August 2011. On 2 June 2012, an Egyptian court sentenced Mubarak to life imprisonment. After sentencing, he was reported to have suffered a series of health crises. He was acquitted on 2 March 2017 by the Court of Cassation and he was released on 24 March 2017.

mative event in the history of digital diplomacy. During and following the Arab Spring, young activists used social media to spread dissident discourse, shape narratives, and broadcast live footage of revolutions across the world. It was at this moment that MFA, embassies and diplomats realized that events that occur offline take shape online. Moreover, social media emerged as a platform that could offer valuable insight into public opinion and public sentiment thus facilitating foreign policy analysis. (Manor, 2017).

When we search about digital diplomacy, we find different names for it such as *la Diplomatie Numérique*, e-Diplomacy⁷, Digiplomacy, Public Diplomacy 2.0⁸, 21st Century Statecraft⁹, Open Policy¹⁰, etc., (Deos, 2015, p.39). Twitter Diplomacy appeared as a synonymous of digital diplomacy based on the fact that Twitter is the most important social network for presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and diplomats of the world (Sandre, 2013, p.24). The newest synonymous of digital diplomacy is Instaplomacy because Instagram Stories have become a secondary channel for digital diplomats, where world leaders meet, greet and tag each other. To see what world leaders are doing at international conferences and summits, it is useful to follow their Instagram accounts to glean valuable behind-the-scenes insights into the halls of power (Twiplomacy, 2018). Many of us may be confused with interchangeable use of prefixes digital, net, e-, Twitter, Insta etc., but all prefixes describe an impact and various developments of the Internet and social media in diplomacy. Meanwhile, some states want to give a special name to digital diplomacy, the best example are the French, who from the first appearance of digital diplomacy until today use a special term “*la Diplomatie Numérique*”.

THE EFFECTIVE DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

Digital diplomacy innovation needs support from the top leadership. It is preferable to avoid grandiose digital diplomacy strategy, because the over-formalisation of a vision can be counter-productive, as it could create rigid structures that might not allow for the flexibil-

7 Digital diplomacy was known as “e-Diplomacy” by the British, as a description of the early commercialization of the Internet and its use in diplomacy.

8 The U.S. State Department uses social media in its public diplomacy initiative, which was dubbed “public diplomacy 2.0” by James K. Glassman, under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs.

9 The State Department of the United States calls digital diplomacy as “21st Century Statecraft”.

10 The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development refers to digital diplomacy as “Open Policy”.

ity needed to adapt to new technologies. Then, digital diplomacy is much more than social media and public diplomacy, because a much broader array of its activities takes place in thousands of diplomatic negotiations, policy initiatives, and crisis management actions every day worldwide and they all depend heavily on digital technologies. It should be emphasized that high budgets sometimes yield low impacts and low budgets sometimes yield high impacts. Selection of the most effective digital platform for special needs depends on many factors, including the target audience and the availability of human resources for maintaining the ministry's online presence on the platform. Putting diplomats, particularly young officials, in the driving seat is very important. Encouragement of early adopters can generate enormous results by involving experienced diplomats in digital diplomacy processes with a bit of patience and innovation. Learning from others and being open to innovative ideas are given prerequisites for successful digital diplomacy. The main element of digital diplomacy investment are human resource expenses, which should be used in calculating an entity's return on investment (Kurbalija, 2016).

Cybersecurity is about risk management. This is particularly important in the use of social media, where openness and engagement increase cyber-risk. It is understandable that without failure there are no successes, but must be sure that failures are contained and that lessons are learned. Digital diplomats need to be aware of the time needed: one day – one month – one year dynamics. They need to experiment and try to be among the early adopters, but also occasionally benefit from a delayed start (Kurbalija, 2016).

Constant engagement and timely content attract followers and make online presence vibrant and what matters is the context in which the content is presented. Social media reaches a wide variety of audiences and must be aware of the predominant audiences of the platform through which the message is sent. There are some useful tips and tricks on social media: Avoid drafting posts by committee, simplify, and don't over-complicate the message. Simplify the sign-off structure. Move from control to trust your social media manager. Don't create a culture, where all posts need to be approved. Instead focus on getting an editorial line approved, so you can create content within the editorial line. Train the inner circle of political advisors, especially on how to take engaging pictures. No handshakes! Always do a background check on hashtags, so you don't use a hashtag that is used with content

you don't want to be associated with. Consider using social media to ask for help and inspiration. It is a good way to start conversations (Twiplomacy, 2019). It is important to separate official from informal communication channels and also to separate professional from private communication in the digital space, which is probably the main challenge for, and a potential weakness of digital diplomacy. In the social media space, it is almost impossible to control the interpretation of messages and diplomatic services should be aware of this risk. Crises and difficulties will come sooner or later in digital diplomacy efforts. The best preparation for that consists of building and maintaining credibility within the community that follows (Kurbalija, 2016).

The most important digital diplomacy resource is found in the knowledge and experience of diplomats, so the MFA need to know how to use them. As Italian authors Stefano Baldi and Pasquale Baldocci stressed, "diplomats are born with a pen in their hand", yes, diplomacy happens in corridors and at dinners, but ultimately, diplomatic deals have to be put onto paper, even if this has transformed into an electronic version. Within diplomatic services, the ability to write informative and concise reports is often a criterion for diplomatic professionalism and advances in career. With this centrality of writing, diplomats are already trained and prepared to begin the practice of social media and digital diplomacy (Kurbalija, 2016).

Diplomats should have sufficient skills and knowledge to judge what they can, and what they cannot publish on social media. It is necessary to build learning into digital organization between senior diplomats that have a lot of experience and knowledge about the diplomatic profession and junior diplomats who tend to be masters of social media. Digital diplomats should know that the main and most important point of the effective digital diplomacy is training and practice.

THE MOST USED DIGITAL PLATFORMS

Twitter in particular, has become a diplomatic barometer, a tool used to analyze and forecast international relations. 97% of all 193 UN member states have an official presence on the platform and only the governments of only six countries, namely Laos, Mauritania, Nicaragua, North Korea, Swaziland and Turkmenistan do not have an official presence on Twitter. Six of the G7 leaders have a personal Twitter account, which means that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is the only G7

leader to shun the social network. Have been identified 951 Twitter accounts (372 personal and 579 institutional) of heads of state and government and foreign ministers of 187 countries. The US President Donald J. Trump has made the biggest impact on Twitter since taking office on January 20, 2017. He is the most followed world leader with more than 59 million followers (Twiplomacy, 2018). A total of 97 multi-lateral international organizations and NGOs are actively present on Twitter (Twiplomacy, 2017).

Facebook is the second-most popular network among government leaders and it is where they have the biggest audiences. The heads of government and foreign ministers of 179 countries are present on the platform, representing 93% of all UN member states with 677 Facebook accounts. While some pages merely broadcast the daily activity of their leaders, others engage with their citizens, replying to the most salient comments and even allowing a free-flow of visitor posts on their respective pages. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi has the biggest audience on Facebook, with more than 43.5 million page likes (Twiplomacy, 2018). Facebook is the key platform of 97 international organizations, when they have their biggest and most engaged audiences (Twiplomacy, 2017).

Diplomacy is becoming more visible and more visual through social media and especially Instagram. What was once hidden behind closed doors is now becoming public for everyone to see. History is now being immortalized on the mobile photo and video sharing platform. Instagram has become the third-most popular social network for governments and 81% of all UN member states have 403 accounts, many of which are sharing daily Instagram stories. India's Prime Minister Modi is the most followed world leader on Instagram with 19.3 million followers (Twiplomacy, 2018). Almost three quarters of the international organizations have active profiles on Instagram and more of them are now sharing daily Instagram stories to win the hearts and minds of their followers or simply promote their latest blog post on their website (Twiplomacy, 2017).

YouTube is ranked into fourth place and 80% of all UN governments use it as a video repository, where are identified 355 accounts (Twiplomacy, 2018). YouTube is used by 88 international organizations to host their long-form videos (Twiplomacy, 2017).

Periscope or Twitter's Periscope platform for live broadcasts has grown, and there are 204 Periscope channels representing almost half (49%) of the 193 UN member states (Twiplomacy, 2018). Also, Periscope is used by 55 international organizations (Twiplomacy, 2017).

Snapchat is unique platform because it neither indicates the number of followers nor the number of views of each post, which disappear after 24 hours. It is also a safe social network for governments, as users cannot publically comment or criticize other users' posts or profiles. Snapchat is used by 30 world leaders, representing 11% of all UN governments (Twiplomacy, 2018). There are 14 international organizations which have a presence on Snapchat (Twiplomacy, 2017).

THE BENEFITS OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

In the twenty-first century, international politics has a wide variety of international actors, including states, ethno-national factors, multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, various transnational movements and networks, or even individuals (Mingst, 2008, p.343). The activity of international actors, especially sovereign states, is tightly related to the concept of power and interest, but the way in which we define power and realize interests has changed in the conditions of increasing interdependence, the development of technologies and the non-governmental actors' intrusion into international politics (Jazbec, 2014, p. 152). Today, digital diplomacy is an essential element for realizing foreign policy because it helps states a lot in advancing foreign policy goals, expanding international alignment, and affecting people who never set foot in any of the embassies of the world. Direct public interaction and the involvement of non-state actors make countries to use social media and digital diplomacy as a way to maintain legitimacy and develop or strengthen relationships in a changing world (Deos, 2015, p.60). Digital diplomacy strengthens international relations by increasing interdependence between international subjects and also their cooperation that is more than necessary for the management of various global issues of the twenty-first century.

Websites, blogs and social media have brought politicians and diplomats of the world closer with the citizens from all corners of the globe. Blogs can contribute to the generation of a principally individual identity of the owner, which can be active, interactive, reflective and multi-dimensional. Social media enable diplomats to observe events, gather

information, and identify key influencers. These platforms can help in consultation process, policy formulation and help disseminate ideas, and also provide channels to influence beyond the traditional audience. To penetrate deeply within different audiences, in social media must be applied the Think globally, act locally formula (Shih, 2009, p.166).

Digital technologies are extremely useful for gathering and processing information regarding diplomatic activities as well as for quick communications in urgent situations. They enable governments to think about the consequences of events in different parts of the world and how they can affect in their country. Quick knowledge of various events can be an advantage to national interest in many cases. For example, in times of crisis, embassies can create groups in WhatsApp¹¹ that include the ambassador, consular officer, press secretary, staff who collects on-line information, diplomats from the headquarter and staff answering citizens questions on the internet. This group can function as a crisis management cell and enables the collection of real-time information, decision-making and dissemination of information (Manor, 2018). Whereas, people who live under authoritarian regimes that aim to limit their ability to communicate internally and internationally, thanks to digital technologies can avoid this kind of limitation, enabling the free expression of objections to certain issues, as well as affecting the minimization of authoritarianism (McGlinchey, 2017, p.139). Even the Chinese government, which is known for blocking Western social media networks behind the Great Firewall¹², is slowly opening to social media engagement such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube and seven Chinese embassies are now active on Twitter (Twiplomacy, 2018). Social media, like other forms of technology, are making societies much more democratic.

The costs of using new technologies are falling rapidly as a result of continuous technology advancements. Moreover, digital diplomacy does not always require financial investments. On the contrary, it is often aimed at reducing costs. This fact makes digital diplomacy more attractive to governments, MFAs and embassies for spreading their work, as it does not cause budget damage. E.g., Twitter posts can help investi-

11 WhatsApp Messenger is a freeware, cross-platform messaging and Voice over IP service owned by Facebook. It allows users to send text messages and voice messages, make voice and video calls, and share images, documents, user locations, and other media.

12 The Great Firewall of China is the combination of legislative actions and technologies enforced by the People's Republic of China to regulate the Internet domestically. Its role in the Internet censorship in China is to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down cross-border internet traffic. Reasons behind China's Internet censorship include social control, sensitive content and economic protectionism.

gate and identify troublesome issues and exposing those responsible, by pushing the public, media and political-diplomatic engagement in order to achieve positive change (Twiplomacy, 2017).

The definition of small states is determined by certain quantitative criteria, like the size of the territory, the number of inhabitants, the GDP and the military size (Petrič, 2012, p.520). Some of the small states during the realization of their foreign policy face many challenges, and the main one which limits their foreign policy execution is the financial capacity. It is true that digital diplomacy favors all kinds of states, but mostly small states. Typical example is the Republic of Kosovo, which, as a new and small country with limited financial resources, sees digital diplomacy as a contributor to its cause by linking its diplomats and citizens with people of other states, than they to put pressure on their states to recognize the newest state of the Balkans (Reka, Bashota & Sela, 2018, pp. 250-251). Small states have already become leaders in the trends of using the internet pages and ICT for their advantages. The technological revolution in most of the poor countries will act as a promoter or new requirements on public services, including MFA (Rana, 2011, p.72).

THE RISKS OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

Although it is perceived as very positive in many cases, mostly in minimizing authoritarianism, freedom from the Internet and social media has its own negative sides. New communication technologies have had a profound impact on negative events as well because terrorist and xenophobic groups also mobilize and recruit supporters through them (Kinsman & Bassuener, 2010, p.13). The Internet is also perceived as a channel for the spread of extremism, terrorism and the imposition of foreign ideologies. Then, part of social media can be anyone, from world governments to various extremist organizations, in which the latter ones distribute their norms, values and objectives, whatever they are (Kalathil, 2013, p. 21). Critics of digital diplomacy consider dangerous such as Trojan Horse freedom from the Internet and social media, because this kind of freedom has contributed to the presence of jihadist movements, which still continues to exist and cause lots of problems that do not recognize any state borders. Between August 2015 and December 2017, the social network Twitter had closed 1.2 million accounts for terrorist apology with purpose to prevent the promotion of terrorism (Le Monde, 2018). However, Twitter, Facebook and You-

Tube still continue to have pressures from some world governments, which are criticizing them about not being strict enough in their fight against terrorist propaganda (Le Monde, 2018).

In practice, secrets no longer exist on the Internet and social media revolution is changing the way how people see the world, and how they are communicating with each other. Not only it has made easier for governments and ambassadors to engage with the public, but it has made everybody more aware of the effects - both positive and negative - a single word, tweet, Facebook comment, video, or image can have in a relatively short timeframe. Lack of knowledge about using new communication technologies, the Internet and social media can result with terrible consequences, severe conflicts, even with dismissals of politicians (Adesina, 2017). That's why diplomatic missions of large countries employ permanent staff specialized in dealing with science and technology related files (Ruffini, 2017, p.47). For more, that is the reason why trainings and practices about the usage of digital diplomacy by all the world leaders and diplomats are so important.

Information about international crises, which used to take hours and days for government officials and media to be scattered, are now being broadcast live in world not only through radio and television, but also from the Internet and social media. Diplomats can no longer be certain that their thoughts will not be revealed to the audiences they have never targeted, and it is now impossible to leave the public eye. For policymakers, the immediate distribution of information about distant and nearby events is likely to be more a risk than a benefit. It seems that the era of secrecy has already been replaced with the era of distribution in which ordinary citizens spend hours reading, marking and criticizing government policies each day, and then sharing their thoughts on the internet and social media. Unfortunately, the level of communication culture in social media is very low, where many political leaders and diplomats face with insults as well as with provocative and threatening messages, thus causing many disagreements. Digital frustration is also linked with digital ethics. What can and cannot be distributed on the internet? What is hate speech and what should be protected as part of freedom of speech? Thus, MFA and diplomats, together with civil society, are indispensable to promote a global discussion on the issues of digital ethics (Manor, 2016).

Another challenge of digital diplomacy is the culture of anonymity, because anyone can pretend to be someone else and cause damages to certain persons. The culture of anonymity can lead to complicated crises as a result of the publication of conflictual information, even untrue. This kind of widespread disinformation on the Internet can hinder the ability of leaders to manage the ensuing crises (Manor, 2017). Social media are being abused, so they have to fix their pages and to make clear whether a post comes from a trustworthy source. The year 2018 will be remembered as the most critical year for Facebook that was faced and is facing with the harshest criticism of its 14-years history of privacy practices and how it treats user data, known as the Cambridge Analytica Data Scandal. The analytical data firm that has worked with the US President Donald Trump's electoral team and the Brexit winner campaign has taken millions of American voter's data and has used them to build a powerful software program to predict and influence the US presidential election of 2016. This has damaged a lot Facebook, because many of its users have deactivated their accounts.

Growing pervasiveness of the digital world, alongside the fear of future attacks of sensitive institutions, has turned many cyber optimists into cyber pessimists. Hacking is a risk, which has existed since the invention of the Internet. Very rightly, it is considered to be the main risk of digital diplomacy, because many heads of states, governments and diplomats around the world have been its victims, which has jeopardized their careers. Diplomatic rivals, including state and non-state actors, try to attack government systems in order to extract information that would serve them for certain purposes. Cyber security has reached the top of the international diplomatic and political agendas of the UN, NATO, ITU¹³, OECD¹⁴, OSCE¹⁵, Commonwealth, G7 and G20. Many countries have adopted national cyber security strategies and relevant legislation. Nevertheless, the risks are increasingly sophisticated, and the groups concerned to exploit the cybernetic vulnerabilities have been expanded by black-hat hacking secret hackers in well-organized

13 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), originally the International Telegraph Union, is a specialized agency of the United Nations that is responsible for issues that concern information and communication technologies. It was founded in 1865 and it is the oldest among all the 15 specialized agencies of UN.

14 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental economic organisation with 36 member countries, founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. It is a forum of countries describing themselves as committed to democracy and the market economy, providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices and coordinate domestic and international policies of its members.

15 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization which was founded in 1973. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections.

criminal and terrorist groups, government security services and defense forces. To make things more complicated, most of the infrastructure and internet services are privately owned, with operators spread around the various global jurisdictions (DiploFoundation Blog, 2017).

CONCLUSION

This paper has elaborated a special form of the postmodern diplomacy, which can be considered as the newest trend of the twenty-first century in diplomatic communication. Digital diplomacy uses ICT, the Internet and social media for strengthening diplomatic relations, and is not only used by states, but also by other international actors like international organizations and NGOs. The usage of websites by MFA, embassies and international organizations is now a standard practice, while the social media has become diplomacy's significant tool, providing a platform for unconditional communication between world leaders with different audiences all over the world.

The first developments of digital diplomacy belong to the year 1992, when at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro for the first time civil society emails were used for lobbying. However, the Arab Spring is viewed as the origin of digital diplomacy, because it was at this moment that MFAs, embassies and diplomats realized social media emerged as a platform that could offer valuable insight into public opinion and public sentiment thus facilitating foreign policies analysis. To have an effective digital diplomacy, digital diplomats should pay attention to six sections that are its organization and management, security, time, content, context and failures, maximizing knowledge, and training and support of digital diplomats. There is a wide range of digital platforms, the number of which is growing by extraordinary steps, but the most used ones in digital diplomacy are Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Periscope and Snapchat. Digital diplomacy has brought world leaders closer to citizens from all over the globe, enables fast communications in urgent situations, has a low costs which favors especially small states in the realization of the foreign policy, and the most important, increase the interdependence between international actors, which results with the strengthening of international relations. However, freedom of the Internet and social media can be used also to spread extremist and terrorist ideologies. The lack of knowledge about the usage of new communication technologies, the Internet and social media can result with terrible disagreements. Then hacking is

the main risk of digital world, victims of which were and are many heads of states, governments, and diplomats all around the world. As can be seen, digital diplomacy is accompanied with benefits and risks, but if they would be placed in scale, the benefits will raise up, arguing enough that digital diplomacy is not risky, rather it is very beneficial. Digital diplomacy as a product of soft power should be combined with smart power, which means maximum utilization of the benefits of digitization and empowering protection policies against various threats arising from digitization.

REFERENCES

- Bjola, C., Holmes, M., ed., 2015. *Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.
- Bjola, C., Kornprobst, M., 2015. *Understanding International Diplomacy*. UK: Routledge.
- Bjola, C., Kornprobst, M., 2018. *Understanding International Diplomacy*. 2nd ed. UK: Routledge.
- Chakraborty, K., ed., 2013. *Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary*. Berlin: Academy for Cultural Diplomacy.
- Deos, S., A., 2015. *Digital Diplomacy & Social Capital*. New Zealand: University of Otago.
- Jazbec, M., 2010. *Bazat e Diplomacisë*. Prishtinë: Kolegji Victory.
- Jazbec, M., 2014. *The Sociology of Diplomacy: Initial Reading*. Istanbul: Kültür University.
- Kalathil, S., ed., 2013. *Diplomacy Development and Security in the Information Age*. Washington: Georgetown University.
- Kinsman, J., Bassuener, K., 2010. *A Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy and Development Support*. Washington: Council for a Community of Democracies.
- McGlinchey, S., ed., 2017. *International Relations*. England: E-International Relations Publishing.
- Mingst, A. K., 2008. *Bazat e Marrëdhënieve Ndërkombëtare*. Tiranë: Albanian Institute for International Studies.
- Petriç, E., 2012. *Politika e Jashtme*. Prishtinë: Kolegji Universitar "Victory".
- Rana, S. K., 2011. *21st Century Diplomacy A Practitioner's Guide*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Reka, B., Bashota, B., Sela, Y., 2016. *Marrëdhëniet Ndërkombëtare*. Shkup: Instituti për Studime Politike dhe Ndërkombëtare.
- Ruffini, B., P., 2017. *Science and Diplomacy: A New Dimension of International Relations*. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
- Sandre, A., 2013. *Twitter for Diplomats*. Switzerland: DiploFoundation.
- Shih, C., 2009. *The Facebook Era: Tapping Online Social Networks to Build Better Products, Reach New Audiences and Sell More Stuff*. USA: Prentice Hall.

THE INTERNET SOURCES

1. Adesina, S., O., 2016. Foreign policy in an era of digital diplomacy - Risks of digital diplomacy?. Taylor and Francis Online, [online] (31 August, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2017.1297175>> [Accessed 1 March, 2017].
2. Adesina, S., O., 2016. Foreign policy in an era of digital diplomacy - What is digital diplomacy?. Taylor and Francis Online, [online] (31 August, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2017.1297175>> [Accessed 1 March, 2017].
3. DiploFoundation Blog, 2017. Cybersecurity - Holistic approach to cybersecurity. [blog] Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/cybersecurity>> [Accessed 27 September, 2017].
4. DiploFoundation Blog. 20+ years of e-diplomacy. [blog] Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/e-diplomacy>> [Accessed 10 March 2017].
5. Kurbalija, J., 2016. 25 Points for Digital Diplomacy: Content, Context and Failures. DiploFoundation Blog, [blog] (4 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/25-points-digital-diplomacy>> [Accessed 9 March, 2017].
6. Kurbalija, J., 2016. 25 Points for Digital Diplomacy: Maximise Knowledge and Hidden Resources. DiploFoundation Blog, [blog] (4 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/25-points-digital-diplomacy>> [Accessed 9 March, 2017].
7. Kurbalija, J., 2016. 25 Points for Digital Diplomacy: Organisation and management. DiploFoundation Blog, [blog] (4 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/25-points-digital-diplomacy>> [Accessed 9 March, 2017].
8. Kurbalija, J., 2016. 25 Points for Digital Diplomacy: Security. DiploFoundation Blog, [blog] (4 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/25-points-digital-diplomacy>> [Accessed 9 March, 2017].
9. Kurbalija, J., 2016. 25 Points for Digital Diplomacy: Time-Timing-Tempo. DiploFoundation Blog, [blog] (4 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/25-points-digital-diplomacy>> [Accessed 9 March, 2017].
10. Kurbalija, J., 2016. 25 Points for Digital Diplomacy: Training and Support for Digital Diplomats. DiploFoundation Blog, [blog] (4 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/25-points-digital-diplomacy>> [Accessed 9 March, 2017].
11. Le Monde, 2018. Depuis 2015, Twitter a supprimé 1,2 million de comptes faisant l'apologie du terrorisme. [en ligne] (4 April, 2018) <http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/04/06/depuis-2015-twitter-a-supprime-1-2-million-de-comptes-faisant-l-apologie-du-terrorisme_5281877_4408996.html> [Accédé Mai 2, 2018].
12. Le Monde, 2018. Depuis 2015, Twitter a supprimé 1,2 million de comptes faisant l'apologie du terrorisme - Une pression politique constante. [en ligne] (4 April, 2018) <http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/04/06/depuis-2015-twitter-a-supprime-1-2-million-de-comptes-faisant-l-apologie-du-terrorisme_5281877_4408996.html> [Accédé Mai 2, 2018].
13. Manor, I., 2016. How will #Digital Disappointment influence digital #diplomacy - How will digital disappointment influence digital diplomacy?. Digital Diplomacy Blog, [blog] (19 November, 2016) Available at: <<https://digdipblog.com/2016/11/19/how-will-digital-disappointment-influence-digital-diplomacy/>> [Accessed 5 May, 2017].

14. Manor, I., 2017. Can Digital Diplomacy Really Start A War? - Digital Diplomacy and the Road to War. Digital Diplomacy Blog, [blog] (21 August, 2017) Available at: <<https://digdipblog.com/2017/08/21/can-digital-diplomacy-really-start-a-war/>> [Accessed 25 January, 2018].
15. Manor, I., 2017. The Revolution Has Been Tweeted - Genesis- The Arab Spring?. Digital Diplomacy Blog, [blog] (25 April, 2017) Available at: <<https://digdipblog.com/2017/04/25/the-revolution-has-been-tweeted/>> [Accessed 2 May 2017].
16. Manor, I., 2018. Delivering Digital Consular Aid - Managing a Crisis. Digital Diplomacy Blog, [blog] (27 April, 2018) Available at <<https://digdipblog.com/2018/04/27/delivering-digital-consular-aid/>> [Accessed 3 May, 2018].
17. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. International Organisations on Social Media 2017 - International Organisations on Facebook. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at: <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/international-organisations-on-social-media-2017/>> [Accessed 8 January, 2018].
18. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. International Organisations on Social Media 2017 - International Organisations on Instagram. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at: <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/international-organisations-on-social-media-2017/>> [Accessed 8 January, 2018].
19. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. International Organisations on Social Media 2017 - International Organisations on Periscope. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/international-organisations-on-social-media-2017/>> [Accessed 7 January, 2018].
20. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. International Organisations on Social Media 2017 - International Organisations on Snapchat. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/international-organisations-on-social-media-2017/>> [Accessed 7 January, 2018].
21. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. International Organisations on Social Media 2017 - International Organisations on Twitter. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/international-organisations-on-social-media-2017/>> [Accessed 7 January, 2018].
22. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. International Organisations on Social Media 2017 - International Organisations on Youtube. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at: <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/international-organisations-on-social-media-2017/>> [Accessed 8 January, 2018].
23. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. Using Twitter to target key decision makers. [blog] (29 November, 2017) Available at: <<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/using-twitter-to-target-key-decision-makers/>> [Accessed 12 January, 2018].
24. Twiplomacy Blog, 2017. Twiplomacy Study 2017: Executive Summary - Introduction. [blog] (31 May, 2017) Available at: <<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2017/>> [Accessed 6 September 2017].
25. Twiplomacy Blog, 2018. Twiplomacy Study 2018: Executive Summary - The Social Media Platforms of World Leaders. [blog] (10 July, 2018) Available at: <<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2018/>> [Accessed 15 July, 2018].
26. Twiplomacy Blog, 2018. Twiplomacy Study 2018 - Periscope. [blog] (10 July, 2018) Available at: <<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2018/>> [Accessed 15 July, 2018].

27. Twiplomacy Blog, 2018. World Leaders on Facebook 2018 - Executive Summary. [blog] (2 May, 2018) Available at: <<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/world-leaders-on-facebook-2018/>> [Accessed 2 May, 2018].
28. Twiplomacy Blog, 2018. World Leaders on Instagram 2018. [blog] (4 December, 2018) Available at: <<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/world-leaders-instagram-2018/>> [Accessed 7 December, 2018].
29. Twiplomacy Blog 2019. Tips, Tricks & Diplo Hacks. [blog] (1 March 2019) Available at: <<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/tips-tricks-diplo-hacks/>> [Accessed 19 March, 2019].

Brain drain – current conditions and perspectives

Ljupcho Kevereski and Bisera Kostadinovska-Stojchevska¹

ABSTRACT

It can be safely confirmed that there may be no other problem in modern living, which with its multidimensional determination and conditionality no longer shakes, disturbs social, institutional and personal perspectives. It is a brain drain as a specific form of migration that implicitly refers to the outflow of the most highly educated, gifted, talented, creative potential possessing professional and personal competencies. The study focuses on the analysis of the situation and the perspectives related to the brain drain which, because of its far-reaching unpredictable, uncontrolled and uncertain implications and repercussions, acquires the legitimacy of a planetary phenomenon. The subject of research in the study is an analysis of the situation and the perspectives that refer to the brain drain from the aspect of the young population based on the examination of the opinion of the examined people regarding the psychological factors for the brain drain. The main goal of the study is to identify and actualize the implicit and explicit factors and assumptions that determine this phenomenon. In the research we start from the general hypothesis that the brain drain is not determined only by material-existential, social and other reasons. The sample in the survey consists of 300 examined people who are part of the student population from 3 universities in the Republic of North Macedonia.

KEY WORDS: Brain drain, gifted and talented, conditions, perspectives, repercussions, implications.

POVZETEK

Mirno lahko potrdimo, da v sodobnem življenju morda ni nobene druge težave, ki s svojo večdimenzionalno odločnostjo in pogojenostjo ne pretrese bolj, moti socialne, institucionalne in osebne perspektive. Gre za beg možganov kot specifično obliko migracije, ki se implicitno nanaša na odtok najbolj izobraženih, nadarjenih, talentiranih, ustvarjalnih potencialov, ki imajo poklicne in osebne kompetence. Študija se osredotoča na analizo stanja in perspektive, povezane z begom možganov, ki zaradi daljnosežnih nepredvidljivih, nenadzorovanih in negotovih posledic in posledic pridobi legitimnost planetarnega pojava. Predmet raziskave je analiza stanja in perspektive, ki se nanašajo na beg možganov z vidika mlade populacije na podlagi proučevanja mnenja analiziranih o psiholoških dejavnikih za beg možganov. Glavni cilj študije je prepoznati in aktualizirati implicitne in eksplicitne dejavnike in predpostavke, ki določajo ta pojav. V razisi-

¹ ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Ljupcho Kevereski, PhD, Professor of Pedagogy at the Faculty of Education, University of St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, North Macedonia. Email: lj.kevereski@uklo.edu.mk
Bisera Kostadinovska-Stojchevska, PhD, Assist. Professor of Pedagogy at the Faculty of Education, University of St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, North Macedonia. Email: k_bisera@yahoo.com

skavi izhajamo iz splošne hipoteze, da bega možganov ne določajo le materialno-eksistencialni, družbeni in drugi razlogi. Vzorec v anketi je sestavljen iz 300 analiziranih ljudi, ki so del študentske populacije s treh univerz v Republiki Severni Makedoniji.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: beg možganov, nadarjeni in talentirani, pogoji, perspektiva, posledice, implikacije.

INTRODUCTION

“The brain drain is the most sought after and most expensive “brand” in underdeveloped countries.”²

The world, which we live in produces new (non) natural phenomena that create a new visualization of our modernity, new natural products that sometimes have confusing terminological perception, uncertain scientific argumentation and spectacular manifest patterns.. One of them is migration as a new visualization of our modernity that has multidimensional manifest forms, where the shifting of space is no longer a trend but an immanent need.

The search for a new world and new future i.e. the shift of space is no longer a trend, but an imminent need. Perhaps there is no other problem in modern living that does not stress, shake or disturb social, institutional and personal perspectives with its multidimensional determinism and conditionality. It is assumed that it is acceptable to conclude that the gifted, the talented and the creative are the best and most expensive brand of underdeveloped countries. This syntagma emphasizes the paradox of the brain drain as the cheapest export of capital, which is found on the waiting list in highly developed countries, especially in the countries from the Western Balkan region. A special feature of the Western Balkan countries is the brain drain, which is a highly sensitive subject and it is still suffering the consequences of the transitional and post-conflict period and is deeply burdened and troubled by their recurrences.

The international project Brain drain (not) solvable problem - states and perspectives of the Western Balkan countries³ is an attempt by the authors to decipher certain implicit indicators of this phenomenon, which do not have evident manifest forms, and potentially social, insti-

2 In this context, a brand means a product that is revitalized by itself.

3 The split results of the project were presented at the International Conference in Ruše, Slovenia, 2018

tutional and individual barometers. The goal is to demystify the needs, motives, the trend, the magic of the human quest in the search for the future that explicitly or implicitly signals intra psychic confrontations the state of the body and mind, the spirit, the reality, the perspectives, the aspirations, the vision, and verifies the personal character of the person in a micro and macro contextual environment. The complexity of the responses to the previously mentioned dilemmas is certainly unconvincing given its planetary expertise, the multifactor determinism and the condition the eternity of this ephemeral. With the project, that is, by means of its empirical argumentation, we need to get closer to building a more realistic diagnostic picture of the pull and push factors that determine the statistical image of migration movements. The authors of the project go in search of checking the existing thesis that the basic brain drain motif is determined primarily by the material-existential set of reasons. But they also point out the potential need for a change or revision of the existing mental personality technology⁴ when taking into account the true argument for brain drain.

Migration is one of the most unpredictable population phenomena from which a new expansive intensity of a migration movement, called brain drain, is shaped, as a specially structured focus that refers to highly educated experts in various fields of science. The brain drain is an extremely complex population phenomenon that is multifactorially determined and conditioned. This means that society, institutions and individuals are facing a new set of challenges on how to behave. Because of the inability to effectively prevent brain drain, academic interest is more or less focused on recording the striking statistical indicators. The brain drain due to its far-reaching (un)predictable, uncontrolled and uncertain implications and repercussions, gets the legitimacy of a planetary phenomenon. Brain drain is a characteristic of the countries, but even more so of the world. Is it seen more as a solution than a problem or a solution to the problem? This paradoxical thesis becomes more absurd when trying to answer it. The symbol of the brain drain can be brought about in the title of the book *The Place in between* (Stewart Rory, 2002), which illustrates the transfer of highly educated individuals, between two places. In fact, this points to the constant searching for the talents of economic and psychological well-being.

⁴ Under mental technology we mean a structured system of mental patterns of thinking who physiognomer a certain kind of behavior in the concrete case towards gifted and talented.

It is estimated that today over 1.5 million highly trained and well educated professionals from developing countries live in already developed countries (Stalker, 2000, according to Iredale, 2001). The statistical data indicate that over 200 million people i.e. more than 3% of the world's population live outside of the country they were born in and their number is constantly increasing and it is expected to continue to increase in the decades that follow. In this process we will include illegal and forced migrations (Stojanoska M., 2018, p.10). In the end, we will point out that migrations, especially the type of migrations relating to higher intellectual capacity could be hard to predict due to their multidimensional conditionality (LeBras, 2002,p.65), especially because this process is determined and conditioned by multiple factors. Our understanding of the term brain drain would be to define it as a specific type of migration that implicitly refers to (most) highly educated, gifted, talented and creative potential, which possesses potential professional and personal competences from various scientific fields, which are the potential bearers of the future development of other countries with which countries acquire a comparative advantage over the other countries in the surrounding area.

DEFINING THE KEY TERM

For the first time, the term brain drain appeared in a report by the Royal Society of London in 1963, in which it is described as an exodus of English professionals in the United States. The term brain drain is defined as a large, very frequent, mass migration of a particular category of population, of mostly higher education specialists from different fields of science. It is often associated with an outflow of young people from their place of residence, who are potential bearers of the future development of their own country. Contrary to this notion is the term brain inflow, which implies the arrival of higher education potential specialists and scientists to give the country a comparative advantage over other neighboring countries.

It is impossible to study the brain drain from the aspect and in the context of globalization and multiculturalism with which (Marga, 2010) agrees from the point of view of the positive effects for the countries where experts come from Mountford (Mountford, 1997) according to Blagojević-Vasiljević (Blagojević-Vasiljević, M. et al., 2016). Winners are those, who attract brains and losers are those, who are experiencing a brain drain (Marga, 2010). Brain drain means an international trans-

fer of resources in the form of human capital, and generally refers to migration of highly educated individuals from developing countries in highly developed countries (Beine et al., 2008). Brain gain means increased investment in knowledge in developing countries in order to avoid migration (Munck, 2010).

The same team points out and suggests that a growing number of authors deal with or treat various aspects of the brain drain, such as defining it, reducing the intensity of this process (Adams, 2003; Beine et al., 2001; Carrington & Detragiache, 1999), analyzing the link between study abroad and brain drain (Oosterbeek & Webbink, 2011). The departure of highly educated people results in the loss of human capital as well as in the shrinkage and elimination of externalities, which the employment of the highly educated creates in the home country (Glytos 2010; Tessema 2010). Also, Sriskandarajah (2005) says that nearly one in ten adults with some university or post-secondary schooling born in the developing world now live in the developed world. Other authors suggest ways to transform the brain drain into brain inflow (Grigolo et al., 2010), but also to introduce the concept of networking the outflow (Ciumasu, 2010), as well as to examine the needs for attracting and retention of specialists (Wadhwa, 2009). In the end it's important to point out that migration movements, especially those relating to higher education potential, can be most difficult to predict given its multidimensional conditionality (Le Bras, 2002,p.65); (compared to Adamovic, M, (2003).

When it comes to emigration, there are a number of factors that stimulate or support it, which are called push factors, and appealing reasons why the individual chooses another particular country (pull factors). The first group certainly includes unemployment, socio-political situation, discrimination, disagreement with the value system, and others (Sullivan and Thompson, 1988; Prpic, 1989; Golub, 2002). But suppressive and appealing reasons are almost the same for all potential migration movements and cannot be fully explained until we take a look at their individual perception of the situations, phenomena, processes, and perspectives (Portes 1976, according to Joyce i Hunt, 1982; Golub, 2002). Migration of skilled workers to France and Germany increased following the implementation of policies to attract researchers, IT workers, and foreign students. In 2000, Germany introduced a program similar to the American green card to recruit 20 000 foreign IT specialists. By the end of that year Germany had recruited half of that number, most-

ly from Eastern European countries (Cervantes, Guellec 2002). This means that the key factor in explaining this complex phenomenon still stems from the subjective perception and experiencing the occasions. Some authors propose a way to transform the brain outflow into the brain inflow in European lands (Grigolo et al., 2010) and the concept of migration of the outflow (Ciumasu, 2010). On the other hand, in larger countries like China and India, the relative scale of loss of human capital is smaller; however, particular sectors might be affected adversely, as for instance through the departure of huge numbers of health care workers from some sub-Saharan African countries (Lowell, 2003; Sriskandarajah, 2005). The brain drain is the migration of highly educated population (professionals, scientists and intellectuals) from individual countries (Šverko, 2004). The same author considers that this negative trend is pernicious for the countries in which it's occurring.

Existing data indicate the extent of high-skilled migration and its continuing growth over time. High skilled migrants come from every corner of the world, especially from poorer, smaller, and isolated economies, and move to larger, wealthier, English-speaking OECD countries. In light of this, it is not surprising that the term brain drain dominates popular discourse on high-skilled migration (Gibson, McKenzie, 2011a). Ironically, the term brain drain first appeared in the British media a little over half a century ago to depict the loss of skilled labor from Britain, mainly to the United States, as noted by Clemens (2013), and Britain still remains one of the largest source countries of high-skilled emigrants. The earlier literature was mostly theoretical, as exemplified by Grubel and Scott (1966), who provide a theoretical framework with which to examine the implications of high-skilled emigration for economic outcomes in the sending countries. They conclude that, if an emigrant takes with them the value of their marginal product, welfare loss is not of concern in competitive and efficient markets. A similar paper by Berry and Soligo (1969) points out that although the sending countries lose their skilled workforce, they would be compensated with remittances from the emigrants and knowledge transmission. More important, they argue that a sending country may gain if emigrants leave behind their assets.

BRAIN DRAIN IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

The unstoppable trends in brain drain do not go beyond our territory which has excellent assumptions about it. In this section we will

present certain media claims of different individuals, institutions and associations that give their views on this problem. The love for the homeland lasts, but not too long (Panel Discussion, The Innovation Fund of the Republic of North Macedonia).

In December 2017, the Skopje-based Institute for Strategic Research and Education published a study showing that 69 percent of lecturers, assistants, and researchers working in North Macedonia's higher education system would consider leaving the country to seek new employment opportunities, and that 20 percent of them had already applied for a job abroad. A study conducted in North Macedonia in 2010 estimated that, during 1995-2000, the number of scientists and researchers in the Western Balkans decreased by 70 percent (Vracic, A., *The way back: Brain drain and prosperity in the Western Balkans*, 2018).

The wealth of a country is determined by how many talented people there are, but how many of them will be successfully kept within the country. "According to World Bank data, the total number of immigrants from Macedonia is 21 percent – a percentage that has steadily increased in recent years."⁵ Twenty-five percent of higher education staff of North Macedonia has moved out in the last 10 years, a conference "Brain Drain: Perspectives of Young People". Brain drain is increasing, with half of young people not seeing a future in North Macedonia. More and more young people are deciding to leave the country in search for a better job and social conditions. More than 70% of young people are willing to be part of that brain drain, and nearly half of them, or 49.3%, do not see their future in the country, according to a new survey by the Institute for Social Democracy Progress. The outflow of young people reaches alarming numbers. In 2010, the World Bank announced that 447,000 people have left North Macedonia, which is a quarter of the population. Thirty percent of these are highly educated people. North Macedonia is considered to be among the 10 countries, whose population is most frequently leaving the country. According to United Nations data, in 1990, the country was abandoned by 14 percent of residents, and in 2010 the number increased and reached more than 20 percent.

How to prevent brain drain: 70 percent of young people are willing to go abroad (Google, brain drain). We are in 133th place. The list is ranked vice versa. That is, the last country is the country with the most

5 More about this issue in "National Report: Brain Drain in Macedonia: Scope and Factors".

outflows. The list is based on the percentage of students and highly educated staff leaving for abroad. A total of 144 countries are ranked in the Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF), with the last place in the country with the largest outflow of staff, and North Macedonia is at 133th place. The drain of brains is worrying, young people are all less concerned about a future art home. Poverty, deep politicization and lack of perspective are all factors that motivate the emigration of young people. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation study only confirms that Macedonia is facing an exodus of young people. New statistics in this area show that according to the World Economic Forum (WEF) of 2012,⁶ Montenegro is ranked 60th, Serbia ranked 141th out of 144 places. Then North Macedonia is ranked 135th, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina rank 126th and 140th respectively, Bulgaria at 128th, Romania at 136th and Albania at 96th place (Melovic, Faculty of Economics Podgorica, University of Montenegro, Stankovic, Faculty of Economics, Niš, University of Nis).

(DE) STIMULATING FACTORS, WHICH DETERMINE THE STATISTICAL PICTURE OF THE BRAIN DRAIN

WHAT ARE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS⁷?

The conclusions to which the highly educated professionals who follow the brain drain index presented by the statistical picture of the most renowned world and European demographic reports and trends came have been staggering and surprising to the scientific world. Although the general causes for the brain drain phenomenon in underdeveloped countries are approximately clear and well known, it is nevertheless necessary to throw a new light so as to further illuminate the factors, which determine this fateful nature of the poorest and most undeveloped countries. The true motivation behind the brain drain is much more complex than what was originally thought, given the fact that the phenomenon is characterized by an intricately complex contextual and structural appearance.

When it comes to the factors, which determine and condition the brain drain phenomenon, there are a number of reasons and causes which stimulate or induce it. These factors are otherwise known as push factors (factors, which are pushing the individuals out of their homeland). On the other hand are reasons, which the individuals deem as

⁶ More detailed on the issues in the reports of the World Economic Forum (WEF) of 2012.

⁷ Relate to the factors that stimulate the brain drain.

attractive and which stimulate them to choose some other country as a future destination for settling down. Those are better known as pull factors (factors which are pulling individuals to other countries).

The first group of push factors consists of such factors as unemployment, the socio-political situation of the country, discrimination, prejudice, disagreement with the value system and many others (Sullivan and Thompson, 1998.; Prpic, 1989.; Golub, 2002). Apart from these, the following are mentioned in the same group: various pressures from different environments, poor infrastructure, inadequate offers for work, poor educational opportunities, poor healthcare, bad environmental conditions, natural disasters, social pressures and others.

The second group of pull factors consists of factors such as: improvement of the standard of life, healthcare and bigger availability of services, variety of opportunities to find work, higher salaries, higher quality of education, reduced social pressures as well as other pressures from the environment, better and bigger perspectives and others.

However, the push and pull factors are almost the same for all types of migration, not only for the brain drain phenomenon, and they cannot be fully explained unless professionals, who follow the brain drain index are able to deeply penetrate the individual perception of the situations, phenomena, processes and perspectives (Portes, 1976, according to Joyce and Hunt, 1982; Golub, 2002). Considering that in a number of papers that study the brain drain problem, we will point out some factors that are not so frequent in bibliographic publications.⁸ Here we mean, first of all, the individual perception of individuals of particular social developments, institutional trends and individual outflows of behavior. But, above all, are those factors that perform psychological pressure on the person in terms of their personal characteristics. In our case, these are the following: it is a special world for me, there are dubious criteria for success, there is differentiation and discrimination of different kind and degree and others.

BRAIN DRAIN FROM ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE⁹

Brain drain presents a serious social and institutional problem for each country, especially for underdeveloped countries. But this prob-

8 In this context, we mean factors that stimulate brain drain and have psychological, ethical and other dimensions.

9 We think of new paradigms that are not in the context of traditional cliches.

lem is not exclusive property only to countries that have a low degree of development and poor economic power. His seriousness is noted in that brain drain is implicitly associated with the abandonment of the high intellectual potential of a state. For these individual development in traditionally established processes, standards and principles of thinking and behavior. Her spatial transfer as well their new mental patterns that go beyond the frames of social stereotyping and rigidity produce the shift and alteration of our social reality. Traditionally the usual migration movements of individuals and groups in the time of globalization processes have a new population form. Traditionally the usual migration movements of individuals and groups in the time of globalization processes have a new population form.

In order to affirm new and different aspects for which there are certain stereotypical views in the perception of this population phenomenon in the common and academic public, we will try to articulate several questionable theses:

The first is that the brain drain does not represent a new population phenomenon¹⁰. It represents a new visualization of reality, which creates a new fabricated constructed phenomenon for the needs of contemporary globalization processes. New in it is that it gets new statistical unpredictable parameters and migratory expansiveness.

The second refers to the fact that the final instance of brain drain is not only the achievement of economic well-being, but also psychological well-being. This means that temporarily or permanently distancing from the social setting in which a series of social and other deviations are governed means also achieving a certain psychological relaxation in the new setting.

The third relates to the fact that material and existential aspects are not the only and dominant motives for the brain drain, but the existence of a series of psychological and ethical issues and problems. This conclusion suggests that in the analysis of the causes of brain drain, it is necessary in the focus to put other intangible determinants that stimulate this process.

The fourth relates to the impossible tendency to stop brain drain, which is also a nominal tendency of underdeveloped countries. In this sense it

¹⁰ This thesis is a hardly acceptable finding for underdeveloped countries.

would be better and more accurate to talk about creating realistic conditions and perspectives for keeping talents with their own country.

The fifth refers to the immanent need to change our mental thinking and behaviors towards gifted and talented. It actually means changing our mental patterns of thinking about the potential that is planning or leaving our country. These changes should take place in the micro and macro context so that brain drain can have new, different perspectives that all underdeveloped countries advocate.

The above elaborations point to the need to redesign our views that will be in line with the new globalization trends and the new contemporary reality.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The fundamental problem in the research was the brain drain as a significant socio-economic one that has multidimensional reflections in all spheres of living. The subject of research in this paper was to examine the differences among the examinees regarding various aspects related to brain drain. The main goal of the paper is to identify and actualize the implicit and explicit factors and assumptions that determine this phenomenon. In the research we start from the general hypothesis that the brain drain is not determined only by material-existential, social and other reasons, but also from a number of other psychological-ethical reasons.

Research questions: Are material-existential, social and other assumptions the real reasons for brain drain? (Explicit discourse). Are personal, psychological and ethical reasons determinants that stimulate the brain drain process? (Implicit Discourse) A collision of paradigmatic concepts. The sample in the survey consisted of 300 respondents, of whom 200 were from the fourth year in high school (Ohrid, Bitola, Štip, Skopje, Strumica) and 100 students from the fourth year of 3 universities in the Republic of North Macedonia.

The survey used the questionnaire (PIOMRM) ¹¹ containing 20 questions with Likert type of answers. They sought to obtain an opinion on the following aspects that explicitly reflect the attitude towards this

¹¹ The questionnaire was designed to identify more psychological factors and dimensions for the brain drain that are beyond the layout and academic observation.

problem: opportunities for progress, motivation for leaving the state, emotional attitude towards abandoning, belief in the perspectives of society, degree of readiness to leave. Statistical processing of results includes a frequency display, percentage ratio, graphic representation, ranking differences in compliance with claims, and others.

A VIEW AND INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

The display of the results was based on an assessment of the most important responses of the respondents regarding the brain drain opinion.

Figure 1. Our country insufficiently invests in the direction of STOPPING¹² the brain drain




Figure 1 shows the high percentage of respondents agreeing with the claim that the state does not invest enough in stopping brain drain. As evidence of this, 34% completely agree, 33% agree and partly agree 17% or 84% in total. This high percentage speaks about the insufficient investment of our country in its talents. This percentage confirms the generally accepted attitude towards gifted and talented, that the state demonstrates a theoretical declarative rather than a practical operational system of measures and procedures that stimulate the development of gifted and talented.

¹² The term STOP for the outflow is insufficiently explicit, more functional would be the prevention or reduction of the brain drain, but its use is the result of a simpler understanding.

Figure 2. There are no reasons for me to stay in my country




Figure 2 shows the attitude of the respondents regarding the reasons for young people staying in the country. Thus, 30% of the respondents fully agree, 37% agree and 18% partially agree with the claim that there are no reasons for staying in the country. The total percentage that agrees with this conclusion is 85%. The previous assertion points the uncompromising attitude of the respondents to stay in their own country. This largely illustrates the high degree of perceptions of the state's lack of transparency, that is, the lack of any opportunity to change the hard-line position regarding the existence of real reasons for staying in their own country.

Figure 3. If I had the opportunity, I would immediately leave the country





Figure 3 talks about the potential readiness of the respondents about

the possibility of leaving their country. In this sense, 27% agree, 40% agree and 17% partly agree that if they had the opportunity they would leave their country. The total percentage of this potential prospect is 84%. Meanwhile, these results indicate the highest level of concern among the relevant factors in the country; the respondents determine to leave the state at all costs and without minimal consideration. This orientation has profound social and institutional dimensions and reflects an irreconcilable attitude for staying in their own country.

Figure 4. There is prejudice against gifted and talented



From figure 4 we can note that as many as 80% of the respondents think there is a different kind of prejudice towards gifted and talented people. Out of the total number of 33%, they fully agree with this trend, 30% agree and 17% partially accept this claim. The results indicate that our micro and macro ambient is fulfilled with a large number of prejudices towards the gifted and talented that makes it difficult to improve the quality of their treatment. But at the same time, it shows the existence of inherited and current types of prejudices that are the result of traditional views of individuals with highly extreme potentials in one or more scientific fields.

Figure 5. I plan to permanently leave from the country




Figure 5 refers to the degree of readiness to leave the country. In this respect, 40% of the respondents fully agree, 33% agree and 9% partially agree. The total percentage that would leave the country is 82%, which speaks of the extremely high degree. The high attitude i.e. the consent of the youth to leave their country confirms the adverse fact about the state's perspectives. At the same time, it illustrates the long-standing their treatment in the state, which we think must be changed with time.

Figure 6. My biggest motive for leaving is the inequitable treatment of people




Figure 6 shows the biggest motive why people would leave their coun-

try. According to the respondents, the biggest motive for the abandonment of their country is the unequal treatment, with 36% agreeing with this attitude, agreeing with 37%, and partially agreeing with 10%. The total percentage of the total is 83%. The illustration above demonstrates that the biggest motive for leaving the state is the unequal treatment of individuals, which shows a profound crisis of social relations in which dehumanization is one of the most common principles of social functioning. This thesis can also be supported by the general attitude of the public and expert opinion to the existence of discrimination of varying degrees, and intensity.

BRAIN DRAIN PREVENTION

In proposing the recommendations for changing the attitude towards the gifted and talented regarding the brain drain prevention, we take into consideration the social, institutional and individual characteristics and specificities of our micro and macro ambient.

1. The national concept for discovering, working and monitoring the development of gifted and talented.
2. Constituting a Ministry-Agency of the diaspora with special emphasis on gifted and talented.
3. Determining a National coordinator for monitoring the treatment of gifted and talented.
4. Preparation of a general operative program for talents returning.
5. Constituting and strengthening of University research centers.
6. Constituting of Regional Scientific Centers for development of gifted and talented.¹³
7. Macedonian Association for gifted and talented.¹⁴
8. Increasing the percentage of research and development (science).
9. Constituting a database of talents from different scientific areas in the Republic of North Macedonia.
10. Recruiting and engaging Macedonian experts from the diaspora to deal with significant national problems.
11. Constituting a computer center for electronic use on the basis of the scientific-research experience of the Macedonian talents.
12. Initiation and realization of school and other acceleration of gifted and talented.

¹³ At the stage of conceptual and organizational facilitation and installation.

¹⁴ Macedonian Association for Gifted and Talented was formed in 2012 in Bitola.

13. Organizing a national, regional and municipal manifestation for gifted and talented.
14. Constituting a database for professionals who live abroad.
15. Greater financial support of young talents.
16. Inclusion of North Macedonia in the Project for Development of Research Areas (European Research Area – ERA).
17. Organizing video conferences for new scientific achievements.
18. Formation of scientific research teams from national and international experts who, besides their knowledge, possess innovative spirit, lobby-contact, ideas, and initiatives.
19. Creating brainstorming mindsets.
20. Constituting a center for Coordination of the National Network for Infrastructure Development, Logistics, and Support of the Mobility of the Researchers in the Republic of North Macedonia.

We assume that some of the mentioned measures exist or are in the phase of formation, but there is a necessity of a new organizational, material, technical, personnel, and financial improvement. The stated measures and activities are more directed towards the relevant institutions, organizations, and individuals that have a direct influence on the creation of the educational policy and the attitude towards the gifted and talented. Brain, collection, and use of minds (brain gain) require a new behavioral strategy.

DISCUSSION

In order to bring the obtained results in intercollective relationship with the empirical results, the existing layouts and academic statements we are ought to analyze the obtained results in the process of research.

The high percentage (84%) pointing out to the insufficient investment of the state in achieving a brain drain stop corresponds to the generally accepted attitude of the academic public in the state that the ratio of gifted and talented people is more theoretically declarative than practically organized. In addition, the high 85% attitude of the respondents that there are no real reasons for staying in the country is in correlation with the view that the state does not invest much in stopping brain drain and domination of the theoretical and declarative orientation of the state towards the gifted and talented.

The results in chart no. 3, which states that if 84% of the respondents would leave their country, implicitly contain the previously mentioned paragraphs of the first and second graphic representations. The results from the chart no. 4 that discusses the high percentage of prejudices towards gifted and talented people, is closely related to the results in chart no. 5, which suggests that 82% of respondents plan to leave their country forever. In this context, from the high agreement of the respondents, we can expect that the greatest motivation for the brain drain is the unequal relationship between individuals, i.e. the existence of discrimination of different kind and at different levels.

In addition we will present the most important results from the survey conducted in 2015 in North Macedonia, related to differences of prejudice based on gender, age, work-experience and place of work-life of respondents. There is a statistically significant difference on the issue whether gifted and talented do not need help (Hi square = 25.215; df = 4; $p < 0.05$) among respondents male and female respondents. Namely 80% of female respondents believe that gifted and talented students do not need help that is not the case with the respondents were male.

The results show that the respondents were female bias exists that gifted and talented students do not need any help. There is a statistically significant difference regarding the question whether gifted and talented are better adapted in the middle (Hi square = 34,069; df = 4; $p < 0.05$) “. Namely 70% of female respondents believe that gifted and talented are better adapted to the environment that is not the case with the respondents were male. The results show that the respondents were female bias exists because they think gifted and talented are better adapted in the environment.

There is a statistically significant difference regarding this issue (Hi square = 21,53; df = 4; $p < 0.05$). The respondents aged between 35 -63 years and 69% believe that gifted and talented arising from families with higher parental education is not the case with respondents aged 35 years. Results to Table 3 show that respondents who are of higher age (35-63 years) show prejudice against gifted regarding that gifted and talented are from families with high education.

There is a statistically significant difference regarding this issue (Hi square = 46,822; df = 4; $p < 0.05$). The respondents aged between 35-63 years believe with 80% that talent is completely innate is not the case

with respondents aged 35 years. The results in Table 4 show that the respondents aged 53-63 years show that gifted and talented have only genetic predisposition. There is a statistically significant difference regarding this issue (Hi square = 11,521; df = 4; p <0.05). The majority of respondents with work experience of 20-40 years considered gifted and talented have no problem in communication that is not the case for those with work experience from 1-20 years.¹⁵

The results in Table 5 show the bias of respondents with longer length of service, from 20-40 years. Teachers think that gifted and talented do not have communication problems.

There is a statistically significant difference regarding this issue (Hi square = 17,663; df = 4; p <0.05) ». The majority of respondents with work experience of 20-40 years think Talent is conditioned by high inteligenicija that is not the case for those with work experience from 1 -20 years. The results show teachers with work experience of 20-40 years think that giftedness is conditioned by high intelligence.

There is a statistically significant difference regarding this issue (Hi square = 12,686; df = 4; p <0.05). respondents from the urban environment, and 76% considered gifted and talented are emotionally more stable than the other which is not the case with respondents from rural environment that this opinion is shared by 54%. The results show that gifted and talented have high emotional competencies.

There is a statistically significant difference regarding this issue (Hi square = 11,231; df = 4; p <0.05). The respondents from the urban environment, disagree with the position gifted and talented show higher verbal skills is not the case with respondents from rural environment. Teachers from urban environment think that gifted and talented have better verbal skills.

As a result of the empirical data of the research as well as the analyzes of many academic observations, we can focus our attention on certain conclusions that have a social, institutional and individual character. In that sense, it can be said that the state or the relevant institutions have not yet created adequate motivational mechanisms that focused on greater inspiration for individuals to stay in their own country.

15 Separate results from the above-mentioned international project.

But one conclusion from the empirical process shows that not always the material prerequisites and assumptions are the main motivational factors for brain drain. Therefore, the results depicts that 59% of the respondents do not agree with the statement that material conditions are determinant for existence. Hence, this situation emphasizes the change of the so-called discourse of understanding and accepting the material-existential causes, which are main motives for the brain drain.

In this article we can agree with the statement that the main motivational mechanism for staying in the country lies in the feeling of the previous state investment in them. Unequal treatment for all individuals is a strong motivational factor for inciting or thinking about leaving the country. Family relationships and responsibilities are one of the more important factors that inhibit the brain drain process.

One of the most attractive conclusions that are part of the empirical research findings is the subjective feeling of the respondents that they are forced to leave their country. In the end, it remains that the state and institutions should make their own reorganization of the existing system of behavior towards every individual, especially those who are forced to give their gifted, talented and creative potential (space) space and time out of their country.

Both the stated analysis and intercollective relationship of the results are a part of an international project titled "Brain drain (un) solvable problem in the countries of the Western Balkans", which includes the following countries: North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania. Comparative sample countries are Slovenia and Croatia. This project is being realized in the frameworks of the collaboration of the Macedonian association for gifted and talented students, Primary School Janko Glazer, Ruše, Slovenia and Faculty of Pedagogy, Maribor.¹⁶

¹⁶ The international project continues with the expansion of countries, institutions and entities.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the empirical findings of the research as well as the analysis of many academic achievements, we can focus our attention on certain conclusions that have a social, institutional and individual character.

The state should build and practice the implementation of an operationalized system of measures and procedures that will encourage the development of gifted and talented at all institutional fields, beginning from pre-school to tertiary education. The absence of real reasons for staying in their country should be replaced by alternative opportunities for the development of the top psycho-physical capacities of the gifted and talented. The absolute and uncompromising attitude towards abandoning their country should be relativized by offering a range of opportunities where young people can satisfy their educational, socio-emotional and other needs. Prevention and elimination of prejudices towards gifted and talented should be a priority goal and a task for all relevant organizations and institutions, but also for each individual. That means a necessary change of thinking patterns and behavior towards gifted and talented starting with and within the family. The theoretical interest of the state towards gifted and talented should change imperatively in order for them to feel the care of the state, for each individual. The absolute humanization of society is possible if one sees and satisfies the individual's needs, opportunities and aspirations of each individual. Nurturing individuals with incredibly high potentials in one or more scientific fields is not a privilege for individuals, but a privilege for the state and its prosperity. In that sense, it can be said that the country, or the relevant institutions, have not yet created adequate motivational mechanisms that are aimed at greater inspiration for individuals to stay in their own country.

However, one conclusion, that is the result of the empirical process, states that the material prerequisites and assumptions are not always the main motivation factor for the brain drain. That tells a lot about the change of the recent discourse of seeing and interpreting that the material-existential causes are the main motive for the brain drain. Unequal treatment of all individuals is a strong motivational factor in inciting or thinking about leaving the country.

One of the more appealing conclusions, that are part of the empirical

research findings, is the subjective feeling of the respondents that they are forced to leave their country. Finally, the conclusion remains that the state and institutions need to make their own reorganization of the existing organization of behavior towards each individual, especially to those who are gifted, talented and creative and are forced to sell their potential outside of their country.

At the very end, we will mention several seemingly paradoxical and provocative statements: Employment does not guarantee brain drain. We need a long-term brain drain strategy, but we urgently need a daily strategy for their treatment, i.e. a current strategy, a strategy of the present. It's not about what we will do, but what we are doing with the gifted and talented. Everything else is the drama of our present. In the end, we will point out that migrations, especially the type of migrations relating to higher intellectual capacity could be hard to predict due to their multidimensional conditionality (LeBras, 2002: p.65), especially because this process is determined and conditioned by multiple factors.

REFERENCES

- Adams, R., 2003. *International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain: A Study of 24 Labor Exporting Countries*. Policy research working paper, No.3069. Washington: World Bank.
- Beine, M., Docquier, F., Rapoport, H., 2008. Brain drain and human capital formation in developing countries: winners and losers. In: *The Economic Journal*, 118 (April), pp.631–652, Royal Economic Society.
- Cervantes, M., Guellec, D., 2002. *The brain drain: old myths, new realities*. OECD Observer (May).
- Ciumasu, I., 2010. Turning brain drain into brain networking. In: *Science and Public Policy*. 2010, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp.135-146.
- Dokmanović, M., 2017. "Establishing criteria for quality in the social sciences in order to prevent brain drain from the Republic of Macedonia". Institute for Strategic Research and Education, available at <http://www.isie.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ISIE-studija-odliv-na-mozoci-MAK.pdf>,
- Grubel, H.G., Scott A., 1977. *The brain drain: determinants, measurements and welfare effects*. Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Golub, B., 2002. Motivational factors in departure of young scientists from Croatian science. In: *Scientometrics*, 53 (3): pp.429-445.
- Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., Moreno, A., 2001. *Human values and beliefs: A cross-cultural sourcebook*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press
- Joyce, R. E., Hunt, C. L., 1982. Philippine nurses and the brain drain. In: *Social Science and Medicine*, 16 (12): pp.1223-1233.
- Le Bras, H., 2002. *L'adieu aux masses: Démographie et politique*. Editions de l'Aube.
- Lowell, B. 2003. Skilled migration abroad or human capital flight? Migration Policy Institute (June). Retrieved from: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=135> (accessed Oct 3, 2011).
- Marga, A., 2010. Globalization, multiculturalism and brain drain. In: *Journal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change*, Volume 7, Number 1
- Mountford, A., 1997. Can a brain drain be good for growth in the source economy?. In: *Journal of Development Economics* 532, pp.287-303.
- Munck R., 2010. Globalization, Migration and Work: Issues and Perspectives, Labor, Capital and Society, Vol.43, Issue 1, pp. 155-177.
- Manashi R., 2012. Brain drain. In: *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization*. Vol. 1, Edition: Blackwell Publishing, pp.132-135
- Skiskandarajah, D., 2005. Reassessing the impact of brain drain on developing countries.

- Sullivan, T. J., Thompson, K.S., 1988. *Introduction to Social Problems*. New York: Macmillan publishing company.
- Stewart, R., 2010. *The Places In Between*. London: Picador. pp. 130–58.
- Seidman, I., 2006. *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A guide for researchers in education and the social sciences.*, 3rd ed., New York: Teachers College Press.
- Sveva A., Brandi C., 2004. *Defining Brain Drain, Evolution of Theories of Brain Drain and Migration of Skilled Personnel and Human, Brain and Knowledge Mobility*, Maastricht: UNU-MERIT.
- Stojanoska, M., 2018. *Determinants and repercussions of brain drain*, Master Thesis, Faculty of Pedagogy-Bitola.
- Šverko, I., 2004. *Studentske namjere odlaska u inozemstvo: Veličina potencijalnog "odljeva mozгова" i njegove odrednice u 1995., 1997.* Zagreb: Institut za društvene znanosti Ivo Pilar.
- United Nations, 2013. *International Migration Report 2013*. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
- Vangeli, A., Mehmedovic, N., Bakiu, B., 2010. *National Report: Brain Drain in Macedonia: Scope and Factors*, Skopje: Center for Research and Policy Making.
- Watty, K. 2006. Want to know about quality in higher education? Ask an academic. In: *Quality in Higher Education*, 12 (3), pp.291–301.
- World Bank, 2016. *Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group*. Washington: World Bank.
- World Health Organization, 2006. *World Health Report: Working Together for Health*. Geneva: WHO.

Eighty years since the midnight diplomatic pact: an overture to the Second World War

Polona Dovečar¹

ABSTRACT

This contribution presents and describes one of the biggest diplomatic successes of the 20th century, still veiled in the myth. Signature of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed on August 23rd 1939. The agreement, which is a proof of capable diplomacy, the agreement that top country leaders themselves could not achieved it, where diplomatic teams are irreplaceable. The pact, signed by the two completely different and opposite countries, suddenly met at the given moment in the given situation. The agreement, which shows how diplomatic communication, the irreplaceability of diplomats as well as secrecy and confidentiality, is the important key when the agreements are concluded. A Pact that did not see the final minute to sign it, because at least from Germany long planned war could begin. An alliance that caused millions of people to die, an alliance that has led many plans fall into the water. A pact that is very complex, both historical and mythical. What happened and what were the reasons for the signature, we analyze in this contribution. There are still quite a few secrets and questions, especially on the Russian side. Once they open the archives, we will be able to re-examine it-again.

KEY WORDS: pact, diplomacy, cable2, Ribbentrop, Molotov

POVZETEK

Prispevek predstavlja in opisuje enega izmed največjih diplomatskih podvigov 20. stoletja, ki je še danes zavil v mit, to je podpis nemško-sovjetskega sporazuma o nenapadanju 23. avgusta 1939. Sporazum, ki je dokaz sposobne diplomacije in ga tudi najvišji voditelji sami ne bi zmogli podpisati brez pomoči diplomatske elite. Pakt, ki sta ga podpisali dve popolnoma različni in nasprotni totalitarni državi, ki sta se v danem trenutku srečali v sporazumu. Ta kaže pomembnost diplomatske depeše in nenadomestljivost diplomatov pri doseganju elitnih dogovorov, kar je ključnega pomena pri sporazumih. Pakt, ki ni videl zadnje minute, da se podpiše, saj se je, vsaj s strani Nemčije, dolgo načrtovana vojna lahko začela. Zavezništvo, zaradi katerega je umrlo na milijone ljudi, zavezništvo, zaradi katerega je marsikaj padlo v vodo. Pakt, ki je zelo zapleten, tako zgodovinsko kot mitično. Kaj se je dogajalo in kakšni so bili razlogi, analiziramo v članku. Še vedno pa ostaja precej zaprtih skrivnosti in vprašanj, predvsem na ruski strani. Ko bodo odprti tudi njihovi arhivi, bomo lahko ponovno raziskovali.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: sporazum, diplomacija, depeša, Ribbentrop, Molotov

1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Polona Dovečar, M.A. in International Studies and Diplomacy, and PhD candidate, Faculty of Governmental and European Studies, Nova University, Kranj. E-mail: polona.dovecar@gmail.com

2 Since there are different terms for a diplomatic report we use in this contribution either cable or dispatch.

INTRODUCTION

There are so many ways and opportunities to remember and discuss why the Second World War happened at all. They all knew in that time that it was not needed or at least not in such a huge range, but there will always hang an open question – could it be different? What if the war could be completely avoided? And there is endlessly number of questions and they can result in pretty the same opinion. There is one thing which deserves a place to talk about – diplomacy and its success or failure. Many of people never knew or heard of Non-aggression Pact Ribbentrop-Molotov, exceptional pact famous for its overture to the Second World War, and this is the subject we will dedicate this article to. The fame that goes to the people, who are sworn in to really take good care of their own country interest. People – diplomats, who don't cling even when their friendly partners are in conflict called war. This article is examining how diplomacy can achieve robust agreements between countries and whether diplomacy is really such a crucial and effective state factor that can influence politics with its advice and recommendations. To repeat the theoretical statements; diplomacy is the regulation of relations between subjects of public international law³.

In the 20th century, however, the United States had a great influence on international relations. As a community, they showed a system of internal relations to their countries, were pragmatic about their diplomacy, made alliances and influenced foreign policy. Ever since Europe had to face US foreign policy for the first time, its leaders have sought to strike a balance between a complete system and global reforms. For almost 150 years, European nations have not touched America. When this happened, America was twice involved in the world war and the war began between European nations⁴.

In this contribution we will discuss diplomatic and strategic reasons that united Germany and the Soviet Union to sign the non-aggression Pact. We will analyze fascinating dispatches which are still not well recognized and are showing diplomatic background one of the most important era in history. How diplomats earned honor to convey such important, strategic and secret information on the conclusion of agreements. At the same time, we compare the state to its interests. They are clearly and very strictly written in the huge number of dip-

3 Jazbec, 2009, p.19.

4 Kissinger,1994, p.20

lomatic cables themselves. This means that we will try to understand why two such different countries have decided to make a diplomatic move at a given moment with an extremely strong belief in its validation. The article shows the excellent practice of military diplomats and the achievement of the impossible and the belief of possible.

80 YEARS AFTER MIDNIGHT DIPLOMATIC TOAST

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The war for every nation that you influence is the end of an era. Whether it comes back from as a victor or a loser, the life order crashes, with his representatives also failing, and then a new, supposedly better order for future generations will be created in the old plains. Therefore, the end of the war is also a good source for gathering, editing and harnessing experience. In doing so, nations are recognizing their weaknesses and trying to remedy them in order to live happier in the future, but also not to be defeated in the coming war⁵.

No matter the fact that World War II already lists enormous writing material and at the same time also many contributions about war diplomacy and even more about Nazism and communism, the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War in this article is described differently. The 80th anniversary with symbolic memory note, more than ever. It is very common to write about Nazism, in fact, this is the most described period until now in our history. However, there is not much written that the Second World War fire up the agreement, brief and concise. Secret. Almost mythic. Agreement written in one sentence. Its signature was the green light for one of the worst battles in the world. The battle where Nazism and communism met, a battle that brought millions of victims and radically changed Europe long after the end of the war. Without diplomacy and its fundamental role, there would be no signature of the pact. But what would it be then? Would there exist another reason for the war? Diplomacy, however, is a substitute for reaching an amicable settlement between countries. The purpose of diplomacy is to strengthen inter-state relations, nations or organizations where interests are maximized. It does not involve risk and the need to use force, it seeks peace. When diplomacy falls because countries are stuck or at war, it can be said that diplomacy is also useful during the war⁶.

5 Vauhnik, 2017, p.15.

6 Marks <http://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy> 18.06.2016.

Diplomacy is a great skill in words, that is, communication in the form of exchange of thoughts and ideas between countries and international organizations. This is reflected through personal ambassadorial interviews or written correspondence (dispatches). The simplest arrangements are at the highest level of the country for Prime Ministers to meet in person and exchange ideas. But centuries of experience and practice have shown that an ambassador is irreplaceable when such interstate agreements are reached. However, the ambassador rarely acts alone; is the head of a diplomatic mission in the field and has a team that works in harmony and has a good network. There have been many events in Europe and in the world over the last decades, such as the existence of NATO and the European Union. In every corner of the world, superpowers set rules and create problems at the same time, requiring every country to somehow show and define its priorities in foreign policy. Diplomats have a lot of work to do here, and we think they will have more, we think years of intense work await them. Countries no longer feel this kind of security when entering international relations. Previously, diplomats worked mostly in war settings, but today they have much more analytical, critical and concrete work to do⁷.

There are so many ways and opportunities to remember and discuss why the Second World War happened at all. They all knew in that time that it was not needed or at least not in such a huge range, but there will always hang an open question – could it be different? What if the War could be completely avoided? Could have the Western Europe stopped Hitler? There is one thing deserves a place to talk about – diplomacy and its success or failure. And this is the subject we dedicate this article to. The fame that goes to the people, who are sworn in to really take good care of their own country interest. Diplomats who don't cling even when their friendly partners are in conflict called war.

Europe suffered massive number of changes between the First and Second World War and was completely changed by its country structures. That was all the result of great fighting in both wars which were crucial bad scenario of the 20th Century. Today we know, at least we think we know almost every reason why the scenario happed for the second time. Also, we know that the devil seed was planted soon after the First World War was finished. It was just taking time to grow and to make great strategies with people, who were just waiting for a chance to stand up.

7 Feltham, 1996, p. 2.

But here we discuss success or failure of diplomacy 80 years back; it is shown in great and shiny success and had so much work to do after the First War. We should not forget – after the war it is time to make peace – and diplomacy it is foreign policy branch which regulates friendly relations with countries where the interest is needed. But diplomacy had really a lot of work to do since the beginning of 20th Century. But the open question stays forever – was it successful or unsuccessful? We know that diplomacy can prevent war, or it can create it. Every time it is a crucial achievement of foreign policy, which is driven to the internal country's interest.

GERMANY AND SOVIET UNION - THE UNWANTED LAND-S

Germany was identified as the main culprit of the First World War and it was imposed to high war damages, estimated at 126 billion gold marks, payable in 50 years, territorially damaging it and limiting its army. The treaty was perceived by the Germans as a great injustice and humiliation and was regarded as a “” document of hatred⁸.

Diplomacy between the two world wars was very active, because there were many reasons for this. First, the parallel existence of two opposing systems, capitalism and socialism, secondly, the extreme aggravation of all the capitalist contradictions that led people to the Second World War. Diplomacy had the biggest work, which, as a result, turned out to be a partitioned block in Europe. On the one hand, allies, on the other central powers. The policy of appeasement, reconciliation and reassurance from the victorious countries, opened the door for the Germany implementing the Versailles Treaty was obstructed. US diplomacy tried to stabilize situation in Europe. On the other hand, German diplomacy did not miss any opportunity not to exploit the opposition among the Allies to the new war. Among the winning countries, there was an internal competition, so the way of victorious countries, and successfully escaped the fulfillment of the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles and grown and strengthened its military power. Soviet diplomacy worked more calmly and did not reject agreements with capitalist countries. For the sake of isolation, they have welcomed all trade agreements. The brave and determined fight of the Soviet government for peace has served a steady rise in international reputation. But the diplomacy of Western imperialist countries rejected Soviet proposals. Instead of organizing the diplomacy of allied countries against Ger-

8 Repe, 1998, p.47.

many, it continued to implement a policy of appeasement towards German aggression. The danger that was threatening the world by fascist Germany was obvious. Hitler was able to mask his revenge by providing peace. His diplomacy invited separate nations to negotiate agreements, at the same time proclaiming a crusade against Bolsheviks. Soviet diplomacy urged tirelessly to unite the countries in order to guarantee collective security. By breaking up the political negotiations with the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain broke the front against Hitler and opened the road of German fascism⁹.

West Europe was many years reluctant to Hitler and to his vicious ideas and requests. West Europe was trying to cover their eyes to blindness that Hitler it's not a big danger to Europe. They were mistaking hardly, since he was even more dangerous as his neighbors could even imagine. His diplomatic team helped him to drive pragmatic policy under cover, resulting in a lot of intelligent solutions. West was to occupy with itself, sadly. And in this self-raising situation, specially United Kingdom and France were slowly letting to much freedom to Nazism and to its dangerous absolutistic leader. On the one side they were afraid, on the other side they were almost sure, that Hitler could not start a new war. Sure, that he was not prepared, equipped. At least not yet. But with the poor action the Allies just gave him a perfect excuse to launch a quick start and helped a lot for raising Nazism.

Only the Soviet Union was left alone on the World map, with abandoned feeling. Angry that West left them out of any agreement. Ignore them many times, not offered to be equal partner with issues dealing after the World War I. And with all big waving that Soviet Union exist on the map, didn't bring satisfying results. At last not in the needed time. Soviet Union was underestimated from the West. One should not ignore that the country was very low-industrial, few steps behind, what resulted in bad feeling. The winning countries, booming with power, intelligence, war equipment, technology. And there was Soviet Union, country with its own leader was deleting people like dominos and his purges were like cutting grain or grass. Soviet Union has tried many times to make agreement against Nazism. But unsuccessfully. That is why Stalin had to find a quick solution. And the result was 'Pact with the devil'. Pact with the biggest enemy. But for them happened to be a logical step in that moment. With the pact they have bought more than one year of peace, time to develop war industry and collect peo-

9 Potemkin, 1948, p.11.

ple. They didn't have industry, but they had raw materials, which were fundamental for their enemy friend. So, they did find business-to-business solution with help of diplomatic team. They didn't have industry, but they had raw materials, which were fundamental for their enemy friend. So, they did find business-to-business solution with help of diplomatic team. They stuffed Germany with needed raw materials and Germans produced war technology. Till the last day of Barbarossa¹⁰ they have complied with the non-aggression Pact principles and trade agreement.

INTERVAL PERIOD – DIPLOMACY REVELATION

The First World War swept Europe, changed its map, scared people and was a quick cause for new events. There was a simultaneous existence of communism and capitalism, following that the ideology and practice of both were totally opposite and this differentiation caused difficulties between the country's possibilities. Germany was an actual loser. Countries were focused only on their goals and they were extremely egoistically oriented towards people, nations and groups. Countries wanted self-determination. Their great goal was a possible destroying situation of the Germany, country with enormous wealth. For this, the President of the United States, Wilson gave them the cause. And this is a diplomatic skill. When, however, the time came for Europe to step together against the enemy Hitler, the countries were too burdened with one another to be able to make a shield. This non-synchronization costed them War.

The winners of the WWI found out very soon that Germany did not comply with the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles and that it was likely to prepare revenge but didn't believed. They started to take it seriously and establish diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union in order to gain protection. But the story got tangled a little differently. With the establishment of the Axis forces, the peace of Versailles began to collapse. The victorious countries competed too much against each other in order to be sufficiently sovereign against Germany and the forces of the Axis. Great Britain feared France. The English did not bother Germany and did not have such a strong interest. England and France fought for the Ruhrland.

In 1922, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo,

¹⁰ Barbarossa was the code name for the attack operation on the Soviet Union.

which was a blow to the victorious countries, urged all forces to break the Treaty of Rapallo. There were ideas and attempts to attack the Soviet Union.

The winning countries greatly strengthened their diplomatic activities. Their aim was to closely follow the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, to paralyze Germany by taking as many fleets, weapons and raw materials as possible. Germany was a country that already had 70 million inhabitants, more than France or England, and from this view it represented a potential threat to neighboring countries that did not want to risk fighting. The winners underestimated Germany, instead of trying to establish diplomatic arrangements with it. Unfortunately, they were unwilling to find out that the establishment of diplomatic relations would be a better decision. At the time, Germany was already in successful and first-rate diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union, and since 1922 it has signed secret agreements with it. The Soviet Union therefore was searching for the partner. German diplomacy was very persistent, polite, and it was behaving exactly as the Soviets liked. Despite attempts by France and England to establish pacts, Soviet Union has opted for Germany. These countries were driving low-respect diplomatic negotiations, sometimes even second-class diplomats have been sent, which the Soviet Union understood as an underestimation.

Many of the events and contracts that ran in the pre-World War II had a dual role. Some gave Germany a great boost for even greater strength; others gave Germany a lot of freedom that it could become (secretly) even more willing to realize the ideas and wishes of its leader. They were increasingly giving up Germany. The Agreement from Locarno from 1925 is an extremely important event of diplomatic rehabilitation of Germany and the West. Germany has thus far departed from fulfilling the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. It got a good starting position for making even more revenge. England and France mistakenly tried to regulate peace. However, the West had, of course, secret plans – they wanted to direct German aggression against the Soviet Union. Pro-Soviet intent is the essence of Locarno agreements. Because of the treaty, the Soviet Union felt very bad, it was overlooked again.

After the major economic crisis in 1929, Germany received remission of reparations at the Lausanne Conference in 1939. It itself experienced a severe blow to the crisis, but the ideology did not suffer the

effects. Stronger than ever continued with the rise of Hitler to show sharp teeth to the West and still insisted, to achieve its goals.

With the Munich agreement, Germany was returned the Sudeten region in Czechoslovakia. Thus, Czechoslovakia was dissolved. The agreements were signed with a heavy heart, but the West thought that is only way to avoid the occupation. But Hitler did not hold this agreement as well. When he achieved his goals and strengthened his right flank and avoided fighting on two fronts (the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on non-aggression), he could begin a war with the attacks in Poland. Hitler led a very tactical diplomacy against England; from it he also knew how to make fun. According to naivety and trust, they showed that they are leading old-fashioned and blind diplomacy. A treaty that should bring the world peace, at least West was hoping so. At the same time, the Soviet Union again experienced a reprise of ignorance, this time also a serious threat. Perhaps it was only aware that they again helped Hitler and Nazism to occupy Europe.

The suggestion that the Sudeten were entitled to self-determination, which meant joining to Germany, was not implemented. Hitler pledged to occupy the territory peacefully after October 1st. Of course, Hitler was not to be believed, he boasted on October 2nd how he would destroy the rest of the Czech Republic¹¹.

The Munich agreement between the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy was expected to prevent the worst. In order not to invade German troops into Czechoslovakia, it was forced to give up Sudeten territories inhabited by Germans. Chamberlain mistakenly thought he would find peace this way. Hitler did not stick to the deal, early in October of that year he walked into the area and connected the rest of the country. Following this very violent act, the United Kingdom and France finally found that they had too much yielded to Germany and promised assistance to Poland in the re-German attack, which was later not confirmed¹².

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND SOVIET UNION

Diplomats are successful only if they have contacts and relations. They depend on them, as this is a source of information necessary for their

¹¹ Overy, 2015.

¹² Boden, 2004, p.93.

work. The information is fundamental to know the situation. They must therefore move a lot, be present at different places and events, get in touch with as many people as possible, from whom important information could be received¹³.

Even though both countries had the form of a totalitarian regime, the difference is still difficult to find. We must look for it in basics and theory. Practically, the system looks the same, but the implementation was quite different. Nonetheless, some countries inherited systems of fear, oppression and violence. Prior to World War II, the parliamentary system was anchored only in Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and Scandinavian countries.

The reality between the systems is not that different, while the theoretical differences are large. What are the real-life differences in communism and fascism? No socialist system in real life has ever truly implemented socialism as found in theory. There has never been a socialist government without a single leader. Social classes were never eliminated. The funds were not properly allocated¹⁴.

Non-Marxist historians know that Nazism is essentially a type of fascism that fits ideally into the context of European fascism. It has many features of Italian fascism, extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism and a very offensive mindset against communism and socialism. It comes from where it threatened the existence of major advances in industrialization. Such a concept of Nazism, a form of fascism in the totalitarian system, suggests to us that Nazism is very similar to Stalinism in the Soviet Union, such as a one-party state, complete government control of the media, and a centrally run economy. However, both countries had different goals. With the above-mentioned theory, we can add that the German Holocaust can be understood as a response to the Bolshevik terror and the Russian state war and the liquidation of the kulaks a few decades later. There is no simple formula to explain to us the existence of Nazism today, but it certainly was a reaction to the process of destabilization of the Industrial Revolution. In any case, he should not be regarded as a last resort, as he sought an ideal world in the future, without sick people and without people who would offend the nationality of the true Germans¹⁵.

13 Jazbec, 2007, p.128.

14 Curiosity Aroused (2013). What's the difference between Communism vs Fascism? URL: <https://curiosityaroused.com/politics/whats-the-difference-between-fascism-vs-communism/> 22.03.2018.

15 Williamson, 2005, p.94.

Both countries had the platform of peace from the Brest-Litovsk agreement. However, in 1939, the Soviet Union had enough deviation from the Western powers and at the same time Germany was in urgent need of a one-front struggle to capture the battlefield on two fronts. The Soviet Union successfully transformed diplomacy in the years before the Second World War, as Hitler's power in Europe grew and all the attention was directed at Germany. During this redirecting of attention, Stalin was much occupied with doing purges and murdered many of his people. Hitler was engaged in oppressing of the Jews population in carrying out his self-satisfied psychological policy. The Munich conference brought the end of kindness, the self-determination of Stalin, who was determinate to offer the possibility to his ideological enemy. And the path that led to the non-aggression pact was created.

Hitler was known as a successful rhetoric, what helped him to achieve with his diplomatic team extremely important and secret agreements what helped him built a military fortune outside his own country. That is why it was logical that he chosen the Soviet Union for his partner. Soviet Union had raw materials and hope of non-attack, when he would start to cut the wounds to the West, whose wounds hurt them. But Stalin had a tough personality and characteristics of a dictator. He led the country of great power and with huge resources.

Hitler, despite having psychopathic personality, continued to work as a top manipulative politician. That helped him a lot in implementing policies and agreements. Germany was always known as a country driving pragmatic policy. Policy that worked conscientiously. Hitler himself was a specialist on breaking rules (like treaty of Versailles or ban on weapons production).

On the other side of the Pact there was – Stalin, a person whose privacy is difficult to write about. We know that he was very against-Hitler oriented, but he signed the pact with such a system. Although today it might seem that Stalin, for the cost of victory, sacrificed millions of people in the battle against Hitler (because only a large number of dead soldiers were the formula to victory), we must know that he did not set the war on his own – Hitler served it to him. He had to fight – but in fact he could have won the war with much fewer casualties. Although he fought against the backwardness of generations, after the war he somehow could not create a peaceful balance with capitalist countries. He succeeded in gigantic progress, which left the agrarian

country behind and drove Soviets to industrialized country. However, the presence of the United States and the post-war strengthening did create coexistence. However, the presence of the United States and the post-war strengthening did create coexistence.

Stalin was a man, a tyrant and a killer. It was the horror of that time. He had a lot of psychological moments in which he was making steps that were mostly related to the liquidation of people. If we can compare it, we must compare it with Hitler¹⁶.

RIBBENTROP, MOLOTOV AND STALIN MIDNIGHT TOAST ON THE 23TH OF AUGUST 1939

Although the Pact did not see the hour before signing it, its finalization nevertheless gave the instable feeling until the last minute of the signature. Understanding is not as easy as it seems at first glance. Due to the insensitivity of Stalin and the final pressures of Hitler, the diplomatic strain of five months could quickly fall to a zero point. It is much more difficult to organize worse than good.

Signing a Pact between Germany and Soviet Union had from political reason logic, it was alternative, since the cooperation between United Kingdom and France has fallen. London and Paris have promised defense to Poland year 1939 in the same time they have rejected Germany from attacks in brought Soviet Union to defense coalition. But Stalin assumed that both, France and United Kingdom will stay neutral and turn the back Poland, if the Germany would put armed force in the country¹⁷.

A successful diplomatic team stands behind the creation of the pact and its realization. On the German side, that was Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and on the Soviet side Mikhailovich Molotov. Top diplomatic representatives Weizsäcker and Schulenburg were directing the diplomatic communication. No decision was taken without a clear confirmation of Hitler and of Stalin. The states exchanged many diplomatic reports; the German archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin recorded more than 1000. Negotiations and correspondence began in April 1939, a pact was signed in August, also a secret protocol and trade agreements were signed at the same time. In September 1939 both sides made an exchange in some spheres of

16 Šömen, 2015.

17 Snyder, 2013.

interest in the Balkans and in the Baltic states.

Although Stalin was suspicious for the entire five months before signing the Pact and somehow avoided negotiations, due to German aggression, he replaced Foreign Minister Litvinov for Molotov at the beginning of the negotiations. Litvinov was Jew. That was a clear sign that he is willing to put possibilities on the table.

“Appointment of Molotov as Foreign Commissar simultaneously retaining his position as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars is published as ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of May 3 by Soviet press with great fanfare. Dismissal of Litvinov appears on last page as small notice under “Chronicle.” Sudden change has caused greatest surprise here, since Litvinov was in the midst of negotiations with the English delegation, at the May Day Parade still appeared on the reviewing stand right next to Stalin, and there was no recent concrete evidence of shakiness in his position. Soviet press contains no comments. Foreign Commissariat is giving press representatives no explanations”¹⁸.

From the mentioned cable, we find that the replacement of Litvinov was a great surprise. But Stalin left the door open for the possibility of negotiating with the Germans if negotiations with the British would not bring success. At least, in their opinion, the Soviet Union was very close to signing the alliance with the West, which made Hitler’s diplomatic world to wait for the expulsion. Even though the both states were rejecting their state systems, they left opportunities open. At the same time, they were not ready to risk anything. Both countries were pursuing tactics and held conversations only at the level of economic relations.

“I (Shulenburg) opened the conversation by saying to Herr Molotov that the last proposals of Herr Mikoyan in our economic negotiations had presented several difficulties which could not be immediately removed. We now believed that a way had been found to come to an understanding and we intended in the very near future to send Geheimrat Dr. Schnurre to Moscow to discuss with Herr Mikoyan whether an agreement could be reached on the basis of our proposals. I asked whether Herr Mikoyan was prepared to confer with Herr Schnurre.

18 Lilian Goldman Law library, Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns002.asp 7.03.2019.

Herr Molotov replied that the course of our last economic negotiations had given the Soviet Government the impression that we had not been in earnest in the matter and we had only played at negotiating for political reasons. At first it had been reported that a German delegation was coming for economic negotiations to Moscow (I suggested that this report did not emanate from us but from the Polish and French press), and later it was to the effect that Herr Schnurre was coming alone. Herr Schnurre did not come, but Herr Hilger and I had conducted the negotiations and then these negotiations also had faded out. The Soviet Government could only agree to a resumption of the negotiations if the necessary “political bases” for them had been constructed”¹⁹.

“The Reich Minister directed me to maintain extreme caution in my conference with Molotov. As a result, I contented myself with saying as little as possible and took this attitude more because the attitude of Herr Molotov seemed to me quite suspicious. It cannot be understood otherwise than that the resumption of our economic negotiations does not satisfy him as a political gesture, and that he apparently wants to obtain from us more extensive proposals of a political nature. We must be extremely cautious in this field as long as it is not certain that possible proposals from our side will not be used by the Kremlin only to exert pressure on England and France. On the other hand, if we want to accomplish something here, it is unavoidable that we sooner or later take some action. It is extraordinarily difficult here to learn anything at all about the course of the English French-Soviet negotiations. My British colleague, who apparently is the only one who is active in that connection here (he was being announced to Herr Potemkin when I was visiting the latter), preserves an iron silence. Even neutral diplomats have not been able to learn anything. My French colleague has been away for some time. The Counselor of Embassy and Charge in the last few days asked us for a transit visa, so that it seems that he also is going to leave Moscow soon. If the reports are correct that France will now take over the negotiations in the matter of the French-British-Soviet “alliance,” these negotiations may well take place not here but in Paris. My Italian colleague is of the opinion that the Soviet Union will surrender her freedom of negotiation only if England and France give her a full treaty of alliance. It is often stated here (I do not know whether it is correct) that one of the principal reasons for the hesitation of England in accepting the Soviet proposals for a military alliance

19 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns006.asp 6.03.2019.

is the question of Japan. London is afraid of driving the Japanese into our arms if she guarantees the defense of all Soviet frontiers. If Japan should come into our arms voluntarily, this consideration for England should be eliminated".²⁰

In these moments German foreign department felt possible fear of London and Moscow having a closing deal moment. Here the Soviet diplomacy showed some diplomacy skills by chance.

At the end of May, Germany decided on an unambiguous dispatch, informing German diplomats in Moscow that, regardless of the Russian-British negotiations, it was entering negotiations with them also. With three strictly confidential dispatches, Germany is exploring the starting position for any negotiations. Russia has been less prone to negotiations.

Weizsäcker reports with dispatch on May 30th, 1939, that Germany had decided to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union. She cited the Prague Trade Mission as a starting point and calls for the external and internal relations to be separated.

"I described to Molotov the impressions which I had gained from talk with influential personalities in Berlin, particularly with the Reich Foreign Minister. I pointed out that we would welcome a normalization of the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, as the State Secretary had stated to the Soviet Charge in Berlin. For this we had furnished a number of proofs, such as reserve in the German press, conclusion of the non-aggression treaties with the Baltic countries and desire for resumption of economic negotiations. From all this it was evident that Germany did not have any bad intentions toward the Soviet Union, particularly since the Berlin Treaty was still in force. We, on the German side, would continue to take advantage of any opportunity to prove our goodwill. However, we had had no answer from the Soviet Union to the question of what Molotov meant in his last conversation with me by "creation of a new basis of our relationship". We also objected to the attitude of the Soviet press. My impression is that the Soviet Government is greatly interested in knowing our political views and in maintaining contact with us"²¹.

20 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns008.asp 6.03.2019.

21 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns020.asp 6.03.2019.

In the beginning of July German-Soviet negotiations became stronger. After some quiet time of not mentioning political scene, the economic negotiations were put in front. Schulenburg and Molotov have done a meeting where interests between countries in the future were main subject. The diplomatic communication was placed, and many friendly subjects were open. Schulenburg new that Molotov can affect media press and that was relevant for Germany. "Thereupon Molotov asked, "Are you convinced that the Berlin Treaty is really still in force and has not been abrogated by later treaties concluded by Germany?" I replied the following: "I know of no such treaties and have no reason to doubt the validity of the Berlin Treaty."²²

At the end of July, Germany began to hurry; Ribbentrop itself was involved in the negotiations and put pressure on the Soviet Union. Poland's issues and interests in the Baltic became a topic for conversations with Molotov. Until the month of August, the whole top diplomatic establishment was included in the talks. After a very quick response, they agreed on the Trade Agreement, the areas of interest, and in particular on one – that the Non-aggression Pact was reached. A trade agreement worth some 400 million Reich marks granted the Soviet Union a loan in the form of exports, and imports from the Soviet Union included the supply of raw materials, the repayment of a loan from 1935, and the supply of Soviet goods under the German-Soviet agreement of 1938²³.

August started strongly in diplomatic communication. The dispatches were very intensive, many per day. All the main diplomatic and political elite was included in negotiations.

The 3th of August brought dispatch with "very urgent" content from Weizsäcker to Schulenburg where he is asking fast and detailed conversation with Molotov to clear the conditions for customization of German-Soviet interests. "In accordance with the political situation and in the interest of speed, we are anxious, without prejudice to your conversation with Molotov scheduled for today, to continue in Berlin the clarification of terms for the adjustment of German-Soviet interests. To this end Schnurre will receive Astakhov today and will tell him

22 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns022.asp 6.03.2019.

23 The German-Soviet Economic Agreement signed 1938 to supply Germany with raw materials in exchange for the German establishment of factories in the territory of the Soviet Union by machinery and machine tools, the supply of ships, vehicles and other means of transport with a total value of 120 million Reich marks.

that we would be ready for more concrete discussions if that is also the desire of the Soviet Government. We would propose in this case that Astakhov obtain instructions from Moscow. We would then be prepared to speak quite concretely concerning problems of possible interest to the Soviet Union”²⁴.

“Last evening, I (Ribbentrop personally) received the Russian charge who had previously called at the office on other matters. I intended to continue with him the conversations with which you are familiar, that had previously been conducted with Astakhov by members of the Foreign Office with my permission. I alluded to the trade agreement discussions, which are at present progressing satisfactorily, and designated such a trade agreement as a good step on the way toward a normalization of German-Russian relationships, if this was desired. It was well known that the tone of our press with regard to Russia had for over half a year been a very different one. I considered that, insofar as the desire existed on the Russian side, a remolding of our relations was possible, on two conditions:

- a) Noninterference in the internal affairs of the other country (Herr Astakhov believes he can promise this forthwith);
- b) Abandonment of a policy directed against our vital interests. To this, Astakhov was unable to give any clear-cut answer, but he thought his Government had the desire to pursue a policy of mutual understanding with Germany”²⁵.

The strong communication on this day in the next one showed has Soviets are having troubles to trust Germany since long history of hating their Union. Moscow and their diplomats very trying to double check many countries like Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, how they approach the idea of German-Soviet non-aggression pact. And the ideological differentiation was also an iron wall.

On the 14th of August Ribbentrop has dispatch to Molotov very important arguments, where he is pointing that ideological contradictions which were the reason for disagreements between countries should be over forever and the new future path on friendly way should be opened.

²⁴ Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns027.asp 6.03.2019.

²⁵ Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns028.asp 6.03.2019.

“He had received instructions from Molotov to state here that the Soviets were interested in a discussion of the individual groups of questions that had heretofore been taken up. A. designated as such questions, among others, besides the pending economic negotiations, questions of the press, cultural collaboration, the Polish question, the matter of the old German-Soviet political agreements. Such a discussion, however, could be undertaken only by degrees or, as we had expressed it, by stages. The Soviet Government proposed Moscow as the place for these discussions, since it was much easier for the Soviet Government to continue the conversations there. In this conversation, A. left the matter open as to whom we would propose to conduct the conference, the Ambassador or another personage, to be sent out”²⁶.

Between 16th and 21st of August many of important dispatches between Molotov and Ribbentrop was exchanged. And they all showed how very important and fast diplomacy ball was this. The content was focused on same arguments, from Berlin to Moscow were flowing the instructions and backwards very important information about the negotiations in the top diplomatic ranking.

A very fast diplomatic response was done at the same day late afternoon, where Ribbentrop is asking for immediately invitation for visiting Moscow to sign the Non-aggression Pact, where he confirms that all points of Pact which were prepared from Molotov are in the wishes with Germany.

“I (Ribbentrop personally) request that you again call upon Herr Molotov with the statement that you have to communicate to him, in addition to yesterday’s message for Herr Stalin, a supplementary instruction just received from Berlin, which relates to the questions raised by Herr Molotov. Please then state to Herr Molotov the following:

1) the points brought up by Herr Molotov are in accordance with German desires. That is, Germany is ready to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if the Soviet Government so desires, one which would be irrevocable for a term of twenty-five years. Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. Finally, it is thoroughly in accord with the German position, and Germany is ready, to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.

26 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns033.asp 6.03.2019.

2) The Führer (Hitler) is of the opinion that, in view of the present situation, and of the possibility of the occurrence any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations and the mutual adjustment of the pressing questions are desirable. For these reasons the Reich Foreign Minister declares that he is prepared to come by plane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal on the basis of full powers from the Führer with the entire complex of German-Russian questions and, if the occasion arises to sign the appropriate treaties.

ANNEX: I request that you read these instructions to Herr Molotov and ask for the reaction of the Russian Government and Herr Stalin. Entirely confidentially, it is added for your guidance that it would be of very special interest to us if my Moscow trip could take place at the end of this week or the beginning of next week²⁷.

Later that night their Berlin received the dispatch from Schulenburg where the content was very clear. "The Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that the first step toward such an improvement in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement.

"The Government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that the second step, to be taken shortly thereafter, could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact or the reaffirmation of the neutrality pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion of a special protocol which would define the interests of the signatory parties in this or that question of foreign policy and which would form an integral part of the pact"²⁸.

Since there was not much time left, Polish situation got every minute more complicated; Ribbentrop has sent Pact draft with briefly two articles. In this time also Moscow has realized that war cannot be avoided any more. But there was still Soviet delay in signing the Pact because of the Trade agreement signature as a priority.

On the late evening of the 18th of August Ribbentrop personally sent dispatch with all the agreements for the proposals. "We were, there-

27 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns038.asp 7.03.2019.

28 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns039.asp 6.03.12019.

fore, now asking for an immediate reaction to the proposal made in the supplementary instruction regarding my immediate departure for Moscow. Please add in this connection that I would come with full powers from the Führer, authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively the total complex of problems.

As far as the non-aggression pact especially is concerned, it seems to us so simple as to require no long preparation. We have in mind here the following three points, which I would ask you to read to Herr M., but not to hand to him.

ARTICLE 1. The German Reich and the U.S.S.R. will in no event resort to war or to any other use of force with respect to each other.

ARTICLE 2. This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon signature and shall be valid thereafter for a term of twenty-five years.

Please state in this connection that I am in a position, with regard to this proposal, to arrange details in verbal discussions at Moscow and, if occasion arises, to comply with Russian wishes. I am also in a position to sign a special protocol regulating the interests of both parties in questions of foreign policy of one kind and another; for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area, the problem of the Baltic States, etc. Such a settlement, too, which seems to us of considerable importance, is only possible, however, at an oral discussion.

Please emphasize in this connection, that German foreign policy has today reached a historic turning point. This time please conduct conversation, except for above articles of agreement, not in the form of a reading of these instructions, but by pressing emphatically, in the sense of the foregoing statements, for a rapid realization of my trip and by opposing appropriately any possible new Russian objections. In this connection you must keep in mind the decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is probable and that we therefore have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately”²⁹.

On the night of August 23rd to August 24th, three of highest diplomatic representatives were joined to sign the Pact; Foreign Minister of the

29 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns040.asp 6.03.12019.

German Government Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Russian Government Molotov and Stalin. They discussed the problems in certain countries and laid the groundwork and later signed a non-aggression pact between the two countries. They mostly talked about countries that were in one way or another connected to one country or another. During these talks, Stalin showed good information about all countries, not least he knew the situation in the military in both England and France. There was a toast at the end of the conversation. Most importantly, the two countries have signed a non-aggression pact, as well as a secret protocol in which countries share areas of interest. Thus, Bessarabia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and a part of Poland come to the Russian interest zone. The memorandum they signed before the Pact was signed was labeled “very secret” and “state secret”.

On the 23rd of August, at the signing of the Pact, also secret protocol was signed, dividing interests in the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and in Finland. The northern border of Lithuania represented the border between influential areas. The interests of Lithuania and the Vilnius region were recognized by each of the two. The secret protocol also regulated the territorial and political reorganization of areas belonging to Poland. The boundary would take place around the river line of the Narew, Wisla and San rivers. The Soviet Union also noted that it had interests in Bessarabia.

In September, officially after the start of World War II, when Poland was no longer in existence, the country signed a Treaty on border and friendship in the territory of the former Poland. They added a confidential protocol where the Soviet Union agreed not to obstruct the citizens of the Reich or those of German origin who reside in the area of former Poland under its jurisdiction if they wish to migrate to Germany. With the additional secret protocol, the countries again changed the Baltic interests and thus added the territory of Lithuania to the influential area of the Soviet Union, while at the same time Lublin and parts of Warsaw were allocated under the influence zone of Germany.

When the countries settled their interests in Poland on September 28th, they strengthened the strong link of the pact regarding to the war and its subsequent actions. Country didn't exist anymore. They decided even more strongly to join against France and England if attack on Germany or the Soviet Union would appear. They signed the declaration,

which is now quite absurd and impossible to read but at that moment, it meant the strong iron fact that Stalin believed in. The declaration says that by signing contracts (on the same day) they have solved the problems caused by the collapse of the Polish state and creating the basis for lasting peace in Eastern Europe. The desire was to end the war, but if that does not happen and the West will be ineffective, it means that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war.

The countries signed a concrete pact, a pact that was essentially written in Stalin's style that did not disturb Hitler, as he had his own direct plans where no one could stop him. Nevertheless, the signature of the Pact was delayed late on the night of August 23, 1939. At the very signing, both Foreign Ministers Ribbentrop and Molotov and Stalin himself were present. After signing, they reached into their hands and raised the toast high, which also flew to Hitler. The pact was largely well received in both countries, as they were managing media content and disclosed only the wished. On September 1, Germany attacked Poland and broke it in a time of two weeks.

Signing the pact with Germany had certain logic of political reasons for Stalin. It was an alternative, since the alliance with Great Britain and France failed. London and Paris promised safety to Poland in 1939 by deterring Germany from attack and at the same time bringing the Soviet Union into a defensive coalition. But Stalin was aware that both London and Paris would probably turn their backs if Germany would attack Poland or the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union it seemed to be the smartest solution to make agreement with Germany and observe the capitalist countries how they are fighting. Stalin's plan was to remain strong by the end of the war³⁰.

In his memories of the Pact, Weizsäcker, who was at the time Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, wrote that negotiations with the Soviets in his mind left a great mark. Perhaps Germany could succeed in retaining the Western powers and building its alliance with the Soviet Union. The mentioned pact fulfilled Hitler's dream of extending the living space for the Germans – in the land of Soviet Union and Poland. But in June 1939, it was clear that Hitler wanted a narrow pact with the Soviet Union just to attack Poland and divide it. Then Weizsäcker changed his mind and began to hope that the Western forces would

30 Snyder, 2013, p.115.

win, and that Stalin would not benefit from the war also. He felt that Britain did not do enough that Germany was trying to attack Soviet Union. Stalin did not want to hear this, he believed tight in agreement with Poland, the territory they conquered together. Since no party has made any progress in negotiations with the Soviet Union, Weizsäcker believed that the war could be avoided. Soviet will, British power and Italian attempts to influence on the Iron Pact of May 1939, was supposed to hold Hitler back. But he led a war against Poland, he wanted to stay within its borders, which was impossible³¹.

An examination of Allied archives and Soviet sources reveals Stalin's foreign policy to be unscrupulously *realpolitik*, dominated by a realization of the Soviet Union's relative weakness. The pact, however, was not regarded as a foolproof guarantee for Soviet western borders in view of Stalin's deep-seated suspicion of British-German reconciliation. Thus rather than commitment to Germany and a division of Europe to spheres of influence Stalin regarded strict neutrality as the crowning success of his diplomacy. Such neutrality, however, remained precarious throughout the interregnum of 1939-1941. It was sapped by the Soviet benign attitude to Germany, by contemplated Allied action against Soviet Union, and by the profound gnawing fear in the Kremlin of a British connivance in a future war with Germany. Consequentially, especially after the fall of France, Stalin was forced to resort to such exceedingly subtle dual diplomacy that its meaning was often lost on his partners. His obsessive suspicion of a separate peace hampered his judgment and contributed to the paralysis which struck him as war drew nearer³².

Balance interpretation of the Pact and his consequences are still veiled in myth. Moreover, historians are still swayed by the indignation prevalent in Western Europe after the conclusion of the Pact, uncritically adopting the contemporary judgment that Soviets had thrown in their lot with Germany. These tendencies should not be dismissed lightly. Hitler's decision to fight Soviet Union can no longer be viewed as a crude aggressive act but rather as a preventive war. Operation Barbarossa was justified by traditional German geopolitical interest and the threat posed to Germany and the civilized western world by Stalin's abhorrent totalitarian regime³³.

31 Hill, 1974, p.33.

32 Gorodetsky, 1990, pp. 27-41.

33 Same as footnote Nb. 19. pp. 27-41.

Adolf Hitler's decision to invade Russia was the result of the beliefs and illusions of a dictatorial demonic psyche. Ever since World War I ended in 1918, he was convinced that Bolshevism helped defeat Germany and that the German Communist Party of which he was a leader could bring the Reich to Moscow³⁴.

By signing the Pact Hitler achieved a huge diplomatic success. The diplomatic capacity of his dictatorship is a paradigm of the 20th century. Hitler's dictatorship was responsible for the collapse of modern civilization, as a nuclear explosion in modern society. It showed what people are capable of: barbarism, ideological wars, genocide, brutality and greed. He never witnessed this sacred until then. The starting point was a leader who was sworn by the ideological mission of national revival and racial cleansing. It was about pursuing politics, in a nonhuman way, with enthusiasm³⁵.

Not to forget that September was the most important month of 20th century, the month of beginning of the Second World War. War happened immediately after the Non-aggression Pact was signed. On the 28th of September Germany and Soviet Union signed the additional secret protocol where the interest in Poland which didn't exist anymore was settled; the war could continue. Both countries have signed protocol, where they have shown that the war between France on one side and United Kingdom on the other side should be finished. Both governments will try to do all the best to achieve this goal, if will not happened than the responsibly for the continuing the war goes to France and United Kingdom³⁶.

34 The New York Times Company (2018). Hitler's Russian blunder. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/21/magazine/hitler-s-russian-blunder.html>. 20.03.2018.

35 Kershaw, 2012.

36 Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns086.asp 7.3.2019.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the fact that the Pact and the need for its existence as a first impression appeared to be the urgent need of the Soviet Union to gain time to strengthen, it was the result of the signing, the enormously rapid crushing of Hitler and his diplomacy, and his devastating and cynical policies, diplomatically reversed the Soviet story in favor – that is, that Soviet Union will have the most benefits. Hitler's rapidly evolving ideologies were remarkable. His clearly diverging ideology of military attacks is Barbarossa's – the conquest attack of the Soviet Union. This was not about the war of two countries, but about the war of two ideologies. We could say that the actions of the West forced Germany and the Soviet Union to cooperate. Both were pressed against the wall after the end of the First World War and diplomatically isolated. Can we understand from this point of view that the World War II could be avoided?

The Non-aggression Pact is an excellent example of diplomacy. Pact won his signature, of course, at the request of two absolutist leaders who endorsed the agreements. In reachable cables we cannot find obviously outstanding speculation or unevenness. In general, the Soviet side and the German side are both also extremely pure, pragmatic and in general, the Pact is written very realistically and in a realistic moment. All can be seen from the fulfillment, since the trade agreement was in use almost until the attack. Secret protocols were also implemented. In any case, the reader knows that the Pact was a fine example of diplomatic moves, especially from the German side.

The reasons why we can put the Pact as an excellent example of diplomacy are several. One of the main reasons is the joining deal of two totally different countries; we can easily say enemies, joining in an agreement in the basis of non-aggression. On the other side the superiority of Pact are Hitler's intentions to Stalin's believes into the credibility and trust of keeping a deal for a purpose written in an agreement. At the very beginning of the negotiations between countries untrusted relations of Soviet diplomacy peak, covered with intense positive and patient diplomatic atmosphere from German side can be cleared. We can guess in this time if Stalin had overviewed the ambiguity of Pact in that time. For sure he had serious doubts about the trust in Hitler himself, but in that time and in that moment that seemed the only smart solution to keep in peace for a while. Exceptionality goes to Germa-

ny diplomacy, which showed that negotiations are better resulting in being in the right time quiet and patient, since the right time for the result will come. Just that the Pact was sadly the overture and help for Germany to started one of the cruelest wars in the world's history.

REFERENCES

- Boden, M. 2004. *Evropa naša preteklost in sedanost*. Ljubljana: Založba Mladinska knjiga.
- Feltham, R. 1996. *P. 2. Diplomatski priručnik*. London: Longman Group Limited.
- Gorodetsky G., The impact of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on the course of the Soviet Foreign policy. *Journal Cashiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 1990, pp.27-41, URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/cmr_0008-0160_1990_num_11_12_2018
- Hill, E. L. 1974. Die Weizsäcker – Papiere. Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein GmbH. The New York Times Company (2018). Hitler's Russian blunder. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/21/magazine/hitler-s-russian-blunder.html>. 20.03.2018
- Jazbec, M. 2009. *Osnove diplomacije*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
- Jazbec, M. 2007. *Vojaška in obrambna diplomacija*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
- Kershaw, I. 2012. *Hitler*. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.
- Kissinger, H. 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon&Schuster Paperbacks.
- Lilian Goldman Law library. Yale Law School. The Avalon project. Nazi-Soviet Relations Page. 2008. URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/1-131.
- Overy, R. J. 2015. *Tretji rajh – kronika*. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba.
- Potemnik, V.P.1948. *Zgodovina diplomacije*, tretji zvezek. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije
- Repe, B. 1998. *Sodobna zgodovina: Zgodovina za 4. letnik gimnazij*. Ljubljana: Založba Modrijan.
- Snyder, T. 2013. *Bloodlands, Europe between Hitler and Stalin*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Šömen B. 2015, Svet 24, novice. Vse Stalinove ženske. URL: https://novice.svet24.si/clanek/zanimivosti/566d2e3a65143/stalin-tiran-clovek-iz-zeleza_03.12.2018
- Vauhnik, V. 2017. *Pod krinko – Na preži za Hitlerjevimi vojnimi načrti*. Ljubljana: Modrijan založba d.o.o.
- Williamson, D.G. 2005. *The Third Reich*. New York: Longman Group Limited.

Diplomacy and family life: co-existence or burden?

Dragica Pungaršek¹

ABSTRACT

The article deals with diplomatic families from a non-career diplomat perspective. It is based on author's master's thesis and it reflects her eleven years of experience living abroad, being non-career diplomat as well as accompanying spouse. Then there are also countless hours of conversations with people sharing the experiences of living abroad as diplomats, together with their families. Significant part of her life was dedicated to diplomacy, which caught interest ever since stepping in for the first time into Slovenian Foreign Ministry. Hence a deep respect towards diplomatic core and everyone involved in it. Among those, in accordance with firm believe, are not only diplomats but also all those, rather often overlooked persons, who are indirectly connected to a diplomacy and diplomats. These are diplomatic families who form the main research subject of this paper. Last but not least, by comparing personal observations and of the author's peers with the foreign literature, the article depicts some authors, mainly from United States and England, where diplomacy has much deeper roots and experiences compared to her country.

Working in foreign countries and with them related stories of diplomatic families, their experiences, their efforts for being recognised firstly abroad and later back in their home countries, facing with the new environments regardless of the country with many other challenges, all these are forming the basis of this paper. What is just listed here and is common among career diplomats and they demonstrate more adaptability, the same cannot be stated for non-career diplomats. For them it is a web of completely new experiences, which rather often dictate their destiny in private life as well as in professional. Therefore, it is no surprise that during times abroad, chances to meet families who have really grown into diplomacy, as well as to meet families who had rather bitter experiences, could be based on their false expectations together with the lack of preparedness for their new lives.

KEY WORDS: diplomacy, career and non-career diplomats, diplomatic families, diplomacy training, integration and reintegration

POVZETEK

Članek obravnava diplomatske družine s perspektive nekarijerne diplomatke. Je izpeljava iz avtoričine magistrske naloge in temelji na enajstih letih lastnih izkušenj v tujini, tako v vlogi nekarijerne diplomatke kot v vlogi spremljajoče soproge. Temu so pridodane še mnogotere ure pogo-

¹ ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Dragica Pungaršek, M.A. in Diplomacy. She has spent more than a decade abroad being closely attached to diplomacy in both roles: as a diplomat and a spouse of a diplomat. Currently she is employed at the Slovenian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food. Email: dragica.pungarsek@gmail.com

vorov z ljudmi, ki so delili svoje izkušnje življenja v tujini v vlogi diplomatov, skupaj z njihovimi družinami. Diplomaciji je avtorica zapisala dobršen del svojega življenja in v njej je prebudila zanimanje za poglobljeno preučevanje, odkar je prvič prestopila vrata zunanjega ministrstva. Avtorica goji globoko spoštovanje do diplomatskega dela in vseh njegovih izvajalcev. Ti po njenem trdnem prepričanju niso samo diplomati, ampak vsi tisti, nemalokrat celo prezrti ljudje, ki so posredno povezani z diplomacijo in delom diplomatov. To so družine diplomatov, ki so v središču preučevanja tega članka. Nenazadnje s primerjavo lastnih zapažanj in zapažanj avtoričinih kolegov s tujo literaturo, članek povzema nekatere avtorje, predvsem iz Združenih držav Amerike in Anglije, kjer ima v primerjavi z njeno domovino diplomacija mnogo globlje korenine.

Delo v tujini in z njim povezane zgodbe družin diplomatov, njihove izkušnje, prizadevanje po uveljavitvi sprva v tujini, po vrnitvi v domovino pa tudi doma, soočenja z novimi okolji ne glede na državo ter še marsikaj drugega sestavlja celoten članek. Če je naštetu nekako že stalnica med kariernimi diplomati in so lažje prilagodljivi, to vsekakor ne drži za nekarierne diplomate. Gre za splet povsem novih izkušenj, ki nemalokrat narekujejo nadaljnjo usodo tako v zasebnem kot tudi v poslovnem življenju. Avtorica je imela opravka z družinami, ki jim je diplomacija zlezla pod kožo, ter tudi s takimi, ki jim je – največkrat zaradi nepripravljenosti in neupravičenih pričakovanj – prinesla tudi marsikatero bridko izkušnjo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: diplomacija, karierni in nekarierni diplomati, diplomatske družine, diplomatske priprave, integracija in reintegracija

INTRODUCTION

The author was always attracted to the diplomatic life and was fortunate to have spent a good part of her life in it. That is why, when choosing the title, she was guided primarily by the personal experience of non-career diplomats with regard to the lives and work of diplomats abroad, and above all, what it means for them and/or their families. Therefore the main research question through the article relates to diplomat's accompanying families: do they or can they contribute when going together with a diplomat to a foreign land and consequently is there an added value. We should also point out that this research stems from the Slovene diplomatic practice.

Working abroad is a great challenge for every individual. Of course, different people face different challenges, especially in terms of adaptation, but leaving home, relatives, friends, acquaintances, leaving a familiar environment is never an easy decision. The decision is even greater when accompanied by a spouse² abroad. If there are children, the magnitude of the challenges is increasing exponentially. The above challenges are suddenly joined by a bunch of new ones, such as school, kindergarten, new living space, many times bringing children to a brand new language, finding new friends. The whole family is confronted with a new culture and habits, sometimes with different attitudes, which, especially for children in the initial stages of life abroad, can be a big problem, as they may conflict with the parents' well-being and those in which they were brought up to go abroad. In short, by coming abroad, the whole family may experience a real shock at the abundance of all the changes that have been foreign to them until recently.

If an individual is sent to a diplomatic environment, he³ becomes a diplomat and represents political, economic, defense and other interests in a receiving state. A family that may accompany a diplomat abroad becomes a diplomatic family and the responsibility for the diplomats and members of his family is even greater. Both successes and failures abroad become part of the national and foreign policy story. In this case, the diplomat and his / her spouse are no longer just individuals with their own family, who care solely for their own family and their own economic interest, but both are additionally in the service of their country. A diplomat is certainly in the service of his country, but indi-

2 The words spouse, partner and diplomat are hereafter meaningfully used for both genders.

3 We use the masculine form in a neutral form for both genders, unless specifically pointed out otherwise.

vidual members of his family need not be aware of it. They are definitely part of a mosaic called the international diplomatic environment. Of course, it is primarily the diplomat who is much more exposed, due to the nature of the work, while his or her spouse is most concerned with the functioning of the family. However, this does not end the spouse's role, as he is often the one who also takes care of informal forms of diplomatic socializing that can later produce formal results. In modern times, there can be a very narrow line between formal and informal, since sometimes decisions that result from informal socializing are also found at the formal level.

The fact is, while working abroad, relationships in the country of origin are changing, and the old situation, which was there before going abroad, is mostly gone. Last but not least, the relationship between the home and the domestic situation is changing, as well as the people who live or have lived abroad. The longer individuals and families are abroad, the greater the difference in attitudes toward the homeland and is getting smaller in comparison to the foreign environment. What can be forgotten is why they are abroad, which is especially important when it comes to working in diplomacy. Both locals and those who have lived abroad become trapped in the expectation that everything will be as it was. But it is not and cannot be because life goes on, with or without them. How the family can help itself, how the state can help it reintegrate are just two of the many questions raised by families abroad as well as the author of the present contribution on its own as a challenge to this task.

This article also discusses the attitude of the employer to provide the diplomat with a safe and stable living environment towards the diplomat's family. Are better pay and status the only incentives for diplomatic families to live abroad? Are there other options for improving the quality of life of diplomatic families? Do career and non-career diplomats and their families have different views on the challenges of living abroad? Does the current system even encourage the deployment of the whole family abroad or does it favor singles? Can and how can the state help maintain the soundness of a marriage that is too often put to the test by working abroad? What to do with spouses after returning home? These are just some of the issues that we find worthy of consideration. What the article intentionally omits itself are the guidances of the receiving states which dictate the lives of diplomats and their families. By doing so it keeps the focus on

common issues regarding the diplomat's families, regardless of the different geographical areas.

Let us point out also here briefly the distinction between career and non-career diplomats. A career diplomat is the person who deals with diplomacy on a permanent, professional basis and this presents his career, regardless of this if he starts with this occupation at the beginning of his career or later. And non-career is the one that steps into this profession only temporarily for certain, most often specialized tasks and projects (like those recruited for the Presidency of the EU Council in the Slovene case in 2008).

THE FAMILY OF A DIPLOMAT

As mentioned earlier, each diplomatic family meets many challenges. To summarize just a few of them: changing the environment, a new country, a new language and new habits. Before a family can even face these challenges, it must first make a conscious decision to go abroad. This is definitely the hardest decision to make. One of the reasons why Foreign Ministry sometimes have a problem sending people abroad is that diplomats do not choose to work abroad for purely private reasons – family reasons, which are purely practical in nature, are at the forefront: the concern of partners from losing their jobs, the fear of a partner and children about the unknown and the like. By far, the most common problem is employer of a partner, as many employers are either justified or unheard of for their years of absence from work. If a diplomat's partner works in the private sector, then the employers' compassion is even less so, to say the least. The very same just listed reason and much more resulting in the absence of attractiveness of being abroad together with a family are depicted in the Kravec's work.⁴ In it one of the leading conclusions was that only a few of accompanying spouses (2 out of 18 families being studied) managed to continue their careers or even find new ones. We quickly come to a situation where even the short-term effects of a diplomat's salary (for the duration of their term abroad) do not outweigh the loss of a spouse's income, not to mention the long-term dangers (loss of spouse's employment). Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account the purely Slovenian features when it comes to quality of life assessment. For many Slovenians, the quality of life is measured by a house, an indispensable car (preferably of higher class), as well as the

4 Kravec, 2015, pp. 207 – 220.

closeness of relatives and friends. If these conditions are met, then there is less need to go abroad.

We distinguish diplomats who are seconded to work abroad alone or with a child, diplomats who go with families, and as a consequence of diplomatic life, we also have diplomats who are divorced. The burden of diversity of life interests can lead to a family breakdown. In the Slovene diplomacy there are cases when, for example, a partner goes to work abroad and his family stays at home in Slovenia. This is due to a conflict of interest when the other partner has a well-paid job, or because of the proximity of the diplomat (Klagenfurt, Trieste, Sarajevo, Vienna, Budapest, Zagreb) and individuals in such situations decide to go abroad independently, while their families remain at home. Nowadays, technology has advanced to such an extent that communication is no problem, as it runs via email, phone, and across platforms on smartphones (Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, and many more). The proximity to home, however, allows the family to be seen almost every weekend, assuming, of course, that there are no diplomatic obligations during this time.⁵

In any case, diplomacy can also be a burden, as families go either formally apart or only for the period of secondment. The author states that during her first term of service abroad, when she cohabited with her son for some time. This period of time was extremely arduous for her, considering that she had no support in child's care after regular working hours, respectively in the afternoon and when her employee required her presence at work until late in the evening. The burden was high; there was no free time except for the weekends.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and through it the state directs the work of a diplomat. They both expect results from him while at the same time his family also demands their share. The state as well directs its expectations, which, due to the nature of the work, often cannot be met. The constant accusations that a diplomat spends too little time at home with a family have outgrown many diplomats over their heads and are suddenly caught between the diplomatic environment and their families. Certainly, diplomats like to be involved in their profession, they want to validate and prove themselves, even more so when it comes to career diplomats. Poor conscience about the family, fatigue, and anxiety about the job are sometimes the reason why expectations from

5 Pungaršek, 2019, p. 38.

partners and children are simply left unfulfilled. Each individual is expected to live up to certain expectations in the family, not to mention the professional life. By trying to please everyone often leads to failure.

If we consider for a moment the difficulties of a family in making the decision to go abroad, it is also necessary to be aware of its advantages when it is already abroad as well as of new positive experiences for the whole family. The benefits are mainly reflected in the diplomat's emotional stability, as his family offers him security and stability, as well as his easier integration into the diplomatic environment. A diplomat with loved ones will certainly be more committed to his work than someone from a far-off home who is burdened with maintaining physical contacts. The second reason mentioned above is to facilitate integration into the new environment with diplomats with families. We have in mind both positive professional consequences (a wider range of diplomatic contacts) and purely private consequences (exchange of experience with other families).

The experience of living abroad is not only an experience for a diplomat; it also leaves a positive mark on other members of his family. The experience abroad is an added value that can be appreciated and used by diplomats' spouses and by their children. Of course, knowing at least one additional foreign language is absolutely paramount. In comparison with the ones left behind the whole family is definitely changing its perspective and as a result of this experience, it is richer for a new knowledge and new skills dictated by the new environment. The next positive experience is an improved ability to adapt, whether it be adjusting to new professional environments, living between different nationalities, different school systems, or adapting to situations that they might never face in Slovenia. We noticed that the experience of being abroad enriched the author for another important realization: more appreciation for certain advantages of her homeland. At the same time we noted that she has become more critical of certain social phenomena in Slovenia.⁶

DIPLOMAT'S PARTNER IN THE SUPPORTING ROLE

What kind of role should be performed by a person being married to a diplomat going beyond just following their partners around the world

⁶ Pungaršek, 2019, p.39.

is an opening question by Hendry.⁷ The role of the diplomat's partner is emphasized in the diplomatic activity, as he is also a subject of preparations/training topics before going abroad. If he really gets into the subject, it's another question, and especially so when referring to non-career diplomats with their family. The principle expectation of a diplomats' partners is that they should be educated, pleasant to talk to and being great hosts⁸ when necessary. The importance of the role of partners in the pursuit of the diplomatic profession (as well as any other) comes from the following thought: "A head of a mission who has an unregulated partner relationship or an unregulated family situation is more difficult to devote himself fully to work."⁹

When it comes to women accompanying diplomats abroad, expectations can easily be too high, not to mention stereotypical. What kind of a woman is expected in diplomacy is best described by Čačinovič Vogrinčič, by speaking of her mother. She describes her as a legend who had a terrible fervor and energy. She was a creative woman who found herself in all foreign worlds, cultures, different languages, social lifes, and at the same time knew how to keep a solid home. The truth is, as Čačinovič Vogrinčič puts it, that her father, diplomat Rudi Čačinovič, would never have become a successful diplomat without her.¹⁰ In order to actively support a family abroad, the diplomat's partner is actually the one who has to show the most flexibility in a new environment. We say this because, for example, diplomats, soldiers, police officers and others find jobs abroad that they are used to, or very similar to their jobs back home. Even if it is a completely new experience it is almost always the rule of using the same common language (usually English) – thus their integration is getting easier.¹¹

These two benefits (work knowledge and the ability to speak one of the world's languages) are usually not provided to a diplomat's partner. Therefore, the partner of the diplomat is the one who, first of all, must find himself or herself in a new country, in a new culture, and possibly in a foreign language unknown until then. We give the latter absolute priority, since at least a partial knowledge of the local language makes it easier for the diplomat's partner to carry out purely

7 Hendry, 1998, second paragraph.

8 Petrič, 2010, p.330.

9 Marc and Pogačnik, 2012, p.25.

10 A Slovenian psychologist and social worker, also the daughter of a diplomat during the time of Yugoslavia, who published a specific statement in the journal Plus, published on 25 December, 2016, p.54.

11 Pungaršek, 2019, p.40.

daily tasks that benefit the entire family (for example, the purchase of food and other necessities for life). That is why we dare to say that the diplomat's partner is the one who should be provided all the support in the preparation of the language of the receiving state, while it is inherently possible for the diplomat to actively master at least one world language.

In order for a partner to accompany a diplomat abroad, he or she must leave his or her job. After arranging a standstill, giving up their careers (some for good, and those with more luck for a certain period) only a few manage to continue their professional career abroad. This is just one side of a coin, because they also leave their friends prior to embarking on a foreign, unfamiliar environment. It depends on the personality of the individual how he or she prepares to move, but in any case, this is considered to be a great psychological burden for the diplomat's partner and the family as a whole. A diplomat's work stretches from official eight hours every day to late evening hours, often affecting family life, whose holder at one time becomes only one adult member, in this case the diplomat's partner, but still with a danger of a prejudice that he or she is a passive partner (in terms of an income) and that it contributes nothing for the benefit of the family. Even the financial allowance he or she receives is not so great as to cover the loss of pay, and this allowance is only an integral part of the salary received by the diplomat, not the partner, into his or her bank account.

In the case of a standstill, it should be made clear that spouse's working period is suspended for the duration of the diplomat's follow-up and is only entitled to coverage of a retirement funds and a disability contributions. There are many cases where diplomatic spouses have lost their jobs despite legal provisions. They are only entitled to at least 6 months reimbursement of the Employment Service in the event of losing their job after returning to Slovenia.

To prevent partners from being characterized as passive monitors abroad, it would be a good idea to give them better job opportunities, for example in the form of part-time employment. The same approach is suggested by Hendry. Maybe this could encourage their employment in the Foreign Service. Many of the accompanying partners come from, *inter alia*, scientific, academic and educational backgrounds while others have practical knowledge profiles. They could be allowed to continue their profession and, upon their return home,

be offered to work in the industry they represent. It is a mutually profitable approach as the country saves money and the diplomat's partner can continue his career continuously without losing his status.¹²

DIPLOMATIC PARTNER IN THE SERVICE OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomats's partners choose to travel abroad for different reasons and with different expectations. These can be very different. Some accompanying partners have young children and wish to devote only to them. There were many mothers who claimed that their period abroad was the most enjoyable, as they could devote their time to their toddlers for several years instead of the usual one year immediately after birth. Other partners decided to devote their time exclusively to themselves and their hobbies so that they could finally do what they always wanted. The next category of partners – and this one is the most numerous – are those who have a day-long preoccupation with a house logistics, childcare, international schools, not to mention a support to their diplomat spouses. There are also partners who are looking for a job during their stay abroad, as they would like to contribute to their family budget and wish to be richer for a new work experience.

There is another category of diplomatic partners who during their time abroad would also like to become more involved in diplomacy. It would be wise to offer this option to all diplomats's partners for consideration before being sent abroad. Let us emphasize immediately that in this role we do not see partners as excellent hosts of social events, although some authors emphasize this role¹³. In most cases, diplomatic partners are also educated people from different working backgrounds and with a wealth of experience that could be used for the benefit of the sending state during their stay abroad.

It's not really anything new, but it's underused a lot. During the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2008, the Foreign Ministry developed a good practice of recruiting both partners to the diplomatic service, one of them coming from the Foreign Ministry while the other was added to the Foreign Ministry for the term of the first. The partners of the diplomats thus worked with them at the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia in Brussels (hereinafter referred to as SPBR). We understand that

¹² Pungaršek, 2019, pp.40-41.

¹³ For example, see Marc and Pogačnik, 2012, p.25.

this was a single act and its next iteration will not be until the second half of 2021¹⁴. We understand that such an event also has completely different needs – requirements for more staff, the need for more staff diversity and the need for more support and administrative tasks. But the presidency is behind us, the experience has been excellent but the diplomatic partners are again in their most passive role.

The problem is that diplomats, when they are abroad with their family members, receive some allowance, and they also have some of their contributions¹⁵ arranged. Of course, we do not oppose the latter, but the amount itself is nothing stimulating and the status of a spouse is not comparable to the employees in Slovenia. The amount is lower than the Slovenian minimum wage, which has the effect of deterring spouses with better jobs – they do not even run the risk of losing their jobs. Concerning the standstill of employment in Slovenia, the partners of the diplomats who are employed in the public administration are definitely in the advantage – the security of keeping the job is definitely higher than in the private sector. Notwithstanding this experience, it has been shown that employers in the public administration do not have too much regard for diplomatic partners who, while receiving a job back, are often worse off jobs. Far from the eyes, far from the heart, is a logic that is still all the more so in an increasingly competitive work environment and diplomatic partners are generally in a subordinate position.¹⁶

EXPECTATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TO DIPLOMATIC FAMILIES

Everything in life revolves around expectations. If they do come true, we are full of impetus for new challenges, if not then we are disappointed, be it in private or in diplomatic life. First, the diplomat and his family are expected to abide by the law of the receiving state, and diplomatic immunity cannot be an excuse here. Furthermore, the diplomatic family is expected to respect and accept diversity and to behave appropriately. These are some basic, even self-evident, expectations that should never be foreign to a diplomatic family.

But here are completely different expectations. In an international environment, there are social events that diplomats and their families are

¹⁴ The Slovene Presidency of the Council of the EU 2021.

¹⁵ Uredba št. 14/2009.

¹⁶ Pungaršek, 2019, pp.42-46.

expected to attend. These can be many and it depends on the diplomat's position and desire to attend. Due to the abundance, social events and receptions can also be exhausting, but in a diplomatic family the desire to participate must be present, otherwise it may be pushed into isolation. These events, as mentioned above, play an important role for the family itself, as they give it the opportunity to better connect with the diplomatic community and access to information, lessons learned and getting new acquaintances that have a great impact on the continuation of a life abroad.

For the diplomat as an individual, and purely from the point of view of the profession's need, such events can be a springboard for facing the future challenges in diplomacy, since they are often attended by people who will be easier to connect with because of their previous social life acquaintance. Regarding the expectations at such events, Čačinovič¹⁷ jokingly says that the modern role of ambassadors is to become caterers, hoteliers and their wives to be experts in diplomatic discounts, high fashion and drugstores, in order to fulfill the expectations of the environment, in which they live. That is not far from the truth. If there are children, they are expected to have polyglot skills. In short, the international environment expects the diplomat and his family to connect with the environment in which they live as quickly as possible. The expectation is in place, as this is the only way to ensure smooth interaction.

This is just one side of a diplomatic social life, most often demonstrated in the form of diplomatic receptions. But foreign life expects much more from the diplomatic family. If there are children and they attend schools abroad (especially international ones), then the school environment also has certain expectations. International schools thus require and expect their students to follow a particular school protocol which is quite different from that used by the children in the Slovenian school system. This protocol occasionally includes families as well.

To sum up, it can be argued that a diplomatic family abroad can be fully occupied, which is more often than not even expected. Especially during the last financial crisis, there was a widespread expectation that families get as engaged as possible with as little or almost no support from the sending state. Another question is if the family wants to do it or at least wishes to do so. In any case, modest approach is

17 For example, see Čačinovič, 2006, p.57.

in place because otherwise it can become overwhelming. Too much passivity when it comes to non-attendance at diplomatic receptions, however, is certainly in conflict with the expectations of the sending state, since in this case the diplomat, though informally, does not fulfill his overall mission. If his family is with him, then the potential for non-participation is even worse, because such absence does not escape the attention of a diplomatic eye. Diplomacy needs diplomatic families capable of interacting with the international environment, and it expects this from them all the time (or at least wishes to have them), because this greatly enhances the diplomatic potential of a host country. One thing are closed-door diplomatic meetings, the other are diplomatic receptions, international fairs, bazaars and more, but all of them reinforce the potential of a country, and in the case of smaller states, their recognition. In diplomacy, the size of the country is even more important and follows the principle that you get as much as you give. In case of small states and without a wide-spread diplomatic network what is another way of getting closer to the expectations of the diplomatic environment? According to the author, the answer lies in diplomatic families.¹⁸

THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMATIC AND PRIVATE LIFE

A diplomat abroad, in the environment in which he lives and works, is primarily a foreigner. As such, he faces a number of challenges, best described by Jazbec.¹⁹ Challenges and a change in environment lead to a change in diplomatic habits – their magnitude is usually proportional to the length of their term. The longer we are abroad, the more we change, the more we become alienated from our homeland, but we are never really accustomed to the new environment, since the latter will never really allow us to do that – we are and will remain strangers to that environment. In doing so, it is necessary to adapt to the new culture, and not just the latter, since it is also necessary to find the right balance between a diplomatic (professional) environment and privacy.

Being a diplomat abroad has its advantages and disadvantages. The great advantage is the start with the financial incentive and all the benefits of diplomatic status. As for the financial benefits of working abroad, the fact is that when you add up the various costs of staying abroad and the cost of maintaining physical contacts (such as airfare), the time spent

18 Pungaršek, 2019, pp.46-48.

19 Jazbec, 2016.

traveling between work abroad and your home country quickly comes to the realization, that a higher salary abroad does not outweigh all the difficulties, not to mention the traumas that foreign life brings to a diplomat and his family. If someone goes abroad solely for the sake of money, there is a good chance that he will be disappointed because then he is simply not ready for the challenges ahead. Conversely, anyone who goes abroad in the desire for new experiences and in the desire for personal and professional development, is very likely to have pleasant time. For starters, a great experience is a completely different work environment that introduces processes and solutions than we were not used to before. What enriches the time abroad, however, is the exchange of experience in a multinational environment.

Therefore, money cannot compensate for weakness. These are mainly reflected in private life. Slowly contacts with the homeland and loved ones (friends) are being diluted despite efforts to preserve them. These contacts can even become an effort, instead of the joy of re-visiting. You are getting horrified because you cannot make everyone happy with your presence. It is about the fact that the relatives and friends of the diplomat expect a lot of attention during their short stay in the homeland, they simply expect you to find the time for just about everyone – this in the end requires daily visits and a selection of visits. The latter becomes more and more tiring that you end up wanting to go back abroad as soon as possible – we are punished with even greater isolation from the people. If it is put in the words of Jazbec, the foreign country with its stunner has brought a curse of alienation. In keeping a contact with a loved ones, modern communication tools do not help us much either, because this is not the right one, it is not genuine contact. Our home media coverage does not help us as well, because the diversity of living abroad changes our expectations – we become more demanding and critical towards our homeland, angry with some nonsense in our homeland, which may not even exist abroad. It can also be the case that we become indifferent to our homeland. If anyone, then the diplomat must maintain real contact with the homeland and what is happening in it – at least professionally, because otherwise the foreign country can suck a diplomat into itself and who ultimately forgets whom he actually represents. First and foremost, it is the diplomat's duty to look after the interests of his homeland. Of course, it is also a sender's duty to watch over the diplomat's engagement abroad, since a diplomat is there precisely to represent a sender. During her eight years of service in Brussels, the author noted a number of diplomats who eventually relented to the expectations of in-

ternational organizations and ultimately only resented over the capital's directions. Sometimes it has been quite clear that a certain person has omitted professional guidance directed by his/her capital.

Those with enough sense for socializing make a new circle of friends abroad to compensate for their absence from the loved ones in their home country. But abroad, too, friends are leaving, which is rather common in diplomacy (this is even more common in military life abroad – because of shorter rotations). Farewells from new but unfortunately short-lived friends abroad are painful, leaving us in the end between two or more banks of friends and acquaintances you can never really commit to. During these periods of change, we feel a void, and it is even more difficult to watch our children, who are forced to leave their classmates and friends overnight, and some of them find it very difficult to deal with. Often thinking that children are more adaptable than we older are does not help us much, since it is actually difficult for children as well. With the exception of the few who consciously choose to stay abroad, most diplomats return home. In doing so, Lukčič Hacin²⁰ states that reintegration into the home environment is a worse experience than socialization in a foreign environment. Secondly, the author states that there is never a real return, for sure no return to the past situation, because everything has changed, from them being abroad to people back in their homeland.

Depending on the number of terms, we leave and come and leave, but life goes on without us and even the most persistent are not ready to wait forever, nor are we entitled to expect it. We are the ones who are constantly running away somewhere else. The author's spouse is an officer of the Slovenian Armed Forces and he says that they are a nomadic family that has no rest in one place and must always go somewhere else. He has spent more than a decade in his career abroad, living in six countries on three continents for extended periods of time, visiting dozens of others for a shorter time. It's a real curse and a stunner. We want to see and experience something new, but at the same time we always leave something behind. The hardest time was always coming back from a longer, long-term stop abroad, as we get used to the latter. Now we find ourselves that we have been in many places and at the same time nowhere, since there is practically no time to grow roots anywhere.²¹

20 For examples, see Lukčič, 2009, p.25.

21 Pungaršek, 2019, pp.48-50.

HOME COMING

Each member of the family of a diplomat at an end of his / her term abroad and upon a return home is conveyed by different feelings, expectations, desires, goals, as well as doubts²². Experiences from abroad shape a person in their own way, both in relation to domestic, neighbors, friends, our loved ones, and in relation to the time and place in which we will be located in the future, for example at work or school. Returning home may be an even more difficult act than going abroad, but, according to the information available to us, Slovenia pays little attention to the repatriation.

Realizing that the situation and relationships that we were used to prior to leaving Slovenia will be mostly gone and that everything will start building anew can be a heavy burden for the whole family. Suddenly, we feel like we no longer fit into the place, however it is us who need to readjust because this is our country, our home. As Gorman names coming home, it is a “reverse culture shock”.²³

We believe that diplomats who complete their service abroad have gained professional experience and of course knowledge that could be used in the organization in which they work. At least these are the expectations of all who have worked abroad and are richer with new experiences that employers should appreciate. That is why they often expect that the return to the previous workplace will be easier, since with their knowledge and experience they will contribute to the team and, if possible, occupy at least an old if not new better workplace. However, these expectations are quite often not met after arriving at the previous job. Due to the inconsistent personnel policy of the leadership, even the fear of new knowledge, which is perceived as a threat by those who remained in Slovenia rather than as an added value and due to inconvenience, there were situations where a good experienced diplomats who were put in a corner left to themselves, waiting for better times or for someone who wanted to use their knowledge. Adding to that any unpleasant experience while working abroad, both professional and/or private, the frustration back home grows even bigger.

It is also challenging for a diplomat's partner and for their children. In case of children a transition from one school system to another is

²² Marx, 1999, p.131.

²³ Gorman, 2015, last chapter.

always a huge shift. However it could be easier for children if they return to the same school and to the same classmates as they had been in before going abroad. It is even more difficult for children who have entered school abroad for their first time. The latter need much more attention, professional guidance and, above all, understanding of teachers. These are young personalities who, because of their youth, have almost forgotten their homeland, which they left before turning five years old. In my experience, the entire burden of repatriating children lies solely on the shoulders of parents. Of course, different school systems are not the only challenges that children must face. Like adults, they have to deal with coming and going, changing friends, surroundings, language. This may seem a little easier for the children, because at least outwardly they give a sense of quicker adaptability but is that really the case? By judging the author's two sons they have had the same regrets as their parents did.

The magnitude of the reintegration problems rises with a spouses who while being abroad haven't invested much in additional education (training) and haven't maintained regular contacts with their employers back home. The last can create a situation where accompanying spouses can be simply forgotten by the employers. It is true that the spouse of a diplomat for the duration of his/her stay abroad, in accordance with the law governing employment regulations, has the possibility of suspending contractual and other rights and the obligations arising from employment related to his/her work – provided that he/she has an understanding employer. Of course, this does not apply to the private sector. Upon the return back home, the previous posts are supposed to be waiting for the spouses, but there is no absolute guarantee that this would be the case. Many times, when returning from a foreign country, a diplomat's partner is reassigned to another post, in some cases even losing a job. For the latter, the main reason is the employers' need for continuity of work. That created a new regulation where the ministries provide diplomatic partners with unemployment insurance upon their return home. Despite the insurance, this is a bad consolation, as it allows coverage of income loss only up to six months after returning home. Judging by the experiences, few can find a new job during this time.

In the previous paragraph, we discussed exclusively problems associated with the employment of a diplomat's spouse. What about the loss of the circle of people we lived with abroad? Of course this is also

the case in other professions, but the peculiarity of diplomatic life is that this phenomenon is repeatedly present during the diplomatic terms. It is a painful experience comparable to the experience of leaving our loved ones when going abroad in the first place. Through the homecoming process, we are once again leaving someone, this time a community of people with whom we have lived abroad. The author especially mentions her great experience within the parent community in the international schools, than communities of people living close to their place of residence which had an international flavour thus making the experience of going well beyond solely related to the new country habits. Of course not forget to mention families of their spouse's co-workers.

With the return home, the process of reintegration begins, which is much more difficult than the process of re-socialization. According to Lukšič Hacin: "Returnees in their memory bear the image of their original environment from the time they left and expect to find the same, but that has changed in the meantime. People in the returning environment also expect the individual (family) to come back as they were, but he or she has also changed. The interrupted communication is alienating people."²⁴ Despite the technology that surrounds us, genuine contact is still the one that ensures relationships to be maintained.

When we look at author's past experiences of living abroad in both roles (as a diplomat and as a supporting spouse), we find that upon each return to her homeland she felt some emptiness and anxiety, as if she had somehow outgrown her previously professional environment as well as the home environment. Talking about professional life the new experiences and ideas from abroad can be disturbing rather than welcome by the previous colleagues. There is also a denial of knowledge from abroad, since "here we do things differently." This is especially pronounced in environments dominated by people who do not have the experience of working abroad – neither they are willing to do it.

To sum up, going abroad is a difficult decision, and returning home is often an even more one. This is difficult already for an individual diplomat, and for a diplomat's family it is all the more difficult.²⁵

²⁴ Lukšič Hacin, 2009, p.25.

²⁵ Pungaršek, 2019, pp.60-62.

CONCLUSION

Diplomacy is not something that came only with the Slovene independence; it is part of the Slovenian space and history that can be easily attributed to the previous century. But even under different national formations, the experience was not collected, stored (perhaps not even appreciated) and transmitted – and, above all, not implemented in a timely manner. Why do we emphasize the word timely?

If contemporary Slovene diplomacy had set its beginnings on a broader basis (both in terms of content and legislation), it would have been accepted as such. Today instead of upgrading the content we are forced to go back to upgrading the legislation. This is an arduous task in current times, unfortunately probably already doomed to modest chances of success. The legally regulated life of families or partners abroad does not end the task of the state. Equally important is return, reintegration and, above all, how the lessons learned from people accompanying diplomats translate into new job opportunities and promotion opportunities for existing employees. People who have returned home should not be viewed as individuals who are at risk of those who were not ready to face the challenges by going abroad. We have to accept them as healthy competition because if we admit it or not, they were ready to do something more for their organization. Staying with one job or be firmly anchored within the organization, regardless of its broader needs beyond borders, while portraying those who dared going abroad as opportunists for higher earnings (or well-paid extended vacation, which is one of the common statements) is an escape from the reality of today. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the umbrella diplomatic organization, does not encounter the problems described, while it is noted for other departments where non-career diplomats come from.

So is the diplomat's family abroad a burden? It depends purely on each individual, every family, every system standing behind the family, and of course on the receiving state. We have not discussed much the latter, but in any case, their internal solutions have a great impact on the lives of diplomatic families – in fact they dictate it. Current solutions in Slovenian diplomacy or legislation could be more favorable to families. Therefore, the answer to the title of the article is best given in a way to paraphrase it: the coexistence of families abroad is burdened by the current state of affairs with its incomplete legislation. There is

still a lot of room for improvement and not all of them are necessarily of a financial nature (for example compiled of lessons learned). The fact is that as long as there is an external service and related diplomatic families and individuals with or without partners, there will always be new challenges. The latter should not be treated as a problem, but rather viewed as an opportunity for further development of the service.

REFERENCES

- Čačinovič, R., 1994. *Slovensko bivanje sveta: Razvoj in praksa diplomacije*. Ljubljana: ČZP Enotnost.
- Gorman, Donna S., 1995. *Am I Going to starve to Death: A Survival Guide for the Foreign Service Spouse*, self publishing, Kindle e-book.
- Hendry, A., 1998. *From parallel to dual careers: Diplomatic spouses*. URL: <https://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/parallel-dual-careers-diplomatic-spouses> 7.3.2019.
- Jazbec, M., 2016. Mission London: A Mini Handbook of Diplomatic Practice. In: *European Perspectives – Journal on European Perspectives of The Western Balkans*, Volume 8, No. 1 (14), pp.195–213.
- Jazbec, M., et al., 2009. *Enake možnosti v slovenski diplomaciji*. Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU.
- Krlev, N., 2015. *America's Other Army: The U.S. Foreign Service and 21st Century Diplomacy*, second updated edition, self publishing, Kindle e-book, ISBN-10: 1517254515
- Lukšič Hacin, M., 2009. *Enake možnosti v slovenski diplomaciji*. Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU.
- Marc, L., Pogačnik M., 2015. *Diplomatski praktikum*.
- Marx, E., 1999. *Breaking through culture shock: What you need to succeed in international business*. London: Nicholas Brealey.
- Petrič, E., 2010. *Zunanja politika: osnove teorije in praksa*. Ljubljana, Mengeš: Znanstvenoraziskovalni center Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti, Center za evropsko prihodnost.
- Pungaršek, D., 2019. *Diplomacija in družina, breme ali sožitje?*. Kranj, Nova univerza, Fakulteta za državne študije.
- Uredba o plačah in drugih prejemkih javnih uslužbencev za delo v tujini, Uradni list RS, št. 14/2009.

Individualism as a determinant of successful diplomats through the engagement of stereotyped sportspersons

Milan Jazbec¹

ABSTRACT

The first part of the paper discussion commences with skiing, which has the dimension of a national myth in Slovenia and elaborates the stereotype that Slovenes are not successful in collective sports, but in individual ones. We examined this issue with presentation, comparison and commenting all facts in selected individual sports vs. collective sports (skiing vs. football, swimming vs. basketball and athletics vs. handball). Generally speaking, Slovenes are in sports above all individuals.

The second part of the paper contemplates the individualism of diplomats and sportspersons. This characteristic enables outstanding sportspersons, who are celebrities, to appear therefore occasionally as ad hoc diplomats. They de facto represent their own countries, promote friendly relations in concrete cases or generally, as a universal value, and also negotiate, if tasked with this. However, they are not diplomats; they just behave like them, since they are successful individuals.

KEY WORDS: diplomacy, sport, individualism, myth, stereotypes

POVZETEK

Prvi del opisuje smučanje, ki ima v Sloveniji razsežnost nacionalnega mita, predstavljen pa je tudi stereotip, da Slovenci niso uspešni v kolektivnih športih, ampak v individualnih. To vprašanje smo preučili s predstavitvijo, primerjavo in interpretacijo vseh dejstev v izbranih individualnih športih v primerjavi s kolektivnimi športi (smučanje in nogomet, plavanje in košarka, atletika in rokomet). Na splošno so Slovenci v športu predvsem individualisti.

Drugi del prispevka razmišlja o individualizmu diplomatov in športnikov. Ta lastnost omogoča izjemnim športnikom, ki so znane osebnosti, da se občasno pojavijo kot ad hoc diplomati. Dejansko predstavljajo svoje države, spodbujajo prijateljske odnose, v konkretnih primerih ali na splošno, kot univerzalno vrednoto in se tudi pogajajo, če se to od njih zahteva. Vendar niso diplomati; samo obnašajo se kot diplomati, saj so uspešni posamezniki.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: diplomacija, šport, individualizem, mit, stereotipi

¹ ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Milan Jazbec, PhD, Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Ljubljana and Ambassador of Slovenia to North Macedonia. Email: milan.jazbec@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

»It was winter and the land was wide covered with snow.«
 Fran Levstik, *Martin Krpan*²

In this paper we discuss on a general level the correlation between sportspersons and diplomats, understanding them as individualists. Our aim is to find out if outstanding sportspersons also perform as diplomats, as well as what the similarities and differences between them are, when sportspersons also appear or are at least perceived as diplomats, after achieving outstanding results that bring them into the public eye and in the focus of international attention.

To come to that test, we firstly have a closer look at a stereotype of Slovenes, stemming from the time of the former Yugoslavia, saying that they are individuals and hence good in individual sports and not in team (collective) sports. Here we start from the origin of skiing and its importance for Slovenes and their national character, which constructs the perception of Slovenes as individualists and not collectivists. This importance has nowadays reached practically a mythological dimension.

From this point of view, we illustrate in the first, more detailed part of this contribution our main thesis, which states that Slovenes are not successful in collective sports; they are successful in individual sports. We could also use more popular and broadly accepted wording, and say that Slovenes are skiers, not football players. This thesis will be examined, while presenting, comparing and commenting on facts in selected individual sports vs. collective ones (primarily skiing and swimming vs. football and basketball; we take into account additionally also athletics and handball). The time frame of this comparison covers the last two decades of former Yugoslavia (from 1970 onwards) and the time span of independent Slovenia (from 1991 till 2008 – almost two decades as well). To this we attach our additional thesis, which says that after the independence of Slovenia, Slovenes have been more successful in collective sports than in individual sports. Since Slovenia is an EU member from spring 2004, we will try to evaluate briefly if this frame has had any additional effect on the subject discussed. The here

2 Fran Levstik wrote his story *Martin Krpan* in 1858 with the ambition to show to his Slovene colleagues how one should write a story as a literary (fictional) piece. *Martin Krpan*, though being most probably based on a real person, is today also considered a myth, which should give Slovenes self-assurance and sovereign behavior.

researched timeframe concludes with the year 2008, when Slovenia was presiding over the European Council.

Complementary to this, we will have a look at our research interest with the question of whether geographical, historical, psychological and political circumstances have, or have had, any effect on the formulation, existence and change of the aforementioned stereotype. Finally, we would try to see if possible changes with regard to the degree of success of Slovenes in sporting, influence possible changes of this stereotype.

In the second part of this contribution, we compare outstanding sportspersons as a whole, in contrast to the approach in the first part, in a generalizing manner, in their role as promoters of their countries with that of diplomats, performing, to a certain extent, basically the same activity. They both promote and represent their countries. We try to draw parallels between sportspersons and diplomats as well as to try to find out some main similarities and differences. For a broader insight into trends, we would include also the concepts of sport diplomacy and celebrity diplomacy. There, we would try to see if individualism lies at the heart of those activities and of their significance.

From the methodological point of view, we use methods of presenting facts, commenting on and generalizing them as well as comparing them. We exercise this on a general level and do not enter into specific theorizing on myths, stereotypes and diplomacy, since we try to find out and articulate trends without the ambition of going into extensive detail and collecting huge amounts of data. A few tables are used to present and illustrate findings also visually. We measure the degree of success in sport with outstanding results in the international arena. In the second part, we primarily rely on the method of comparison (between sportspersons and diplomats). There we will have a look at the relation between sport and celebrity diplomacy from one point of view and with mainstream (political) diplomacy from another point of view. We presuppose that they complement each other to a certain extent. Slovenia has been chosen as a research subject matter because it is widely known for successful skiers and since it was the first new EU member of the 2004 enlargement to preside over the European Council.

MYTHS AND STEREOTYPES AND THEIR SOCIAL BACKGROUND

When Fran Levstik wrote his famous story, Slovenes were skiing already for more than two centuries and were also engaged in the diplomatic profession for more than three centuries.³ Skiing, which was at that time primarily a means of travel and light transportation during heavy winters, was for the first time put down, described and elaborated by Janez Vajkard Valvasor.⁴ That sport was at that time reflecting an individual effort to get along in harsh times. We think that at least from that time individualism has been shaping a certain part of the Slovene national character, which was also partially transferred to stereotypes about Slovenes, including those that refer to sports. Here we see a possible basic link between sports and diplomacy – namely, both areas, in spite huge organizations behind each protagonist, leave him/her at the final act on his/her own, primarily in an arena, exposed either to broad public attention or to the diplomatic environment. It is our strong belief that both successful sportspersons and diplomats are primarily individualists, while huge machineries behind them take care about organizational, financial, policy etc. details. Those machineries are either highly complex support teams of various experts from areas like medicine, psychology, bioenergy, therapy, public relations, etc., or complex bureaucratic organizations, which provide diplomats with policy instructions and advice as well as with financial, technical, security, promotional, etc., support. Only they enable them to reach high in international competitiveness. But, at the end of the day, individual skills and similar characteristics appear as the crucial determinants.

Until the mid-20th century, at least in former Yugoslavia, skiing remained a rather unknown and undeveloped as well as an unpopular sport (with the exception of Slovenia). It became more known and was slowly gaining in popularity with the emergence of radio and TV, but still tradition, skill and facilities (in particular premises for ski jumping) were needed. Highly spread in Slovenia, it is no wonder that

3 The first known Slovene diplomat, Sigismund Herberstein, originates in that time (1486–1566). He was a highly successful diplomatic envoy – an *ad hoc* one (meaning also individualist) in the service of three consecutive Habsburg monarchs (Caesars Maximilian and Karl as well as King Ferdinand) (cf. Čačinovič, 1998 and Jazbec, 2009: pp.247–272).

4 The interdisciplinary work of Count Janez Vajkard Valvasor (1641–1693), a masterpiece *Slava vojvodine Kranjske (The Glory of the Duchy of Carniola)* was published in 1689 in Nuremberg, with the original title *Die Ehre dess Herzogthums Crain*. In this work of four volumes he systematically presented and elaborated data, impressions, findings and folk heritage as well as his own drawings of the countryside, cities etc., all of which he gathered traveling around the country for years. Due to his achievements, Valvasor was elected to membership of the British Royal Society in 1687.

skiing formed part of the national identity. Therefore, it always has been part of myth, gradually transformed into stereotype.

We build our contribution from understanding myths as to a certain extent being composed of various stereotypes as an important part of common belief. Both myths and stereotypes are used to form a significant part of the national character (mentality). They arise from the social context and are influenced as well as encouraged by it. In our understanding and for the purpose of this contribution, “myths are the symbolic tales of the distant past (...) that concern cosmogony and cosmology (...), may be connected to belief systems or rituals, and may serve to direct social action and values” (Magoulick, 2012).⁵ Myths are important for identity building, in particular as a partial compensation for (absent) history (Južnič, 1993) and are also connected with literature. Some heroes from literature could get mythical dimensions (Lah and Inkret, 2002, p.6). And a stereotype would be a common belief, which a certain group or part of population shares about another group or part of population: “A stereotype is a fixed, over generalized belief about a particular group or class of people” (Cardwell, 1996).⁶ This belief to a certain extent and from certain points of view may reflect reality (truth about that group or part of population), but has been exaggerated and generalized for the description/characterization of the whole population, mostly in a manipulative, negative and also misleading way. Additionally, a stereotype has been transformed into a classification used to describe such a group or part of the population on a general level, without having the ambition to describe it correctly and comprehensively. Stereotypes, “Both negative and positive, [they] are acquired from everyday social environments, beginning in childhood, and often without any awareness” (Benet and Gaines, 2010, p.436). An important characteristic of stereotypes is that they are very often implicit and tend to perpetuate themselves.

While contemplating myths and their backgrounds, we should have a glance at the nature of individual and collective sports, followed by a closer look at the differences among Slovenes and Serbs (who were the biggest and most influential nation in former Yugoslavia).

Individual sports demand from the performer – an individual – continuously exercised hardworking behaviour. No improvisations are

5 For more on myths see Hansen, 2002, Leeming, 1990 and Lévi-Strauss, 1995.

6 For more on stereotypes see McGarty, 2002, and Stangor, 2000.

allowed, since they cost you the result immediately – you are, as a consequence, out of the game. There is hardly any space for sudden inspirations. Rationalism prevails, since you are working alone and purely on your own. Social interaction practically does not exist; you cannot rely on anybody apart from yourself. Practically speaking, there is only one way to reach the end. The pace should be steady, with a possible speed-up towards the end.

Collective sports are, on the contrary, dynamic; the social framework is complex and changeable, full of interaction and surprises. There is always (enough) space for improvisation and exercising inspiration – one could even say this is a precondition for successful performance and its outcome. The end result depends on various actions and activities, including mistakes. Because of all of this, changes in the team during the match are necessary. Reserve players are on hand; you can always seek to and try to choose the best team combination. Thus, there are many different ways to reach the end and win. They depend upon tactics, the pace, on combination and inspiration. All these factors constantly change. The closer the end is, the more important is it to produce the combination that will surprise the counterpart and bring better result.

Within this sport framework we intend to evaluate the successfulness of Slovenes in former Yugoslavia and during the later period. We will complement this sport framework with some dwelling on national characters of Slovenes and Serbs to have the opportunity of better understanding the topic discussed.

Generally speaking, there were (and indeed still are) obvious differences in the national characters of Slovenes and Serbs, which were (are) supported primarily by historical and geographical backgrounds. Serbs lived for few centuries under strong Ottoman influence, while Slovenes almost a millennium under strong German/Habsburg and briefly also under French influence. These differences could be illustrated by an example from Slovene political history and anthropology from the early 20th century. The Slovene researcher Albin Prepeluh (Zver, 1990; see also Jazbec, 2006, p.46) presented and elaborated the “western” and “eastern” patterns of political culture, using Slovenes and Serbs as examples, respectively. He focused himself on presenting and analysing selected elements that influence the social and political behaviour of both nations. His elaboration is used here to offer a better

inside view on the differences that support the creation/emergence of myths and stereotypes. The presentation of his findings follows in the next table.

Table 1: A comparison between Western and Eastern types

“Western Type” (Slovenia)	“Eastern Type” (Serbia)
Politically differentiated and socially segmented space	Politically consolidated space
Autonomy	Centralism
INDIVIDUALISM	Unification (“the myth of unity”)
Relative or negative attitude towards state	Fetishization of state (“loyalty”)
Ideological differentiation	Less obvious ideological differentiation
Social democracy	Communism
Democratic self governance of people	Adherence to dictatorship

Prepeluh developed his categorization as a result of different historical, political, economic, cultural, geographical etc. circumstances, in which the nations concerned lived throughout their history. It is our opinion that this has also influenced, *inter alia*, the inclination towards various and different sport options.

REALITY IN THE SPORTS ARENA

After elaborating a few elements and aspects, which to our mind have strongly influenced myths and stereotypes about Slovenes in the area of sport, we move on and present a selection of facts and figures about the results achieved⁷ by Slovenes in the sports mentioned here. These sports, as listed in the beginning of this paper, are as follows: skiing and swimming (individual ones) as well as football and basketball (collective ones).⁸

7 As a criterion we take high results, achieved in the international arena (the Olympic Games, the World or the European Cup and similar), both individually or as a member of national or club teams.

8 To catch a broader glimpse of the here-elaborated topic we also include illustrations from athletics and handball.

Firstly, during 1970s and 1980s Slovenes, appearing as members of the Yugoslav national team, represented a strong international power in skiing, alpine skiing in particular. Among the most well-known skiers were Bojan Križaj,⁹ Jože Kuralt, Boris Strel and Rok Petrovič as well as Mateja Svet. Slalom was their favourite discipline. In ski jumping, Ludvik Zajc, Bogdan Norčič and Primož Ulaga stood out. Among swimmers two names stood out, namely Borut and Damjan Petrič (brothers). It must be mentioned here that skiing was extremely popular during this period and still is treated almost as a national sport in Slovenia. The majority of Slovenes ski regularly worldwide, not only at home.¹⁰

As far as football is concerned, during the same period three names stood out, namely Branko Oblak,¹¹ Danilo Popivoda and Vili Ameršek (Olimpija). There are more names when speaking about basketball. To name the most important, they would be: Ivo Daneu,¹² Borut Bassin, Vinko Jelovac, Aljoša Žorga, Peter Vilfan (Olimpija), etc. There is no Slovene team in collective sports that would stand out in this period. The sport club Olimpija from Ljubljana participated with its football team in the Yugoslav first league, but never managed to win neither the league championship nor the cup championship. Its results were primarily average, a few times close to the top, but a few times also quite close to the bottom. There were a few seasons when there was no Slovene representative in the first Yugoslav football league. Rather similar were the results of the Olimpija basketball team during this period. It managed, however, to win the championship in the season 1969/70,¹³ prior to the World Basketball Championship 1970, which was organized in Ljubljana. The Yugoslav team won the Championship (Ivo Daneu was the best player in the Yugoslav team), which inspired basketball in Slovenia (as well as in Yugoslavia) tremendously.

9 He was the only one capable of challenging and also defeating the famous Swedish skier Ingemar Stenmark (they managed to develop a strong friendship). Križaj was selected to give the opening speech on behalf of sportspersons at the opening of the Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo in 1984.

10 Also, Slovenes adopted the stereotype that they all ski (judging at least from the general media picture). This is, of course, not true, the author included.

11 Branko Oblak played at various German and Austrian teams from 1975–1987. With Bayern he won the German League in 1979/80. In 1972 he played at the farewell match of Pele in Rio de Janeiro. At the World Championship in 1974 in Germany he was selected to the all-stars team of the Championship.

12 Ivo Daneu was the best player of the World Basketball Championship in 1967 as well as the best sportsman in Yugoslavia in the same year. In 2007 he was accepted to the FIBA Hall of Fame (www.halloffame.fiba.com – 29 September 2012). He ended his career in 1970, being a member of the Yugoslav national team 209 times and won, apart from gold at the World Championship in 1970, also silver three times at European Championships and twice at World Championships as well as bronze once at the European Championship.

13 Olimpija also won the Yugoslav basketball championship five times in the early years.

Secondly, during the 1990s and later, fewer Slovenes and with less success have been presented in elite skiing. We could name Jure Košir as well as Špela Pretnar, Urška Hrovat and Tina Maze in alpine skiing (again primarily slalom), but also Franci Petek, Primož Peterka and Rok Benkovič in ski jump.¹⁴ In swimming Peter Mankoč, Sara Isakovič as well as Alenka and Nataša Kejžar (sisters) stand out.

As far as football is concerned, the Slovene national team qualified for the European Championship in 2000 in Belgium/Netherlands (among 16 best teams) and for the World Championship in 2002 in Japan/South Korea (among 32 best teams), both being huge and unexpected success. Also, a few clubs achieved noticeable results in the European Champions League (in 1999 Maribor qualified) and in the UEFA Cup (various teams gained attention while participating in both league's qualifications). Practically the same is true for Slovene basketball club teams and the national basketball team. They achieved good results in the European Championship League (Olimpija in 1996/97 achieved 3rd place in the Final Four) and the Cup League (Olimpija won in 1993/94) as well as in the Adriatic League (various Slovene teams play important role traditionally), and also at the World and European Basketball Championships. These clubs are primarily Union Olimpija, Celje Pivovarna Laško, Slovan, Krka, etc. Among individual players several stand out, who also play (or have played) in the NBA League, like Marko Milič (the first Slovene ever in the NBA – Philadelphia 76ers in 1997), Primož Brezec, Radoslav Nesterović and Beno Udrih as well as Sani Bečirovič, Jaka Lakovič and Uroš Slokar.¹⁵ We face the intensive development of both football and basketball throughout Slovenia during the second period. As it was with skiing during the first period, football in particular (as well as basketball) has become highly popular in Slovenia during the second period. At the beginning of the new millennium, Slovenia witnessed a de facto football-mania. This presents a new phenomenon in Slovene sport history as far as collective sports are concerned and football in particular (the latter is even more striking, keeping in mind our main thesis).

Additionally, there were no Slovenes who played any role in athletics during the first period. The same goes for handball teams (and individual handball players). There has not been a single handball team

¹⁴ Additionally, we could also name Dejan Košir, world champion and vice champion in snowboarding.

¹⁵ Of course we have to point out Luka Dončić, a top Slovene basketball star, who stands out now in the NBA and Aleksander Čeferin, the UEFA President, coming from Slovenia, just recently elected for his second term.

from Slovenia that played in the first Yugoslav handball league. Slovene handball players appeared only exceptionally and temporarily in the Yugoslav national team or in successful teams from other Yugoslav republics.¹⁶ However, there was a huge number of handball teams throughout Slovenia, but they hardly reached past regional level.

However, the circumstances changed significantly in the second period. There is a handful of names that stand out in athletics, both women and men: Brigita Bukovec¹⁷ (women hurdles 100 m), Brita Bilač¹⁸ (women high jump), Jolanda Čeplak¹⁹ (women 800 m), Brigita Langerholc²⁰ (women 800 and 1500 m), Alenka Bikar²¹ (women 100 and 200 m), Matic Osovnikar²² (100 m), Primož Kozmus²³ (hammer throw), Gregor Cankar²⁴ (long jump) and Jure Rovnan²⁵ (pole vault). As far as handball is concerned, the Slovene national team achieved huge success by winning the silver medal at the European Championship in Ljubljana in 2004. Furthermore, it is the only Slovene sport team that ever took part at (even) two Olympic Games: in Sydney 2000 (eighth place) and in Athens 2004. Apart from the national team also Celje Pivovarna Laško (men) and Krim (women) stand out significantly in European Champions League (both won once).

A COMPARISON OF SPORT ACHIEVEMENTS

We start our comparison, as already presented, with the general proposition that during the period of former Yugoslavia, Slovenes were successful in individual and not in collective sports, while after gaining independence and achieving statehood, success in collective sports ap-

16 Like in many other collective sports (basketball, football, water polo etc.), Yugoslavia played an important role also in handball.

17 She won the silver medal at both 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games and at the European Championship in Budapest in 1998.

18 She originates from Germany and is married to a Slovene sportsman Borut Bilač (athletics – long jump).

19 She won the gold medal both at the European Championship 2002 and at the European Indoor Championship in 2002 (also setting the indoor world record) as well as the bronze medal at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. However, she was disqualified and banned from professional sports in 2007 for drug abuse.

20 She won fourth place at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and the silver medal at 2001 Mediterranean Games (Universiade).

21 She won bronze at the 1997 Mediterranean Games, silver at the European Championship in 2000 and gold at the 2005 Mediterranean Games.

22 He won bronze at the European Athletic Championship in 2006 and seventh place at the World Championship in 2007 (the first white sprinter at the World Championship final in the last 20 years).

23 He won silver at the World Championship in 2007 and gold at the Olympic Games in Beijing 2008 (and also silver in London 2012).

24 He won bronze medals at the Mediterranean Games in 1995 and 1997 as well as at the World Championship in 1999.

25 He has participated at three Olympic Games so far.

peared and grew while it decreased in individual sports (yet remained present). In the following table we present this starting point.

Table 2: A comparison of success in individual and collective sports

	Sport	
	<i>Individual</i>	<i>Collective</i>
	Skiing (swimming) /athletics/	Football (basketball) /handball/
YU	+ (+) /-/	- (-) /-/
SLO	+ (+) /+/	+ (+) /+/

When we take into account some facts from an additional pair, namely athletics and handball, and support the main finding, our impression changes slightly. Slovenes did not have any outstanding athletes during the Yugoslav period, but Yugoslavia also had hardly any (which barely changes the image of Slovenes being successful individualists). Slovenes practically had neither any outstanding handball teams nor individual players (which also does not change that part of our general finding). However, these supportive data strengthen our findings for the second period significantly. Slovenes remain successful individualists (though not that much from a quantitative point of view), but become also successful in collective sports.

At the next step in our comparison, we would try to find out what determines and influences the spirit of individualism in Slovenes, and how this influenced changes in success.

Four determinants are taken into account, namely:

- geography,
- history,
- psychology, and
- political environment.

During the main part of their *history*, Slovenes were part of two big multinational states, the Habsburg Empire and Yugoslavia. If we understand the former as a general reflection of a primarily German influence, it lasted all together for almost a millennium.²⁶ The influence

²⁶ From 1809 till 1813 Slovenes were, however, part of the French (Napoleonic) Empire. It presented different a national, cultural, political etc. influence, but it was, again, a big multinational entity.

of the latter lasted for seven decades. After thirteen years of independence, Slovenia gained EU membership in 2004, which would again mean being part of a big multinational entity. Since this has been so far a rather short period (four years only),²⁷ it would be difficult to measure its influence exactly and with high validity. Nevertheless, we think it would be at least interesting to speculate about it and try to notice any possible changes.

The geographical position of Slovenes has, of course, not changed. Slovenia is a primarily hilly country, with lots of mountains and numerous valleys;²⁸ its landscape is covered with forests (well over 60%). This encourages a high level of individualism and does not stimulate collectivism (which is also physically much less possible than in the plains). Still, as an EU member, Slovenia is since January 1, 2008 part of the Schengen area. This means that Slovene citizens can travel around the majority of the EU without any (border) limitations and with only a personal identity card.²⁹ This at least compensates for the otherwise narrow perception of physical (but also of psychological) aspect. When contemplating geographical aspects and their perception, this represents a huge change.

History changes with the passing of time, of course. This effect is primarily cumulative. Slovenes added to their Slavic origins after centuries of German experience also the Yugoslav as well as their own experience (the period of independence). Statehood has for sure influenced this accumulation significantly and enriched it from a specific point of view, which so far has neither been known nor experienced by Slovenes. The EU framework furthermore enriches this historical experience with new stimuli. Still, since geography has delivered to Slovenia the status of a crossroad of nations and cultures, throughout much of Slovenian history survival has been the driving force of behaviour. With the emergence (ten days war) of the independent Slovene state and later also with its EU membership, this changed significantly. At least relatively speaking, we could say that Slovenes (more precisely, Slovenian citizens) have solved the question of their survival.³⁰

27 As already noted, our observed period ends in 2008.

28 This is one of the main reasons why there are over 20 (sometimes very different) dialects in the Slovene language.

29 In addition to this, there is also the single currency, which Slovenia shares since January 1, 2007. This strengthens the freedom of traveling and has also a significant psychological meaning (not only a highly practical, financial one).

30 Achieving this half a millennium after the Slovene language, which is now one of the official EU languages, was founded, is an unprecedented result. Primož Trubar, the founder of Slovene language, was born in 1508 and published the first Slovene book in 1551.

Consequently, also *psychological* aspects witnessed an important evolution. The minimization of the ‘survival’ issue, an extension of geographical area, and the dispersion of social pressure, along with a much lower level of social control compared to what has been traditional, have most probably influenced and culminated in a different social positioning of the individual. Perhaps, this has also resulted in the weakening of social pressure and the enhancement of possibilities of interaction. This could also encourage possibilities and abilities of creating or producing a better team spirit (collectivism),³¹ which rests on capable and efficient individuals.

The political environment that frames Slovenes has changed considerably. The evolution faced by the process has gone from monarchy (the Habsburg and early Yugoslav one) to dictatorship (a later proclaimed royal dictatorship in the first Yugoslavia and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” during the communist/socialist second Yugoslavia, which during much of the later period remained an ideological phrase) to parliamentary democracy (first within independent Slovenia and then within the EU). The complexity of this change is in particular illustrated by the complexity of the EU. It would be our guess that all this could have stimulated potentials and capabilities of the individual and of his/her inclination for easier socializing, including in sports.

In the next table we try to present the already elaborated evolution of the four discussed determinants in three different political settings, including the years spent in them.³²

Table 3: A Comparison of Determinants

	YU (72)	SLO (13)	EU (4)
Geography	■	■	⊕
History	■	⊕	⊕
Psychology	■	⊕	⊗
Political environment	■	⊗	□

31 We understand collectivism in this essay as a team-building spirit within the sport framework. However, we must make this distinct from communist/socialist collectivization, which was fostered in Yugoslavia immediately after the WW II.

32 We try on a general level to present the process of this change and its intensity. Hence, in our opinion there is no need for a legend to decode the general message of this Table.

The most obvious and intensive is the change of political environment (it is also the easiest to measure). Psychological changes are the most complex and hence also the most difficult to measure. Hence, they could be measured by various indirect variables. Historical factors change above all through their accumulation, while the geographical factor does change indirectly. Generally speaking, this offers more opportunities to dwell further, and in much more detail, on the topic discussed.

There are several questions that could be drawn from these findings. Let us point out at least two groups of them.

Firstly, does this influence also change the impressions or stereotypes about the population concerned, in our case about Slovenes? If yes, does this influence from one point of view affect also changes in stereotypes about Slovenes from others (how they perceive Slovenes) or from another point of view also about Slovenes by themselves (how they perceive themselves)? Furthermore, how does this affect the creation and evolution of myths about Slovenes?

Secondly, how could one understand both individualism and collectivism? Does the former present a runaway from the state, from institutions and politics? Does the latter present a way in which the state tries to manipulate the individual and society? How does the EU integration framework affect individualism and collectivism, in our case in sports in particular? Has the political frame in any way affected the creation of the myth about Slovenes? Or it is just a matter of historical tradition and geographical position? Could we research these aspects in sports alone or are they inseparable from the broader social context?

To wrap up our brief discussion, we could notice the fast and intensive change of the political environment, complemented by a most probably subtle and complex psychological change (being at least at its beginning), also as a consequence of the slightly changed geographical perception and enriched historical accumulation. It would be difficult to disagree with the impression that this all must have influenced the way Slovenes express and exercise individualism and collectivism, particularly in sports.

DIPLOMATS AS INDIVIDUALS

Diplomacy could be understood through various meanings, like organization, activity, skill, profession, technique and foreign policy.³³ Diplomacy is being exercised by a diplomat, who is a person, authorized and qualified to pursue it. Following different understandings and interpretations of diplomacy one also speaks about different characteristics of diplomats, such as being tactful, direct, reserved, introverted, honest, always keeping in mind their positive as well as negative perception in public.³⁴ Diplomats as holders of this profession are members of a diplomatic service or organization; they are compared to, and basically also are, bureaucrats, who have to follow the exact rules of the organization.³⁵ Diplomats work by instruction, which may be general or concrete. But, at the same time, they are also individualists. Whatever the precise instruction is, they always have a certain manoeuvring space to add to its execution a personal touch. Each brings to the profession a certain dose of new aspects which add to the profession as such, as well as influencing the way they themselves perform and are efficient. A personal touch is something highly important for this profession. One could claim that diplomats are individualists.³⁶ This is particularly obvious while speaking about senior diplomats, primarily ambassadors, when they are on their duty abroad.

Throughout the historical development of diplomacy, one can notice the obvious importance of individualism. In the period of early diplomacy, one could speak about diplomatic envoys, who were engaged in a certain task, with a mission to fulfil it and to return after its completion to the sovereign. During the period of classical diplomacy this practice of so-called *ad hoc* diplomacy remained highly important, although at a later stage countries started to form foreign ministries and to establish permanent missions in the receiving states.³⁷ During the period of modern diplomacy, multilateralism appeared and grew significantly in momentum and importance, but the importance of diplomats as individualists remained.³⁸ One could also say that from one point of view, the

33 Compare Barston, 2006, Benko, 1997, Berridge, 2002, Bohte and Sancin, 2006, Feltham, 1994, Jazbec, 2009, Nicolson, 1988 etc.

34 Compare Bohte and Sancin, 2006, pp.31-35, Feltham, 1994, pp.27-28, Nick, 1997, pp.13-24, Nicolson, 1988, pp.55-67, Petrič, 2010, pp.307-341 etc.

35 For more on diplomatic organization see Jazbec, 2009, pp.125-178.

36 Compare Jazbec, 2006, pp.83-92.

37 Compare Mattingly, 2008, and Carter, 2008.

38 We stick to the periodization of diplomatic evolution in four phases, namely the early, the classical, the modern and the postmodern (Jazbec, 2009, pp.31-46). The latter is significantly marked by special envoys, which is an individual tasking.

period is outstandingly marked by envoys of various kinds, like special representatives, *ad hoc* emissaries, while from another point of view that the level and rank thereof are permanently increasing.³⁹

During the late modern diplomacy period, in the second part of the 20th century, we also witness a significant stratification of diplomacy into various special diplomacies, like economic, cultural or scientific, and lately also environmental, celebrity and sport diplomacy.⁴⁰ We understand this trend as a reflection of the tectonic changes in the structure of the international community, produced by its globalising, which brings new issues to the diplomatic agenda, together with demand for new kinds of specialists.⁴¹ At the same time, it also offers a manoeuvring space for persons from non-governmental areas to start performing some of the diplomatic tasks or functions in various environments, while using their own personal prestige, influence and popular charisma. There is an impression that this strengthens the presence, importance and frequency of individualism as a characteristic of the diplomatic profession. This impression is even stronger when we look at *ad hoc* envoys, originating from popular fields, like music, film, sport, advertisement etc. Whatever their origin is, they are to a certain extent perceived as diplomats, although they are not. But they use some skills, which traditionally adhere to diplomats, so their original charisma is more powerful, while adding to it the diplomatic image. Apart from understanding diplomats as individualists, this also shows us the importance and prestige of the diplomatic profession, which is many times mystified, being at the same time not fully known and understood (what at the same time does not decrease its public attractiveness). While the diplomatic profession is still to a certain extent mystified, also myths and other works of literature are becoming a research matter of diplomatic analysis.⁴²

This train of thought brings us to the concepts of sports diplomacy and celebrity diplomacy.⁴³ We could understand both of them as the use of charismatic and successful persons, who are asked to be engaged in dealing with issues of a global importance, like climate change, illness-

39 There are many former heads of state who act as special representatives for various tasks and stand for their former reputation, image and persuasiveness.

40 This evolution also marks steady transformation towards postmodern diplomacy (Jazbec, 2009, pp.44–46).

41 For more on diplomacy and its changes in the era of globalization see Jazbec (2009, pp.53–56) and Riordan, 2003.

42 We could list some of such classical literary achievements, like the Slovene national story Martin Krpan (Jazbec, 2015) or the British bestseller Harry Potter (Neumann and Nexon, 2006) or masterpieces from the early modern era (Hampton, 2009).

43 For the first see Defrance and Chamot, 2008, and for the second Cooper, 2008.

es, poverty etc. In both cases, there is a huge impact, naturally, on individuals, on concrete persons, who are famous for their outstanding results and where there is the widespread perception that they achieved those results by themselves, as a result of a personal, individual struggle and effort.⁴⁴ An additional perception is that those persons, since they are so popular, could be also efficient in pursuing various tasks, where one would primarily need charisma and not necessarily other skills (like negotiation, professional approach and techniques etc.).⁴⁵ Sport and celebrity diplomacy is also understood as a means by which huge sporting, musical, or similar events bring together politicians, who are then able, in a relaxed and more personal environment, to strive for results which are out of reach in a formal, tense, sometimes also conflictual atmosphere.

Consequently, sportspersons and celebrities could find themselves in two different roles and positions. From one point of view, they, for their achievements and attractiveness of their profession, bring together high-level stakeholders and decision-makers. And from another point of view, they are the people who strive to reach for a solution, to bring two parties together, to bring attention to a problem or an issue, which with their help becomes more acceptable or at all acceptable. As already noted, we deal with them here in the latter meaning. As outstanding individuals, they attain immense popularity and possibly also increased influence; therefore they are engaged as envoys, as de facto diplomats. They would not be able to get such tasking without being successful, and they could not be successful in their professions without possessing huge individual potential. From one point of view, depending on the circumstances, they perform as a medium, bringing together diplomats and politicians to discuss issues, while performing their job, in a relaxed, creative, friendly, informal atmosphere, created by joint effort and enthusiasm. They use their influence, prestige, power to animate, to create such conditions, again, as individuals. And from another point of view, they are promoters of issues, drivers of processes, actors in the international arena, to a limited extent, diplomats.

We would say that in both cases their activity refers directly and generally to three diplomatic functions, the first, the third and the fifth; namely a) representing the sending State in the receiving State, b) ne-

⁴⁴ Of course it is widely known and understandable that for example a gold medal winner from the Olympic Games would not be able to achieve this by him/herself alone, without huge team. But the public perception is of one person, that concrete person and not the team.

⁴⁵ Cooper (2008) examines the cases of Bono, Bob Geldof, Audrey Hepburn and Angelina Jolie.

gotiating with the Government of the receiving State, and c) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State (...).⁴⁶ This wording should be understood, as said, generally and partially also in symbolical sense. They represent their state in the international community, and not directly and necessarily in the receiving State; they negotiate, when they do, with a given government or institution to achieve a given aim, and not exactly with the government of the receiving State, and they promote friendly relations between states and people as a general, universal value, which is not related only to the relations between two states. But they perform the diplomatic functions of representing, negotiation and promoting. And they do this, or, better, they were asked to do this, since they have charisma, influence, prestige, since they are supposed to be listened to. This would not have been the case if they had not been outstanding individuals.

A COMPARISON ON THE DIPLOMATIC PARQUET

This brings us in the second, as already mentioned and obviously primarily generalized part of our contribution, to the comparison between sportspersons and diplomats, both understood as individuals. As already mentioned, too, we focus in this contribution on Slovene sportspersons, who by stereotype should be individuals, and use them as a back-up for our generalization.

To be able to draw some final conclusions from our research, we take a look at some characteristics of both diplomats and sportspersons, as we understand them. They both represent their countries – diplomats as professional members of the diplomatic service, which is a part of public administration, and sportspersons as members of national teams at various international competitions. Their formal relation to their state is generally the same, but varies in different aspects, mainly referring to their appearance, behaviour and area of responsibility. Diplomats represent their state because of their employee status in the diplomatic service and sportspersons because of their outstanding achievements in the sports arena.

We try to point out similarities as well as differences between them to be able to see how individualism appears and functions in their performance. This, the second comparison, takes place on the diplomatic parquet, while the first one took place in the sports arena (Table No.

⁴⁶ Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 3.

2), though we think that both fields are or at least could be similarly slippery and demanding. We present it in the following table.

Table 4: A Comparison between Diplomats and Sportspersons

Diplomats	Sportspersons
Individualists	Individualists
Outstanding results	Outstanding results
Generally visible achievements and hidden failures	Clearly visible achievements and failures
Less clear messages for broader public	Clear messages for broader public
High frequency of media appearances	High frequency of media appearances
Identification with states	Identification with states
Identification with governments	Identification with people
Directs representatives of governments	Indirect representatives of countries
Instructed frame of expression	Open frame of expression
Employment status in the diplomatic service	Status in the national team achieved by outstanding results

We could say there are many similarities between diplomats and sportspersons as far as their individualism is concerned. However, these similarities differ a) in the way they enter either the diplomatic service (the employment issue) or the national team (qualifications in each case), b) how limited the frame of their behaviour as members of those organizations is (diplomatic service: strict rules of behaviour; national sport team: relaxed rules of behaviour), c) the frame of expression on behalf of the organization (diplomats per instruction, sportspersons basically per their own impression), and d) the public visibility of their results (diplomats: sometimes achievements are not immediately recognizable and may even be hidden on purpose, while failures are as a rule hidden for political reasons; sportspersons: both achievements and failures are immediately visible).

In any case, the opinion prevails that they are both highly profiled individualists, which enables them to be successful. We would also believe that in the Slovene case this individualism generally originates from the geographical, historical, psychological as well as political environment, which is reflected partially in stereotypes about Slovenes as sportspersons, too. To be able to claim this for the Slovene diplomats as well, one should undergo another research effort.

Diplomats, chosen by random or consistent choice, represent their countries and are a reflection of their societies (including being the result of the four determinants from Table 3).⁴⁷ In this regard they also cannot avoid possessing identities that enable stereotypes. Here we also see a social and psychological connection between sportspersons and diplomats. They, diplomats, cannot avoid such stereotyping enabling identity regardless of the fact if they ski, swim or play football or not. As diplomats, they primarily work per instruction, which would also mean that, while exercising their duty, their individualism comes to the surface and influences the exact mode of their behaviour (which should not necessarily be something wrong). They are – both sportspersons and diplomats – under the same psychological and social pressure, while exercising their duty. Sportspersons do it in public, diplomats away from the public. Nevertheless, their work is for both of them, in spite of high pressures and expectations, a high-level routine, maybe also because they are individualists.

CONCLUSION

The main goal of our presentation was to find a possible link between sportspersons and diplomats, both being understood as individuals.

In the first part we elaborated on the stereotype that Slovenes are not successful in collective sports, but in individual sports. We have tried to examine this with presenting, comparing and commenting facts in selected individual sports vs. collective sports (skiing and swimming vs. football and basketball). Together with an additional pair, we followed three levels of comparison (primarily skiing vs. football, additionally swimming vs. basketball, and as support athletics vs. handball). An important part of our research has been the additional thesis that says that after the independence of Slovenia, Slovenes have been

⁴⁷ Digol (2010) speaks in her analysis of diplomats in the post-communist countries about four factors as well, three of them the same as ours in Table 3 (historical, geographical and political) and the fourth one different (cultural).

more successful in collective sports than in individual sports. Here, we tried also to take into account the EU membership of Slovenia and its possible effect on the researched topic.

Our findings could be summarized in three main conclusions, as follows:

- a. During the first researched period (former Yugoslavia) Slovenes were successful in individual sports (skiing and swimming /men primarily/, but absent in athletics) and not in collective ones (football, basketball and handball), although they had a few outstanding individuals in collective sports (except handball).
- b. During the second researched period (the Slovene state) Slovenes showed a certain decline in individual sports as far as the number of outstanding skiers and the superiority of their results is concerned (but a high number of successful women skiers appeared) and basically the same level of successfulness in swimming, but an outburst in athletics. However, they demonstrated an unprecedented success in researched collective sports (both in team results and in number of successful individuals in these sports).
- c. The supporting pair of sports (athletics and handball) has contributed significantly to our research results. It has cemented the image of Slovenes as individuals and helped us notice the emerging success in collective sports. The latter is a new phenomenon, both with regard to the number of sports and number of outstanding individuals in these sports.

As far as the first part is concerned, we could form the following main conclusion, namely, that Slovenes are successful in individual sports, but have also appeared as successful in collective sports, where also exceptional individuals stand out. To be even more concise on the general level and taking into account both periods (four decades altogether), we would try to say that Slovenes are above all individuals, whatever the sport.

This could be seen both from traditional success in individual sports and from newly emerging success in collective sports. The former – however – witnesses structural development and change (fewer outstanding skiers with less outstanding results in the second period, but still clearly present, as well as the increased appearance of highly successful women in the second period; the same level in swimming and

the unprecedented outburst in athletics), but remains to be strong, while the latter stands out again for remarkable individuals and, what is new, for team results. They are – as individuals – successful in those collective sports where Slovenes traditionally were not successful. Therefore, it seems that individualism still creates the overall image and transforms it further into the researched and generated stereotype.⁴⁸

In the second part we tried to find – and we think we did – a correlation between diplomats and sportspersons, both understood as outstanding individualists. This, we believe, enables sportspersons to appear occasionally as *ad hoc* diplomats, being engaged in various tasks out of their usual scope and area. While doing this, they de facto represent their own countries, they promote friendly relations in concrete cases or generally, as a universal value, and they also negotiate, if tasked with this. But they are not diplomats; they just behave like them, since they are successful individuals. Here they bring additional manoeuvring space to diplomatic activity, which diplomats, being official, formal representatives of their states and governments, for the very same reason can not.

We have focused our attention in this research on Slovenes, since they have been already in former Yugoslavia stereotyped as individuals, being successful in individual sports, such as skiing and swimming. We also tried to show that this stems from their history and refers also to their long tradition of skiing and diplomatic activity (what is both sometimes mythologized). The main limitation that occurs in our research is the fact that we focused on a complex and complicated topic, internally very structured. The difference in form and style of our approach in the two parts highlights this. But we also think that it is much easier to generalize facts and trends if this is backed up with thorough empirical support. At the same time, this offers much food for thought for similar future contemplation. The issue of stereotypes has been present throughout the discussion, although hardly ever in the first front. In any case, stereotypes basically work from the background and in a multilevel, complex manner.

⁴⁸ This picture could be additionally supported by the examples of Rajmond Debevec (shooter in various disciplines) and Petra Majdič (cross-country skier). He won gold at 2000 Winter Olympic Games and is a multiple medalist at numerous events and disciplines (including cross bow), but particularly stands out in both research periods for his participating at seven Olympics (twice in the Yugoslav team and five times in the Slovene team; including bronze from the London 2012 Olympics, where he participated for the eighth time and won three medals). She stands out for winning silver at the 2007 World Ski Championship and numerous victories in the World Cup during the last decade and a half at least.

Whatever the overall findings of our research effort are, we could say that myths and above all stereotypes form an important and yet inevitable part of daily discourse and social interaction, no matter what the current circumstances and the time period in which they appear are. The prevailing opinion that sportspersons and celebrities could perform as diplomats might as well be a kind of myth, stemming both from the difficulties and mystification of diplomatic tasks as well as from the necessity to involve in their fulfilment highly successful individuals from other areas.

REFERENCES

- Barston, R. P., 2006. *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Longman.
- Benko, V., 1997. *Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih*. Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče.
- Bennett, T. and Gaines, J., 2010. Believing What You Hear: The Impact of Aging Stereotypes upon the Old. In: *Educational Gerontology*. (36) 5, pp.435–445.
- Berridge, G. R., 2002. *Diplomacy; Theory and Practice*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Bohte, B. and Sancin, V., 2006. *Diplomatsko in konzularno pravo*. Ljubljana: Pravna fakulteta, Cankarjeva založba.
- Cardwell, M., 1996. *The Complete A–Z Psychology Handbook*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Carter, C. H., 2008. The Ambassadors of Early Modern Europe: Patterns of Diplomatic Representation in the Early Seventeenth Century. In: Jönsson, C. and Langhorne, R. (eds.). *Diplomacy*. Volume II. London: SAGE.
- Cooper, A. F., 2008. *Celebrity Diplomacy*. Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers.
- Čačinovič, R., 1998. Zgodovina slovenske diplomacije. In: Jazbec, M. (ed.). *Diplomacija in Slovenci*. Celovec: Založba Drava.
- Defrance, J., Chamot, J. M., 2008. The voice of sport: Expressing a foreign policy through a silent cultural activity: The case of sport in French foreign policy after the Second World War. In: *Sport in Society*. (11) 4, pp.395–413. Special Issue: Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World.
- Digol, D., 2010. *Emerging Diplomatic Elites in Post–Communist Europe: Analysis of Diplomats*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag dr. Müller.
- Eagleman, A. M., 2011. Stereotypes of Race and Nationality: A Qualitative Analysis of Sport Magazine Coverage of MLB Players. In: *Journal of Sport Management*. (25) X, pp.156–168.
- Feltham, G. R., 1994. *Diplomatic Handbook*. London: Longman.
- Hampton, T., 2009. *Fictions of Embassy*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.
- Hansen, W. F. and Hansen, R., 2002. *Handbook of Classical Mythology*. ABC Clío.
- Jazbec, M., 2006. *Slovenec v Beogradu*. Pohanca: samozaložba.
- Jazbec, M., 2009. *Osnove diplomacije*. Ljubljana: Založba FDV.
- Jazbec, M., 2015. *Diplomat Martin Krpan*. Ljubljana: Založba Forma 7.
- Južnič, S., 1993. *Identiteta*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

- Lah, K. and Inkret, A., 2002. *Slovenski literarni junaki: Mali leksikon*. Ljubljana: Založba Mladinska knjiga.
- Leeming, D. A., 1990. *The World of Myth*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lévi-Strauss, C., 1995. *Myth and Meaning*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Levstik, F., 2008. *Martin Krpan*. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga.
- Magoulick, M. 2012. *What is Myth? What other scholars say about myths (especially as connected to heroism)*. <http://www.faculty.de.gcsu.edu/~mmagouli/defmyth.htm> (27 September 2012)
- Mattingly, G., 2008. The First Resident Embassies: Mediaeval Italian Origins of Modern Diplomacy. In: Jönsson, C. and Langhorne, R. (eds.). *Diplomacy*. Volume II. London: SAGE.
- McGarty, C., 2002. *Stereotypes as Explanations: The Formation of Meaningful Beliefs about social groups*. Cambridge: University Press.
- McLeod, S., 2008. *Stereotypes*. <http://www.simplypsychology.org/katz-braly.html> (27 September 2012)
- Neumann, I. B. and Nexon, D. H. (eds.), 2006. *Harry Potter and International Relations*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Nicolson, H., 1988. *Diplomacy*. Washington: Georgetown University.
- Petrič, E., 2010. *Zunanja politika: Osnove teorije in praksa*. Jable, Ljubljana: CEP, ZRC SAZU.
- Riordan, S., 2003. *The New Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Rowley, S., J., Kurtz-Costes, B., Mistry, R. and Feagans, L., 2007. Social Status as a Predictor of Race and Gender Stereotypes in late Childhood and Early Adolescence. In: *Social development*. (16) 1, pp.150–168.
- Stangor, C. (ed.), 2000. *Stereotypes and Prejudice: Key Readings*. London: Psychology Press.
- Valvasor, J. V., 1978. *Slava vojvodine Kranjske*. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga.
- Zver, M., 1990. Albin Prepeluh o demokraciji in avtonomiji Slovencev. In: *Teorija in praksa*. (27) 12, pp.622-1629.

**NATO and the Western Balkans:
from neutral spectator to proactive peacemaker**

Niall Mulchinock

Viona Rashica

**Essays on the statehood and political development
of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Mirko Pejanović


Polona Dovečar

Niall Mulchinock
NATO AND THE WESTERN BALKANS:
FROM NEUTRAL SPECTATOR TO PROACTIVE PEACEMAKER

Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom, 2017, 293 pages
ISBN 978-1-137-59723-6

Niall Mulchinock, an expert of international relations, has given a valuable contribution with his book about NATO, within which he discusses, the role of Yugoslav wars in the transformation of NATO from neutral spectator to proactive peacemaker.

Established on April 4, 1949, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the transatlantic military-political component in Europe after the Second World War, during the Cold War had the purpose to prevent Soviet invasion in Europe. To explain NATO's transformation after the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, in the first part of the book the author highlights the importance of the summits of London and Rome. London Summit (July 1990) was important because along with a solemn commitment to extend the hand of friendship to the former states of the Warsaw Pact, there was also a need to consider NATO's own military and strategic functions following the end of the Cold War, and also to iden-



tify for the first time the new risks and challenges that could pose security threats to the stability of the alliance in the future. Whereas the Rome Summit (November 1991) underlined the future projections for the Alliance, which were risks for the security of NATO's member nations, resulting from instability and uncertainty in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the Balkans and in the crisis belt from

Maghreb, North Africa to the Middle and Near East.

The book also describes in what degree did individual NATO Secretaries-General influence the development of the alliance, focusing on Manfred Wörner (July 1988 – August 1994) and Javier Solana (December 1995 – October 1999). Wörner played an important role in NATO transformation and in its response to the Yugoslav conflicts, because he became a significant advocate for the alliance's engagement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO was fundamentally lucky to have a dynamic, forthright and disciplined Secretary-General like Wörner at the helm of proceedings and decision-making during this transition period. Flexibility and adaptability were key to Wörner's thinking on how the Alliance was going to move forward in the 1990s. There was much criticism about the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, but Javier Solana stated that the objective of NATO's intervention was to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, which began in 1989 and the unification of East Germany with the West in 1990 marked a very important step in the end of the Cold War, in the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Union and of the Yugoslav federation. Unlike the dissolutions of the USSR and Czecho-

slovakia, the breakup of Yugoslavia was accompanied with bloody wars. The Yugoslav crisis started with the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia in 1991, and continued with the crisis of Bosnia and Herzegovina, culminating in 1994-1995, and returned with the Kosovo crisis, especially in the years 1998-1999. The crisis of the former Yugoslavia, with special emphasize on the wars of Bosnia and Kosovo, engaged all major international factors such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union and NATO.

The complexities of the Bosnian conflict, which commenced during the spring of 1992, challenged the new security architecture of NATO and, more importantly, drove a wedge between individual NATO member states at a time when they should have been united. The Bosnian war was viewed as a civil war rather than a war of aggression and there was a failure and reluctance to use military force in the early stages of the conflicts, mostly because of the individual preferences and grievances of its member states. In general terms, 1993 represented the year of the failed peace plans for Bosnia, because the most prominent member state to oppose NATO action in Bosnia was the UK from the outset of hostilities in 1992, because it had relatively good ties with the Serbs due to their wartime cooperation against the Nazis in the Second World War. Also France

opposed the use of military force, while Germany, to some extent, supported the use of force in 1991, but there was a general anti-militarism present within the German population. From all the European allies, Denmark was the most vocal in urging for military force in Bosnia. These underlying divisions between the institution and member states would be further exacerbated in the 1994-95 period. The US tactic to build support among the smaller allies showed that it was taking seriously the situation. Americans worked to emphasize their concern for the UNPROFOR troops on the ground in Bosnia, where the British worked on them in the opposite direction. They also tried to isolate the British position by attempting to undermine the strong partnership between Britain and France. The humiliation of UNPROFOR troops being used as human shields in May 1995 was followed in quick succession by the abhorrent events at Srebrenica two months later, when more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys belonging to the ages of 12 to 77 were executed by Serb forces. The failure in Srebrenica, the world's first-ever-safe UN-declared area, is considered to be the darkest event in the UN history. Without US leadership at this moment, it is far from clear if NATO would have used force. The author points out three valuable lessons for NATO from its involvement in the Bosnian War, which were: To make early intervention a pre-requisite in any future outbreak of violence in the region

to prevent the occurrence of another Srebrenica; The construction of a more cohesive and dynamic relationship between the Alliance and the EU; To avoid the future resumption of major transatlantic disputes that had caused a lot of the paralysis in Bosnia. It should be said that failure to respond in due time has resulted with more than 140,000 people killed and almost 4 million displaced, and with more than 50000 victims of sexual violence.

The Butmir Process, which was inaugurated in the autumn of 2009 in BiH aimed to develop new constitutional reforms, which would eventually led to the creation of more centralized institutional structures. In the longer term, these measures would have presumably resulted in the formulation of a probable Bosnian unitary state, overcoming the divisions imposed by the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, and preparing the country for eventual EU and NATO membership. This initiative produced a mixed response from the various ethnic groups and resulted with internal disagreements over the future political arrangements. The ongoing crisis of Bosnia's future political structures is certainly not helped by the re-opening of old wounds. Bosnia still, however, remains a deeply ethnically divided country and is not a fully functioning state. One can argue that the alliance should have been more proactive in supporting the return of internally displaced persons and the arrest of war criminals. The Inter-

national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, an ad hoc tribunal established by the UN in 1993, mandate of which ended in 2017, wasn't so successful in sentencing war criminals of the Yugoslav wars because from 161 accused, only 89 of them have been sentenced, 59 of which have served their sentence. The strong partnership between the EU and NATO in BiH was further enhanced with preliminary plans in place to deal with any possible outbreak of hostilities in that country during the 2008–10 political crisis. In the event of a hypothetical outbreak of hostilities, EUFOR (The European Union Force) troops would have been supplemented by troops from the KFOR mission in Kosovo.

NATO had been trying to carve out a strategic partnership with Russia, but the alliance's evolving relationship with Russia was also disrupted by the Kosovo intervention. The air attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) put this important relationship in peril as Russia was a very vocal supporter and defender of its Serbian ally during Operation Allied Force. The intervention of NATO in Kosovo still has many criticisms for two reasons. First, NATO's decision to engage in large-scale military action without prior Security Council authorization raised significant doubts about the status of the law governing the use of force and the viability of UN primacy in matters of international peace and security. Second, NATO's high-altitude bomb-

ing campaign, conducted without a single NATO combat casualty but with significant civilian casualties within the FRY, called into question the appropriate relationship between means and ends in an intervention designed to save lives. However, the use of military force was the only way of putting an end to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1199, which among other things, expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. Approximately 740,000 Kosovars, about one-third of the entire population of Kosovo, had been expelled from the latter one and thousands more are believed to be internally displaced. An unknown number of Kosovars have been killed or disappeared in the different operations, and there are more than 20000 victims of sexual violence. This intervention of NATO had the purpose to maintain the grim possibility of another Srebrenica repeating itself in Kosovo.

NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) since June 1999, after the end of the war, when Kosovo passed under the international administration of the United Nations. KFOR's objectives were to deter renewed hostilities, establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, sup-

port the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with the international civil presence. Nevertheless, one error made in relation to KFOR operations in Kosovo was incapability to be adequately prepared for a probable are-up of violence in the northern section. The eruption of hostilities in the tense town of Mitrovica in 2000 and 2004 exemplified NATO's inability to deal effectively with these occurrences

in a diligent and swift manner. Another criticism would relate to the development of close relations between KFOR and former members of the now-defunct KLA.


Finally, without the American tactics on NATO member states, there would not be an intervention of NATO in BiH and, also in Kosovo, something that is emphasized by the author himself.

Polona Dovečar

Mirko Pejanović
ESSAYS ON THE STATEHOOD AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Translated into English by Gordana Ristić
 TKD Šahinpašić, Sarajevo, 2016, 381 pages, Šahinpašić 3. Supplemented ed.
 ISBN 978-9958-41-673-6

Essays on the statehood and political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina is carefully selected textbook, written by academician Mirko Pejanović, professor, Vice-Rector and Dean, also a member of the war time presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (further on BiH), born in 1946 near Tuzla. Mirko Pejanović has compiled this book chronological due to his presence in the country unique situation since many years, featuring dozens of publications about BiH and its political development and European integration process, which officially began in 2008 and is the necessary result and solution for country's stabile and growing potential as well as future. The book is a quality summary of events since the independence of BiH and enables the reader to understand the situation, even it is not up to date. The text is thematically structured research study and drives the reader to quick interest of the content. The book is interested to the academic public and students, as well as to open public.



Development of BiH is centuries old, author is introducing the country as unique land in the world in the situation, which was and still is going through the content of adapting to moments that should have happened long time ago. Country with

radical change of ethnic structure, municipalities and cities after year 2007 (first steps of integration to EU). Country with decades of multinational community. Country is fighting with nationalism and disintegration process, democracy deficit is gaining bright results, future is yet not so close to be cleared, but the time for BiH being a stabile European country is behind the door. During country's historical development, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a historical, political, legal and cultural framework for the development of national identities in full political equality of the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian people.

The book is interesting for the academic public and students, since the content is very educationally focused. Part with the title Essays contains structured research studies, articles and interviews, created in the period from 2000 to 2010, which contains projects in the fields of development of the character, structure and functioning of the political pluralism and local self-government, so the content drives the reader to accomplish important knowledge about the country's history and present time. The studies and researches were written and published within scientific-research projects carried out at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo and Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana and published in relevant journals and academic conferences.

The third supplement edition of the book contains eight chapters, where author has chronologically presented statehood of BiH from historical view, through the structure and development of political pluralism and democracy followed by political development and European integration process with the migrations, prerequisites for acceleration and controversies in the development of parliamentary democracy.

The analysis of the social-historical process of the development of political pluralism in BiH during the post-Dayton period has shown that a single ethnic and ethnics politics-based multiparty structure has no power to shape an interparty consensus about the issues from constitutional competence of the Parliamentary Assembly of country. The parliament - decision making body do not have (yet) a democratic capacity to implement the ruling of the European Court for Human Rights. BiH elaborates for political pluralism and parliamentary democracy critically in the controversies in the post-Dayton political development. With the year of 2008, when BiH signed Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which was the first step to enter the contractual relation, the development of parliamentary democracy is still not stabile and didn't reach its peak. Pejanović has been for years observing and explaining that democracy in BiH is an appearance, while the political scene is domi-

nated by the power of partocracy, instead of equal multicracy.

One of the most important historic dates in the contemporary history of BiH is November 25th 1943, where the statehood was established and authentic people's representation was found. It is a fact that BiH after the World War Two was in progress in social, economic and cultural development. The followed referendum in 1992 elaborates the will of citizens to decide for dissolution with the SFRY and for independent state of BiH, which was stopped by the forces of the Great-Serbian state hegemony and brought war. Under the leadership of the United States government, BiH won the peace by signing the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.

The author leads the way with eight chapters having in mind the importance of the decision in 1943 to the ideas and reality after the Dayton Peace and the present situation in European integration process which is complicated, but more than necessary. The ethnicization, the phenomenon of BiH space, which occurred after the victory of national parties in 1990 and led to the forced expulsion of population and ethnic cleansing, is still not come. On the other side, while European countries developed regional structure, BiH was falling to abysses of ethnic divisions and ethnic closing of territory. Domination of the ethnic criterion became the main provision of all peace plans created

in the time of war (1992-1995),

The author also explains various challenges with the final and most important question – the EU membership. The BiH with the achievement of the statehood is in process to become the EU member and the member of NATO. Historical process of integration of BiH into the EU assumes the establishment of a regional structure appropriate to the politics of regional development with the EU. The outcome will significantly depend on the assistance of the international community.

The respected author has analysed BiH democracy, which is still facing deficit instead of stability. There are deep marks of political pluralism with historical delay together with country's uncertainty of the state status. There is still existence of anti-democratic formula in exercising the multiparty parliamentary rule. The force of European integration influences on internal integration of BiH by conducting the reforms, which EU membership depends on. This process is not only for achieving European living standards, for BiH this is in achieving stability in the political development of the state, termination of political forces, both internal and external, which can lead to the ethnical division of the state.

The author, Pejanović, who gives his academic afford to his state, has shown to the readers the facts, which are necessarily, not just de-

sire, for the country to become self-sustainable, democratic, European and secular state. He invites all of us to learn and gain modern knowledge in order to be equal

at European market, to believe in values of peace, freedom and joint living, justice and interethnic tolerance in the territory of BiH.

GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

European Perspectives is an international scientific journal that publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific articles focusing on relevant political, sociological, social, security, economic and legal as well as ethnic, cross-cultural, minority and cross-ethnic issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and South-Eastern Europe.

Before the submission please note:

- All texts submitted to the journal must be original works of the author(s). By submitting a manuscript, the author(s) warrant(s) to the journal that it does not infringe the copyright or any other rights of third parties.
- The journal reviews received manuscripts on the assumption of an exclusive submission: by submitting a manuscript for consideration, the author(s) warrant(s) that it is not simultaneously being considered by any other publication and that it shall not be sent to another publication until a response is received from the journal.
- All issues of the journal and all articles are published on the journal webpage www.europeanperspectives.org.
- Article should be submitted in electronic version in text format (doc., docx.) to e-mail address: office@europeanperspectives.org.

PEER REVIEW

- European Perspectives reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form without requesting an external review.
- All manuscripts are checked by referees by means of a double-blind peer review. Two external referees review each manuscript.

ARTICLES

While preparing the manuscript take in the account the following:

- Manuscripts should be written in English.
- The normal length is between 6.000 and 9.000 words (including footnotes).

- Every article should contain title, abstract, keywords, introduction, and additional titles in the body, conclusion, and references.
- A brief biographical note about author, including previous and current institutional affiliation should be attached with full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about all the authors.

The following format and style guidelines should be applied:

- Article should be divided with titles (introduction, additional titles in the body, conclusion). Format of the titles in the text should be: letters only, caps lock & bold.
- An abstract should have 150 - 200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached. An abstract should be translated in Slovene.
- An abstract is followed by a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes.
- The text of the manuscript should be in 12 point normal Times New Roman with single line spacing.

For in-text citations, notes, and references, please follow the guidelines below:

- In the text please use the Harvard system of referencing available at <http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.htm>.
- Here are some examples:
 - When making reference to an author's whole work in your text, it is sufficient to give the name followed by the year of publication of their work: *When writing for a professional publication, it is good practice to make reference to other relevant published work. This view has been supported by Cormack (1994).*
 - However, where you are mentioning a particular part of the work, and making direct or indirect reference to this, a page reference should be included: *Cormack (1994, pp.32-33) states that "when writing for a professional readership, writers invariably make reference to already published works".*
 - If you make reference to a work or piece of research without mentioning the author in the text then both the author's name and publication year are placed at the relevant point in the sentence or at the end of the sentence in brackets: *Mak-*

ing reference to published work appears to be characteristic of writing for a professional audience (Cormack, 1994).

- Including the page numbers of a reference will help readers trace your sources. This is particularly important for quotations and for paraphrasing specific paragraphs in the texts: *Lawrence (1966, p.124) states "we should expect ..."* or indirectly: *This is to be expected (Lawrence, 1966, p.124)...* Please note page numbers: preceded with p. for a single page and pp. for a range of pages.
- References list - The purpose of a reference list is to enable sources to be easily traced by another reader. All items should be listed alphabetically by author or authorship, regardless of the format, whether books, websites or journal articles etc.
- The required elements for a book reference are: Author, Initials., Year. *Title of book*. Edition. (only include this if not the first edition) Place of publication (this must be a town or city, not a country): Publisher: *Baron, D. P., 2008. Business and the organisation. Chester: Pearson.*
- For chapters of edited books the required elements for a reference are:
Chapter author(s) surname(s) and initials., Year of chapter. Title of chapter followed by In: Book editor(s) initials first followed by surnames with ed. or eds. after the last name. Year of book. *Title of book*. Place of publication: Publisher. Chapter number or first and last page numbers followed by full-stop: *Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. In: S. Stone, ed. 1980. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS. pp.44-68.*
- Articles from web based magazines or journals, including Open Access articles found in institutional repositories - Authors, Initials., Year. Title of article. *Full Title of Journal or Magazine*, [online] Available at: web address (quote the exact URL for the article) [Accessed date]. - *Kipper, D., 2008. Japan's new dawn. Popular Science and Technology, [online] Available at: <<http://www.popsoci.com/popsoci37b144110vgn/html>> [Accessed 22 June 2009].*

BOOK REVIEWS

European Perspectives welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of European Perspectives was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

European Perspectives encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

For submitting a book review, authors should follow the requirements:

- A book review should not exceed 1.500 words.
- State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review.
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified.
- An exact page reference should be provided for all direct quotations used in reviewing the book.
- Book reviews should be submitted in electronic version in text format (doc., docx.) to e-mail address: office@europeanperspectives.org.

TEXTS FOR THE WEB PAGE – IN FOCUS

In focus is a part of our webpage www.europeanperspectives.org, which is dedicated to short texts – articles, essays. It is a place to present different views and aspects, but the focus is on European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. European Perspectives reserves the right to reject any text as being unsuitable in topic.


For submitting short texts, authors should follow the requirements:

- A text should not exceed 3.000 words and should be written in English.
- Text should contain title, introduction, additional titles in the body and conclusion.
- The text should be in 12 point normal Times New Roman with single line spacing.
- A brief biographical note about author, including previous and current institutional affiliation should be attached with full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the text is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about all the authors.
- Texts should be submitted in electronic version in text format (doc., docx.) to e-mail address: office@europeanperspectives.org.

www.europeanperspectives.org

Sponsors / Donators





articles

Digital diplomacy: aspects, approaches and practical use

Viona Rashica

Brain drain – current conditions and perspectives

Ljupcho Kevereski and Bisera Kostadinovska-Stojchevska

Eighty years since the midnight diplomatic pact: an overture to the Second World War

Polona Dovečar

Diplomacy and family life: co-existence or burden?

Dragica Pungaršek

Individualism as a determinant of successful diplomats through the engagement of stereotyped sportspersons

Milan Jazbec

IFIMES – Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC/UN since 2018

ISSN 1855-7694



9 177 1855 7690 08

15 eur