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Letter from the Guest Editor

This special issue of European Perspectives comes in a very interesting time (actually there are not many editors who would not argue this is not the case with regard to their publication, so as to justify it and at the same time try to attract the readers). In our opinion it really is *a special* one, as it deals with the topic that has been rather put aside by the European public in the last couple of years due to, as politicians and journalists tend to say, the more pressing challenges that had recently appeared on the EU agenda(s): immigration to the EU from war-torn countries, radicalization and terrorism in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, authoritarian moves in certain EU members and the neighbouring countries, Brexit, the new president of the USA and his view of the future role of the US in international community...

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is the central topic of this special issue, is an ambitious project that has, if one looks at the age only, just recently reached the age of maturity (at the same time there are strong points in favour of arguing that CSDP has not even reached the puberty phase). CSDP has, like it or not, somehow slipped off from the attention of EU citizens also due to aforementioned challenges that have been "securitized" and presented to the Europeans as more "pressing ones". CSDP was conceived vehemently at the end of the 1990s as a result of the EU's inability to efficiently respond to the bloodshed not only in its immediate neighbourhood (Southeast Europe), but widely (Rwanda and Somalia, for example). However, if we consider the concept of security as it is – indivisible in its essence – we quickly realize that CSDP is both in theory and practice actually the part of the same story as all the above mentioned "new" phenomena. This reasoning also led us to initiate the idea to assemble the papers for this special issue, which stems from the research in the framework of the H2020 project "Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention – IECEU".

The first paper entitled *The European Union and the (r) evolution of its strategy of conflict prevention,* written by Rok Zupančič explains the evolution of the EU's and its predeces-

sors' (European Communities) approach to conflict prevention. The author argues that CSDP missions and operations are only one, though very important face of the EU's external (neighbourhood) policy, and should thus also be seen as such. It is often heard in the international community that certain mission or operation did not deliver on its promises, which is often the case, the paper emphasized that CSDP missions and operations cannot succeed alone in stabilizing the conflict- or post-conflict areas - without the application of a wider set of conflict prevention initiatives and instruments.

If the first paper is theorizing the concepts of conflict prevention and developments in this regard in the EU realm, the second paper in this special issue entitled *International community and the European Union in the Western Balkans: from disinterest to active participation*, written by Jana Arbeiter and Bostjan Udovič, presents the pillars for the debate, described in the following papers that are needed to understand CSDP and general engagement of the EU in Southeast Europe. The authors analyze the selected historical facts and concepts that were developed in and about this region, pointing out that certain concepts from the World War I, World War II and the wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s deeply penetrated the modern structure and thinking in, on and about the region. Unsurprisingly, this has important consequences also for the modern understanding of Southeast Europe, both in theoretical and practical terms (policy-making in the EU and engagement of the EU in the region).

The next contribution, entitled *Assessing the planning and implementation of the EU Rule of Law missions: case study of EULEX Kosovo* by Blaž Grilj and Rok Zupančič is directly linked with the field research phase of the IECEU project. It assesses the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, one of the most ambitious and complex CSDP engagements to date, from the perspective of the planning phase of the mission. The paper builds on the analysis of interviews conducted in Kosovo in March 2016, arguing that both structural and political challenges affected the assessed planning process, which resulted in a delay of the deployment of EULEX in Kosovo.

Analysing the effectiveness of peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions and operations has never been an easy task. In the paper *Analysing the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,* Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Meliha Muherina and Nina Pejič embarked on a "mission" of analysing the longest CSDP operation in history from the perspective of effectiveness. The analysis follows the conceptual clarifications established in the first (methodological) phase of the IECEU project, noting that effectiveness can be regarded "when an operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict it seeks to prevent". The paper argues that the operation has achieved certain success, especially in maintaining safe and secure environment, advancing human rights and gender equality as well as capacity-building of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The special issue delivers another paper, traversing two CSDP engagements in the region - Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In the paper entitled *Drawing lessons learnt on operational capabilities of EU's CSDP missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina,* Ivana Boštjančič Pulko and Nina Pejič compare the operational capabilities of the civilian mission EULEX Kosovo and military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They find out that the lack of political willingness and commitment to both on-going CSDP engagements in Southeast Europe hampers the operational functioning of the mission from several perspectives, leading also to many operational risks.

This issue of European perspectives concludes with the reviews of two important books theorizing the EU as an international security provider. The review of the first book (*Fortress Europe*: *Inside the War against Immigration*) was written by Sara Jud and presents a humanistic (human-face) perspectives of the migration issues, which are often neglected or simply ignored in the discussions whether the EU should be less or more open towards to immigrants.

The second review (written by Petra Trkov) presents the book co-edited by three prominent authors on the security aspects of the EU, Annemarie Peen Rodt, Richard G. Whitman, Stefan Wolff. The book entitled *Theorising the European Union as an international security provider* brings number of interest-

ing chapters on the state of the EU's actorness in the security and defence realm.

The contributors to this issue and the editors hope that this special issue will, at least partially, stimulate further research and discussions on CSDP both in academic and policy-making realms. Parallel to this special issue, several discussions on CSDP organized by CEP took place at the Jable Castle. It proved that experts and policy-makers are often dissatisfied by the fact that CSDP has nowadays been dealing with similar issues as at the outset of its existence (inability to form unified position, different interests of member states for taking mitigating in certain conflicts, etc.). This is certainly understandable. However, the geostrategic challenges of modern era, mentioned at the beginning of this letter, do require that policy-makers, think-tank analysts, academics and other relevant actors work hand-in-hand and provide the answers to the questions that have been lacking in CSDP since its inception: should the EU's role in security affairs be global or regional, what is the ambition in terms of quality and quantity of operations, how to make the member states realize that the EU's response to security challenges should be unified and not let to the individual will of the member states, etc. However, these might be the topics that will be scrutinized in detail in future editions of European Perspectives.

Graz, 30 October 2016

Dr Rok Zupančič, guest editor

Research of Peace Missions and Operations

Ljubica Jelušič

European Perspectives – Journal on European perspectives of the Western Balkans
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Research of Peace Missions and Operations

Ljubica Jelušič[1]

The academic study of peace missions and operations, which had for a long time been neglected and isolated corner of political science, experienced a renaissance in the early 1990s, when the United Nations launched a number of new missions. Although enthusiasm for deploying new peace operations cooled after failures in Somalia in 1994 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the task of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of existing and past peace missions and operations continues to attract intense academic attention. Improving the strategies and instruments for dealing with conflicts and their humanitarian effects namely remains an important aim of decision and policy makers in national governments and international agencies around the globe.

The present issue of the journal European Perspectives, which is based on the findings of the H2020 project IECEU - *Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention*, presents an interesting and very specific contribution to the history of research related to the international peace missions and operations. National research institutes have so far rather focused on the analysis of either on a specific peace mission and operation during a certain period of time through contributions of individual countries or contribution of a specific country to different missions and operations. NATO, for example, has been active in the field of systemic forms of data collection related to military lessons learnt from peace operations, for which even a special headquarters was established in order to provide proper tactical information flow for countries' future rotations.

[1] Dr. Ljubica Jelušič is a Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana.

IECEU project, however, uses a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of EU peace missions and operations with the aim of preparing EU and its member states on the future peace missions and operations, their aims and purpose. Such a research project is of great importance and should also be conducted at specific points in time in the future in order to redefine the future goals and aims of EU's role in peace missions and operations. It is the comprehensiveness of this research, interdisciplinarity and multimethodological approach, which constitutes a special contribution to the set of gathered knowledge concerning the peace operations and missions in general.

IECEU is a three year project (2015–2018), which aims towards enhancement of EU's external activities. The consortium is coordinated by Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Finland) and consists of a diverse group of eleven civilian, research and military organisations from seven EU countries reflecting the variety within EU missions. The overall goal of the project is to find out new approaches and solutions to respond to the future challenges and threats.

The project analyses and evaluates the missions' and operations' effectiveness in three selected, case study areas, where Common Security and Defence Policy activities are represented: the Balkans, Africa, Middle East/Asia. Such comprehensive analysis of current external actions can provide better answers to creating more effective missions and operations. Through analyses and evaluations, the project will identify best practices and develop new approaches and solutions. It aims to strengthen cooperation between different actors in the operational context and to provide recommendations for EU to guarantee long-term stability and to create new types of solutions and mechanisms for conflict preventative activities as an approach to guaranteeing safe communities. The project will also produce a catalogue of best practices and recommendations for the EU to strengthen its capabilities and to focus its strengths more effectively. I hope that the EU and its member states will have enough political will to adopt the project's recommendations in their day to day work

and strive towards more efficient policies and processes related to peace missions and operations.

articles

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The European Union and the (R)Evolution of its Strategy of Conflict Prevention

Rok Zupančič[1]

ABSTRACT

The paper explores the evolution of the European Communities'/the European Union's strategy and approach to conflict prevention. As it will be argued, the CSDP operations and missions are only one, though very important face of the EU's external (neighbourhood) policy, and should also be seen as such – by no means can the CSDP missions and operations "succeed" alone in stabilizing the conflict- or post-conflict areas, without the application of a wider set of conflict prevention initiatives and instruments. However, the emphasis on conflict prevention is a relatively recent phenomenon for the EU and has as such only recently become an integral part of its external (neighbourhood) policy. The paper builds on the findings of the H2020 project 'Improving the effectiveness in EU conflict prevention' (IECEU).

KEY WORDS: the European Union, conflict prevention, European Security Strategy, Common Security and Defence Policy

POVZETEK

Članek raziskuje razvoj strategije in pristopa Evropskih skupnosti/Evropske unije (EU) k preprečevanju konfliktov. Prispevek zagovarja tezo, da so operacije in misije Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike (SVOP) le en, čeprav zelo pomemben del zunanje (sosedske) politike EU in bi jih bilo potrebno tudi na ta

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način obravnavati. Misije in operacije SVOP na konfliktnih in pokonfliktnih območjih ne bi bile uspešne brez uporabe širšega niza pobud in instrumentov za preprečevanje konfliktov. Kljub temu pa poudarek na preprečevanju konfliktov predstavlja relativno nov pojav za EU, saj je kot tak razmeroma nedavno postal sestavni del njene zunanje (sosedske) politike. Članek temelji na ugotovitvah projekta z naslovom »Izboljšanje učinkovitosti EU pri preprečevanju konfliktov« (IECEU), ki je financiran v okviru raziskovalnega programa Obzorje 2020.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Evropska unija, preprečevanje konfliktov, Evropska varnostna strategija, Skupna varnostna in obrambna politika

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) has many faces: many see it primarily as an economic actor (EuroBroadMap 2016), others argue that its most important aspect is that of 'a civilian power' (Bull 1982), 'a normative power actor' (Manners 2002; Pace 2007), or even 'an ethical actor' in the international community (Aggestam 2008). As an actor of international relations aspiring for a greater say in the world, the EU does not hide its ambitions of becoming a global security actor, and this also implies taking an active role in security and defence challenges.

For the EU to become a global actor, the development of adequate capabilities for acting in security and defence realms is a precondition for two reasons: firstly, it is needed to guarantee its own (internal) security and repulsing eventual threats, and secondly, adequate capabilities are required to prevent violent conflicts and assist in the stabilization processes in volatile regions throughout the world. Also a precondition for becoming renowned as a global, or at least, regional security provider, is the outward orientation of the EU's security compass. Namely, looking at the security challenges solely from an inward perspective cannot guarantee security in the 21st century, as most of the security threats nowadays are of a transnational character, looming regionally or even globally, irrespectively of state borders (Peterson and Geddes 2015).

The goal of this paper is to explore the evolution of the European Community's/EU's strategy of conflict prevention. The paper will discuss the topic from the perspective of the EU's shy attempts in conflict prevention from the early phases in the 1950s to the present day, when the EU has a more comprehensive and elaborated approach. The paper builds on the argumentation that the emphasis on conflict prevention is a relatively recent phenomenon in the EU, which has become an integral part of its external policy. As it will be argued in this paper, the CSDP operations and missions are only one, though very important face of the EU's external policy, and should also be seen as such – by no means can the CSDP missions and operations "succeed" alone in stabilizing the conflict- or post-conflict areas, without the application of a wider set of instruments.

The methodology, which was developed at the initial stage of the Horizon 2020 research project entitled *Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities in EU conflict prevention* (IECEU), is based on an analysis of primary and secondary sources.[2] The relevance of this paper lies in the fact that it is important to understand the evolution of the conflict prevention strategic thinking and conflict prevention action in the European Communities, and later, the EU, in order to establish a solid conceptual basis for the project IECEU, which aims at improving the capabilities of the EU in conflict prevention. From a wider perspective – given the turbulence in the EU's neighbourhood (the crisis in Ukraine, civil wars in Syria and Iraq, the rise of the so called Islamic state) – understanding the deliberations and concrete actions taken in the European Communities/the EU in the last decades, in the security domain with regard to conflict prevention, is of crucial importance to be able to put CSDP operations and missions in the wider context of the EU's conflict prevention strategy and approach.

EARLY ATTEMPTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN

[2] The IECEU Consortium consists of a diverse group of civilian, research and military organizations. The IECEU analyses the best practices and lessons learned with a view to enhance the civilian conflict prevention and peace building capabilities of the EU with a catalogue of practices, new solutions and approaches. More about the project at www.ieceu-project.com Accessed 5 September 2016.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

The integration processes in Europe, which started after the Second World War and culminated in the foundation of the EU, are first and foremost a peace project, aiming at preventing another devastating war on the European continent. In 1951, the six High Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – stated that '*world peace can be safe-guarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it*' (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1951).

At the beginning of European integration, the spirit of conflict prevention rested predominantly on an economic dimension, which was, of course, underpinned by political reasoning. Nevertheless, the thinking of the European politicians of that time was not limited to economic and political dimensions alone. There were ambitions and initiatives to establish a European Defence Community and a European Political Community already back in the 1950s, but they foundered quickly: firstly, because the French Assembly failed to ratify them, and secondly, because the president of France, Charles de Gaulle opposed any further supranational integration. Security and defence issues back then were therefore to remain predominantly in the domain of NATO and the Western European Union, an organization of states – Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – that signed the Brussels Pact in 1948, forged as an alliance against Germany (Stewart 2006, 44).

With the resignation of the French president de Gaulle in 1969, and the new president, Pompidou taking over, the political environment in Europe changed. The ambitions of the "European integrationists", who favoured the supranational political ideas that would further integrate the Member States of the European Communities, again came to prominence. The Davignon Report (also known as the Luxembourg Report) established the European Political Cooperation in 1970, which aimed at entailing regular intergovernmental contact and dialogue between the foreign

ministers of the member states (Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification 1970). The officials from the member states' foreign ministries that drafted the report became the Political Committee – the main European Political Cooperation body.

From the early 1970s, the European Communities were gaining an international voice through Member State foreign policy cooperation and began practising quiet, long-term preventive diplomacy. With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, a rudimentary form of preventive diplomacy was also given a treaty basis, as it codified the so called European Political Cooperation, which is considered as the forerunner of the CSDP. However, the competence of the European Political Cooperation regarding (European) security questions was restricted to 'political and economic aspects of security', meaning that conflict prevention and crisis management conducted by other rather than by military means clearly fell within its scope (Wouters and Naert 2004). Looking back from today's perspective, this was a small, but necessary step in consolidating the common approach of the Member States to external relations, of which conflict prevention became one of the most vital aspects.

Before endorsing an explicit strategy for the prevention of violent conflicts – and turning conflict prevention into practice – the EC/EU's attempts to prevent conflicts rested on the export of the virtuous circle of political and economic stability to its closest neighbours. Although the European Communities (or later the EU) never included the prior solving of conflicts in the accession criteria for the countries aspiring to join, the European Communities (the EU) has, nevertheless, used its 'power of attraction' on several occasions, aiming at anchoring peace and freedom in the candidate states. This has happened in the cases of Greece (1982), Spain and Portugal (1986).

During the accession process of Central and Eastern European countries, the European Commission relied on the 'carrot and stick approach' as a powerful instrument to decrease tensions in some inter-state disputes. One of the most well-known examples

of the first attempts of the European Communities to mitigate conflicts was the dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia (later Slovakia) over the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project on the Danube, which began back in the 1980s, when both countries were still members of the Warsaw Pact.

The European Communities observed the conflict for quite some time, and the significant attempts to find a suitable solution for both sides began in 1990 through the PHARE programme. In this dispute, the European Communities learned one of its first 'conflict prevention lessons' when acting as a mediator: the situation necessitated for the EU to change its initial perception of the inter-state problem from an inappropriately narrow (technical) view to the recognition that this dispute was a sensitive problem of a political nature. The success of the European Communities, including the strong diplomatic role of the European Parliament, to prevent further escalation of conflict was mixed: the conflict did not reach a violent phase, though, which could have happened had the countries not felt the decisive diplomatic pressure "from Europe". However, the long-term solution was not reached despite the fact that the parties had in 1993 signed a compromise agreement, which was in the end not observed by Slovakia. Hence, the case was submitted to the International Court of Justice (Fürst 2003). This example clearly shows that the first conflict prevention and crisis management attempts of the European Communities were of an explicitly structural conflict prevention character.

A similar approach, mostly relying on structural conflict prevention dimensions, was used by the European Communities in Estonia, where the international organization pressured the Estonian government to resolve the status of the Russian minority (Kronenberger and Wouters 2004, XVIII-XX). These conflict prevention activities were effective as they were mostly of a non-asymmetric character, in which a powerful actor (the European Communities) decides on the fate of a weaker actor (Estonia). With regard to the conflict prevention theory and its implementation in practice, the EU has learned that an actor willing to

prevent conflicts, or play a decisive role as a mediator, has to have credible sources of power (political, economic, military, normative etc.), which can be used to mitigate between the conflicting parties.

When it comes to third states that have not aspired for membership due to geographical or political reasons, as was the case in the Eastern and Central European countries mentioned above, the European Communities did not contribute significantly to the prevention of conflicts. The available conflict prevention instruments were mostly of a structural character, such as developmental policies. However, one should not underestimate these early attempts of the EC. For example, several African, Caribbean and Pacific states benefited from the EC's policies in this regard, and so some crises and inter- and intra-state wars were averted, as the people in need had benefited from the better economic opportunities (Stewart 2006, 43). Nevertheless, these policies of the EU focused mostly on trade and developmental aid until the early years of the 1990s, with no systematic emphasis on conflict prevention. Thus, the EU's conflict prevention of that time was mostly a result of fortunate events, and not a multi-faceted conflict prevention policy.

From the theoretical point of conflict prevention, one may rightly argue the first attempts of the European Communities/the EU were mostly of a structural conflict prevention nature, while operational conflict prevention was not the norm. There are many reasons for that, among them the following seem to be the most important:

1) *the characteristics of the Cold War security environment*, in which the international actors (states and international organizations in particular) were rather reluctant to intervene directly in the 'sphere of influence' of the other superpower (Grizold *et al* 2016).

2) the European Communities at that time was mostly *occupied with its own integration and consolidation*, and thus far from

having neither capabilities nor ambitions to become a global security actor (Stewart 2006).

THE 1990s AND THE GROWING AMBITIONS OF THE EU IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

The EU, like other actors in international relations, had to adapt to a new security environment that emerged after the Cold War. Not being internally endangered, the ambitions of the EU – aspiring to become a credible player in international relations – significantly increased. The goal to become a 'force for good' (Manners 2002) in international relations, which presupposes a commitment to conflict prevention throughout the world, became the *lingua franca* in European institutions. The following events, in particular, led the EU to embark on the path of conflict prevention:

- the powerful destabilization effect of the dissolution of the Soviet Union;
- the outbreak of deadly conflicts which devastated Yugoslavia and some African states;
- on-going conflicts in the Middle East and Asia;
- the lack of appropriate mechanisms for conflict prevention and conflict resolution at regional and international level.

The changed security paradigm, in which military security lost its dominance in the security/defence discourse at the expense of other emerging aspects of security (economic, political, societal, ecological etc.), and the above-mentioned events convinced the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali that more needed to be done for conflict prevention to become a norm of international relations.[3] Boutros Ghali introduced the concept of preventive diplomacy, with the final aim of promoting

[3] During the Cold War, the term 'security' was used in Western Europe predominantly to denote military defence against the Soviet Union. Stemming from this understanding, it comes as no surprise that the state (and national security) was the central level of analysis (Stewart 2006).

the so called 'culture of prevention'. This term has soon become a buzzword not only in the UN, but also in other international organizations (Zupančič 2015).

In the period when strategies for conflict prevention rose to prominence, the leaders of the states of the European communities swiftly embraced the idea that conflict prevention was not merely about the prevention of *imminent* crisis, and thus embarked upon a deeper coordination of their foreign, security and defence policies, which should ideally lead to the prevention of armed conflicts throughout the world, or, in other words, to long-term conflict prevention (*ibid.*).

The ambitions of the European integration process, which also began spreading in the realms of security and defence, and the optimism of the European leaders that the European Communities could have contributed more to world peace was clearly reflected in the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in February 1992. In the new political agreement, which is still today seen by many as a milestone in European integration, the new "European Union" proclaimed the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the possibility of a common defence, as one of its three main pillars (Treaty of Maastricht on European Union 1992).

Compared to the European Political Cooperation on the 1970s and the 1980s, which hardly dealt with conflict prevention in any significant manner, the Maastricht Treaty brought the European Political Cooperation – and conflict prevention indirectly – into the institutional framework of the EU (Wouters and Naert 2004, 34–35). Within this, the scope of the CFSP was comprehensive and was 'covering all areas of foreign and security policy'. As rightly noted by Wouters and Naert (*ibid.*), the potential of conflict prevention under the CFSP was exposed quite soon at the highest levels. The Report to the European Council (1992, Annex 1, 29) on the possible ways of the development of the CFSP stated that:

"/…/ the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external actions are less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises."

Possible objectives for the joint action of the EU, including the contribution to the prevention of conflicts or their settlement, were also specified in this document. Stemming from this report, the priority of the EU was to be attached to a number of regions, namely 'Central and Eastern Europe', in particular the Commonwealth of the Independent States and the Balkans, the Mediterranean, in particular the Maghreb and the Middle East'. Furthermore, a number of priority 'horizontal issues', in particular 'domains within the security dimension', were identified. It must be said that these included no direct or specific reference to conflict prevention, although conflict prevention was clearly an inherent 'ingredient' of the CFSP (Wouters and Naert 2004, 35–38).

The institutionalization of conflict prevention and putting it at the forefront of the EU's external activities did not cease, in particular because it became evident that the EU at that time was not capable of dealing with the crises in its immediate neighbourhood (the war in Yugoslavia, for example). Aiming at preventing conflicts before they happened and "equipping" the EU with the necessary instruments, the European Parliament called for the establishment of a European Union Analyses Centre for Active Crisis Prevention in 1995. The unit as such was not formed, but in 2000 an important milestone in this regard was reached, when the European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit was established inside the DG RELEX. The unit became the lead institution on conflict prevention within the European Commission, aiming at coordinating activities among various DGs involved with the Council and CSDP structures. As noted by Lavallée (2013, 376) and Nowak (2006, 15–37) the definition of conflict prevention and crisis management at that time remained quite disputed because of the institutional split be-

tween the civilian instruments created under the first and second pillars and the more complicated issue of competence-sharing in the civilian areas of crisis management between the Council and the Commission.

At the end of the 1990s, with the war in Kosovo (1998–99) looming in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and the clear evidence of the EU's impotence to intervene, the conflict prevention discourse in the EU gained another momentum with the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy, which was established as a policy of a strictly intergovernmental character. In the annex to the conclusions of the Cologne European Council, which went even a step further than the Saint Malo Declaration (Joint declaration issued at the British-French Summit, 1998), it was explicitly noted that the EU:

"*should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union*" (Cologne European Council 1999).

As rightly put in the forefront by Wouters and Naert (2004, 35–38), the efforts of the EU largely run in parallel with the conflict prevention activities of other organizations. Within the CFSP, conflict prevention as a policy was not an autonomous priority, but rather *one* of the aspects of the EU's policy towards certain regions, or a consequence of specific but limited horizontal measures, which did not primarily envisage conflict prevention.

DECISIVE STEP ON THE STAGE OF CONFLICT PREVENTION: FROM THE GOTHENBURG PROGRAMME (2001) TO THE INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE

A major political milestone for the EU came in 2001, when *The European Union programme for the prevention of violent conflicts* was adopted in Gothenburg by the European Council. The highest political body of the EU decided that '*conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union's external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development*

policy and trade" (EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts 2001). In the same year, the European commission has, in its Communication on Conflict Prevention, reaffirmed that development cooperation provides one of the most powerful instruments available to the EU for treating the root causes of conflict over the longer term.

In this document, the Commission divided the EU instruments between a long-term perspective for 'projecting stability' and a short-term one for 'reacting quickly to nascent conflicts'. This was also a first attempt to clarify this concept from a holistic approach, considering that the EU should 'address cross-cutting issues, which may contribute to tensions and conflict'. This Communication, as argued by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008, 90), contributed in terms of agenda setting, and putting "external policy" actions into a clear strategic foreign policy perspective.

Some concrete actions of capability building aimed at providing the EU with the instruments for effective conflict prevention and crisis management followed the political and normative commitments. In 2001, the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism* (RRM) was established. This was also an attempt by the EU to address various criticisms of being too reactive, and less proactive as a conflict prevention actor in global affairs. The RRM was '*designed to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis*.' (Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 2001).

The RRM offered some autonomy to the Commission even if its room for manoeuvre was clearly delimited by the member states. The external assistance instrument had a limited annual budget of only €30 million, which could be used only for an operation of up to six months. Furthermore, the mechanism did not include EU humanitarian aid which has been traditionally conceived as a neutral assistance tool rather than a crisis management instrument. Despite certain constraints, the mechanism gave an important degree of flexibility to the Commission, as it was equipped with a real conflict prevention and crisis manage-

ment instrument without any sectorial or geographical limitation (*ibid.*).

Around 50 projects in 25 countries and regions amounting roughly to €120 million were streamlined through the RRM (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). The RRM was undoubtedly a step forward in the EU's conflict prevention and crisis management activities, but it suffered from many constraints. As argued by Lavalée (2013), it was unable to ensure the long between the short-term crisis response and long-term development assistance. This was a serious deficiency, as the theory of conflict prevention vocally maintains that long-term assistance is needed in volatile regions or countries, if the root causes of the conflicts were to be addressed.

With the RRM in place, and more than a decade long debate on what are the most imminent threats the EU is facing, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 (A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy 2013). With this document, the EU committed itself to using a wide range of instruments to prevent violent conflicts – conflict prevention remained at the heart of the strategy. After its adoption, the sceptics were afraid that the Member States 'will pay increasing attention to developing the military aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, rather than civilian, and preventive responses, without which, military engagement is counter-productive'.

The ESS made the causal and direct link between 'new threats' (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, state failure, organized crime) and the 'older' problems of regional conflicts. Furthermore, a human security approach has been brought forward; national security problems were not the only problems of 'security' anymore, as the ESS paid much greater attention to the security of individuals. In this regard, the strategy linked security closely to the development, noting that 'security is a precondition for development' (*ibid.*). Early action was again emphasized, as well as the need to address the challenges arising from conventional weapons. Working together with other actors engaged in conflict prevention (multilateral diplomacy) was strongly advocated. The

need to assist weak and failing states was clearly emphasized in the strategy as well as were the regional approaches to building peace (International Alert and Saferworld 2015).

Due to the imperfections of the then-conflict prevention performance of the EU, which were also exposed by certain lessons learned within the first ESDP missions, the Commission took the opportunity to reorganize the assistance and cooperation programmes, and for that reason proposed a new instrument, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which entered into force in 2007 (Lavallée 2013, 377). The IfS was a substantial improvement to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The EC was given more resources, better control over the budget, the linkage between short- and long-term conflict prevention was better elaborated, and the duration of the projects became more flexible (Regulation (EC) No. 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 2006). Overall, the room for manoeuvre was greater due to the flexibility and faster reaction times. Although some deficiencies were ingrained in the IfS since its birth, many scholars argue that the IfS measures adopted since 2007 reinforced the EU's comprehensive approach towards conflict prevention and peace-building, and have positioned the Commission more strategically in EU security governance.

Conflict prevention after the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty placed conflict prevention formally to the EU institutions as part of the Petersberg Tasks, referring to the earlier tasks inherited from the Western European Union in the Amsterdam Treaty. The policy of conflict prevention is further integrated into the CSDP and is also referred to in the context of permanent structural cooperation. With an ambitious goal of 'the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights,' the profile of conflict prevention in the EU's external action was further strengthened.

From an institutional viewpoint, it became clearer with the Lisbon Treaty who the 'people' responsible for the implementation of conflict prevention were: the president of the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were given the primary responsibility in this regard. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which assists the High Representative, is of particular significance, particularly because – according to the treaty – it aims at bringing together different bodies/agencies dealing with conflict prevention issues in the Commission and the Council Secretariat.

As rightly emphasized by Duke (2001, 3-4), the greater involvement of national diplomats on temporary assignment with the EEAS could provide a better linkage between the nation capitals and Brussels. The EEAS, consisting of the experts of all member states, increased the synergies among the EU's external instruments, moving further towards a strongly integrated approach in crisis response and conflict prevention. As pointed out by Lavalée (2013, 382), it was necessary for the DG RELEX to get integrated into the structure of the EEAS (in the geographical departments). Another issue pointed out by Boin and colleagues has to do with the rivalry between the Commission and the Council; both the Commission's Crisis room and the Council's Situation Centre been included in EEAS to increase the coherence and complementarity of information (Boin et al 2006, 490).

The capabilities (instruments) of the EU's conflict prevention, particularly what were the improvements of deploying the conflict prevention instruments in place, should also be explored, particularly from the aspect of the often troubled financing and speediness of the decision-making process. The EU has recently made another step forward in this regard. In 2014, with the regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union a remodelled instrument was established, named *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace* (IcSP), which succeeded the Instrument for Stability (IfS) (Regulation (EU) No. 230/2014). The crisis response component of the Instrument has broadened, with an increased focus on conflict prevention. The management of the IcSP is now the shared responsibility of the EEAS and the Commission, under the authority of the High Representative (Official Journal of European Union 2010).

The IcSP has by far the highest budget so far, €2.3 billion for 2014–2020. In 2015, 292 projects in 80 countries throughout the world were funded by this instrument. The priority areas, defined in the Strategy Paper 2014-2020 and the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014–2017, were clearly showing that the EU by no means relinquishes from its more than a decade long policy of addressing conflicts in a comprehensive and long-term (structural) manner:

- Promoting early warning and conflict-sensitive risk analysis in policy making and implementation;
- Facilitating and building capacity in confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, with particular regard to emerging inter-community tensions;
- Strengthening capacities for the participation and deployment in civilian stabilization missions;
- Improving post-conflict recovery, as well as post-disaster recovery with imminent threats to the political and security situation;

Assistance to curb the use of natural resources to finance conflicts and to support the compliance by stakeholders with initiative (European Commission 2015).

What does it mean in practice? Before the EEAS was created, the elaboration of the IfS process involved mainly CSDP actors (the Council and its structures). With the EEAS, daily contacts between the relevant stakeholders became more frequent and better coordinated, as they are physically located in the same building. From the human resource perspective, the coordination and the coherence of work is, at least theoretically, better, as many experts who have been working on conflict prevention and crisis management moved from the DG RELEX to EEAS (Lavallée 2013)

CONCLUSION

In the last six decades, and especially after the end of the Cold War, the European "peace process" gained other dimensions and ambitions. Nowadays, there are only a few volatile regions in the world, in which the EU does not aim at playing the role of conflict preventer or crisis manager, often working alongside other international organizations, non-governmental organizations and other actors. Looking back over a good decade of the EU's Gothenburg Programme and conflict prevention, the EU has had both evident successes and complete failures. The Gothenburg programme adopted in 2001 has raised awareness on the importance of conflict prevention not only in the Brussels-based institutions, but also in the member states, and has also triggered necessary actions for conflict prevention to be effective.

The conclusions from Gothenburg have also been bolstered by other policy documents, most importantly within the European Security Strategy (2003), the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003), the European Consensus on Development, the EC communication on security and development and some other documents. A clear line connecting all the documents undoubtedly shows the EU's commitment to conflict prevention, and *an ambition to develop the capabilities for operational and structural con-*

flict prevention (humanitarian assistance, development aid, economic incentives, trade relations …). A decade and a half after Gothenburg, structural conflict prevention is still perceived as being far less problematic for member states (as actors with a final say, although it does not mean they are eager to provide financial support for it), as it encompasses the actions, which, compared to more decisive and often disputed military operations, enjoy significantly higher approval of the European audience. This comes as no surprise, and the EU and its citizens are not a special case: sending humanitarian and development aid has always been less politically sensitive compared to "putting boots on the ground".

Stemming from the theory of conflict prevention, it is more likely that conflict prevention is successful – meaning that the conflict is averted –, when the action is decisive and multifaceted. Using the terminology of Michael Lund, one of the leading scholars in the field, conflict prevention shall include active/passive, long/short-term, economic/legal/political/military, and internal/external aspects. It cannot be disputed that the EU has adopted such a notion of conflict prevention in its documents.

It is evident that the challenges of inter-institutional coordination concerning EU conflict prevention still exist. Many initiatives were proposed to address them, such as common structures, action plans and the civilian headline goals. However, the comprehensive approach is not easy to implement in practice, as there are different visions and understandings of the notion of security, different backgrounds, cultures, and consequently, different priorities and strategies within each institution.

But what has the implementation phase – the last and the only really meaningful indicator of conflict prevention of the EU – shown? Although it is driven by the EC, it became evident that conflict prevention then should also include the instruments that traditionally fall in the 'second pillar' (CFSP). The expansive nature of conflict prevention has led to concerns on the one hand that it is too all-enveloping, and is thus difficult to implement on a coherent basis, and on the other, it has also met criticism for not being expansive enough, most notably when it comes to gender

sensitivity and awareness. For this reason, IcSP as an improved mechanism was established in 2014 in order to reinforce the link between the short-term and long-term perspectives and to work across all phases of the conflict cycle (conflict prevention, crisis response, conflict resolution, post-conflict stabilization, and even reconciliation).

It is impossible to say one-sidedly, whether the EU is a successful conflict prevention actor or not. It certainly does not operate in a vacuum, and there are many causes and permissive conditions triggering violence. Looking at the EU's southern border, which has been under the heavy pressure of refugees from Africa and the Middle East, one may rightly say the EU is impotent. There are various conflict prevention and crisis management activities in several regions or countries, from where the refugees come from.

Has the EU done enough in this regard to prevent conflicts throughout the world? What is (not) enough has always been a political answer. And there are certain areas in the EU's immediate neighbourhood, which are not accessible neither to the EU's experts, development aid and humanitarian workers, nor anyone else with the goals of humanitarianism, despite the fact the structural and operational conflict prevention of not only the EU, but all other actors contributing to conflict prevention – international organizations, non-governmental organizations, educational institutions etc. – should be done *there*, if the EU is serious in contributing to stability in the world.

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The International Community and the European Union in the Western Balkans: from 'Disinterest' to 'Active Participation'

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ABSTRACT

This article's intention is to frame the debate on the role of the international community and the European Union in the Western Balkans. The article deals mostly with the historical facts in concepts that were developed in the Balkans; starting with the role of the Ottoman empire, which traces can be found in the Balkans still today and going through the bloody 20th century wars – from WWI and WWII to the Balkan wars, which deeply penetrated the modern structure and thinking in, on and about the Western Balkans. The article finishes with a short analysis of the international community's activities in the Western Balkans that presents the pillars for the following debate in the following articles.

KEY WORDS: Balkans, Western Balkan, Yugoslav wars, European Union, International Community

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POVZETEK

Cilj članka je uokviriti razpravo o vlogi mednarodne skupnosti in Evropske unije na Zahodnem Balkanu skozi obravnavo zgodovinskih dejstev v različnih konceptih, ki so bili oblikovani na tem geografskem področju. Začenši z vlogo Otomanskega imperija, katerega sledi lahko najdemo na Balkanu še danes, skozi krvave vojne 20. stoletja – od I. svetovne vojne, II. svetovne vojne, do balkanskih vojn, ki so globoko prodrle v sodobno strukturo in razmišljanje v, na in o Zahodnem Balkanu. Članek se zaključi s kratko analizo aktivnosti mednarodne skupnosti na Zahodnem Balkanu in predstavlja temelj za nadaljnje razprave v člankih, ki mu sledijo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Balkan, Zahodni Balkan, jugoslovanske vojne, Evropska unija, mednarodna skupnost

INTRODUCTION

Defining the Balkans[3] is very difficult, considering the fact that there is a multiplicity of meanings, which combine geographical, historical, cultural, anthropological and socio-political elements, which are often ambiguous (Strle and Josipovič 2014, pp. 13). Those elements together with a very diverse population in the Balkans significantly influenced by the subsequent bloody conflicts, which resulted in the wish for a sovereign nation state, which was born with the decay of the Ottoman power (Strle and Josipovič 2014, pp. 17). Nevertheless wishes sometimes convert to the reality; nations in the Western Balkans started to *westphalise*[4] only in the late 19th century. However, the push and pull factors did not support the clear path of the state-building processes, especially because several great powers were interested to leverage their powers within the Balkans. The Balkans as an area was also so complicated because – as pointed out by Horvat (1971, pp. 71) – these people have been using two alphabets, three major religious denominations have been present and at least four

[3] The word Balkans is in Turkish explained as a mountain range and was spread by the Ottoman Turks (Mazower 2000; Todorova 2001, pp. 58)

[4] *Westphalisation* is a process of conversion of ethnic groups to nations, which later on gain their own state.

languages have been used by the five nations. Thus after the decrease in power on the side of the great powers and after the disappearance of the balance of powers in the European continent, it was clear that the nations from the Balkans would opt for their own nationhood and would start to form their own political milieu. Whether World War I (WWI) was the dawn of the Balkan political emancipation, World War II (WWII) promoted the idea of the intra-Balkan's political cooperation. States that were formed after the end of WWI after 1945 became stronger and more important. However, the political emancipation of the Balkan nations did not solve the problems of their diversity. Because of the external factors this diversity was after WWII linked to a common denominator – the communist system – but as soon the bipolar world order fell apart, the 'old' (inter-nation) divisions gained impetus. When it was clear that the world order would change from bipolar to multipolar, some ideas on the Balkans state-to-state diversity started to reappear. The dissolution of Yugoslavia, being the most important actor in the Balkans, was just a question of time. However, the occurrences that happened later reaffirmed the common (western) perception about the Balkan nations, being understood as "primitive, cruel and blood-thirsty savages" (Zupančič and Arbeiter 2016). The wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia not only confirmed such statements about the Balkans, but reinforced them.

Even though "we all know all about the Balkans" (Udovič 2014), no one really wants to tackle the issue, regarding the role of the European states and international community in the Balkans. Starting from the Ottoman Empire, naming the role of the Habsburg monarchy, which tried to conquer the Balkans for several times in its existence, and finally stopping at the Stalin-Churchill division of the Balkans – half-in-half – which was managing to divide the Balkans according the its historical legacy. In more recent times, we should ask ourselves about the activities of the European states after the dissolution of the bipolar order and especially on the actions performed by the European Union (EU), which was in the Balkans, during the Yugoslav wars – not only inhibited but impotent. One can say that the EU (intentionally) overlooked the Balkans because of its internal inca-

pability to set an agreement on what was going on in the region, while others can discuss that the EU was cautious, because of the historical experiences with the Balkans. Nevertheless, the EU omitted the occurrences in the Balkans for almost a decade and started to become an (important?) actor only in the first years of the 21st century.

Why this happened so late, how the EU reacted during the Yugoslav wars, what were the scenarios of entering into the Balkans and what was the role of the EU in the Balkans after the end of the bloody conflicts, are the research questions that we would like to discuss in this and in the following articles. In order to answer all these enumerated questions, we have employed qualitative and quantitative approaches, using different methods: from an historical-critical assessment of facts, to in-depth semi-structured interviews and data-analysis. All these methods are not only employed in this article but in the whole section, which should be read as an in-depth analysis of what was happening in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and what are the challenges the EU should focus on.

The proposed article therefore serves as a platform for the debate on the role of the EU and international institutions in the Western Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. It is not therefore the intention of the article to go into detail, but more to establish a framework of the Western Balkan mosaic, in which other authors can fill their piece, which will altogether form a clear picture on what has been going on in the Western Balkans after the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia. However, since we all know that *Historia magistra vitae est*, we decided to start the proposed article with a short excursion into the history of the Balkan peninsula where from ancient times ethnic groups and nations applied the *homo homini lupus* modus operandi. The historical part is followed by a sketch of the dramatic Balkan wars and major inter-ethnic issues that today still influence the activities and developments in the Western Balkans. The third part of the article presents an overview of the activities of the EU and the international community in the region, which in the first years after the dissolution of Yugoslavia (intentionally?) overlooked the

occurrences in the region, but in the late 1990s they started to accelerate their 'interests' about the inter-ethnic problems and issues. The article concludes with an open question on the future of the EU and the international community's engagement in the Western Balkans which from today's perspective does not seem too optimistic.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

EARLY HISTORY IN THE BALKANS

The Balkan Peninsula was firstly dominated by the Roman Empire and after that by the Goths and the Byzantine rulers (Javornik, Voglar and Dermastia 1987). But before the Balkan Peninsula was inhabited by the Slavs in the 6th, 7th and 8th centuries, the territory was inhabited by the Illyrians, who are assumed to be ancestors of the Albanians (Anderson 1995, pp. 2).[5] After the Slavs began to colonise the area, they very quickly converted to Christianity. Furthermore, a shift from the Christian regime towards a Turkish Muslim one happened during the 14th century, which was the result of the Ottoman Empire occupation (Skendaj 2012, pp. 16). More specifically, the Ottoman Turks consolidated their rule in the Balkans in 1371, when Ottoman troops defeated the Serbian army in the battle of Maritsa and conquered the territory of present-day Macedonia. Even though, the joint forces of Serbs and Albanians managed to defeat them in 1386 in present-day Montenegro. The Ottoman invasion carried on and led to the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389, where the Ottoman troops conquered the joint forces of the Serbs and Albanians (Voje 1994; Krstić 2006; Zupančič 2013). The battle at Kosovo Polje became a historical battle for Serbian mythology and their statements over Kosovo.

After the few centuries' long occupation of the Ottoman Empire over the Balkan Peninsula, the Empire started to fragment, which offered the possibility to the Balkan nations to politically emancipate themselves. The landmark could be the Treaty of

[5] The tribe of Illyrians, who inhabited the territory of today's Kosovo in the 4th century BC, spoke a language similar to the Albanian (Zupančič 2013).

San Stefan that ended the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and created an independent Bulgaria[6] and an enlarged Serbia and Montenegro (*ibid*).[7] But the other European states, especially some of the Great Powers[8] were not very fond of this new arrangement. The idea about a powerful Slavic state was, for example, contrary to the economic interests of the Habsburg monarchy and the undisturbed path to the Aegean Sea, whereas Great Britain was afraid that Bulgaria was only a satellite country of Russia (Oakes, Mowat and Richards 1918, pp. 325–6). Dissatisfaction about this new arrangement led to the Berlin Congress in 1878, with which the size of Bulgaria was considerably reduced and split into two autonomous principalities under the sultan's supremacy (Hall 2000, pp. 3; Pirjevec 2003, pp. 19). Moreover, Serbia had gained its independence and was granted additional territory in the south, Montenegro had lost its autonomy, which it gained with the Treaty of San Stefan and BiH and the Sandjak of Novi Pazar came under Austro-Hungarian administration (Hall 2000, pp. 3; Pirjevec 2003, pp. 19–21; Sotirović 2016).

After the Berlin Congress an imaginary truce prevailed in the Balkans as the result of the new balance of power between the European superpowers. Despite the individual local conflicts there were no major wars until 1908, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire neglected the *de iure* sovereignty of the Ottomans over the Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) (Jelavich 1983, pp. 96; Seljak 2005, pp. 16). The annexation of BiH to the Habsburg monarchy changed the everyday aspects of life for its citizens also in terms of the balance of power, considering the fact that BiH was gradually de-Islamized and therefore the catholic community was improving its position on the power scale (Strle and Josipovič 2014).

The Ottoman Empire occupied the Balkans for more than 500 years before its people started to really rebel and "initiated the exodus of Ottoman control of the territory" (Gewehr 1931, pp. 79 in Shahan 2012). The Balkan states with one main goal to divide the

[6] New Bulgaria encompassed most of the territory in the eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula and it also included Macedonia (Hall 2000, pp. 2; Britannica 2016).

[7] According to the Treaty of San Stefano, Serbia gained the right to statehood (Sotirović 2015).

[8] Great Powers were known as Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy (Hall 2000, pp. 2).

retrieved territory among the Balkan states, without the occupier in the picture (Hall 2000, pp. 13; Shahan 2012), joined the Balkan League[9] and the first Balkan war outbreak on 8 October 1912 with the Montenegrin attack on the Ottoman troops (Hall 2000, pp. 15). The rise of nationalism and the new aspiration fuelled by the ethnic identity initiated the aggressive ideas and desires for the territorial expansion (Hall 2000; Pirjevec 2003; Shahan 2012). The First Balkan War, which ended on the 30 May 1913 with the Treaty of London, resulted in a high number of casualties on both sides, the loss of the territory[10] on the Ottoman side and Albanian independence (Mazower 2000).

The Second Balkan War began on 29 June 1913 because of the dispute between Serbia, Greece and Romania over the division of their newly conquered joint territory in Macedonia. The war ended only a month later with the defeat of the Bulgarians and peace treaties were signed in Bucharest in August 1913 and Constantinople in September 1913 (Hall 2000; Pirjevec 2003; Udovič 2011). The aftermath of the conflict was that Serbia gained the Kosovo region and extended its territory to the northern and central part of Macedonia, whereas the southern part of Macedonia belonged to Greece (Mazower 2000; Hall 2000). A year after the Habsburg Archduke Franc Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914, which resulted in riots that escalated into WWI (Hall 2000; Udovič 2011; Pirjevec 2003). After that everything changed.

WWI AND WWII

One of the results of the end of WWI was the emergence of several new states out the territory of the Habsburg monarchy. The Slavic nations, which were before fragmented between different states, became independent and in October 1918 established the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (Repe 1995,

[9] The Balkan League was the alliance between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro and was also formed because of the high Russian influence with one main goal to get rid of the Ottoman occupation (Allcock, Danforth and Crampton 2015). Moreover, the Balkan league was formed by the efforts made by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and the Cretan politician Venizelos

[10] The Ottoman Empire lost control over the Aegean Islands, Crete and its former provinces in Europe (Helmreich 1938).

Pirjevec 2003; Udovič 2011); a month later this newly established state merged with the Kingdom of Serbia into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which later on renamed itself to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 (Pirjevec 2003; Udovič 2011; Allcocke and Lampe 2012). The cultural and ethnic mosaic of the Balkans was made up of people of different traditions, cultures and religions, therefore tensions between them were inevitable. The Serbs for example saw the new arrangement as an old, but bigger state whereas the Slovenes and Croats saw the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a reality that was foreign to their own interests and mind-set (Pirjevec 203; Nation 2003). Serbia saw itself as the centre of the newly established country and side-lined the role and the autonomy of the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians (Seljak 2005; pp. 19). Irrespective of the differences in political tradition and their different interests, relations between the nations of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were peaceful until the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, which was followed by the series of political instabilities (Repe 1995; Seljak 2005).[11]

After the putsch in March 1941, when Yugoslavia dismissed its adherence to the Berlin-Rome axis, Yugoslavia was attacked. In only 14 days the country was occupied by Germans, Italians and Hungarians and divided in occupational zones; only on the territory of Croatia a new state emerged – the 'puppet state' known as the Independent state of Croatia (Nezavisna država Hrvatska), which was ruled by Ante Pavelić (Pirjevec 2003; Udovič 2011). After four years of fighting against the occupation and after the bloody civil war, Yugoslavia was liberated in 1945. Josip Broz - Tito, being the ruler of the communist resistance, formed a new state that tried to reduce the notion of ethnic issues and forced the uniformity. This was also visible in the documents where there where two categories: nationality and citizenship. The idea of the communist government was that nationality would be abandoned and a new common identity would be established. However, this experiment failed and instead of converging na-

[11] After the assassination of King Alexander an agreement between Serbia and Croatia was reached, which established the Autonomous Banovina of Croatia as the only autonomous political-territorial unit in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with a series of powers which were transferred from the Yugoslav government to the newly established Banovina (Pirjevec 1995).

tionalities they started to diverge. This was brought so far that the main ideologist Edvard Kardelj prepared a new constitution in the 1970s, that was based on a national-principle. Even though this pace was just the absorption of reality into the political system, it was clear that nations within Yugoslavia had opted for fragmentation instead of unification. After Tito's death, who was the main authority linking together all nationalities in Yugoslavia, the national movements revived and led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Curtis 1992; Pirjevec 2003; Seljak 2005).

TOWARDS THE STATES' INDEPENDENCE AND THE YUGOSLAV WARS

Soon after Tito's death in 1980, a new era in Yugoslav politics started with many proposals for political reforms; a serious economic crisis happened between 1983 and 1985 and tensions between the constituent nations were very evident (Curtis 1992; Pirjevec 2003; Udovič 2011). The important step towards the breakup of Yugoslavia was the rise of Slobodan Milošević who tried to undermine the foundations on which Tito's Yugoslavia rested with the abolition of the Constitution of 1974 and the consolidation of his power in Serbia, in both autonomous regions; in Montenegro and among the Serbian population in BiH and Croatia (Pirjevec 2003, pp. 37–9). The notion that Yugoslavia should be reshaped into a new country with the biggest power given to the Serbs as the biggest ethnicity in the country, was very high and intensified the relations between the secessionist Slovenia and Croatia and unitarian Serbia (Udovič 2011).

In the last six months of the existence of Yugoslavia, a series of dramatic events occurred which were set out by the Slovenian plebiscite, organized on 23 December 1990, on which the Slovenes declared an independent and sovereign country with an absolute majority (Pirjevec 2003, pp. 39). "Each of the republics of the modern federation underwent its own historical and cultural development, very often in conflict with the territorial or political goals of its Slavic and non-Slavic neighbours" (Sudetic 1992, pp. 56). Religious beliefs and nationality threatened the idea about national unity and the newly established federal state

structure. Moreover, ethnic diversity and man-made borders, which did not encompass all the members of one ethnic group within the republics, emerged in political disharmony and disagreements. After Tito's death the period of peace and prosperity was over and the state of the united South Slavs was only a dream from the past, which had started to crumble. The identity and historical origin of each constituent nation within the SFRY was stronger than the artificial common culture and ethnicity (Sudetic 1992; Pirjevec 2003; Vladisavljević 2004; Udovič 2011).

"Armed conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2001 claimed over 200,000 lives, and gave rise to atrocities unseen in Europe since WWII and left behind a terrible legacy of physical ruin and psychological devastation" (Nation 2003, pp. vii). The main cause of the conflict in former Yugoslavia was the rise of "intolerant and exclusionary nationalism among its constituent nations", which led to the destruction of the multinational country (Nation 2003, pp. ix).

SLOVENIA (JUNE 1991 – JULY 1991)

Slovenes expressed their will for an independent and sovereign state at the plebiscite on 23 December 1990, with the official announcement of the results on 26 December 1990, which stated that the absolute majority wanted an independent and sovereign state (Pirjevec 2003, pp. 39–40). The Slovenian government launched a diplomatic campaign with one main goal, to explain to the world their motive for independence. Furthermore, it defended the idea of disassociation and not secession in order to highlight the point that Yugoslavia had been "from its origins /…/ a voluntary union of peoples" (Nation 2003, pp. 105). Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991 and the day after the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) tried to suppress the Slovenian independence by force. Slovenians at the borders changed their uniforms and took over the control of the borders and were prepared for the YPA attacks. The Ten-Day War started on 27 June 1991 and was fought between the Slovenian Territorial Defence and the YPA. The war for Slovenia's independence ended on 7

July 1991 with the Brioni Agreement[12] and sustained very few casualties (Nation 2003; Pirjevec 2003; Pirjevec 2011). The European Community recognized Slovenia as an independent and sovereign state in January 1992, which was also followed by the recognition of the United Nations in May 1992 (Pirjevec 2003; BBC 2012).

CROATIA (1991–1995)

Croatia declared its independence together with Slovenia on 25 June 1991, but the introduction to the war in Croatia started even before that with intense propaganda, which was led by the Serbs in order to convince the population about the genocidal nature of the Croatian nation and its fascist regime (Pirjevec 2003, pp. 65). The conflict, fuelled with propaganda and hatred escalated in the areas which were mostly populated by Serbs and the war in Croatia started in March 1991 when the Serbs from Krajina[13] attacked Croatian police units, followed by the Plitvice Lakes Incident (Pirjevec 2003;). The majority of Croats fully supported Croatia's sovereignty and independence, whereas ethnic Serbs in Croatia opposed the secession and wanted to reunite the territories which were mainly populated by ethnic Serbs, with Serbia (Nation 2003). After the plebiscite in May 1991, when the Croats voted for the independence of Croatia, the Serbs in Krajina decided to secede from Croatia and therefore created a political and organizational prerequisite for an open armed conflict (Tatalović 1997, pp. 110).

After the declaration of Croatian independence Serbian forces strengthened their attacks on Croatian villages and towns, but the balance swung towards the Croatian side after the four-month siege of the town of Vukovar, which fell in November 1991 (Tatalović 1997, pp. 110). Towards the end of 1991, Croatia freed a large part of the occupied territory and at the same time many member states of the European Community recognized it as an

[12] The Brioni Declaration (1991) was signed on 7 July 1991 between Slovenia and Yugoslavia under the auspices of the European Community and it halted the hostilities in the territory of Slovenia and froze the independence activities for a period of three months.

[13] The territory was mostly populated by Serbs, who self-proclaimed Krajina as the Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina within the territory of Croatia (Nation 2003, pp. 98).

independent and sovereign state, which resulted in the loss of legitimacy for the military action of JNA which therefore had to sign a ceasefire in January 1992 and withdraw its troops into BiH (Tatalović 1997; Nation 2003; Pirjevec 2003). In February 1992, the Security Council through its resolution 743 approved the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervise and maintain the agreement (UN 1996).[14] Despite the UN intervention, the fronts were intact and in September 1993, Croatian forces launched an offensive in order to retake the Maslenica Bridge and the Peruca hydroelectric power plant. A ceasefire was once more renegotiated in March 1994, but in 1995 Croatia finally moved to free Krajina and was able to defeat the Serbian resistants and gain control over the whole territory (Nation 2003, pp. 125–6).

BiH (1992–1995)

After the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, BiH organized a referendum on independence on 29 February and 1 March 1992. The members of the Serb Assembly, which was formed in protest, invited the Bosnian Serbs to boycott the referendum on independence and strongly opposed the secession of BiH from Yugoslavia (Grant 2009; Bose 2009).[15] BiH declared its independence on 3 March 1992 and was recognized by the European community on 6 April 1992, becoming a member state of the United Nations on 22 May 1992 (Grant 2009; Bose 2009). The declaration of independence triggered a very nationalistic war, with extreme violence and war crimes aiming at territorially dividing BiH alongside its ethnic lines,[16] which lasted three years, starting on 6 April 1992 and ending on 14 December 1995 (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012, pp. 16).

Even though the YPA left BiH in May 1992, most of the weaponry and military personnel remained in BiH in the so-called

[14] Its mandate was a "classic peacekeeping mission, assuming a ceasefire-in-place, consent of the warring parties, neutrality between former belligerents, and limiting the rules of engagement confined to cases of self-defence" (Nation 2003, pp. 1259).

[15] The Serb ethnic community in BiH strongly opposed any sort of separation that would leave them as a minority within an independent new state (Nation 2003, pp. 151).

[16] "Serbs had Republika Srpska, the Croats had Herceg-Bosna and the Bosniaks the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia" (Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012, pp. 16).

Army of Republika Srpska (Nation 2003; Pirjevec 2003). In the summer of 1992, the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia led to the deployment of UN peace keepers to the area (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005, pp. 193), but nevertheless, ethnic cleansing quickly spread from Republika Srpska to other areas which were controlled by Muslims and Croats (BBC 2016). Bosnian Serbs under Karadzic besieged Sarajevo, which lasted for 44 months (*ibid*). By the end of 1992 Bosnian Serbs already dominated nearly 70% of the territory of BiH (Notion 2003, pp. 164). In May 1993, the UN declared Sarajevo, together with Gorazde and Srebrenica, as a safe area, under the protection of the UN. Also, in 1993 the Vance-Owen peace plan was proposed, which included the division of BiH into ten semi-autonomous regions and was rejected by the Bosnian Serb National Assembly (Glaurdić 2011)

Conflict continued through most of 1995 with its peak in July 1995, when Bosnian Serbs attacked the safe area of Srebrenica and killed around 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men (Kalyvs and Sambanis 2005, pp. 193). UNPROFOR troops did provide the civilians with humanitarian aid; however, they failed to protect the safe area of Srebrenica in July 1995. As Notion (2003, pp. 189) notes:

/t/he premeditated nature of the massacre, the extent of the killing, and the arrogant demeanour of the conquerors combined to make it a unique, and uniquely horrible, event, and an appropriate symbol for the degenerate nature of the Serb national agenda as it was pursued during the Bosnian war.

A ceasefire was reached by the end of September 1995, with the help of a ground offensive, NATO's air strikes and the US Special Representative's diplomacy and the war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was signed on 21 November 1995 (Silber and Little 1996/1997; Nation 2003; Pirjevec 2003). The estimated number of casualties in the BiH war range from 25,000 to 329,000, which is the result of the use of inconsistent definitions of who is to be considered as a victim of war (Notion 2003; BBC 2016). Nevertheless, new BiH, according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, become a unitary state, divided between the

Bosnian Federation (51% of the territory) and Republika Srpska (49% of the territory). After the war there still remains discrimination and violence against human rights, and the Dayton Agreement's arrangements also represent an obstacle to any serious political-administrative reform, with high potential for returning to a violent conflict (Nation 2003; Pirjevec 2003; Kivimäki, Kramer and Pasch 2012.

KOSOVO (1998–1999)

According to Nation (2003, pp. 223) the disintegration process of the SFRY started by the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, which resulted in a demeaning occupation of the Kosovar Albanian majority. Tensions over the control and sovereignty over the same territory, which was populated by Serbs and Albanians, has always been the essence of the Kosovo conflict (Anastasijević 2004).[17] The instability and dissatisfaction with the Milošević regime and the rhetoric resulted in a referendum organized by the Kosovar Albanians on 22 September 1991, where 99% of Kosovars (mostly Albanians) voted for the independence of Kosovo (King and Mason 2006). Even though Serbia did not accept this move as legal or legitimate, the Albanians started establishing parallel structures in order to address their basic needs (Zupančič 2013, pp. 165). The inability of the Dayton peace process to address the whole region and to also include on the agenda the extreme fragility of the various regions which were aspiring to statehood, including Kosovo, culminated in another bloody conflict (Nation 2003, pp. 205–23).

When the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed in 1996, Kosovo Albanians started the rebellion against Belgrade and the armed conflict between both sides escalated in 1998, when the Yugoslav armed forces killed Adem Jashari and 58 other Kosovo Albanians (Zupančič 2013, pp. 163–9). Open aggression escalated and the UN Security council (UNSC) Resolution 1199 was adopted on 23 September 1998 with the request for the

[17] According to the Serbs, Kosovo was freed by them in the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 and represented the cradle of their culture, religion and their national identity, whereas according to the Albanians, the area was occupied by the Ottoman Turks, therefore without the special rights of the Serbs over the territory (Djilas 1998; Malcom 1998).

immediate termination of the armed conflict (Nation 2003; Zupančič 2013). Despite Milošević's preparedness to negotiate and the entrance of the observers from the OSCE to Kosovo, violence did not cease, leading to NATO's intervention at the beginning of 1999, when the Račak massacre was reported. When Serbia refused to accept the Rambouillet Agreement,[18] NATO launched the military operation Allied Force which ended after 78 days with the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement and with the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, Kosovo came under the auspices of the UN, headed by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Nation 2003; King and Mason 2006); Zupančič 2013).

Desires for a Great Serbia on one hand and a Great Albania on the other; the inability to resolve the Albanian national question in Kosovo and suppressing the aspirations of Kosovo Albanians for their own independent and sovereign country and the revival of historical myths led to the outbreak of a fully-fledged war in Kosovo. Despite NATO's intervention in Kosovo, dilemmas of national identity and the root causes for the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians were not addressed (Nation 2003, pp. 325–7).

MACEDONIA (FEBRUARY 2001–AUGUST 2001)

Macedonia in contrast to all the previously mentioned countries, declared its independence on 8 September 1991 and has avoided the bloody conflicts of the Yugoslav wars and maintained a peaceful environment up until the Kosovo War in 1999. Macedonia opened its borders for thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees, who represented more than 11% of the whole Macedonian population at that time (Nation 2003, pp. 333). Albanian nationalists on both sides of the border wanted their autonomy and independence, also for the areas in Macedonia which were populated mostly by Albanians. The National Liberation Army (NLA) started with opening fire on the Macedonian police and

[18] The Rambouillet Agreement was a proposed between the SFRY and the delegation representing the Albanian majority population in Kosovo. It contained several conditions such as "freedom of operation for NATO forces throughout the entire territory of Yugoslavia and the designation of a binding referendum on Kosovo's final status that would almost certainly result in a choice for independence" (Nation 2003, pp. 244).

security forces in late 2000, which escalated into the armed conflict between the NLA and Macedonian government in 2001 (Nation 2003, pp. 335). After the Ohrid Agreement with which Macedonia pledged to improve the rights of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, the NLA agreed to a ceasefire (Nation 2003, pp. 337–8).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The discussion on why the EU entered the Balkans only after a decade of bloody conflicts never gives a clear and straightforward answer. Some researchers explain the reluctance of the EU to deal with the Balkans with the 'cultural superiority' (those barbarian savages), others say that the EU was at the time more focusing on establishing its internal stability (single market, introduction of a political union etc.) and was unprepared to act abroad, even though the Balkans are at its backyard. The third possibility sometimes quoted is that the EU did not act in the Balkans, because the decision-makers had not really accepted the new geopolitical situation, including the collapse in the wreckages of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Our statement is that it is impossible to find one clear answer on why the EU was so reluctant and defensive, but the fact is that the EU, for the first time, faced a bloody conflict in its neighbourhood. Being inexperienced and being unprepared to act in such a situation, the EU instead of adopting a proactive role opted for a reactive role, leaving the decision-making process on how the Balkans should be stabilized to external/international actors, such as the United Nations or NATO. Such a statement can also be partially confirmed by the fact that the EU established the Delegation of the European Commission in BiH 'only' in 1996, and only six years later the EU created the post of EU Special Representative for BiH. Even though someone may say that these two are political figures and are only important because of their symbolic value, the EU was also leveraging in its commitment at the level of preventive diplomacy. The deployment of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation EUFOR Althea in December 2004 was not an independent decision, but it was forced by external variables, one of them being the fact that NATO decided to quit its

SFOR operation in BiH. The changed situation therefore externally forced the EU to take some action and the result of this was the establishment of Althea. What was noted by different interviewees in BiH[19] was that the citizens of BiH are less interested in the power and authorities of Althea than they are in NATO or even before – IFOR (Implementation force) and SFOR (Stabilization force).

A similar situation happened in Kosovo, when the EU presented itself only after the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1244 that established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which administered Kosovo from June 1999 to February 2008. The UNMIK mission based on four pillars: the civil administration of a country (UNMIK), the humanitarian assistance (UNHCR), the democratization and institutions-building (OSCE) and the reconstruction and economic development (EU). What should be emphasized here is that NATO remained outside the four pillars and was entitled to address the military aspect of the peace-building process. The 2008 was a crucial year for building the state of Kosovo. With the strong tacit support of almost all EU28 members in February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. In the same year the EU deployed its European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which was intended to substitute the UNMIK's rule-of-law functions, and appointed the European Union Special Representative (who was at that time Pieter Feith), who presented a clear linkage between the Commission and the country. From that point forward the EU was strongly presented in Kosovo, but limited to its civilian sphere.

The above brief description presents two individual approaches by the EU in the Western Balkans region, focusing mostly on state-building. But parallel with the individual approaches, the EU also started to develop some regional approaches aiming at establishing and reinforcing peace and security within the Western Balkans. The first step in that direction was the establishment of the *Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe*, formed by the Cologne conclusions in 1999, which as pointed out by Vesnić-Aluje-

[19] See more in the report on BiH (Udovič et. al. 2016).

vić (2012, pp. 31) "introduced as a long-term conflict prevention strategy on the territory of SE Europe". The next step towards a higher involvement of the EU in the Western Balkans was the Thessaloniki European Summit (2003) that developed the conditions and activities in the Stabilization and Association Process, being the waiting room for the European integration. At that point it was for the first time clear that the EU changed its role from a reactive to a procreative one. The Thessaloniki conclusions also set a milestone for the EU CSDP missions that were later (in BiH in 2004 and in Kosovo in 2008) deployed in the region. Another step in a proactive policy towards the Western Balkans was done in 2008 with the establishment of the RCC and in 2015 with the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).

The analysed facts show that the EU importance in the Western Balkans has been progressively changing. From the starting point, when the EU needed more than 5 years to act in its own backyard, it is now, two decades later an important agent in the region. Its politics within the CSDP missions mostly utilize the carrot and stick approach, named the possible future membership of the Western Balkan countries in the integration. However, its engagement is predominantly in civilian affairs, while the EU omits the importance of military presence in the region. Maybe the role of the EU in the region can be summarized best by the words of one interviewee who said that "we count on the EU, but we count more on NATO". Taking this in consideration we can conclude that there is still room for improvement regarding the normative power and the real power of the EU in the region of the Western Balkans. The next decade can present a turning point of the positioning of the EU in the Western Balkans – but only if the EU missions will also adopt some 'military' character.

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Assessing the Planning and Implementation of the EU Rule of Law Missions: Case Study of EULEX Kosovo

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ABSTRACT

The European Union Rule of Law Mission Kosovo (EULEX) is one of the most ambitious and complex EU Common Security and Defence Policy engagements to date. Its planning and deployment have gone through several political and legal difficulties that have challenged the overall EU planning process and exposed some of its internal flaws. This paper assesses the planning phase of EULEX and tries to identify some of the lessons learnt. It draws from the interviews conducted in Kosovo and takes into account both the EU and the non-EU perspectives. Both structural and political challenges affected the assessed planning process and delayed the deployment of EULEX in Kosovo. Due to the various partial interests among EU institutions and member states, the technical aspects of the planning have often been subject to political compromises. The paper further notes that the CSDP missions are positioned relatively low on the agenda of the member states and may occasionally rather serve as an instrument for the EU to "wave its flag" on the occasions where the EU cannot form a unified position. The initial CSDP framework was generally intended to serve as a rather short-term instrument; thus the paper comes to the

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conclusion that if the EU wants to plan and conduct complex, long-term civilian CSDP missions efficiently, then the mandates and general approach of the EU should be adapted accordingly.

KEY WORDS: EULEX, Kosovo, European Union, CSDP, mission, civilian planning

POVZETEK

Misija Evropske unije za krepitev pravne države na Kosovu (EULEX Kosovo) je ena izmed najbolj ambicioznih in kompleksnih angažmajev v okviru Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike (SVOP) EU. Načrtovanje in napotitev misije sta bili soočeni s številnimi političnimi in pravnimi ovirami, ki so predstavljale izziv za celostni proces načrtovanja misij EU in izpostavile nekatere notranje pomanjkljivosti. Članek obravnava načrtovanje misije EULEX in identificira pridobljene izkušnje v tem procesu. Prispevek temelji na intervjujih, ki so bili izvedeni na Kosovu in upošteva tako perspektivo EU kot tudi zunanje perspektive. Tako strukturni kot politični izzivi so vplivali na proces načrtovanja obravnavane misije in podaljšali čas, potreben za njeno ustanovitev. Zaradi parcialnih interesov EU institucij in držav članic so bili tehnični vidiki načrtovanja pogosto izpostavljeni političnim kompromisom. Članek ugotavlja, da so SVOP misije na političnih agendah držav članic pogosto uvrščene razmeroma nizko in lahko občasno, ko EU ne zmore oblikovati enotnega stališča, služijo zgolj kot instrument EU, da izkaže svojo navzočnost na konfliktnem oz. pokonfliktnem območju. Prvotni okvir SVOP misij je bil načrtovan predvsem kot instrument kratkotrajne narave, ne pa kot dolgoročni angažma EU na nekem območju. Avtorja ugotavljata, da vkolikor EU želi učinkovito načrtovati in izvajati kompleksne in dolgotrajne civilne SVOP misije, potem morajo biti mandati in pristop EU k njihovi izvedbi smiselno prilagojeni.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: EULEX, Kosovo, Evropska unija, SVOP, misija, civilno načrtovanje

INTRODUCTION

The aspirations of the EU to become a global actor and provider of security and stability have perhaps most significantly materialized in the region of the Western Balkans, where the EU has launched its most extensive external engagement, including several CSDP missions. One of the focal points of its engagement has been Kosovo, with the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) being labelled as the prime example and the "flagship" of the EU Common Security and Defence (CSDP).

EULEX is not only by far the largest CSDP mission so far, it is also the most complex, expensive and one of the longest lasting EU civilian CSDP missions.[3] We can label it a flagship CSDP mission, both from the aspect of the dedicated financial and human resources, and from the perspective of an ambitious decision by the EU to undertake an unprecedentedly complex and challenging mission (Keukeleire and Thiers 2010; Capussela 2015). The EU recognition that the advancement of the rule of law in Kosovo is essential to the maintenance of peace and security, sustainable development, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is reflected throughout its external efforts and most notably materialized through the deployment of the extensive rule of law mission (Cierco 2014). Some of the authors noted that the objectives of EULEX go beyond common peace-keeping or peace-building and engage in institution and state building (Keukeleire and Thiers 2010; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). In spite of its extensive resources and unprecedented powers, the mission has so far undergone several criticisms, claiming that the mission has largely failed to achieve its goals of improving the rule of law.

Kosovo remains one of the most underdeveloped countries in Europe. According to the World Bank (2014 Worldwide Governance Indicators report), Kosovo continues to be the lowest

[3] EULEX is currently fulfilling its objectives through two organizational divisions: the Executive Division and the Strengthening Division, accompanied by its "North" and "Support to Dialogue Implementation" objectives, which are included within the framework of the above-mentioned divisions. The number of EULEX staff was the highest in late 2008/early 2009 when it amounted to 3,200 personnel – more than all other CSDP missions at the time combined. Currently there are about 1,300 EULEX staff members, approximately half of them locally contracted.

ranking country in the region of the Western Balkans, albeit receiving by far the largest support from the international community (World Bank 2016). Musliu and Geci describe EULEX's presence in Kosovo as defined by inaction and avoidance (2014). The ambiguous position deriving from status neutrality has often been noted as a challenge to the mission's efficiency (Derks and Price 2010). Several analysts concluded that the mission made only limited progress in the field of judiciary, especially in relation to the organized crime and corruption, while modest contributions to other aspects of the rule of law are noted (e.g. police and customs) (Kursani 2013; Radin 2014; Cierco 2014; Malešič and Juvan 2015; Malešič 2015; Zupančič, 2015; Capussela 2016). The criticism was further highlighted by the European Court of Auditors report, which found that the EU assistance to Kosovo in regards to the rule of law had not been sufficiently effective (The European Court of Auditors 2012). Infamous allegations of corruption among EULEX staff put the mission in the public spotlight and questioned its reputation. The review of the EULEX Kosovo mandate implementation conducted by Professor Jean Paul Jacque delivered a list of recommendations and noted that a substantial reform of the mission was needed (Jacque 2015).

This paper will examine the capability of the EU to effectively plan for and engage in complex, comprehensive and potentially long-term civilian missions. It will use the case of EULEX Kosovo to present the dynamic range of challenges and obstacles that should be taken into consideration in the civilian CSPD planning process and try to offer some lessons that could be transmitted to the planning and implementation of the future civilian CSDP missions. Firstly, we will briefly analyse the background and political and security environment that led to the establishment of EULEX Kosovo. We will continue with the examination of the EULEX planning process and assess some of the identified challenges that emerged during this process. The paper identifies the main achievements and challenges that emerged during planning of EULEX, as well as evaluates the process by examining the perspectives of both the EU and non-EU actors. The implications of the planning process, both direct and indirect, on the current operational capabilities of the mission will be analysed

and the identified lessons will be presented at the conclusion of this paper. The paper will try to answer the main research question, namely, is the EU, as an aspiring global actor, adequately equipped to effectively plan (and carry out) complex long-term civilian CSDP missions, based on its performance in the case of EULEX Kosovo.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper is based on the original research carried out by the authors which was conducted in the form of a qualitative analysis of the interviews and focus group discussions within the framework of the project: Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU).[4] The field trip to Kosovo was conducted in March 2016. During the trip, interviews with 21 individuals were made, primarily in Pristina and Kosovska Mitrovica. The sample includes the current and former EULEX personnel, EU officials, NATO KFOR personnel, staff employed by local institutions, members of the local government, experts from non-governmental organizations, academia and research institutions and officials from member states contributing to the EULEX mission.

Both the EU and non-EU perspectives were taken in consideration during the analysis. Due to the political and security sensitivity of the issues discussed, the interview responses in this paper were anonymized.[5] Following the preliminary research findings which were based on the analysis of the interviews, a focus group of international experts was invited to the roundtable, organized

[4] The IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention) project is aiming to enhance the conflict prevention capabilities. This project has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020. The IECEU Consortium (11 participants from 7 different European countries) itself consists of a diverse group of civilian, research and military organizations. The IECEU analyses the best practices and lessons learned with a view to enhance the civilian conflict prevention and the peace building capabilities of the EU with a catalogue of practices, new solutions and approaches. The main goals of the IECEU -project are: analysing the current situation of on-going and past European Union CSDP missions and operations; learning from the lessons provided by these CSDP missions and assessing the different options; providing new solutions, approaches and recommendations for the EU to guarantee long-term stability through conflict prevention and peace-building.

[5] The interview data and details are in the possession of the authors.

in Slovenia, to present their views and positions on the gathered information; adding another perspective to this research.[6] Their comments have been anonymized and included in the paper. The paper will further draw from the authors' extensive research on the matter and analysis of the primary and secondary sources on EULEX Kosovo and CSDP in general.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: OVERVIEW OF CSDP PLANNING FRAMEWORK AND THE EVENTS THAT LEAD TO THE PLANNING OF EULEX KOSOVO*

The case of EULEX Kosovo is significant for the EU (civilian) CSDP mission planning process for several reasons. Firstly, the mission was and remains by far the biggest CSDP mission ever planned and deployed by the EU. It was supposed to be the flagship mission that would showcase the dedication of the EU to the region and its role as a security provider. Secondly, the complexity of the mission, including its executive mandate, has brought many new responsibilities but also challenges that had to be addressed. Thirdly, the mission was preceded by a special dedicated planning mission, which was tasked to conduct advance contingency planning for the possible deployment of the EU mission on the territory of Kosovo. Furthermore, the case of the EULEX mission has exposed several internal and external challenges, both before and during the deployment that are relevant for the analysis of the efficiency of the EU civilian CSDP missions.

It is worth noting that the EU civilian crisis management concept and procedures have still been in their development phase

[6] The roundtable was organized by three consortium partners in the IECEU project (University of Ljubljana, FINCENT, Centre for European Perspectives – CEP) on 24 May 2016 at Jable Castle, Slovenia within the framework of WP2 'The Balkans', as envisaged in the Grant Agreement. In addition to that, the representatives of the security-enforcement institutions (Slovenian Armed Forces and Slovenian Police), Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, think tanks and academia also participated in the public part of the event, so as to evaluate the IECEU researchers' findings from various perspectives. Experts present at the roundtable include: Mr Kurt Bassuener (Democratization Policy Council); Mr Tobias Flessenkemper (CIFE – Centre International de Formation Europeenne); Mr Simone Guerrini (participated in his personal capacity (former EULEX, seconded expert from the Italian MFA); Mr David Palmer (CIV. SHAPE EU/EUSG, Op ALTHEA, EU OHQ at SHAPE); Ms Ariana Qosja (Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development – KIPRED); Mr Christian Ramet (European External Action Service, the EULEX Kosovo desk).

* This article is based on deliverables D2.2 and D2.3 as part of the IECEU project.

at the time of EULEX Kosovo planning.[7] The Union has decided to develop the civilian aspects of the crisis management in four priority areas defined by the Civilian Headline Goals adopted at the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection (European Union External Action Service 2016). The aspirations and goals of the EU in the field of civilian crisis management have been further reinforced by the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal and 2010 Civilian Headline Goal (European Union 2016).With the availability of a wide spectrum of civilian instruments of an economic, social or diplomatic nature, the EU focus on preventative activities is not surprising (Malešič 2015). Since the first (civilian) CSDP mission launched in 2003 (EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina), civilian CSDP missions have varied in their scope (police, monitoring, justice, and security sector reform), nature (non-executive and executive), geographic location and size (European Union 2009).

There are currently 10 civilian CSDP missions on 3 continents: Afghanistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo, Libya, the Palestinian Territories (Ramallah and Rafah), Niger, Mali, and the Horn of Africa (Somalia & Somaliland) (European Union 2016). In general, the planning process within the EU takes up to 1 year; in cases where a strong political will is exhibited it can take less. Planning and implementing the EUMM Georgia could be perceived as a best practice case, since the process only took around 2 months. As seen from the case of Kosovo, due to several reasons, the planning was stretched over longer period.

[7] E.g. An important CSDP planning capability was established in 2007 – the civilian Planning and Conduct capability (CPCC) – which had been established under the General Secretariat of the Council with about 60 staff. It has a mandate to: 1) plan and conduct civilian missions under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC; 2) provide assistance and advice to the High representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; 3) direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review the civilian mission in the areas of the police, border assistance management, rule of law and the security sector. The CPCC Director is the EU Civilian operations Commander who exercises control and command at the strategic level for the planning and conduct of the civilian crisis management operations.

INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK LEADING TO PLANNING OF THE EU-LED MISSION IN KOSOVO

Following the 1999 NATO intervention, Kosovo has been put under the interim United Nations administration (UNMIK) in accordance with the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244). Over time, with signs of security and political stabilization, some of the governing powers eventually started to be gradually transferred to the Kosovar Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The international community, however, was still unable to reach a consensus on the highly disputed Kosovo status (Derks and Price 2010). Under the growing pressures for Kosovo independence, Martti Ahtisaari, a Finnish diplomat, was tasked by the UN Secretary General on October 31, 2005 to prepare a comprehensive plan for the settlement of the Kosovo status issue, which he delivered in 2007 (Keukeleire and Thiers 2010; Guttry 2007). The report, commonly known as the Ahtisaari plan, proposed supervised independence for Kosovo, which meant that Kosovo would become independent but its independence would be closely supervised by the International Civilian Representative with a veto power over the decisions of the Kosovo government, KFOR would continue to be present throughout Kosovo and an EU mission that would monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo in the field of the Rule of Law would be deployed (United Nations Security Council 2007).

Keukeleire and Thiers noted that one of the important advantages of the transfer of leadership from the UN to the EU, as argued at the time, has, aside from other reasons, also been the aspiration of both Kosovo and to a certain extent Serbia, to become EU members. It was considered that the EU was the best placed actor to have an influence on both sides. Thus the utilization of the EU power of attraction is noted by the authors as an important leverage of the EU for its increased engagement in Kosovo (Keukeleire and Thiers 2010). Other conditionality-driven processes, such as the visa liberalization process, have also been identified as important instruments in the hands of the EU that could be used as part of its comprehensive approach to advance its engagement in Kosovo. The Union has on the other hand been

keen on taking greater responsibility in the region of the Western Balkans. As noted by some of our interviewees, the EU was at its strongest peak at the time of the planning of the mission, with recent important enlargements, its increased actorship in the Balkans and high aspirations of becoming a global actor (Interview no. 5). With signs of the possible transfer of responsibility from UNMIK to the EU led mission (Cierco 2014), the necessity for the establishment of the planning team for a potential civilian EU mission in Kosovo was already recognized in early 2006 (Keukeleire and Thiers 2010).

THE EULEX PLANNING PROCESS

The planning of civilian CSDP missions is based on the EUs Crisis Management Procedures, which outline EU engagement in a crisis from the political level down to the mission level, how responses are planned, carried out and terminated (Kermabon 2014). While the political considerations date even further back, the planning of the EU engagement in Kosovo within the framework of the CSDP most notably started with the formation of the EU planning Team in 2006. For the purpose of the advance contingency planning for the possible deployment of the EU mission on the territory of Kosovo, the EU formed the so called Planning Team (EUPT), which was deployed to Kosovo. The Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP "On the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo)" was adopted on 10th of April 2006. (European Council 2006). The planning team was tasked to prepare the ground for a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of the rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo. It has been emphasized that the establishment of the planning team did not prejudge the outcome of the status process nor any subsequent decision by the EU to launch the ESDP mission in Kosovo.[8] Among the variety of tasks that were assigned to the EUPT, in the authors' opinion the following are central to the present research: to transfer the responsibilities from UNMIK to the EU; to prepare all the necessary legal acts; to work in the field and learn about local needs and expectations etc. The EUPT team was also

[8] The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been renamed to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon.

tasked to draw from the lessons learnt from the experience in BiH which should lead to the transfer of good practices and the avoidance of mistakes made in EUPM BiH.

According to the conducted interviews and focus group discussions, the deployment of the EUPT prior to the deployment of the CSDP mission has been mostly assessed as a positive practice that should be replicated in future CSDP missions (Interview no. 20). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the findings of other authors (e.g. Derks and Price, 2010). Among the main positive effects of the planning missions, it was mentioned that the EUPT benefited from its local presence in Pristina, its full support of the Council Joint Action and the budget, as well as the comparatively lengthy time it was given to work (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2012).

The EUPT had a role in the initial deployment phase of the EULEX mission as defined in Article 4 of the Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. According to that article EUPT Kosovo was appointed to lead the planning and preparation phase. The EUPT has thus been responsible for the recruitment and deployment of the staff, equipment and services for EULEX in the initial phase when the mission had not yet reached its full operational capacity. It worked in the field to identify the local needs and discuss the forms of cooperation with local authorities. Further on, the EUPT contributed to the planning of the Concept of operation (CONOPS) and the operational plan (OPLAN) and for developing the technical instruments necessary to execute the mandate of EULEX (Council of the European Union 2008).

One of the perhaps most important phases of the planning process that, accordingly to the analysis performed by the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, exposed the lack of the EU's "plan B" and the (over)confident trust in the success of the initial plans, was at the time of the realization, that the Ahtisaari plan was not approved by the UNSC. It seemed to catch the EU by surprise. The analysis finds that this lack of a "plan B" was seen to be the consequence of either the EU's inability to

anticipate it, or political resistance to deviate from the assumption that the UNSC approval would pass. (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2012). The mission mandate, which was agreed upon on 4 February 2008, tasked EULEX with supporting Kosovo authorities by monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA) on each of the rule-of-law components (Judiciary, Police, Customs), while also retaining certain executive powers, in particular with respect to investigating and prosecuting serious and sensitive crimes.

The mandate was thus largely following the initial plan despite the political reality and the framework of deployment which since then has been vastly changed. When the EU consequently "entered" Kosovo – a decade after the start of the Kosovo war and just before the declaration of Kosovo's independence – after the lengthy considerations, internal disputes over the mission's legal status and political disagreements, the mission was tasked with a confident but complex mandate. Our interlocutors noted that EULEX raised high expectations, with a substantive EU presence and a relatively robust and extensive civilian mission, giving big promises of reforming the rule of law, the implementation of the European legal norms, the elimination of political interference, and going after "big fish" (Interviews no. 9, 10, 18, 19, 20).

Local interviewees noted that the initial attraction of EULEX vanished rather quickly, as the promises were eventually only partially met by the mission. For example, they mentioned that: *"EULEX was never perceived as part of society. The mission was harmed even before deployed because of the status issue. /…/ EULEX was initially wanted in Kosovo because people believed Kosovo institutions could not deal with problems of corruption and organized crime by themselves. /…/ The missions, however, failed to explain the difference between them and UNMIK. Expectations from EULEX decreased when they saw it is only continuation of UNMIK."* (Interview no. 19). It was also suggested that: *"EULEX devoted too much of their efforts to investigating war crimes' allegations, which is important for the reconciliation process, but not at the cost of neglecting the fight against organized crime and corruption. /…/"* (Interview no. 18). EULEX was exposed to severe pub-

lic criticism and distrust due to its presumed inefficiency, failure to deliver on its promises and even allegations of possible corruption among EULEX officials (Interviews no. 5, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19).

Despite the efforts to base mission planning on a substantial on-the-ground analysis, it was acknowledged that there was a difference between the last document of the EUPT, when its representatives were planning the mission, and the first EULEX OPLAN (Interview no. 9). It has been claimed that among other reasons, this was due to the fact that the mission served (also) as a substitute for the political aims of the EU that go beyond the mission's mandate. As argued by the focus group experts, the mandate is always deriving from the political will of the member states. That in turn means that it may not totally reflect the needs on the ground. Furthermore, as mentioned above, one of the most fundamental circumstances of mission planning substantially changed – the mission was initially envisioned as an integral part of the Ahtisaari plan.

With the plan failing to be agreed upon in the Security Council, the framework of the mission had to be re-structured. The mission was eventually deployed under the Security Council Resolution 1244 as part of the UNMIK. This, according to de Wet, brings us to one of the main points of the controversy, concerned whether the EULEX mandate was reconcilable with the Security Council Resolution 1244. Since UNMIK was still in place at the time when EULEX was created (and still is), the question arose in particular whether Resolution 1244 gave the necessary legal basis for the introduction of EULEX especially considering that the mission was to operate alongside UNMIK at least for a certain period and, if so, how these two missions were to operate in practice given the potential overlaps in their mandates (de Wet 2009; Guttry 2007). It is not in the capacity of this article to argue for one side or the other. From a planning perspective, it was noted however, that those legal and political dilemmas pushed against the initial EU optimism and complicated the situation on the ground, where due to the above-mentioned disagreements, legal and political restraints; EULEX was limited in its deployment phase which led to delays beyond the initial EU forecasts

(Keukeleire and Thiers 2010). This essentially meant that it took around two years for the EU CSDP mission to be deployed to Kosovo from the initial start of planning with the deployment of the EU planning team in 2006. If we consider that the mission only became fully operational as of April 2009, this process was even longer.

Some of the interviews suggested that the CSDP missions and operations are often deployed to countries without a clear and unified EU policy, which contributes to difficulties in their planning. It was also noted that the effectiveness of the mission itself may often be of lesser importance than the political significance of the statement made by the EU by solely deploying the mission. It seems as if the CSDP missions are regarded by some rather as a way for the EU to "wave their flag" on the ground, when no other instruments are available. In general, it seems that the CSDP missions are perceived to be very low on the political agendas of the member states (Interviews no. 4, 9, 16, 19). Our analysis of the case of EULEX to some extent confirms this claim. While the EU was eventually able to agree on deploying a CSDP mission, it did not manage to form a unified position regarding the indicated and eventually announced Kosovo independence. Five member states[9] had reservations and did not recognize the statehood of Kosovo. Due to the lack of political unity in the EU and the fact that several EU member states still do not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, the strategic planning and consequent EULEX status neutral position, had far-reaching effects (Derks and Price 2010). As noted by Keukeleire and Thiers, the EU status issue deliberations in a way confirm the view that the EU is capable of acting as a foreign policy actor when it is to contribute to the peace-building actions which are devised by other actors (e.g. UN), but having trouble finding a consensus on politically sensitive matters (when acting on its own) (2010). They nevertheless agree with Ker-Lindsay and Economides (2012) who argue that despite the divisions on the question of status, EU member states were nevertheless united on the need to improve standards on the ground, regardless of the status, as a matter of practical urgency, which eventually led to a compromise solution (Keu-

[9] Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus, and Greece

keleire and Thiers 2010). This is an important observation from the perspective of the planning process as it indicates the ability of the EU to eventually reach an agreement on technical matters in spite of political reservations and disagreements. Nevertheless, the negotiations on the status issue required a lot of cooperation and negotiations with several stakeholders. This consequently prolonged the already lengthy EU CSDP planning process.

The adopted EULEX mandate declared the mission as status neutral, but at the same time tasked it with strengthening the rule of law institutions of the independent Kosovo. While the adopted compromise was necessary due to the political objections of the above-mentioned five member states, the solution was at least partially self-contradictory. Whilst the mission is supposed to act neutrally in regards to the status issue, the mandate tasks it to assist and mentor the institutions of this very same state. The interviewees noted that the ambiguous position impacted EULEX in many different aspects but perhaps most significantly its public image, specifically from the local standpoint (Interview no. 19). It consequently limited the desired showcase of a strong and dedicated EU, capable of solving the challenges in its neighbourhood and beyond. Due to the lack of political unity, the mandate and capacity of the mission, strategic planning and political guidance are sometimes not as clear and direct as desired, and consequently, bound to compromises, which often result in vagueness. The interviewees and focus group experts mostly agreed that the ambivalent stance of EULEX was an issue, though acknowledging that concrete alternatives to the existing compromise solution are missing. It was thus noted that the unresolved status of Kosovo is something that the EU had to and has to learn to live with (Interviews no. 19, 20).

EULEX CHALLENGES ORIGINATING FROM AND RELATED TO PLANNING PROCESS

In addition to the already mentioned political and strategic obstacles during the planning process, this paper identifies various other challenges related to or originating from the mission planning. Taking into consideration the framework in which

the mission was planned and operates many of our interviewees agreed that it is in fact actually quite impressive what EULEX managed to achieve in those circumstances. In order for EULEX to become operational in the area of the contested statehood and due to its commitment to neutrality, it had to address the considerations from both Kosovars and Serbs. As noted by Kursani, from Kosovo's standpoint, EULEX's presence is legally and practically justified by referring to the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo, the Ahtisaari Plan and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, all three rejected by Serbia. While from Serbia's point of view, EULEX's presence is justified under the terms of the "status-neutral" mandate and implementation of the UNSG Six Point Plan, both considered unacceptable by Kosovo (Kursani 2013). These disputes lead to the neutral approach that tries to "please" both sides.

It was mentioned quite often from the local actors that the needs of Kosovo were conceptualized wrongly or not necessarily entirely based on the factual demands on the ground (Interviews no. 1, 9, 10, 15, 18, 19). This brings us back to the planning dilemma already mentioned above. Local interviewees for example pointed out that there is a lot of demand for the rule of law present on the ground but the mission focuses too much on the war crimes and cares too much about stability even when compromises in the rule of law are made, etc. EULEX is most often criticized by locals for its inability to successfully transform the Kosovo rule of law system and conclude its lengthy legal procedures, which could potentially lead to convictions in high level cases. It was argued by some interviewed locals that due to the so called 'stability mantra', EULEX had many times been perceived even as a tool for strengthening the political elites. Radin (2014) noted that the need to prevent violence and to avoid undermining the potential of the EU accession in the region, may have led EULEX to avoid risky but transformative activities. This brings us to important planning challenge of balancing the priorities, in this case stability and the rule of law.

The central role of member states in shaping and defining the goals and vision of the mission has been emphasized during the

research. According to some of the interviewees, however, this vision is often non-existent or very limited. That can be visible at many different levels: from the cumbersome administrative procedures, the lack of a clear ("Brussels-based") leadership, to the observations by some of the international staff that their home countries are often simply not interested in the information they (the staff) are in the position to share with them, which leads us back to the finding that the CSDP missions are often low on the political agendas of member states (Interviews no. 16, 19). On the other hand, it was also suggested that the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate (CPCC) might be understaffed. As noted by the interviewees, CPCC officers have to deal with several missions simultaneously; while only two officers are assigned specifically for EULEX (Interview no. 4, 16). The challenge of the EEAS structure has been identified as an ongoing difficulty but the EU member states seem to be reluctant when it comes to the possibility of increasing the funds and carrying additional financial burdens. This was noted as frustrating for the mission staff as their requests are occasionally delayed and the procedures take too much time. Furthermore, according to the mission staff, reporting is occasionally mismatched with the discussions in Brussels. As they claim, the reports often do not have the desired impact.

On the other hand, challenges related to mission staff have been evident early from the formation of the mission. The challenges were attributed both to the (un)availability of the staff, their (lack of) competences and the (short) planned durations of the deployments of international seconded staff. Both international and local staff interviewed for this research noted the negative implications of relatively short term deployments and exposed certain limitations in staff pre-deployment training (Interviews no. 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20). An especially concerning situation has been observed in regards to the judiciary branch, as member states are not willing to second their best judges and prosecutors, or are not seconding a sufficient number of judicial staff at all. The limitation of the durations of deployments was further emphasized by the experts at the roundtable who noted it as a particularly significant problem in relation to

the relatively lengthy judicial proceedings. It means that a judge or a prosecutor often could not conclude some of the lengthier and more complex cases, as his or her mandate expired within the course of the proceedings. Those are consequently passed to his or her successor which inevitably delayed the process. Similar findings were also indicated before by Jacque, as well as Cierco and Reis, which points to the persistence of the challenge (Jacque 2015; Cierco and Reis 2014). Better planning of human resources and increasing the training level of the deployed staff thus seems crucial in order to achieve higher levels of efficiency.

Perhaps even more fundamental than the above-mentioned challenges is the mission's lack of clearly set goals and exit strategy. The mission statement perceives a desired end state through sustainable and accountable Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies, an independent multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-ethnic police and customs service, free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices (Council of the European Union 2008). Some of the interviewees and experts participating in the focus group noted that it is was hardly imaginable that the mission could achieve the overall goals of the mandate in the foreseeable future (Interviews no. 4, 16, 18). As noted by one of the interviewees: *"Certain end goals and standards envisaged in the mission's mandate are overly ambitious. If the mission was to fully fulfil its mandate, it could stay in Kosovo for another 20 years or more"* (Interview no. 4).

The lack of a clear end-state or exit strategy does not help in preventing the CSDP engagements from being seen as 'eternal' and without 'feasible goals' by the local communities that should benefit from the CSDP. It also poses a certain challenge in relation to comprehensiveness and contributes to a lack of clarity in the mission's future, both in relation to other international actors and Kosovo institutions. On the other hand, the CSDP missions in general are political tools, and as such their deployment and potential closure is essentially a political rather than a technical decision. The desired end state and goals are thus defined and agreed by 28 EU member states, which again raises the questions

of EU cohesiveness and common policy objectives. Some of our interlocutors even noted that an overly ambitious and vague end state is an instrument of non-recognizing countries by which they continuously push the EU to retain a substantive international presence in Kosovo.

CONCLUSION

The CSDP missions and operations have been envisaged to be a rather short-term response to the crisis. The current trends, however, indicate that they are used as relatively long-term post-conflict institution-building instruments. This is especially evident in the case of EULEX; creating discrepancies between the strategic framework in which the missions are planned and their implementation. The case of EULEX has proven to be an especially complex case both from the planning and operational perspective. Several political and legal obstacles were in a way of the mission planning, which resulted in a relatively long planning process and eventual settlement for a compromise solution that was acceptable to all EU member states, the international community and conflicting parties. While compromises enabled the mission to finally be deployed, they also lead to certain limitations, raising the question of balancing the political considerations and on-the-ground needs in the mission planning.

The EUPT had been pointed out as a positive practice albeit the concerns that the results of the planning were to a certain extent adapted when the mission was eventually deployed in order to fit the political context. On the operational planning level, the issues such as, for example, a poor public perception, human resources planning challenges and the limited capability of the mission to effectively fulfil its executive role; all of which at least partly derive from the above-mentioned planning questions, are perhaps even more obvious than the noted strategic considerations. The standardization of pre-deployment training, the definition of common EU-best practices and adapted durations of staff deployments are just some of the broader CSDP challenges that should be taken in consideration.

If we draw some conclusions from this case study and apply them to a broader CSDP civilian framework, the following can be said. First, the reaction and planning process of the CSDP missions is still relatively long; it often takes a lot of time to reach a political consensus within the EU, especially, as evident in the case of EULEX, on more complex and sensitive issues. Second, there are many partial interests both within various EU institutions and among member states, which prolong the decision-making process and often result in compromises that do not necessarily reflect the actual needs of the host countries. Third, the CSDP missions are still very low on the political agendas of the member states. This is reflected in many respects, including in the reluctances of the member states to second their best staff to these missions. Fourth, while the CSDP framework has evolved substantially during the years, there are still certain structural challenges to be addressed in order to make it a truly functional instrument, adequate for longer lasting and complex engagements.

The findings of this paper thus indicate that if the EU wants to efficiently plan and conduct complex, long-term civilian CSDP missions, then the mandates, structures and general approach of the EU should be adapted accordingly. This is of particular importance in the light of the new EU Global Strategy, stating that the CSDP "must become" more responsive and effective.

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Analysing the Effectiveness of EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

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ABSTRACT

European Union has since the 1990s established close links with the countries of the Western Balkans, aiming to secure stable, prosperous and well-functioning democratic societies on a path towards the EU integration. It had placed operations in the framework of then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), high on the political agenda of the Union. Following the decision by NATO to hand over its own operation that had the task of maintaining security in the region, the EU launched a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina titled Operation EUFOR Althea, on 2 December 2004, 9 years after the war ended. EUFOR Althea is a military operation and up until now the longest CSDP operation in its history. The present paper undertakes an analysis of the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea, which is defined as: "when an operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from

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the perspective of the EU and the conflict it seeks to prevent." So-called 'effectiveness success criteria/indicators' are used to evaluate the effectiveness. Indicators take into account two levels of perspectives, EU and non-EU, the first one including the general EU and EU personnel perspective, and the second entailing local stakeholders' view. For assessing effectiveness, the article draws lessons from the findings of the research of EUFOR Althea's capabilities. The article argues that despite the long-lasting presence of the operation on the ground and no official sign of the operation leaving soon, the operation has nevertheless achieved certain success, especially in maintaining safe and secure environment, advancing human rights and gender equality as well as capacity-building of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

KEY WORDS: European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, CSDP, EUFOR Althea, effectiveness

POVZETEK

Evropska unija je od 1990-ih let vzpostavila tesne stike z državami Zahodnega Balkana, da bi zagotovila stabilne, uspešne in dobro delujoče demokratične družbe pri integraciji v EU. Ta cilj je postavil misije in operacije znotraj takratne Evropske varnostne in obrambne politike (EVOP) visoko na politično agendo držav EU, kasneje preimenovane v Skupno varnostno in obrambno politiko (SVOP). Ob odločitvi Nata, da preda svojo misijo, ki je bila vzpostavljena z namenom zagotavljanja varnosti v regiji, je EU 2. decembra 2004 v ta namen ustanovila vojaško operacijo EUFOR Althea v Bosni in Hercegovini (BiH). EUFOR Althea je do danes najdlje trajajoča SVOP operacija. Pričujoči prispevek analizira uspešnost le-te, ki je definirana kot: 'ko operacija doseže svoj namen na primeren način, tako z vidika EU, kot tudi konflikta, ki ga želi preprečiti.'' Za potrebe analize so bili vzpostavljeni tako imenovani kriteriji/indikatorji za merjenje uspešnosti. Indikatorji upoštevajo dve perspektivi, EU raven ter raven izven EU, kjer prva vključuje EU kot celoto ter njene predstavnike, medtem ko se druga osredotoča na raven končnih lokalnih deležnikov. Pri oceni učinkovitosti članek črpa zaključke iz ugotovitev raziskave o zmogljivostih operacije Althea. Članek tako navaja, da operacija kljub dolgi prisotnosti v BiH ter brez znakov, da bo kmalu zakl-

jučena, dosega določen uspeh, predvsem pri ohranjanju varnega in stabilnega okolja, spodbujanju človekovih pravic in enakopravnosti spolov ter krepitvi zmogljivosti oboroženih sil BiH.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Evropska unija, Bosna in Hercegovina, SVOP, EUFOR Althea, uspešnost

INTRODUCTION

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), one of the six constituent republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), entered a period of bitter war in March 1992, which lasted more than three years. It ended with a death tool estimated between 100.000 and 200.000 people and left almost half of the population displaced (New World Encyclopedia, 2016). The war was brought to an end in 1995 with the assistance of the international community under auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), bringing the leaders from Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb to negotiation table in Dayton, and with the signing of the Dayton Accords[4] in Paris, which signalled a long road towards restoring peace and security in the country. NATO remained in BiH for nine years, ensuring the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords in all entities of BiH, meaning de-escalation of the conflict, demilitarization and disarmament of the armed forces and civilian population, as well as repatriation of the displaced persons. NATO's first task force was named Implementation Force (IFOR) and became operational in December 1995, containing over 60.000 troops. Exactly one year later, the subsequent task force known as Stabilisation Force (SFOR) took over IFOR's mandate, until NATO expressed intention to retreat its forces at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 after eight years of its operation (Knezović, 2005).

European Union (EU) clearly expressed its objective to take over the operation in BiH. The approach of the EU to the Western Balkans was based on the strategic objectives aiming at an eventual membership of these countries in the EU and has guaranteed

[4] United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council S/1995/999 *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina.*

European commitment to BiH (Council of the EU, 2004b). In June 2003, Romano Prodi, the tenth President of the European Commission, addressed all EU member states and nations from the European region at the Thessaloniki Summit and declared that Europe's unification cannot be completed without all countries from the region becoming members. The final document of the Summit, Thessaloniki Declaration[5] also confirmed that the future of the Western Balkans, consequently BiH, lies within the EU. 9 July 2004 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) welcomed the intention of the EU to provide for the new operation in BiH with the UNSC Resolution 1551[6] and authorized the EU operation to proceed in November 2004 with the UNSC Resolution 1575[7] (ibid.).

The purpose of this article is to introduce the findings related to the effectiveness of the EUFOR Althea operation, drawn from the research in the framework of the project Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU).[8] The case of EUFOR Althea operation will be utilized to present the outcomes and considerations that should be taken into account when discussing the real impact of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military and civilian missions and operations on their host countries. In the article, we will firstly research the main background information on the EUFOR Althea, which are needed to understand the security, and especially the political environment, that has brought to the establishment of the operation – we will especially stress the EU's perception of the

[5] *Thessaloniki Declaration* 10229/03, adopted in Thessaloniki on 21st June 2003, at EU – Western Balkan Summit.

[6] Security Council Resolution S/RES/1551 (2004), adopted on 9th July 2004.

[7] Security Council Resolution S/RES/1575 (2004), adopted on 22th November 2004.

[8] The IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention) is project aiming to enhance the conflict prevention capabilities. This project has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020. The IECEU Consortium (11 participants from 7 different European countries) itself consists of a diverse group of civilian, research and military organizations. IECEU analyses the best practices and lessons learned with a view to enhance the civilian conflict prevention and peace building capabilities of EU with a catalogue of practices, new solutions and approaches. The main goals of the IECEU -project are: Analyzing the current situation of on-going and past European Union CSDP missions and operations; Learning from lessons provided by these CSDP operations and assessing the different options; Providing new solutions, approaches and recommendations for EU to guarantee long-term stability through conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For more info check: http://www.ieceu-project.com/ (23 November 2016).

operation's significance for the development of the CSDP pillar, which even today still affects its functioning. The mandate and its evolution will also be presented. Secondly, we will closely examine EUFOR Althea's effectiveness and assess the considerations emerging from it and the challenges due to the lack of it. The evaluation of effectiveness is inherently based on the preceding case-study research of the key capabilities – planning capacity, operational capacity, interoperability, competencies, comprehensiveness and technologies. The objective is to assess the effectiveness of the EUFOR Althea operation through the four so-called effectiveness success criteria/indicators, developed as a methodological approach in the IECEU project; namely internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness. The paper seeks a deeper understanding of concrete factors furthering the effectiveness and impact of CSDP crisis management operations. The article argues that EUFOR Althea, being a testing ground for CSDP missions, has achieved certain success, especially in maintaining safe and secure environment, advancing human rights and gender equality as well as capacity-building of the Armed Forces of BiH.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The research method applied is qualitative data content analysis. The data used in this article has its basis in the interviews and discussions, carried out in the framework of the IECEU project. The interviews were conducted in the period between November 2015 and March 2016, with former and current personnel of EUFOR Althea, local and international regional experts, representatives of the governmental actors of various EU member states, European External Action Service (EEAS) representatives as well as other EU, non-EU and civil society representatives, NATO, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and international development agencies. All discussions were confidential; the names of the interviewees will therefore not be disclosed. The interviews were carried out by seven experts in English, Finnish and Bosnian language. Analysis of primary and secondary sources serves as a supportive research method.

Within the IECEU project, level of effectiveness in CSDP operation is measured based on success factors. Effectiveness of the EU´s crisis management is defined as "*when a mission/an operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.*" Effectiveness thus encompasses both, achievements of a certain mission/operation, as well as the path and tools the operation used to achieve it. Effectiveness is assessed through internal and external perspective. The internal perspective should reflect the extent to which the operation succeeded according to EU's politico-strategic goals and objectives, and if the implementation went well according to the EU's plans (hence, whether it achieved the goal in the way in which they had set out to do it). The internal perspective looks for the views of the policy-makers, civilian mission personnel and military operation personnel. The external perspective should assess the operation according to the overall purpose of conflict prevention – it considers the effectiveness with regard to medium term peacebuilding and long term stability. It takes into regard the perspective of local actors in the host country and the international community.

The effectiveness of EUFOR Althea is assessed through the lens of the four 'effectiveness criteria' established in the project, namely internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness:

Internal effectiveness

- *Internal goal attainment* – to what extent does an operation achieve what the EU set out to do? It analyses whether the operation has achieved its intended purpose and the tasks it had set out to do, taking into account key objectives and the overall mandate of the operation. Indicators of internal goal attainment take into consideration *fulfilment of operational objectives* and *politico-strategic goals* of the operation.

- *Internal appropriateness* – to what extent has an operation been implemented according to EU plans? It examines

whether the way in which the operation has been implemented is appropriate, looking at it from the intervener's perspective. Internal appropriateness assesses whether an operation is implemented well on the ground and has the desired politico-strategic effect at home as well as abroad. *Timeliness*, *efficiency* and *cost-effectiveness* in implementation are three key indicators of internal appropriateness.

External effectiveness:

- *External goal attainment* – to what extent does an operation help prevent violent conflict? EU operations are usually a part of wider efforts to prevent conflict and this criterion considers CSDP operations in the light of these broader efforts. It analyses whether an operation has had a meaningful, positive and sustainable impact on the potentially violent conflict on the ground. The indicators of external goal attainment are, whether or not there is an initiation of violent conflict (violent conflict begins), continuation (continues over time or reoccurs), diffusion (a conflict in one geographic area spreads to another), escalation (new actors have become involved in an existing conflict) or intensification (increase in number or nature of violent incidents) of the conflict.

- *External appropriateness* – to what extent has an operation been proportionate in its preventive measures? It assesses the ways in which an operation seeks to achieve its purpose. It assesses whether more good than harm is done, as well as ensures that what is done is done by proportionate means of power and persuasion to facilitate effective prevention of (more) violent conflict. The indicators, which measure external appropriateness, are proportional prevention i.e. more good (positive and sustainable contribution to preventing violent conflict) than harm (force, coercion and other negative effects).

EUFOR ALTHEA AT GLANCE

EU's objectives regarding external and foreign relations were first identified in the Maastricht Treaty[9] as EU realized it had no power over conflict in its immediate neighbourhood, which had clear effect on its borders and member states became interested in development of common crisis management capabilities. Two approaches were established, aiming at complementing each other, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), concentrating on foreign policy objectives, and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which aimed at execution of crisis management in the field. The need for operational capabilities was expressed already in St. Malo declaration[10] and Treaty of Amsterdam,[11] which encompassed crisis management into CFSP. In 1999, European Council approved the Action plan for civilian crisis management and development of institutional structures for its implementation (Gourlay and others, 2006). ESDP, renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after Lisbon Treaty[12] entered into force and became operational in 2003, with first missions being carried out (Juncos, 2014). The then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, confirmed in his speech in June 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit that the Thessaloniki declaration officially stressed that the future of the Western Balkans lies within the EU (European Commission, 2004). EUFOR Althea was launched in the proper momentum for ESDP when the future of BiH mattered not only for maintaining peace and security in EU's neighbourhood but for EU's self-perception as a foreign policy and security actor.

Indicating the significance of the operation is the fact that BiH has sometimes been referred to as a 'testing ground' for CSDP. Firstly, it has been the impetus providing for the development of the EU crisis management instruments (Council of the EU,

[9] European Union, *Treaty on European Unio*n, Treaty of Maastricht, signed 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, in force from 1 November 1993.

[10] Saint-Malo Declaration, signed on 4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo.

[11] European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, as signed on 2 October 1997 in Amsterdam, in force from 1 May 1999.

[12] European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01

2004b). The EU has been able to evolve from a civilian power to a more multifaceted one, resorting to military instruments – with an aim to promote its own values and goals – through the development of the CSDP. Moreover, EUFOR Althea has allowed the EU to experiment with its military capabilities in a relatively safe multi-actor environment. With deployment of EUFOR Althea, the EU has been aiming at constructing itself as a credible security actor, while doing so in a relatively risk-free environment. Furthermore, EUFOR Althea has been explicitly framed as an element of a broader, comprehensive EU policy towards the region, like stated in Thessaloniki Declaration – promoting instruments, which will strengthen BiH, bringing it closer to the European perspective and towards eventual EU membership (Juncos, 2015). This was also stated in public official documents, as the EU medium term objective: "[EU is] supporting BiH's progress towards the EU integration by its own efforts, by contributing to a safe and secure environment with the objective of signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)" (Council of EU 2004, 3).

EUFOR Althea, EU's third military operation, is a concrete embodiment of this perception. Since it has been explicitly framed as part of a comprehensive approach to the Balkans, Althea can be seen as a mix of civil-military operation, rather than a purely military one. Established in December 2004, with the decision of the Council of the EU,[13] EUFOR Althea has been the longest military intervention launched in the framework of CSDP, as one of the EU's crisis management instruments. It was deployed in 2004 under the Berlin Plus Agreement[14] enabling the EU to utilize NATO's assets and capabilities in the operation (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).

The goal of the EUFOR Althea was at the time of its founding to ensure the continued implementation of and compliance with the Dayton Agreement, to contribute to a safe and secure envi-

[13] Council of the European Union Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[14] The Berlin Plus agreement is a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in 2003 between the EU and the NATO and it enables EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (European External Action Service, 2016a).

ronment and, finally, to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH. It was deployed at a force of 7.000 troops (Kim, 2006). However, due to the changes in the security situation in BiH, the mandate has evolved and has been reconfigured four times, most recently in September 2012 – however, it continues to act in accordance with its peace enforcement mandate under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The new mandate of the EUFOR Althea now encompasses three main objectives: to provide for capacity-building and training of Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) (non-executive part), to support BiH authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment in BiH and to provide support to overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH. The non-executive part of training of AFBiH, aims at achieving that BiH becomes a security provider, rather than a security consumer in the long term. The executive part, a goal of supporting the authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment, consists of tasks such as: countermines activities, military and civilian movement, control of weapons, ammunition and explosive substances and management of weapons and ammunition storage sites (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015). The operation EUFOR Althea maintains its presence throughout the BiH through Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs), which are mostly made up of troops from Austria, Hungary and Turkey (Interview no. 2). Following reconfiguration in 2012, EUFOR Althea's troop level is currently approximately 600. It has been argued that the restructuring was driven primarily by lack of political will and by withdrawals of participating nations (Interview no. 21).

EUFOR Althea has been present in BiH for 12 years so far, and despite the fact no violence among the ethnic lines occurred during this mandate, yet the operation with its executive mandate is still present in the territory of BiH. The strategic planning seems to be problematic, since there was no open discussion on the exit strategy or phasing out of the operation: what milestones should be reached for the operation to be able to end? (Interview no. 67, 68). There is no timetable or benchmarks that the operation should achieve, for the gradual transfer of power to the national government – the exit strategy is listed as: "to be based on progress in building efficient state level structures, in particular in

the area of security and defence. This objective is primarily the responsibility of the BiH government assisted by EU civilian actors. Moreover, it will be important to avoid the creation of a culture of dependence upon EUFOR," (Council of EU 2004, 4). With no clear reform agenda nor the exit strategy, it is highly difficult to assess the success of the ongoing operation, while the wide perception is that the continuation of the operation serves political purposes (IECEU, Roundtable discussion of experts, 2016).

EFFECTIVENESS OF EUFOR ALTHEA

INTERNAL EFFECTIVENESS: SUCCESS FOR THE EU

Success for the EU takes into account the extent to which EUFOR Althea has succeeded in relation to the EU's politico-strategic goals and operational objectives, along with whether their implementation is going well in the light of Union's plans, procedures, and principles. It analyses whether the operation has been implemented well on the ground and had the desired politico-strategic effect at home as well as abroad. In other words, the internal assessment focuses on whether the EU achieved what it set out to do, in the way that it set out to, both strategically and operationally.

Internal goal attainment: to what extent does the operation achieve what the EU set out to do?

The operation was established in line with the EU's comprehensive approach, to assist in creating conditions for meeting the long-term political objective of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH, as well as supporting BiH's progress towards the EU integration by its own efforts (Council of EU, 2004). In this framework, its original operational objectives were to provide deterrence and contribute to a safe and stable environment in BiH. In 2012, Althea's focus shifted to capacity building and training for the AFBiH and supporting them in their progress towards NATO standards. Its obligation to support authorities in maintaining safe and secure environment remained (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).

Deriving from the former, in terms of deterrence and maintaining a safe and secure environment, EUFOR Althea can be considered a success, but we have to take into account that the security environment into which EUFOR Althea arrived had been relatively stable and safe. There has been no recurrence of the fighting along the ethnic lines in the time of EUFOR's presence in BiH (Interview no. 68). The operation is also performing well with regard to its achievements in the field of capacity building and training of the AFBiH (Interview no. 28, 34). The goal is to create an effective domestic army that will be able to support BiH authorities in a humanitarian role and in the spirit of a 'dual use of forces,' besides performing conventional army roles (European External Action Service, 2016b). There are some indicators supporting the notion that the development has been reached. Firstly, AFBiH troops have been participating in NATO- and UN-led peace-support operations since 2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 2007) and an agreement enabling participation in CSDP operations was signed in September 2015 (European External Action Service, 2015). Secondly, Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC)[15] has within the last 10 years increased its number of yearly activities from five to thirty-two and has managed to provide training for more than 6,000 individuals, 25% of them consisting of international personnel (Interview no. 55). However, no clear goals or baselines have been agreed upon for capacity building and training that would enable more precise assessment of the effectiveness of the EU efforts (Interview no. 21). Furthermore, the CSDP operation recently failed to carry out an assessment of the capacity building and training activities carried out that was assigned by the member states, because of the six-month rotation of the EU staff. This indicates a shortfall in operational capacity, which ultimately resulted in NATO taking over the assessment process (Interview no. 68, 27, 41, 59).

[15] In order to train the officer corps, the international community set up the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOCT) in 2005, co-located at Camp Butmir with the AFBiH Operational Command as well as EUFOR and NATO Headquarters. PSOCT started functioning under international leadership and since its inception has offered training both for the multi-ethnic AFBiH and international participants. According to interviewees deployed in BiH during the first years of the CSDP operation, the cooperation both between the ethnic groups in AFBiH and between AFBiH and EUFOR worked well.

Currently, NATO and EUFOR seek to coordinate their efforts to reach some kind of defence reform, which can help both organisations achieve their long-terms objectives over the country. From the EU perspective, after 20 years since the end of the conflict, the politico-strategic goal of BiH's membership in the EU has still not been reached. Although BiH formally applied for the EU membership in February 2016, there is still a long way to go with several political and social challenges awaiting BiH along the way (Minard 2016, 2). Therefore, the internal goal attainment clearly balances closer to partial success, rather than success.

Nevertheless, there are open questions that should be presented, regarding the politico-strategic goals and operational objectives. Firstly, even though the security situation seems to be stable in BiH, there has been something bubbling under in regard to the social situation. Factors threatening security are socio-economic, starting at unemployment and healthcare, and continuing with radicalization contributing to terrorism (Security Council Report, 2016). Hence, we can identify a discrepancy – the current security concerns are relatively far from the daily life of citizens and the tool the mission uses is only adequate for military threats (Interview no. 67). Should the operation finally be phased out, should the resources be allocated to something else? For taking the steps towards the EU membership and reaching democratization and reconciliation, BiH needs economic and social development. So why did the EU first opt for closing the civilian CSDP mission in BiH[16]? For example, law enforcement in BiH is too complex; it burdens the public administration and is not trusted by the local population. Hence, policing is clearly an area, where BiH would need further support (European Commission, 2015). Several other questions are also still left unaddressed by the operation when it comes to the politico-strategic goals and operation's objectives. First of all, several interviewees and experts noted that

[16] The civilian mission European Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH started on 1 January 2003, for an initial period of three years. It overtook responsibilities rom the UN's International Police Task Force. The mission's objectives were to strengthen the capacities of the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organized crime and corruption, assist in the investigations and the development of criminal investigative capacities of BiH, enhance police-prosecution cooperation, strengthen police-penitentiary system cooperation, as well as to contribute to ensuring a suitable level of accountability. Ultimately, the mission continued with modified mandates until 30 June 2012 (European External Action Service 2012).

although no violence has occurred since the deployment of the operation, threats in the country still exist, but they are of a societal nature (Knauer 2011, 5 and Interviews no. 39, 57, 62). For years now threats for everyday citizens have shifted and evolved, where biggest problems currently include socio-economic issues, health and radicalization, while the tool at hand has stayed appropriate for tackling military threats solely (Interview no. 70).

Internal appropriateness: to what extent has the operation been implemented according to EU plans?

Internal appropriateness examines whether the way in which the operation is implemented is appropriate, looking at it from the intervener's perspective. Internal appropriateness assesses whether the operation is implemented well on the ground and has the desired politico-strategic effect at home as well as abroad. Timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in implementation are three key indicators of internal appropriateness.

The first indicator measuring internal appropriateness is timeliness. The EU response timeframe in case of EUFOR Althea was not a critical question in the case of BiH. The military problem had largely ceased to exist by the time EUFOR Althea took over its tasks from SFOR. Therefore, no rapid deployment was deemed necessary and force generation did not present a challenge for the Union. Furthermore, the operation was not very demanding in terms of planning, since it has been carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements. On the other hand, even though the deployment and initial planning were successful actions, the EU has failed to define and agree on the end state for the exit strategy (Interview no 67, 68). Evaluation criteria for the operational tasks have been discussed and drafted at the Headquarters level since 2005, but the CSDP operation still lacks official time-limited conditions. Lack of coordination or planning guidance exercised from strategic/political level toward operational level is a clear inadequacy mentioned by several interviewees. As for the capacity-building and training work, like previously mentioned, EUFOR Althea has only recently come to an understanding with NATO and the AF-

BiH on the coordination of efforts and resources to aim at a specific set of capabilities of the AFBiH (European External Action Service, 2015). What is still needed is a fully funded plan for procurement of key assets and equipment and an agreement on the goals against which the development of the AFBiH could later be evaluated.

The second appropriateness indicator, efficiency associated with the capabilities and their implementation, is less clear to assess. Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) that are living among the local population across BiH seem to have been an excellent tool for gathering information, bringing visibility to the operation, and engaging with a wide audience, but as already mentioned, the operation had good planning capacity from the outset although with certain gaps and weaknesses, which manifest in the operational capacity and were identified in the course of the research process. Firstly, lack of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capability is a gap that hinders efficient and effective intelligence-gathering. Also subject to question is the extent to which the 17 LOTs can maintain and produce situational awareness, especially in the current context in which EUFOR has less mobile capability than it previously had. Other problems with the LOTs lie in the personnel breakdown (specifically, a low proportion of female officers and older personnel) and the above-mentioned short rotation cycle that hinders development of relationships of trust with locals and following up on the policies implemented (Interview no. 41, 59).

The composition of the force in terms of personnel is a weakness also in a broader sense; participating nations do not provide staff with the background and skill sets needed (Interview no. 26). The short rotation cycle, in turn, undermines institutional memory and has a negative effect on the lessons-learnt process. Also, it appears that the national pre-deployment training could be more harmonized and suited to the tasks at hand (Interviews no. 34, 40, 46). In addition, lack of strategic communication is a weakness that affects both the institutional efficiency and the political visibility of the CSDP operation – unless the EU has a proactive and coherent information strategy, local politicians will

use the platform, which is also going to be affected by geopolitical power games (Interview no. 57, 61, 63 and 36).

Thirdly, the lack of resources within the AFBiH for acquiring appropriate equipment is a significant external barrier to effectiveness. The Althea mechanism cannot be used to fund AFBiH equipment. For this reason, training is frequently cancelled. Even when training is conducted with the aid of EU assets and equipment the result is not sustainable because the AFBiH may have gained the skills but still lack the means to deliver. Lack of common equipment reduces the ability to cross-train and hence demands that training be carried out by each equipment-providing nation (Interview no. 36, 34, 39 and 24).

Other major external barriers include the political structure, a culture plagued by corruption and lack of meritocracy in BiH, and extensive power games in the region. The EUFOR Althea operation is clearly most popular among the Bosnian population and on the side of the Federation (FBiH), whereas Republika Srpska (RS) is not genuinely committed to cooperation with the EU actors (Interview no. 37). Cooperation with all ethnic groups requires a balancing act and is time-consuming on account of the inflexible institutional structures. In order to reach the operational objectives related to capacity-building and training, EUFOR Althea will also have to enhance its cooperation and coordination with NATO, which is leading the defence reform at the strategic level.

The main internal institutional barriers of EUFOR Althea mission, when it comes to efficiency, are largely connected with political will and comprehensiveness. Firstly, the future of EUFOR Althea may be debated between those in favour of discontinuing the operation and those who wish to stay in BiH, but as long as the operation continues, there should be stronger political will to provide human and other resources that its mandate requires (Interview no. 21).

As in the case of other CSDP operations, common operational costs are covered jointly through the Althea mechanism. Since

the definition of common costs is relatively narrow, most costs fall to the troop-contributing countries. However, the cost of EUFOR Althea for the participating nations both in terms of common costs and nationally borne costs is relatively low (Council of the EU, 2014b). All in all, the operation keeps the EU flag waving and, with its annual budget of approximately 10 million Euros, represents a minimal cost presence to ensure that no deterioration in the security situation occurs (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015). From the cost-effectiveness angle, the operation can therefore be considered a success. On the other hand, it can be argued that the EU is gambling its reputation and credibility since it maintains a Chapter VII mandate without real capability to carry out the security task fully (Interview no. 50 and 62). In the worst case, with the current configuration and contributions, the political costs could be significant, both from the perspective of individual member states and from that of the rest of the world. In consequence of the above-mentioned gaps and weaknesses, the operation can only be seen as a partial success in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

EXTERNAL EFFECTIVENESS: ASSESSING THE SUCCESS FROM THE CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

Looking from the external perspective, CSDP operation is assessed in terms of its contribution towards the overall conflict prevention or to preventing further violent conflict. This criterion takes into account the effectiveness of short-term EU crisis management with regard to medium term peace-building and long-term stability. The external perspective is focused on what can reasonably be expected of operational conflict prevention and the ways in which the operation has sought to prevent violent conflict, for purposes of determining whether the prevention efforts were and are proportional to the challenge at hand.

External goal attainment: to what extent does the operation help prevent violent conflict?

External goal attainment analyses whether an operation has had a meaningful, positive and sustainable impact on the poten-

tially violent conflict on the ground. The indicators of external goal attainment are, whether or not there is an initiation of violent conflict (violent conflict begins), continuation (continues over time or reoccurs), diffusion (a conflict in one geographic area spreads to another), escalation (new actors have become involved in an existing conflict) or intensification (increase in number or nature of violent incidents).

By the end of 2004, when transition establishing EUFOR Althea happened, BiH was well beyond the stabilization stage and was progressing towards the integration to the EU, and the state-strengthening process was already happening (Azinović and others, 2011). The relationship between the two parties in the conflict, FBiH and RS, improved (Knauer, 2011), and despite the tensions still existing, the intensity of the conflict was defined as "low" (ibid.). Since EUFOR Althea was not deployed in a crisis, but in an already stable post-crisis security environment, it is difficult to analyse to what extent the CSDP operation has been the reason for preventing continuation, diffusion, escalation, and intensification of violence (Interview no. 68). However, EUFOR Althea, being a military tool, with focus on capability development, has limited resources and capabilities for responding to the mentioned challenges of socio-economic environment, corruption or radicalization that could lead into the potential conflict (Security Council Report, 2016). But, judging from the facts at hand, EUFOR Althea has provided safe and stable environment, as there has been no recurrence of violence, and the operation's forces have never been asked to intervene, we can assess that the operation has been successful in external goal attainment. At this point it is important to note that no direct proof exists proving the causal relationship of no occurrence of violence and EUFOR Althea, so no direct success can be attributed to the operation, while improvement of certain conditions, listed further in the research, prove that EUFOR Althea had its fair share in it.

The role of EUFOR Althea in stabilizing the society and creating conditions for long-lasting, sustainable peace has been clear in the field of capacity-building training, as it has contributed to the professionalization of the AFBiH (Interview no. 55). EU-

FOR plays an important part in implementation of the reform's technical and tactical aspects, while it is coordinating its efforts with NATO (Interview no. 39). EUFOR Althea can be viewed as having contributed to the concrete institutional development of the AFBiH and its capabilities, by helping to set a good example of the benefits to be achieved with ethnic integration (Interview no. 69). The operation has also improved conditions for structural conflict prevention particularly in the field of gender and human rights. It may be considered that the more the vulnerable population groups are included in maintaining sustainable peace, the lower the likelihood of these groups becoming targeted by violence or their rights being ignored or violated. Nevertheless, there are almost no examples of representatives of vulnerable or underrepresented groups being included in peace negotiations in a timely and effective manner. In consequence, potential for deficiencies in the peace arrangements can be expected, and BiH is no exception with regard to these deficiencies (UN Women 2016). BiH for example, has not yet modified its State Constitution in accordance to the Judgment made in a case Sejdić-Finci v BiH (2009). The appellants, a Roma minority and a Jewish minority, filed an application to the European Court of Human Rights after being illegible to stand for the House of Representatives and Presidency of BiH. In its Judgment, the Court assessed that the Dayton Peace Agreement and its constitutional provisions were designed to end one of the deadliest conflicts in Europe. The Court recognized, although did not justify, that due to the nature of the conflict, such constitutional provisions of giving certain power-balancing mechanisms to the 'constituent peoples' have served to ensure peace and stability in BiH (ibid.).[17] The Court went an extra mile by citing sources that clearly demonstrate appropriate alternate mechanisms in which the same ends could be achieved without racially discriminating other ethnic groups/minorities, hence concluding that the State Constitution of BiH is in respect to election to the House of Representatives in violation of Article 14 in junction with Article 3 of Protocol no. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ibid.).

[17] *Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovin*a (2009), application 27996/06 and 34836/06, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights.

In the context of our interviews conducted with EUFOR Althea personnel, we deem particularly important to problematize this structural violence that is constitutionally enforced over minorities in BiH. UNICEF BiH (2013, 14) in one of its final reports states "*pattern of social, economic and political exclusion that Roma experience shows that their life expectancy and living standards are below average. Health problems start earlier. A majority of Roma children never complete primary school, very few go to secondary school, even fewer attend university. Roma are virtually absent from politics, their civil society organizations tend to be weak and they are often without official representation as a minority. Attitudes towards Roma are more negative than towards any other* [ethnic] *group*". To understand inequality and especially to understand the root cause of inequality in the case of minorities in BiH, requires a more methodological approach of examining and assessing structural violence.

It seems that all relevant activities aimed at gender equality in BiH started after the Dayton Agreement, not having been acknowledged as a necessity already during the peace negotiations. In consequence, many gender-related issues have not been addressed properly or in a timely manner, and some may not be adequately addressed even today. This is evident particularly with respect to sexual violence during conflict. Increased participation of women in governmental and public institutions may not only act toward the achievement of gender equality, but also foster better prevention of future conflicts. In BiH this work is in progress and has already shown measurable results; the BiH defence sector has shown particular success in increasing female engagement. Also, EUFOR Althea has managed to put gender equality on the agenda of the post-conflict society through its gender mainstreaming efforts (Interview no. 33, 53, 38).

Finally, EUFOR Althea has contributed relatively successfully to further conflict prevention initiatives through the lessons learnt output. On some occasions, lessons have truly been learnt, though, on others old problems have either re-emerged or not been sufficiently dealt with. Examples of these are the need for better coordination of the EU instruments, including calls

for trained personnel, and for more efficient procurement procedures. Most of the progress has been made in regard to coordination and coherence among the various actors in BiH (Interview no. 30). Further lessons have been learnt from the Berlin Plus agreement, cost-sharing agreements, intelligence-sharing and clarity in delineation of tasks whenever there are NATO and EU military operations in the same theatre (Emerson and Gross, 2007).

External appropriateness: to what extent has the operation been proportionate in its preventive measures?

External appropriateness assesses the ways in which an operation seeks to achieve its purpose. It assesses whether more good than harm is done as well as ensures that what is implemented is done by proportionate means of power and persuasion to facilitate effective prevention of (more) violent conflict. The indicator measuring external appropriateness is proportional prevention; i.e. more good (positive and sustainable contribution to preventing violent conflict) than harm (force, coercion and other negative effects) has been done.

External appropriateness of CSDP operation is evaluated through the preventive measures taken and their possible positive or negative impact on civil society and local institutional structures. Taking into account that EUFOR Althea has never been asked to intervene in order to maintain safe and secure environment in BiH, we can argue that the operation has carried out its tasks in a way that at least it has not worsened the security situation. Through the interviews conducted, we may conclude that Bosnians, in general, consider the presence of EUFOR Althea necessary and a stabilizing influence, contributing to their sense of security (Interview no. 38). EUFOR Althea has through the capacity-building and training also positively contributed to the professionalization of the AFBiH. By integrating all ethnic groups in one organization, EUFOR Althea advanced sustainable changes in Bosnian society, while good cooperation was established in the field of human rights and gender equality as well. According to local and international actors the cooperation has

positively contributed to changes in the attitude and values of the society (ibid.)

On the other side, EUFOR Althea has also contributed to some negative developments. Firstly, as EUFOR Althea is one of the elements of EU's comprehensive approach towards the region, operation has participated in enabling and creating certain aid-dependency in terms of institutional change. As some interviewees pointed out, the EU should be stricter in demanding deliverables in return for the money that is spent in BiH, which would force local institutions to deliver changes (Interview no. 24). Secondly, the fact of always considering ethnicity creates and perpetuates the divisions in the society as a whole and will be continuously used by political elites as a tool to avoid fundamental change and progress in the country. Thirdly, certain bilateral actions (for example donations of military equipment) have caused counter-productive actions, as operation has been forced to allocate time and human resources to activities that have not supported sustainable development of the AFBiH (Interview no. 36, 34 and 39). Despite the negative consequences, which are mostly the result of bad coordination, it can be argued that negative effects are proportionate with regard to the good done by the operation.

CONCLUSION

For the EU, the stabilization and reconstruction of a multicultural and multi-ethnic community in BiH became a litmus test for the Union's commitment to becoming a political and security actor that projects peace and stability across the entire continent. Accordingly, BiH's future mattered not only to the citizens of the country but also to the EU's perceptions of itself as a foreign-policy and security actor. Deploying EUFOR Althea meant projecting its aspirations for the region in a relatively safe, risk-free environment, with low costs.

When it comes to success of EUFOR Althea regarding the internal effectiveness, as the analysis of success factors has shown, EUFOR Althea has been a success in terms of internal goal attainment, as no recurrence of violence along the ethnic lines has

occurred since its presence in BiH, while safe and secure environment was maintained. Here it is important to note that the maintenance of safe and secure environment cannot be attributed solely to the operation since different internal and external factors cannot be excluded. It is namely difficult to measure how much of the deterrence can be attributed only to the operation. EUFOR Althea is also performing well with regard to capacity building and training of AfBiH, as the forces have been participating in peace support operations within NATO and UN, while the PSOTC has so far successfully trained around 6.000 people for the missions abroad. On the other side, no baselines have been set up, that would allow us to measure the success of Althea in capacity building of AfBiH. When it comes to politico-strategic goals of Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH, membership in EU nor NATO has not been reached. Based on the above mentioned facts, operation can be considered partially successful with regard to internal goal attainment.

From the perspective of internal appropriateness, where we measure whether EUFOR Althea has been implemented according to the EU plans, the operation can be considered partial success again. Firstly, when it comes to timeliness, operation can be considered a success, but we have to take into account that at the time of the deployment, no rapid response was needed, as military danger seized to exist by then. Operation also took over NATO assets and capabilities, so planning was rather simple. One part they have failed to address during the planning was the end state for the exit strategy, which consequently causes lack of clear guidelines. Secondly, in relation to efficiency, operation has several weaknesses. Despite the good planning capacity, which was stressed during the research, operation lacks Human Intelligence, some personnel can be considered a weakness since they do not possess sufficient professional background and skills needed for their posts, while short rotation cycles hinder development of long-lasting trust with the local population. Further on, AfBiH lacks resources for acquiring appropriate equipment, which means they are trained on borrowed equipment that they will never again use. Other challenges for the efficiency include the political structure, corruption and power games in the region,

while the country and EU member states lack political will and comprehensiveness. And thirdly, when it comes to cost efficiency, operation is run at relatively low cost, so it can be concluded it is successful concerning the cost efficiency.

When taking into account external effectiveness and firstly talking about external goal attainment, we can conclude the operation has been successful in helping to prevent the conflict. There was no occurrence of violence since EUFOR Althea is present on the ground, while it is important to notice there is no proof of direct causal relationship. Further on, operation is a military tool and has been incapable of adapting to current causes of insecurity in BiH, which are mostly of economic and health care nature. Despite the fact that operation has enhanced gender equality and human rights, EUFOR Althea has failed to address the structural violations of minority rights, which is shown through the Sejdić-Finci case.

When it comes to external appropriateness, it can be concluded that the mission is acting proportionately in its preventive measures and more good than harm has been done so far. Althea has positively contributed to the sense of security within the population, professionalization of AfBiH, where it managed to integrate all ethnic groups in one organization, advancing sustainable changes and achieved good cooperation in the field of human rights and gender equality. On the other side, EUFOR Althea has to a certain extent contributed to the aid dependency in terms of institutional changes, where it should put more conditionality on its spending. We can conclude that, taking into account external effectiveness criteria, EUFOR Althea has achieved partial success.

Nonetheless, a CSDP operation is always part of a comprehensive approach toolbox and also part of a wide array of activities carried out by the international community as a whole, so the outcome cannot be solely contributed to the mission. The EU can bring added value, above all, through special expertise instead of vast numbers of personnel. Furthermore, the ongoing and completed CSDP operations have already proved the challenges faced by the Union in terms of seconding civilian experts and getting

boots on the ground. Sticking to a relatively limited mandate should also help the EU to avoid repeating the mistakes that have been made in the case of BiH – related to lack of exit strategy and lack of political will after twelve years of operation. In fact, the EU would benefit from an in depth introspective debate regarding its crisis management instruments and other conflict prevention capabilities. Defining a clear exit strategy, suitable indicators and exit-connected milestones before or immediately after the launch of a CSDP operation should be mandatory to keep CSDP from being a purely open-ended political tool.

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Drawing Lessons Learnt on Operational Capabilities of EU's CSDP Missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina

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ABSTRACT

EU has taken on the role of guaranteeing long-term stability through different measures of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in two countries of the Western Balkans, which have undergone a severe armed conflict in the 1990s. This paper undertakes an analysis and evaluation of operational capabilities of civilian mission EULEX Kosovo and military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It draws lessons learned from the challenges the missions have faced in this field of functioning, namely operational capabilities. Furthermore, the article provides a quality assessment comparing both missions' **operational capabilities**, which can lead to improvement in approaches. The overarching feature in both EU missions is the seeming lack of willingness by the EU and its partner nations to continually politically commit to more effort at contributing to well-functioning security sectors of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina not only "waving their flag on the ground". It draws the conclusion that without the political willingness, both missions are exposed to many operational risks.

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POVZETEK

Evropska unija je v dveh državah Zahodnega Balkana prevzela vlogo zagotovljanja dolgotrajne stabilnosti s številnimi ukrepi za preprečevanje konfliktov in vzpostavljanja miru. Članek vključuje analizo in oceno posmeznih vidikov operativnih zmožnosti civilne misije EULEX Kosovo in vojaške operacije EUFOR Althea v Bosni in Hercegovini. Obsega nova spoznanja o težavah, s katerimi sta se misiji spopadali na tem področju delovanja. Hkrati članek podaja tudi oceno primerjave določenih operativnih vidikov obeh misij, uporabno za nadaljnje izboljšave v pristopih. Obema misijama je skupno očitno pomanjkanje politične volje EU in njenih partnerskih držav pri zavezi za stalni in dolgotrajni prispevek k dobro delujočemu varnostnemu sektorju Kosova in Bosne in Hercegovine, ne le, ''mahanju z EU zastavo''. Podaja tudi zaključek, da sta brez politične volje obe misiji izpostavljeni številu operativnih tveganj.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Evropska Unija, Kosovo, Bosna in Hercegovina, EUFOR Althea, EULEX, SVOP preprečevanje oboroženih spopadov

INTRODUCTION

European Union (EU) has directed its efforts for conflict prevention in the Western Balkans as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), supporting countries which have undergone a period of violence in their recent history, hence directly influencing the stability of a region in EU's proximity. This article is focusing on comparison of the two of the EU's, each in its own way, most ambitious missions regarding their **operational capabilities**, EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) approved the Resolution 1244, which authorized international military, as well as civil intervention and created UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UN-

MIK) with a mandate until 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence (Llaudes and Sanchez Andrada, 2015). Since 1999 the international community has pledged support to Kosovo with contributing and investing major donor assistance, with most of the funding coming from the EU and its member states. Overall, "Kosovo is the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the world" (Cierco and Reis, 2014), and also the transfer of UNMIK's powers to the EU after the termination of its mandate followed in 2008. EULEX is EU's biggest civilian mission in its history, created in a Joint Action Resolution in 2008 (Council Joint Action Resolution, 2008). EU has aimed to establish and strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo and create accountable and sustainable institutions in the country. A comprehensive approach towards strengthening the rule of law includes tackling the topics of justice, security bodies and good governance, which is according to Cierco and Reis (2014), critical for conflict prevention. In June 2016, the Council of EU extended the mandate of the mission until June 2018 and provided over 60 million euros for the mission's budget (Council of EU, 2016).

EUFOR Althea is often referred to as the first major military operation of the EU and after twelve year of functioning, it is also known as the longest EU mission in its history (Knauer, 2011). Established in December 2004 with decision of the Council of the EU[3], it took over responsibilities from the NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR)[4] in Bosnia in Herzegovina. The goal of the EUFOR Althea mission was at the time of its inception to ensure continued compliance with Dayton Accords, contribute to safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and finally, to support the Euro Atlantic integration of the country (Kim, 2006). However, in the light of improving security situation, the mandate of the operation has been reconfigured four times, most

[3] Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the *launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

[4] Thirty-six countries, led by the United States of America and backed by NATO, sent around 60.000 troops to enforce the Dayton Accords ending the war in Bosnia (1992–5), in a mission called Implementation Force (IFOR) with one-year mandate. It was succeeded by SFOR, established with Security Council Resolution 1088 in December 1996 (Daadler, 1998), with reduced power of approximately 30.000 personnel. During NATO's 2004 Istanbul Summit, the withdrawal of the SFOR mission was announced (Kim, 2006).

recently in 2012[5] - also the objectives of the mission changed and now encompass provision of capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, support to the country's efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment and support to overall EU comprehensive strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).

The objective of the article is to introduce the aspects of **operational capabilities** shared by both, civilian mission EULEX Kosovo and military operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina – since both EU's conflict prevention missions vary to the extent that questions, which are essential in one context may be less relevant in another, it was necessary to extract the common characteristics. Drawing from the research in the framework of the project Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention, the emphasis is on these shared and comparable characteristics with a focus on **organisational structures of the mission, decision making processes, security and human resources**.

The conceptual framework aims to evaluate the following elements of the operational capabilities: the processes of planning and execution, adjustments to changes and feedback loops, operational deficiencies, connections within the mission, etc. The analysis is implemented on two levels: politico-strategic and field-operational. Furthermore, both EU and non-EU perspectives are combined, the former including EU perspectives of the policy-makers and EU personnel, and the latter entailing international community and local actors.

This kind of comparative study leads towards greater understanding of EU mission activities and importantly, identification of the successes and potential shortcomings at the implementation of the mandates. Lessons are sought to enhance the understanding of how the effectiveness of the **operational capability** can be improved. Reviewing missions' capabilities can help us as-

[5] Nevertheless it continues to act in accordance with its peace enforcement mandate, specified in the UN Security Resolution 2183, accepted in 2014 (Council of EU Secretariat 2015).

sess EU CSDP missions' impact in the fields covered by the missions' mandates.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The paper is based on analysis and research in a form of interviews and a focus group discussion carried out in the framework of the project Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU). In its conceptual framework the project includes six capabilities under scrutiny: **planning capacity, operational capability, interoperability, competences, comprehensiveness and technologies**. The purpose of the project is to analyse and assess the current situation in the on-going and past EU missions, learning from lessons provided by these missions and providing new solutions, approaches and recommendations for the EU to guarantee long-term stability. Two field trips were organized in February and March 2016: the field trip to Kosovo (led by the University of Ljubljana, supported by CEP and FINCENT), and the field trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina (led by FINCENT, supported by CEP and the University of Ljubljana). In Kosovo, the IECEU researchers focused on the analysis of EULEX, while the researchers responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina scrutinized the EUFOR Althea operation. The main aim of both field trips was to conduct interviews with the representatives of EULEX, EUFOR Althea, members of the governments of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the representatives of local institutions involved in security sector reform (Kosovo: customs, police; BiH: armed forces) and the experts from non-governmental organizations, academia and research institutions of both countries. From the methodological viewpoint the interviews (qualitative analysis) present the methodological basis. Analysis of primary and secondary sources serves as a supportive research method.

EULEX – OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY CONSTRAINS

Organisational structure To pursue the overarching aim of the EULEX mission, the support to Kosovo's rule of law authorities to become independent, multi-ethnic, accountable, sustain-

able and free from political interference, EULEX was given two tasks, to support rule of law institutions, and on the other hand, to directly exercise judicial and police powers to a certain extent (Capussela, 2015). Up until 2012, EULEX mission was divided into three main divisions, covering Police, Customs and Justice. The extension of the mandate in 2012 coincided with the downsizing of the mission by about 25% and new restructuring into two sections (EULEX, 2012). The Executive Division works on the mission's executive mandate. It is carrying out the rule of law services in accordance with Kosovo law, instead of local authorities, until they become sufficiently qualified to take over. The Strengthening Division supports Kosovo judicial authorities and law enforcement institutions in establishing higher levels of accountability and sustainability (EULEX, 2016). The new, reconfigured mission structure is better at addressing the needs, division of responsibilities and tasks more comprehensively. However, the organizational allocation of the judges and prosecutors in the EULEX mission is problematic and often raised as a criticism of the mission. Due to the structure, the norm of judiciary independence is not guaranteed and respected in its constitutional meaning of separation of powers – the police, prosecutors and judges are all part of the same organisational division. Although in different departments, they are however still part of the division's leadership structure and have the same head of the division. Hence, the true separation of powers and judiciary independence cannot *de facto* be really possible (Interview no. 3, 16).

Decision making processes The whole decision making process of CSDP is criticized as too complex and lengthy, which leads to addressing the concerns of managing the mission itself, rather than attending to the continuously new challenges arising from its mandate (Interview no. 5, 7). The political significance of deployment of the mission and the statement EU is making with it can even overshine the importance of the efficiency (Interview no. 4).

But moreover, the decision making process of the EULEX mission is lacking united political vision necessary for its work. It is constrained by the nature of the EU political system since

all EU member states have different approaches regarding the EU's foreign policy. Yet, all CSDP actions, including the decisions about missions, are decided through intergovernmental cooperation and the unanimity voting rule within the Council of the EU, which seriously constrains the possibilities of finding a common political vision and will (Tomescu, 2015). A clear example is that at the time of deployment of EULEX, Kosovo did not receive recognition of independence by several EU member states[6]; which has led to several political compromises when creating policies for EULEX on the level of the EU Council, although the member states commonly agreed upon the necessity of providing funding to Kosovo, with a purpose of ensuring stability in the wider Western Balkans region (Cierco and Reis, 2014). Moreover, EULEX is also financed through the CFSP budget (which CSDP is part of). The mission is therefore doomed to function on the lowest common denominator of political will, which has impacted operational capabilities of the EULEX civilian mission not only on the matters of decision making processes but also in the areas of leadership, training, mission organizational structures and human resources challenges.

Security Another serious challenge are the mission's security limitations due to presumed or actual security threats especially from the northern part of Kosovo, even though the armed conflict concluded before the mission was deployed. These limitations can result in reduced efficiency, affecting the mission's executive mandate (Interview no. 14). However, the safety concerns were reintroduced in 2013 after the shooting incident of the EULEX's customs officer in northern Kosovo, which again reminded of the fragile state of security in the country (Interview no. 20). Moreover, we can connect security with the operational focus of the mission and assess that some new threats are not sufficiently addressed to provide for the security of the mission. Border management is not adequately tackled, due to the lack of border control capabilities, especially in northern Kosovo; however broader challenges, such as the international migration crisis, may directly or indirectly impact Kosovo as well. The EU has to adapt to

[6] EU member states that did not recognize independence of Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

new threats, which may not have existed at the time of the mission establishment, such as the threat of foreign fighters and the rise of violent extremism in Kosovo. These issues are not part of the official mandate; however, they present an increasing security challenge and have a definite impact on operational work of the EULEX mission (Interview no. 20). Furthermore, as a result of the complex and lengthy planning and decision making process of the mission, it would take from one year to one year and a half for the mission to change its operational focus regarding these security issues.

Human resources Firstly, duration of deployments of EULEX staff was mentioned by both international employees and locals of Kosovo to be relatively short. On one hand, majority of staff seconded by the member states is deployed for one year or less, and on the other, the contract renewal is often limited (Cierco and Reis, 2014). Newly arrived staff have little time to adjust to the mission's activities and their deployment is already coming to an end when they do. The short duration of deployments bring negative implications related to operational capacities, as well as cost-efficiency and sustainability of the mission (Interview no. 16). It is practically impossible to establish long term guidance and leadership when evaluating the strategic level continuity if staff need an extensive knowledge of the system of the mission, the country and understanding of the local issues. They also need to establish trustworthy relations with local staff to operate effectively on a bilateral level (Interview no. 7, 8). On the other hand, quick rotations of seconded employees also cause legal and operational discrepancies (Cierco and Reis, 2014), which are partially solved with inclusion of the local staff that have already established relationships and necessary organizational and cultural knowledge; this provides sustainability and continuity to the mission (Interview no. 2, 8). Secondly, short term deployments tend to appeal to younger and less experienced staff – but it is often the member state itself that is not keen on sending their best (especially judiciary) staff and wishes to keep them in their own countries. That presents a challenge, yet to be solved by the mission.

The problem regarding successful work of the personnel lies also in the lack of the common approach, which deepens when connected to the staff rotations. As previously noted EULEX Strengthening Division is in charge of supporting Kosovo's judiciary institutions and local law enforcement agencies through monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA) tasks. These tasks should be implemented referring to EU know-how, standards and best practices – which should be the rule of action. However, no specification is made to identify what these practices specifically are (Ferati, 2012). The challenge consists of EU best practices not being standardized or gathered across contributing member states, which has a negative impact on operational capability of the mission in the sphere of task performance. Occasionally the working practices, knowledge and experience brought by the seconded staff even contradict the ones from previous rotations, which causes, most notably, the lack of continuity of MMA engagements after each staff rotation (Interview no. 1). Challenge appears when identifying the solutions for ensuring this continuity, with overpassing the internal differences in perception of common EU practices. In judiciary branch, different backgrounds, traditions and experiences of the judges are notable, which again cause the lack of common approach needed to apply the same laws and practices in Kosovo (ibidem). Kosovo police is outstandingly the most positive example of EULEX engagement, whereas their practices having a substantial effect on operational capabilities of the police are related to gender, vulnerable groups and minority training, community and intelligence based policing, riot control units training, integrated border management, customs and dealing with sensitive crimes (Interview no. 1).

Lastly, in terms of human resources, EULEX is facing troubles with the budget allocation and distribution of resources. While there are many resources devoted to the police component (which still lacks a good strategy on staffing), the judicial component is being left behind, which results in a reduced number of cases resolved (Cierco and Reis, 2014).

EUFOR ALTHEA – OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY CONSTRAINS

Organisational structure EUFOR Althea is a military operation created to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement after decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation deployed after the end of Bosnian wars, and after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 1575 approving EU force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU Council Secretariat, 2015). Due to EUFOR Althea nature as a CSDP military operation, its internal organization structures and execution of plans from the operational perspective follow traditional and standardised procedures according to the arranged OPLAN. At the time of EUFOR Althea's deployment, OPLANs were already prepared by the mission's predecessor SFOR and most of the units partaking in SFOR were only transmitted under the command of EUFOR Althea (Interview no. 21, 23, 31, 33, and 44). The number of troops (around 7.000) did not change after the transfer to EUFOR Althea[7] and 80% of the initial EUFOR Althea EU personnel were already deployed in SFOR. The units entailed personnel from 22 EU member states and 11 partner nations; 32 of previous nations contributing to SFOR continued their support under EUFOR (Knauer, 2011). On paper, the structure of EUFOR Althea and the functions that it encompasses well match the situation and required tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

EUFOR Althea has a tripartite structure (Knauer, 2011). Operational resources of EUFOR Althea's mission were firstly gathered in three Multinational Task Forces, with 3700 personnel covering Tuzla, Banja Luka and Mostar, additionally 2000 Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) members spread across various locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina[8] and 500 personnel in Integrated Police Units[9] in Sarajevo. Followed by restruc-

[7] However, the number of troops was reduced soon after deployment, first to 5.500 and to 2.500 in 2007.

[8] Called Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) are the third element of EUFOR Althea and also a local one. The teams of two to ten members are allocated throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, living among local citizens. Their task is intelligence gathering, demonstration of presence and coordination of EUFOR Althea's actions in the field. LOTs are also known as »the eyes and ears of EUFOR Althea on the ground.« (Knauer, 2011).

[9] The second EUFOR component, Integrated Police Unit (IPU) is a type of military police force (*Gendarmerie*) and their task is general maintenance of safe and secure environment, civil crowd

turing in 2007 and 2012, EUFOR troops were reduced to 600, driven primarily by lack of political will (Interviews no. 24, 25, 26 and 27). Now operating is the Multinational Battalion, tasked with being prepared to conduct activities by itself or in support of Bosnia and Herzegovina's authorities to maintain safe and secure environment. Especially local actors still perceive the presence of EUFOR Althea as a strong political symbol, providing reassurance and reminding population of their country's political objectives (Interview no. 62); moreover, it shows will and ability of the EU and partner nations to work together.

Decision making processes The EU Military Staff, responsible for supervising CSDP operations is using NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as the EU's operational headquarters (EUFOR Althea Operational Headquarters – OHQ)[10], which then update and develop operational plans in coordination with NATO Strategic Operational Planning Group (SHAPE, 2014). OHQ also coordinates all operational matters, monitors operations and advises on operational questions, as well as participates in operational planning for current operations. Operational planning is normally decided upon and executed together with EU Command Element (EUCE) at NATO Joint Force Command in Italy and HQ EUFOR Althea in Sarajevo (Interview no. 46). There is always a dialogue between phases of planning, as well as OPLANs at OHQ and EUFOR Althea are always coordinated. Finally, EUFOR Commander puts a plan into action, distributes orders and directives within the OPLAN framework. There are regular visits among the EUFOR Althea and Operational Commander, hence enabling personal contact between commanders and supporting EUFOR Althea's Commander leadership from strategic and operational perspective (Interview no. 34). This also supports Operation Commander's understanding of the current situation on the ground. Due to very detailed and coordinated planning process outcomes, the decision-making process is functional; nevertheless, national agendas of EU mem-

and riot control, policing investigations and fight against organized crime, border protection, weapon collection (Knauer, 2011).

[10] For this mission, the SHAPE provides the EUFOR Althea's OHQ and working through the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) or Operation commander (Op Cdr), a European officer.

ber states and their political priorities need to be taken into consideration when discussing major adjustments to the operational plan (Interview no. 29, 34, 35, 47).

Security Since there is a regular exchange of information and personal contact between the leadership, from both strategic and operational perspective, the OPLANs are always also reviewed in light of the security situation and the changes of the operational circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Interview no. 40, 41, 46, 47).

It is doubtful however, according to some, that the operation would be able to intervene successfully in the case of a large threat to safety and security (Interview no. 50 and 62). EUFOR Althea's situational awareness is limited as a result of reduced number of personnel, which compromises mission's ability to react in a timely manner to safety threats from environment, especially if the security problems break out in several locations simultaneously. The shortage of personnel is posing a critical challenge if the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorates (Interview no. 46) and even has an effect on EUFOR Althea's ability to protect or evacuate its own personnel if necessary. There seems to be no consciousness about the possible risks on the level of political decision-making process (Interview no. 25).

Moreover, even when it comes to the security, we can also question the quality of the intelligence sharing. Even though EUFOR Althea's intelligence does liaise with local and international agencies and organizations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina and receives information, operational effectiveness regarding the gathering and analysis of intelligence information is questioned – also due to the fact that EUFOR Althea is facing national unwillingness to share intelligence and hence the information flow within the mission does not work well (Interview no. 24).

Human resources As seen during the restructuring personnel cuts in 2007 and 2012, the operational capabilities of the mission regarding the personnel are influenced by the countries' readiness and political will to contribute staff (Interviews no. 24, 25,

26 and 27). The success of the mission depends highly on human resources and the commander's ability to implement the given task. Concerning the security matters, there are doubts that the human resources are currently sufficient (Interview no. 46).

The sending nations are not always ready to deploy their best people for the positions in the EUFOR Althea operation (Interview no. 34); or not deploy staff for some tasks at all, for example the planned reserve concept. At times nations deploy personnel that are not even qualified for the position, either because of the lack of experience or rank. Also, the training level and the knowledge of the local language are not always adequate, which is a challenge in terms of obtaining information. Moreover, the structure of HQ EUFOR Althea presents itself as suitable formally, but in practice maximum operational output is not always reached. This happens due to the frequent rotation of staff[11], which causes the lack of continuity[12] and lower level of effectiveness of the operation (ibidem). Cultural differences are also noted to be one of the reasons for slower processes and disagreements about applying a common approach (Interview no. 35). However, gender perspectives and human rights are areas, thoroughly incorporated into the structures of EUFOR Althea, through the principle of double-hatting by additionally tasking staff functions in relevant crisis management structure with gender and human rights related duties. There might still be a need for greater representation of female soldiers in the EUFOR Althea mission nevertheless.

There is a human resources management problem affecting the intelligence gathering as well. EUFOR Althea is still a major intelligence information provider in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being especially efficient in gathering information regarding the feelings and outlooks of the local population and local authorities – but on the other hand, the operation lacks skilled professionals in the field of human intelligence, especially trained social analysts to assess the atmosphere. They are never deployed due to many member states' restrictions (Interview no. 26).

[11] The duration of personnel deployment is usually six months or even shorter period of time.

[12] The lack of institutional memory, as well as looser relationships with local authorities or other international actors in the field are possible consequences.

SHARED LESSONS LEARNED FROM EULEX AND EUFOR ALTHEA'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY'S CHALLENGES / CONCLUSION

Both missions were created as a result of EU being perceived as a particularly legitimate actor to support the development of countries in its immediate neighbourhood. Also, the EU holds a certain amount of influence over the Western Balkans region (Hazelzet, 2013). The appeal of the EU is clearly visible when discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina, a potential EU candidate country, which negotiated and signed the stabilisation and association agreement (SAA) in 2008 and submitted its application for EU membership officially in February 2016. EU also provides a single person for the post of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Head of the EU Delegation, with special powers in Bosnian political system. Similarly to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo is also a potential candidate for EU accession and SAA entered into force in April 2016. After independence in 2008, the country stated that it has a »clear European perspective«. EU also appointed a Special Representative in Kosovo and a Head of the EU office (De Munter, 2016). Hence, EU operations are never "lone wolf" actions, but part of the EU's wider long-term policies towards a country or in our case, a whole region. Such broader EU processes based on conditionality have a positive impact on the missions and EU engagement – any actions are more likely to bring results.

Comparing both EULEX mission in Kosovo and EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina we can draw parallels on lessons learned regarding their operational capacity successes and challenges still remaining.

Table 1: comparison of the operational capacities

	EULEX	Althea
Organizational structure	• created specifically for EULEX • reformed in 2012 and it now better addresses the needs of the mission • challenges in terms of norms: separation of powers and judiciary independence	• overtook the structures from NATO • clear military structures, appropriate for addressing the situation
Decision making processes	• only slow change in OPLANs possible • lack of the EU member states' consensus over independence of Kosovo	• more flexible adjustment of OPLANs
Security	• limitations regarding operating in Northern Kosovo • slow adaptability of OPLANs prevents addressing new security challenges	• shortage of personnel might incluence the ability of the mission to react successfully to the change in security environment • no recognition of the possible change in security situation on a political decision-making level • no political will to cooperate in the field of intelligence sharing, information flows are limited
Human resources	• lack of political will to provide adequate resources, sufficiently skilled • unequal distribution of resources (less consideration for judges and prosecutors when it comes to budget allocation) • short deployments affect the institutional memory, effectiveness and continuity • failure to attract best quality workers • shortage of judges and prosecutors • lack of a common pool regarding best practices	• lack of political will by member states to provide adequate resources, sufficiently skilled • short deployments affect the institutional memory, effectiveness and continuity • failure to attract best quality workers • lack of human intelligence workers, liaison officers and general lack of troops • lack of a common pool regarding best practices

Regarding mission's **organizational structures**, EULEX mission was created to respond to a specific need that other actors in the region did not yet address or have failed to do so effectively, and on the other hand, EUFOR Althea took over most of its structures, tasks and units from its predecessor, SFOR. One could argue that due to the fact that NATO has an already established traditional military clear structures, rules of actions and chains of command, EUFOR Althea's organizational structures would have more value to the mission's operational capacities. The structure of HQ EUFOR Althea is indeed appropriate for the situation and current field responsibilities of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR Althea's mixed structure might seem complicated, but it is also an extremely symbiotic and functional one, and it shows the ability of EU to work together with other institutionalized structures (in EUFOR's case, NATO). However, EULEX new organizational structure divided into Executive and Strengthening Division is also better in addressing the needs of the mission and dividing the duties more comprehensibly, even though it is facing serious challenges when it comes to the norms of separation of powers and judiciary independence.

When it comes to the **decision making processes**, EUFOR Althea has much better starting point than EULEX. EUFOR Althea's adjustment processes for operational plans (OPLANs) are functional, not as rigid and much quicker as in EULEX Kosovo mission, where the change in circumstances would take over a year to be implemented into the operational plans. EULEX's most persisting challenge regarding its decision making processes in all matters related to operational capabilities is still the lack of EU member states' consensus regarding its independence and the fact that it does not enjoy unwavering support of the member states, which puts it into a very challenging environment.

Both missions are seriously affected by **security** difficulties. EULEX is firstly facing the constraint of not being able to operate in Northern Kosovo as well as it should, due to the mission's own limitations regarding the area. But on the other hand, the missions mentioned slow adaptability of OPLAN (deriving from slower and more difficult decision making process) prevents the

mission to successfully address potential new security challenges, such as the rise of radical ideologies and the migrant crisis, which can define the success of the operational work of the mission or lack of thereof. EUFOR Althea faces even more difficulties regarding the security situation, even though the operations get reviewed often in the light of the changes in the operational circumstances, such as deteriorating security situation. The shortage of personnel is pointing out the mission's inability to truly react to the security problem breakout and even their ability to protect its own personnel, while there is no awareness of this situation on the level of the political decision making. The problem of political will to implement change is visible on another level of security objectives, intelligence sharing and enabling the information flows in the mission, which is essential for its operational success. We can conclude that EUFOR Althea faces severe challenges when it comes to the security, especially since it is indeed a military operation with broader security obligations and objectives, while EULEX is a civil one, addressing institutional state-building.

In relation to **human resources**, the biggest problem is the exogenous constrain to the mission, namely the lack of political will by the EU member states. This is clearly visible especially in relation to the need to provide adequate resources in terms of number of sufficiently skilled seconded personnel to the mission. Especially in EUFOR Althea, the planned reserve concept suffers due to the nation's unwillingness or inability to nominate troops and resources to these tasks. EULEX Kosovo is facing challenge of unequal distribution of resources for its human resources capacity – judges and prosecutors get less consideration when it comes to the budget allocation. Short deployments of seconded staff affect institutional memory, continuity and effectiveness of both missions, whereas EUFOR Althea's personnel has even shorter (6 months or less) duration of tour in comparison to EULEX (a year). Both mission fail to attract the best quality seconded workers – EULEX has a shortage of judges and prosecutors, while EUFOR Althea faces a lack of human intelligence workers, liaison officers and a general lack of troops. Moreover, there is a great lack regarding a common pool of EU best practices in both

missions. Consistent standardized practices are not gathered and established across contributing member states, which is especially worsened due to the staff rotation and second best seconded staff, lacking knowledge of the system of the mission, the country and local issues.

Throughout the study on the operational capabilities we can see an overarching theme, arising in almost every characteristic revised. The challenges of the operational work of both CSDP mission are not specific only for one mission, but are shared on at least four levels (organisational structures, decision making processes, security and human resources), and always connected with the broader problem of dysfunctional EU foreign policy, which lacks unanimity by EU members states to form a common vision for it, hence it does not adapt to the changes quickly, without this change posing a risk for the success of the mission's operational work. Member states are more inclined to focus their efforts and commitments bilaterally through their own independent initiatives and similarly wish to follow their interests through various EU structures and mechanisms as well, and CSDP missions are no exception.

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book reviews

FORTRESS EUROPE: INSIDE THE WAR AGAINST IMMIGRATION

Matthew Carr

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THEORISING THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROVIDER

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FORTRESS EUROPE: INSIDE THE WAR AGAINST IMMIGRATION

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Fortress Europe: Inside the War against Immigration reads itself as an ahead of time alert on European lost direction. First published in 2012, it foresaw Member States' tendencies towards construction of new walls that were not disputed but rather encouraged by the European Union (EU), as well as consequent dangers of increased mixture of populist and nationalist views on one side and decreased access to international protection on the other side. As such the Fortress Europe provides actual and relevant reading on European state of affairs in the previous year and might well keep its popularity in years to come.

In separate chapters author Mathew Carr takes a reader on a journey alongside European schengen border and lands beyond its line, bringing forward a brief historic and geographic overview of border regions before concentrating on borders' increased securitization. Special attention is given to human resources each Member State chose to deploy to guard European borders, their equipment, various employed surveillance measures, and new technologies in use. The travel starts in a distant and gray Polish-Byelorussian border town Terespol where Straz Graniczna, a former unit of Polish army before World War II, guards European border using the most advanced equipment financed by the EU, International Migration Organisation (IOM), and even the United States. The route continues southwards through Slovakian and Hungarian external schengen border to Ukrainian detention camps, where the majority of irregular migrants intercepted at the border end up in appalling conditions, exposed to violence, robbery, and extortion, without access to legal assistance and most likely sent back to their origin countries where they risk being tortured or prosecuted. Carr claims that readmission instruments imposed on neighbouring countries for various other political and financial benefits contributed to creation of 'exter-

nalized' border controls, looking for further evidences in extensive Spanish and Italian cooperation with North African governments, which in exchange for financial, political and economic incentives help to prevent and deter irregular migration towards Europe, including those whose aim is to seek asylum in one of EU Member States. The travel through chapters takes a reader further through the labyrinth of Greek asylum system, dangers that persist in Mediterranean route and all challenges awaiting those who desire to reach the British Island.

Taken into a broader narrative, Carr criticizes the EU failure to bring down borders that have once in the past already incised deep scarves and frustrations into the continent. Though, in the words of Schuman, the EU creation was not about to question elimination of ethnic and political borders, since "they are a historical given: we do not pretend to correct history, or to invent a rationalised and managed geography. What we want is to take away from borders their rigidity and what I call their intransigent hostility" (p. 27). However, border transformation from high and tick concrete Berlin Wall into an administrative and electronic border did not render borders more friendly and permeable, but rather the opposite. Integrated Exterior Vigilance System (SIVE) in Western Mediterranean composed of cameras and radars from Malaga to Tarifa works as a maritime CCTV system controlling every movement in the whole Strait of Gibraltar. As a consequence of Mediterranean being used as a highway of African asylum seekers to Europe, Carr claims that regular patrol boats, primarily aimed at rescuing migrants, have transformed the Sea in one of the most militarized waters in the world. The fact that Italian maritime guard excused itself for opening fire on a fishermen boat as it mistook it for boat of potential asylum seekers in Europe, does not help to denounce Carr's argument. A range of other instruments has been developed to control movements of third countries' nationals all across Europe. For example, European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), and Schengen Information System (SIS) databases contain millions of names of asylum seekers in Europe and of those whose entries had been rejected, accompanied by photos, fingerprints and biometric data. Further, all entry-trials on the main routes are intercepted by the advanced European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) that uses satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles to prevent 'unauthorised border crossings.'

Although Carr understands increased surveillance and controls as a 'compensatory' border to provide security for internal borderless area, he questions ra-

tionality as well as morality behind it. In terms of the latter, new border measures limit the access to asylum in the EU, while their consequences often put migrants in dehumanised situations and deprive them from any dignity. Lots of rejected asylum seekers are put in a limbo, being readmitted from one country to another with none accepting the responsibility to provide international protection. It seems ironic that countries that were the leading actors of the Libyan 'humanitarian war' against Gaddafi, France and Italy, are doing everything in order to deter migrants coming from the same areas and escaping destructive consequences of the same war. In addition to that, we are talking about one of the most prominent advocator of human rights in international arena, whose, for example, none of the Member States is a party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families from 1990, and the richest trading block worldwide which is, in the name of asylum law harmonization, shifting responsibility and burden for refugee protection to border Member States and further to countries with bleak human rights records beyond its borderlines. Carr further puts under question governments' accountability harmed by the lack of transparency and rule of law in countries innovative and ignorant ways of migrants' deterrence. A telling postscript chapter in 2015 edition denounces European restrictive migration policies and reinforced border controls as a way back towards barbarism, expressing outrage over EU's lost moral compass. In terms of irrationality from the point of the EU own interest, Carr refers to several demographic foresight studies that see more open border as a win-win outcome for asylum seekers as well as a necessary measure to counterbalance European greying population and enable sustainable existing economic model.

However, European politicians lack courage to stand for long term interests that demand immediate sacrifices. It is much easier and appealing for voters to keep strict borders and limited direct access to asylum, justified by striving for greater social cohesion and final integration. Carr refutes the argument, accusing it and politicians, media, and public who commonly promoted it for the rise of migration stigmatization, xenophobia, anti-immigration policies based on racial and religious rejections, as well as populist leaders all across Europe, who name migration a crime and call upon 'moral crusade' against 'invasion'. Checking the facts, we see that in 2010 there were 20.2 million non-European Union nationals living in the EU, what represents no more than 6.5 %, the top three nationalities be-

ing Turks, Moroccans, and Albanians, who came to Europe mostly under the umbrella of foreign workers recruitment agreements in 60s. Although more than 50 years later, the ambiguous EU attitude towards migration has not changed. In 2015 adopted Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, an overarching framework on EU external migration and asylum policy, opts for selective immigration, namely stimulating the acceptance of immigrant skilled labour, while on the other side opposing irregular migration, the category that most commonly comprises also asylum seekers.

Being a prominent freelance journalist with works published by The Observer, The Guardian, The New York Times and BBC, the author in the book transforms his careful observations combined with the results of his years-long investigative journalism. Silver-tongue writing easily catches the attention of a reader, while witty remarks and sarcasm that occasionally substitute criticism guarantee for a good reading. The author writes from his own experiences of travelling across Europe, visiting borders on its edges and joining migrants on their dangerous ventures crossing yet another border in line and shares their stories from almost Hobbesian circumstances that forced them to leave their homeland to alleged welcoming beating of European border guards. Besides analysing the current state of migration in Europe and its controversies, the book offers broader conceptualization of main relevant factors; from the history and meaning of borders, migration and asylum, thus putting a discussion into a greater narrative, offering an insight definitely needed in an age of narrow-mindedness.

Instead of a conclusion, it is worth reminding on Carr's statement, that migration represents geopolitically and economically conditioned phenomenon and is as such totally rational. Understanding this, we should be able to form less fearful and more rational response to it, without invoking parallels to invasions and near state of collapse of Europe as we know it today. Refuting any possibility of successful deterrence of rational flow of migration, Carr warns that the barriers put in place today risk not only defining the 'fortress of Europe' but becoming a 'tomb' of the best and the noblest EU aspirations and display of twentieth century barbarities.

Petra Trkov

Annemarie Peen Rodt, Richard G. Whitman, Stefan Wolff (editors) THEORISING THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROVIDER

Taylor & Francis Ltd, Oxon and New York, 2016, 140 pages
ISBN 13:978-1-138-65966-7

The European Union (EU) has been a security provider since its inception. It has brought peace and stability to member states and it has been an anchor as well as a guarantor of peace for candidate countries and other countries in its immediate neighborhood. With different policies and funding instruments – e.g. Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace – it has also helped to maintain peace and security elsewhere in the world. While the securitization of various EU policies and instruments has been evident for some time, what is new in the last several years, is the fact that internal and external security are ever more intertwined. Notwithstanding the considerable body of scholarship devoted to the EU's foreign and security policies in the past two decades, the research on the field still present an empirical puzzle.

The study of EU's international security role is dominated by descriptive empirical accounts, while a theoretically guided research is rare. When focusing on the substance, it is noticeable the scholarship on the field is fragmented, since individual studies analyze security aspects in specific policy or geographic regions. The book Theorizing the European Union as an International Security provider aspires to facilitate the development of a more integrated theoretical approach to the study of the EU's role as an international security provider. The contributions in this book were previously published as a special issue of Global Society.

In the opening chapter of the book the editors compendiously present the academic literature on the EU's role as an international security provider and indicate that in order to establish the much needed comprehensiveness of the study of the field, future work will have to carefully link different branches of research,

rather than treating them as separate phenomena.

Alistair J. K. Shepherd, the author of the first paper "The European Security Continuum and the EU as an international Security Provider" explores the implications of the diminishment of the traditional internal-external security divide for the EU as an international security provider. The analysis examines the EU's discursive framing of security and extrapolates the implications of such structure for the EU's security practices. The paper also evaluates the implications of these changing discourses and practices for the perceptions of the EU as an international security provider. Shepherd maintains that the EU's discourse on the intertwinement of the internal and external security is vital for differentiating the EU from other international security providers and for the establishment of the EU as a distinctive actor capable of providing a truly comprehensive approach to the security challenges worldwide.

In "Analytic Eclecticism and EU Foreign Policy (In)action" Benjamin Plohl and Niels van Willigen explore the wide-ranging arguments that shape governmental and consequently EU's decisions on interventions in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Analytical eclecticism, a more pragmatic style of research which concurrently applies different theoretical perspectives, is particularly suitable for analyzing the complex and ever changing field with multiple actors interacting through different mechanisms and processes. The authors argue that the EU's interventions under the Common Security and Defence Policy can best be explained by a two-stage model. First, each member state evaluates a potential EU action in light of the state's general security policy's tendency and evaluates the potential operation also against the self-image that the state embraces. Such dispositions are generally adaptable. In the second stage, the governments apply the cost-benefit analysis, which, in the end, comes down to whether the public considers the (desired) outcome of the intervention will be worth the cost. The paper presents a conceptual framework as well as a plausibility probe of the model.

Argyro Kartsonaki and Stefan Wolff offer a comparative analysis of the EU's responses to different conflicts in "The EU's Responses to Conflicts in its Wider Neighbourhood: Human or European Security?". The analysis examines the diverse range of conflicts the EU faces in the following regions of the wider neighbourhood: the Sahel, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The authors identify three main categories of intra-state conflicts: territorial, regime and inter-com-

munal; inter-state disputes are in most cases conflicts over border, territory or resources. The analysis shows that while the nature of the prevalent conflict stipulates the nature of the EU's approach to the management of a specific conflict, the influence of the EU's own security concerns cannot be overlooked. The EU approaches the human security as an instrument in pursuit of its own security interests. Although the EU consistently promotes respect for human rights, rule of law and institutional capacity building – which are all attributes of the human security – there is a certain amount of flexibility in the extent to which the EU promotes those values.

The last three papers focus on the EU's approach to providing security in Africa: "After Afghanistan: The European Union as Security Provider in Africa" by Gorm Rye Olsen, "The European Union's "Comprehensive Approach" in Chad: Securitization and/or Compartmentalisation" by Jan Orbie and Karen Del Biondo and "Reform or Business as Usual? EU Security Provision in Complex Contexts: Mali" by Laura Davis. The contributors of all three papers note the securitization of EU's foreign policy on the continent. Olsen examines the circumstances that determine the positions of the EU's decision-makers on international security issues. The predominant factors, shaping the EU's crisis management policy in the region, are the perception that Europe's security is threatened by the "Somalization" of African states, the negative debate in Europe on immigration and the influence of US anti-terrorism priorities in Africa. Orbie and Del Biondo investigate whether the EU's comprehensive approach represents one of the incentives for the securitization of non-security policies. In the case of Chad their research shows the EU's approach to providing peace and stability in the country was compartmentalized, and, therefore, while the securitization of individual policies was prevalent it was not comprehensive. In the concluding paper Laura Davis research to what extent the EU managed to translate its foreign policy's commitments to promote principles such as peace and justice for human rights violations into practice in EU's management of the crisis in Mali.

The book Theorizing the European Union as an International Security provider is a well thought out collection of six papers written by scholars, academics and practitioners from different subfields of political science and international relations, and, therefore, each contribution presents an individual piece in the mosaic of studies of the EU's international security role. It presents a well-designed, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary analysis of the EU's role as an international

security provider and it represents a solid basis for the development of a mid-range theory of the EU as an international security provider.

GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

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European Perspectives is a scientific journal that publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific articles focusing on relevant political, sociological, social, security, economic and legal as well as ethnic, cross-cultural, minority and cross-ethnical issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and South-Eastern Europe.

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Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

All submissions should follow the Harvard style of in-text parenthetical citations followed by a complete list of works cited at the end. Should you find yourself in a dilemma on how to cite, please visit: http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.htm

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References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in International Security (Summer 1990): 5). ' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

You should also include a full reference list in alphabetical order of authors. Below you can find some examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style, for more information please see Harvard style guidelines:

Diehl, Paul F. (1994): International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Degnbol-Martinussen, John, Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): Aid. Understanding International Development Cooperation, Zed Books, Mellemfolkelight Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1993): Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press.

BOOK REVIEWS

European Perspectives welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of European Perspectives was published or in the previous year).

Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

European Perspectives encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

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- A book review should not exceed 1,500 words.
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- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review.
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified.
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STUDIA DIPLOMATICA SLOVENICA

Editors: Gorazd Justinek, Alen Novalija, Dubravka Šekoranja, Mitja Štrukelj

Spremenimo svet: Agenda za trajnostni razvoj do leta 2030 – Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development



2015/156 pages
ISBN 978-961-92839-5-0

The goal of this publication is to promote orderly and balanced global development and international development cooperation. It is vital that we contribute to raising general awareness of global development challenges as well as the international and national efforts being made in order to respond to them adequately and effectively. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity and it also seeks to strengthen universal peace and larger freedom.

Andrej Rahten, Janez Šumrada (editors)

Velikih pet in nastanek Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (Les Grands Cinq et la création du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovénes)

2011/480 strani
ISBN 978-961-92839-3-6

Price: 35 €

Book is based on the research in the archives of teh Great Powers fort he period 1918–1920 , with a focus on the Slovenian role in re-dfining the borders of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference. Fort he first time in one place and on the basis of primary sources, the research describes the policy

of the »Big Five« - the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan – towwards the establishment of the Yugoslav state.

Ernest Petrič

Zunanja politika - Osnove teorije in praksa (Foreign Policy – Basic Theory and Practice)

2010/509 pages
ISBN 978-961-92839-2-9

Price: 45 €

„The book by Dr. Ernest Petrič on the theory and practice of foreign policy is a fitting opener to a new series in the collection Studia diplomatic Slovenica dedicated to monographs on international relations. It is the first work by a Slovenian author dealing systematically in monograph form with the dilemmas of foreign policy as a science. What gives Dr. Petrič an important edge is not only his painstaking theoretical analysis but also his extensive diplomatic experience. Starting his career in the former common state, he has capped it with key positions in Slovenia‘s diplomatic network since independence, making his views on contemporary diplomatic practice invaluable.

This extensive work, which has been divided into five sections, presents both the author‘s broader understanding of the theory behind international relations and foreign policy as well as an analysis of cases of actual conduct in the international community, primarily that concerning the policies of „small and new states“ such as the Republic of Slovenia. In his examination of this science, Dr. Petrič tackles with utmost precision definitions of numerous basic concepts of foreign policy, making this book particularly useful for the growing number of students of international relations in Slovenia. Fittingly, the author is currently active as a lecturer at three of the four faculties teaching the subject in Slovenia at the time of writing.

Ernest Petrič et al.

Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu (Slovene Diplomats in Slavic Countries)

2010/472 pages
ISBN 978-961-92839-0-5
Price: € 40

This is an excellent and rare book which analyses and reflects the role of Slovene diplomats in the Slavic countries up till 1990. The main message of the book is that Slavic component is part of the Slovene diplomatic experience. It has contributed to enhanced diplomatic relations between the Republic of Slovenia and several Slavic countries. Contributions are published in Slovene, Czech and Russian languages. The book was published as part of the Personae series of the Studia diplomatica Slovenica collection.

Andrej Rahten

Izidor Cankar – diplomat dveh Jugoslavij (Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias)

2009/420 pages
ISBN 978-961-92173-8-2
Price: € 40

The biography Izidor *Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias* is an account of the diplomatic career of Izidor Cankar in the first and second Yugoslav states. The book outlines Slovenia's progress from the end of the 19th century to the late 1950s in broad social terms as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the monarchist and communist Yugoslavias. Special attention is given to the international point of view – debates on the Slovenian issue in correspondence involving Slovenian diplomats serving at Yugoslav missions. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Franc Rozman

Baron Josef Schwegel – spomini in pisma (Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters)

2007/376 pages
ISBN 978-961-92173-0-6
Price: € 34

The book *Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters* contains an autobiography of Baron Josef Schwegel and his notes from the Congress of Berlin. The book sheds light on Schwegel's work in diplomacy and foreign affairs based on his memoirs and the letters he wrote his wife when he was a member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation at the Congress of Berlin. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič (Chief Editor)

Slovenci v očeh Imperija - Priročniki britanskih diplomatov na Pariški mirovni konferenci leta 1919 (Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919)

2007/524 pages
ISBN 978-961-92173-1-3
Price: € 35

The book *Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* includes a collection of handbooks prepared by the Historical Section at the British Foreign Office for the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Political analyses, texts containing historical and general information (Slovenes, the Yugoslav movement, the Austrian Primorska (Littoral) and Kansan (Carniola) regions, Koroška (Carinthia), Štajerska (Styria)) that were intended to help shape British policy on Central and Southern Europe following World War I. The book was published as part of the *Fontes* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

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Responsibility for the information and views set out in this publication lies entirely with the authors and does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union.

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