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Letter from the Editor

The idea for this special issue, our third one out of eight all together so far, origins from mid November 2012. It was soon announced in the Call for Papers, and half a year later readers have the result in the hands.

While abstracts, paper proposals and final contributions were coming on the editor's desk, events, focusing on the situation and perspectives of the young generation, were generating on a fast track: the Young Bled Strategic Forum team invited some fifty participants who will be brainstorming and identifying main obstacles at the June "Challenge Conference"; we will follow-up on this, and the findings of the "Solution Generator Conference" in September will be presented in our Autumn 2013 issue; Petra Kocjan, the Ypsilon Director, who contributed the Guest View to our previous issue, made her echoing appearance at the Istanbul Marmara Group Eurasian Forum; Friends of Europe started inviting to their Brussels May event on Youth; the organizers of this year's August Conference of Alpbach Forum, were fully focused also on the young generation (we are glad for our traditional cooperation); the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research have announced their pioneer and echoing study on the principles of intergenerational justice (focusing on the OECD countries), comprising the new Intergenerational Justice Index (IJJ), and last but not least, The Economist pointed out in its last April issue the "global epidemic of youth unemployment".

Hence we are glad that the editorial board was sensitive enough to detect the spirit and to react on time. May be we should also be a little proud of this. But above all, these elaborations are important for the understanding of the situation of the young generation and for offering solutions. They should be the result of a thought over policy approach and materialized as a result of consistent encouragement as well as pressure from the civil society. Decision makers should take this into account seriously.

There are six contributions in this special issue. They point out the following topics: firstly we get acquainted with a general picture of a possible transition towards innovation-driven economies in the region. Next to this there are dwellings on young precariat in Greece and young activism in Mostar. Then, a look at challenges and opportunities for the young generation in Kosovo and at the security culture among young Slovenes follow. We close the main section with a contribution facing the question how young members of the Slovene minorities in the four neighbouring countries see their future. When comparing these topics with the agenda of previously mentioned events, we see how current this issue is. It brings reflection to one of the most challenging trends nowadays. In the issues to follow, this Journal will continue to dwell on these topics.

Additionally, the new round in our Croquis Section has been opened: we focus on those Western Balkans cities, primarily, but not only capitols, which have something special to offer for better understanding, cooperation and for a unique as well as widely echoed cultural promotion. Sarajevo, as it is pointed out this time, has, among other particularities, the famous Film Festival, which could also be understood as a *memento*.

The Sarajevo 2014 section shows up creativity in its purest form: the Young Cup as a part of the Istanbul International Advertising Festival, which was initiated as the Slovene–Turkish idea. The region has always been an inspiring place, a venue for creative departures, a sparkle of hope, a sign of perspective. Where else, if not on the Balkans, creativity can blossom and shine?

Finally, our Guest View is announcing, in essence and in composition, the sign of change in the region; read it carefully and you'll see the point. So, the Western Balkans has now its definite and historical chance to overcome chronological hatred, confrontations and the destructive heritage of wars. A *memento*, indeed.

Wishing you a nice and fruitful critically coloured reading and see you in autumn.

The Castle of Jable, April 2013

M. J.

Young Bled Strategic Forum

When Youthful Energy Meets Experience

The idea was born in 2010. After the fifth Bled Strategic Forum (BSF), Ms Miriam Možgan, at the time BSF Secretary General, and her team realized that future prospects can no longer be discussed without the generations of the future! Young people and their voices should complement the wisdom of experienced leaders gathered at the BSF. Only through synergy between fresh ideas and mature reasoning can we reach the main goal of the conference: generating new ideas for Europe to better use its potentials in a changing global order.

The idea was promptly put into practice. The next BSF in 2011 saw a younger audience – future decision-makers – from the Western Balkans, Europe and China discussing the Power of the Future and the prospects for the Western Balkans. Last year, in 2012, BSF dedicated a whole-day event to young people: 120 young participants from Europe and elsewhere gathered in Bled to discuss “The Young and the Restless in the Balkans”, “Digital Natives Entering the Labour Market” and “Europe and the Changes in the Mediterranean”.

Young BSF has once again shown an added value and, at the same time, a clear vision: it brings together aspiring young professionals from diplomatic, academic and business spheres as well as think-tanks and students from all over the world. It is a platform at which young leaders, thinkers and entrepreneurs exchange ideas on current affairs, providing them with an opportunity to discuss potential solutions with high-level participants of the Bled Strategic Forum. **Giving young people a platform to discuss the views of their generation with current leaders proved a success and the BSF team decided to devote Young BSF even more attention.**

As new leaders always bring new approaches and novelties, the concept of Young BSF enhanced with the new Secretary General, Ambassador Alain Brian Bergant, and his team, who took over the leadership in November 2012.

Starting from 2013, Young BSF will no longer be a one-day event. Instead, it will be held over a longer period of time to enable all participants to discuss different situations and define the challenges they are facing, then present different ideas and proposals on how to tackle these challenges and, finally, come up with possible guidelines and solutions.

We are kicking-off the debate in June with participants discussing the state of play on three different topics:

- Youth in the EU: The Promise for the Future or a Lost Generation
- Digital Revolution: DIY Politics
- Doing Business: New Tools and New Rules

What promises to be a fruitful and timely discussion will continue as an online platform during summer, rounding off with a closing event for some 150 participants, to be held on 1 September, a day ahead of the BSF, bringing concrete recommendations and possible solutions.

The challenges we are facing today are great, but our determination and hope to tackle them are greater still. By establishing a platform where the voices of young people can be heard, we will collaborate with various associations, institutes, companies and all other like-minded and young-at-heart partners. Aware of the meaning of a famous sentence by Oscar Wilde “I am not young enough to know everything”, we would like to make Young BSF an event **about** the young people, not **for** them. Only through active dialogue among different generations can these courageous ideas become a reality and generate the winning recipes for addressing the issues of common concern.

Last but not least, it is our pleasure to cooperate with European Perspectives, an international journal, based in Slovenia, which addresses the challenges of young generation in this special issue. We are already looking forward to follow-up and sharing our findings in the next, Autumn 2013 edition of European Perspectives.

For more information, please contact Mr Timotej Šooš, Young BSF Programme Director (young.bsf@gov.si), +386 01 468 1255.

Milica Kotur

Programme Assistant
Bled Strategic Forum

The World Stands on Young People
Blaž Kos, Žiga Vavpotič

guest view

The World Stands on Young People

Blaž Kos, Žiga Vavpotič¹

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Who, if not us?

When, if not now?

Petra Kocjan, director of the Ypsilon Institute, concluded her article *What the Youth Can Do for Our Common Future?* in the previous number of European Perspectives with questions above.

Three years ago, when we started Ypsilon Institute, we had the following view of society. We are in the middle of the largest (r)evolution of the mankind. The development of new technologies, information technology at the forefront, has led to entirely new operating rules of society. If we look at a few trends that characterize today's society, such as the Internet boom, global integration, open markets, individualization, large surpluses of goods in the market (at least for the western world), the rise of women, glorification of fun, widespread competition, etc., we can see that we are in the middle of a real tsunami of change. In accordance with the laws of the occurrence of singularities, these changes are coming faster and faster. Today's world is quite different from that 20 years ago, and in 5 years we are going to live quite differently as we live today. We will follow new rules of life and face new challenges. We are developing from today's information society towards the creative society with lightening speed.

Talented individuals are mobile monopolies with global passports. They control the key to competitiveness, the secret resource. The first major characteristic of creative society is that each and every individual holds a key to his own success, wealth, power and happiness. In the creative society, the power and resources leverage from the earth, manual work, and capital to the intellect and brains, i. e. to the level of innovation and creativity which leads to distinguished and successful competitiveness on the market irrespective of the branch or sphere of activity (business, culture, art, sports, etc.). That is why nowadays extremely talented and competent individuals are becoming crucial. We are talking about less than one percent of the society, about the individuals, whose names are actually becoming brands. Owning an amazing degree of freedom and ability to influence the development of the world, these individuals are the drivers of change in the creative society.

An increasing share of these talented individuals comes from the so-called Generation Y that makes up a quarter of the world's population. Born between 1980 and 2000, these people are children of the information age, with a vision of international integration and interdependence, religious, racial and cultural diversity – values of the modern world. Access to technology, and new values backed by an

¹ Blaž Kos and Žiga Vavpotič are co-founders of Ypsilon Institute Slovenia.
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incredible desire for lifelong learning, leads to the development of new exceptional talents with a high degree of competence and knowledge. It can be said that the Generation Y also embodies extreme individualism and the need for freedom, all of which constitutes a completely new profile of people.

Who is who? We are happy to present two young people, talented potentials, our friends, and potential founders of Ypsilon Institute in their countries. Jelena from Serbia and Visar from Kosovo.

Jelena Vlku², Serbia

Education, for most young people in Serbia, is not a safe ticket for the future. And that is why they often do not see any perspective in this country. In this devastated system of values school is less appreciated and one of the reasons for that is, that models, which were characteristic for the nineties are returning to the scene. However, there are those who are trying to succeed with their own hard work, despite all the difficulties. In time of economic crisis and rising poverty in Serbia, more than half of young people are unemployed. Sadly, the number of those, who have university degrees and even those with masters and PhD's, is increasing. In a country, where there is not enough investment in education, where the doubt in real values is present, a lot of young people are suspicious about their future. Guided by this idea and in search for a better tomorrow, a few ambitious people, who have the same views and perspectives on the future, decided to continue and expand their vision in Serbia in an attempt to unite the youth in the Balkan countries. That is how we came to the idea to establish the Ypsilon Institute in Serbia.

Our peers and colleagues from Slovenia have come to a great idea how to help young people and how to make them believe in themselves in these difficult times. Therefore, with our youthful enthusiasm, we decided that in cooperation with them, we should try and provide help to our young people to create their vision for a better tomorrow.

Nowadays, young people do not believe in themselves, they are not improving their abilities. Education is only one part of what lies ahead in life and business. It is necessary to work on it while we are alive.

From my perspective, I cannot hold it against them, because the average young person in Serbia has 24-25 years, has finished school and is looking for a job. This young person cannot imagine how his/her life will look like in two years, while his/her European peer knows how his/her life is going to be in the next five years. In that kind of situation, young people are very uninterested and are thinking that there is nothing that they can do about it. According to some statistics only 11% of people is ready to make some changes in the society. This is, in my opinion, a very devastating fact, because I have will and idea, but I need a team, which will help make our dreams come true.

My personal opinion is that the future is in our hands. Therefore, the mission of the Ypsilon Institute is to help us in personal and professional development and raising awareness of our members, in cooperation with the older, more experienced colleagues. Our youthful spirit, power and strength in conjunction with the experience, skills and knowledge can move the world. Also, I hope that the Ypsilon Institute will expand to all Western Balkan countries, as a good step towards a better future.

2 Jelena Vlku is co-founder of Ypsilon Institute Serbia.

I would like to get back on some facts, which accompany the youth in Serbia and to note that most of them are torn between ambition and reality. According to some statistics, one in three young people in Serbia sees himself/herself abroad in the hope of a normal independent life. Having that fact in my mind, and I must admit that I use to be one of those three people, the more I wish to be able to provide a better life for me and my colleagues.

I would also like to mention that young people, despite the fact that they are unsatisfied, do not have the confidence in institutions, which, I do not like to admit it, are closing their doors on them. This strong desire to buy a one-way ticket is explained mainly by the crisis, the lack of jobs and the possibility of a normal life, personal and professional development. Going abroad is one of the three ways, in which they can cope with the time in which we live. The other two ways are to engage in organizations, in which they believe that can make a difference in society, and to commit to their own development no matter what.

As I already mentioned, with the mission of the Ypsilon institute and the manner of its operation, we strive to implement and enable our young people in Serbia what our colleagues from Slovenia with efforts and desire succeed. With joined forces, capabilities and faith, combined with energy, enthusiasm, youth and wisdom we can achieve a lot.

With faith and hope and a realistic look on the current situation, by launching the Ypsilon Institute in Serbia, we will try to help awaken our peers and future young ambitious people with a well known slogan "For a better common future". We will try to implement the idea and make new ones for the sake of our future. Inspired by our colleagues and partners from Slovenia, who achieved a part of their dream, we will try to expand that same dream in our country for a better perspective of our generation and the future ones.

Visar Kelmendi³, Kosovo

Kosovo, the Young Europeans, this is not just the slogan of the country's promotional video that is being broadcasted around world's media, it is what Kosovo really is, but this is not enough.

Being young is often being seen as being irresponsible, revolutionary and as trouble makers but in Kosovo this doesn't seem to be the case. In this tiny republic, placed in the heart of the Balkans, young people have always been the propulsion force that has moved processes forward, young people and students, in particular, were the initiators and the loudest in expressing discontent and asking for rights and freedoms. Young people have always carried the fight for civil rights, for freedom and the right to be equal with other nations within Yugoslavia.

The paradox in our case is that the elder generations, that have done so much for their rights, are not diligent and willing to work hard towards the improvement of the life conditions and the future of the younger generation. This might be considered as an exaggeration by many, but so far this seems to be the case. In an ever more globalized world, young people are well informed and increasingly attentive to the lifestyle and tendencies of their peers, consequently the needs of young people have increased however, to our disappointment, there is a decreasing curb of possibilities.

³ Visar Kelmendi is co-founder of Ypsilon Institute Kosovo.

Kosovo is a young country in terms of statehood as well as in terms of population with over 60% being beyond the age of thirty, this phenomenal force and energy is confined within its state borders and some of neighboring countries without the possibility to move freely in the ever more integrated Europe. Being left alone, as a grey area without even the mere possibility to have lifted the current visa regime, is disappointing. The lack of possibilities to move in the EU as well as long lines in front of various embassies is often seen as exploitation and creates frustration. Consequently, this manifests itself in general discontent and tendencies towards anti-globalism as well as towards more accentuated nationalism, where the unification with Albania is often seen as a solution to the process of European integration and freedom of movement.

From the point of view of a young man, living in Kosovo, who attentively observes the processes and understands the reality in which we live, I strongly believe that Kosovars and Europe should bear great responsibility to develop this Balkan republic as well as offer to its younger generation a brighter vision of tomorrow, a vision with economic development and freedom of movement. The responsibility lies mainly with key decision makers. Support is necessary for if Kosovo is left to walk this path alone it will require a lot of time, far more than what is needed for other countries. It is the young generation that will be mainly affected, thus leading to the development of mixed feelings and growing mistrust in the European Union.

What characterizes Kosovo and its people is certainly the fact that we are people of hope, perhaps because there are a lot of young individuals and hope is something very much present among the young or it is simply because it is installed in our genetics. With great hopes for a better tomorrow many friends, me included, are working together to build a better joint future. Our vision is to develop ourselves as well as our country the best we can, taking good examples from European countries and having a strong belief in values like democracy, equality, tolerance, justice, and respect to human rights.

In an event, organized by the Youth in Action program, in the outskirts of Europe, I met with wonderful people from Slovenia and got to know what they do and learned of their efforts to build a better and more inclusive society in Slovenia. What brought us together was mainly the common past – not so many years ago we were a part of a joint federation, as well as the communication and understanding of similar languages. This was the start of the establishment of the Ypsilon Institute Kosovo.

While speaking to Petra Kocjan, the Director of the Ypsilon Institute, I recognized that this institute, led by young Slovenians, is doing in fact what young Kosovars could do in order to contribute to build a better future and to benefit the society in which they live and which they shall inherit. What I was always arguing for, concrete support from the European countries to the development of Kosovo, was actually what was happening. We got to work immediately and together, with the Ypsilon Institute, we set an agenda for the establishment of the Ypsilon Institute in Kosovo. The initiative was followed by hard work and a lot of commitment, where one side was cheering for the other and helping in overcoming obstacles and difficulties. Finally, on March 1st 2013, the Ypsilon Institute Kosova was established in Prishtina with an opening ceremony, that took place in the European Information Center.

What the Ypsilon Institute in Kosovo intends to do is not only to replicate the success stories of its peers in Slovenia, but also develop its own identity in establishing a sound communication between young people and decision makers with whom we want to discuss the process of economic development of

our country, its integration in the European Union as well as the development of our identity and vision, shared by all the Kosovo population. This vision is one of common living in an integrated and globalized world, a world with more possibilities for young people.

We will work towards building a joint future in the Europe Union and towards recognizing our common past.

Yes, you might be surprised. Kosovo and Serbia, together in one article. Another thing about the Generation Y.

From competition and exploitation to cooperation, that is our focus. The most important part of raising the level of awareness, is understanding that we are all connected in one way or another. One's higher standard at one part of the world does not mean any harm to some other individual at another end of the planet. All of us are concerned that more than three billion people are living in unimaginable poverty and whether our children will have a place to live or not. All this depends on the level of awareness of those, who create society. Therefore, it is essential that we rise from competition and exploitation of resources to the creation and participation. With the right level of awareness, a positive view, social responsibility and noble goals. This means cooperation among representatives of the Generation Y, as well as intergenerational cooperation. The latter is even more important since a joint wisdom and a healthy ambition lead to a better tomorrow. Breaking the ice, the first step and action are on the shoulders of the Generation Y, according to the Slovenian saying "The world stands on young people."



articles

Transition towards Innovation-driven Economies in the Western Balkans: A Brief Survey on Graduate Employability and Job Mismatches

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Transition towards Innovation-driven Economies in the Western Balkans: A Brief Survey on Graduate Employability and Job Mismatches

Tom Hashimoto¹

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ABSTRACT

This short survey reviews the link between the graduate labour markets and higher education policies by focusing on graduate employability, education-job mismatches and over-education. As the Western Balkans is expected to experience transition towards innovation-driven economies demand for graduate labour becomes too complex for the current higher education programmes to accommodate in their training. Likewise, expected labour mobility in Europe and the Western Balkans require both local and intra-European responses to the above phenomenon. Inevitably, much of the discussions presented in this study is rather obvious and familiar to anyone who is involved in the graduate labour market. Yet restating the obvious is sometimes necessary in dealing with complex reforms in higher education to accommodate rapid economic growth in the region.

Keywords: innovation-driven economies, graduate employability, job mismatches, higher education policy, labour market flexibility

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1. INTRODUCTION²

Innovation – a link between technological knowledge and monetary value (van der Meer 2007) to cite one of its characteristics – seems to play a key role in sustainable economic growth for countries with less human capital and less natural resources, such as those in the Western Balkans. The establishment of the Ministry of Innovation and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) in Albania in April 2010 is perhaps a phenomenon reflecting the belief in the innovation-driven economy. The World Economic Forum for example illustrates the ‘stages of development’ from ‘factor-driven’ to ‘efficiency-driven’ and then to ‘innovation-driven’ economies. The Western Balkans seems to enjoy some degree of ‘progress’ or ‘catch-up’ in this regard (Table 1).

Table 1: Western Balkans and its transition towards innovation-driven economy

2007				
Stage 1: Factor-driven	Transition from stage 1 to stage 2	Stage 2: Efficiency-driven	Transition from stage 2 to stage 3	Stage 3: Innovation- driven
	Albania Bosnia (BiH)	Macedonia (FYR) Montenegro Serbia Turkey	Croatia	Greece Italy Slovenia
2012				
Stage 1: Factor-driven	Transition from stage 1 to stage 2	Stage 2: Efficiency-driven	Transition from stage 2 to stage 3	Stage 3: Innovation- driven
		<i>Albania</i> <i>Bosnia (BiH)</i> Macedonia (FYR) Montenegro Serbia	Croatia <i>Turkey</i>	Greece Italy Slovenia

Source: World Economic Forum (2007, 2012), no data on Kosovo, emphases added

At the same time, innovation is largely associated with higher education, constrained by well-known problematic factors such as limited access to financing and underdeveloped infrastructure. Given adequate funding and infrastructure, innovative ideas are often the products of intellectual clustering, systematic analyses of rich empirical data, speedy launch of prototype projects and sufficient marketing. As a result, the European Commission deals with the Bologna Process (e.g. higher education harmonisation) and the Lisbon Research Agenda (e.g. human capital investment in innovative sectors) in parallel (Keeling 2006), and this approach has been reflected up on the series of EU accession negotiations in the Western Balkans. Moreover, the rapid speed of telecommunication development as well as emerging social network culture and markets both in the EU and the Western Balkans indicates the necessity to incorporate young generations, particularly graduate workers, into the innovation-driven production cycle. Yet, there exists a tension between traditional custom-based employment practices through friends and acquaintances on one hand and systematic resume-based employment practices increasingly adapted in the Western Balkans on the other. While the latter practices positively evaluate higher education trainings, the relation among higher educational qualifications, skills learned and employability of graduate workers is not as clear as we had hoped.

² The author would like to thank Prof. Slavo Radošević of University College London. His presentation at the SEESOX/Bank of Albania Workshop (Oxford, March 2013) largely inspired this article.

This short survey therefore reviews the link between the graduate labour market and higher education policy by focusing on graduate employability, job mismatches and over-education. By drawing on empirical studies in the wider European setting, this study investigates the general causal mechanisms behind the mismatches between the demand and supply in the graduate labour market as well as behind a phenomenon known as ‘over-education’ and its problematic definition. While empirical studies from the Western Balkans are yet to be done, the analysis implies that the issues of graduate employability and job mismatches are rather ubiquitous as the causal responsibility seems to rest on higher education policies rather than on business decisions. Inevitably, much of discussions presented in this study is rather obvious and familiar to anyone who is involved in the graduate labour market. In lieu of a research oriented conclusion, thus, this study summarises strategic and conceptual suggestions on the job-skill-education triangle with a particular focus on the expected labour mobility in the Western Balkans. Such an angle of the argument becomes more and more relevant as European integration deepens in the Western Balkans, opening up the common European labour market.

2. CHOOSING A HIGHER EDUCATION PROGRAMME: WHERE IS THE CAREER VISION?

In 2011, a philosophy student at the University of Pristina was quoted criticizing the lack of professors, despite the reform measures that had taken place in the faculty and at the university³. At the same time, the number of students enrolled at the Faculty of Philosophy seems to be quite high (2,692 in 2010/2011) compared to medicine (2,335) or electoral and computer engineering (1,081)⁴. Given the rather inflexible labour demand associated with the current financial crisis, our intuition tends to consider vocational degrees as the more ‘rational’ choice and the above number is surprising. Can all philosophy graduates find adequate jobs in Kosovo? The World DataBank records a high unemployment rate (45.4%) in Kosovo in 2009 and the trend seems to have continued⁵. While high unemployment is also due to a number of factors other than the employability of newly graduated students, the above anecdote captures the lack of career vision on both the individual student level as well as the university’s administration level. In other words, the inadequate student/instructor ratio is one issue, but the fact that students disproportionately select study programmes without clear and reasonable career plans⁶ – and that universities let them do so – is yet another concern. Does this mean students do not foresee their employability when they choose study programmes?.

Employability here is understood as a set of skills, knowledge and experience which (in theory) make a job-seeker ‘ready’ to tackle relevant business tasks and to receive further training provided by employers. Andrews and Higson (2008) find a remarkable similarity among UK, Austrian, Romanian and Slovenian employers regarding their demands for ‘hard’ business knowledge, ‘soft’ interpersonal skills and relevant project/internship experiences; a survey in the same study shows that those demands

3 Brajshori, M. (2011) ‘Kosovo’s Higher Education Challenges’, *SETimes*, 13 April [online]. Available at: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/04/13/feature-04.

4 University of Pristina, Central Administration. Qtd. in Radošević, S. (2013) ‘Smart Specialisation Strategies: Lessons from Slovenia for Croatia’, Presentation at the SEESOX/Bank of Albania Workshop (Oxford, March).

5 Karadaku, L. (2012) ‘Kosovo: Highest Unemployment Rate in Western Balkans’, *SETimes*, 9 February [online podcast]. Transcript available at: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/document/setimes/podcast/2012/02/09/podcast-transcript.

6 Presumably, a further degree may increase employability. Yet another philosophy degree for instance would invite the same dilemmas few years later given the competitiveness in the academic market.

are clearly understood by business degree graduates in all four countries. Although it is limited to business degrees, this finding implies that employability communicated in the labour markets is rather homogeneous at least within the EU in spite of differences in higher education systems. Thus, in order to increase the efficiency in the graduate labour markets, Andrews and Higson promote further integration and synchronisation of higher education programmes in Europe – including relevant intra-European internship opportunities – according to the spirit of the Bologna Declaration (1999). Employer involvement in courses is also emphasised by Cranmer (2006) in order to deepen the virtual communication between not only graduate job-seekers and employers, but also students and potential future employers as early as at the stage of selecting study programmes. Firms in Kosovo for example can coordinate courses on business ethics within the philosophy programme given disproportional interests in philosophy by the prospective students. By doing so, universities do not have to redirect or force students to pursue study programmes other than that of their choice.

The above logic for the harmonised European education system and for the employer involvement is divided when local ‘tacit’ knowledge is concerned. Faulconbridge *et al.* (2007) for example stress the importance of such knowledge in the financial market: financial actors must have locally available information (e.g. quality of their employees) when dealing with private equity in order to accurately assess its value and risk. Likewise Jones (2007) emphasises the ‘face-to-face’ interactions with clients in legal services, implying the significance of knowing the local interpersonal customs as well as having embedded personal networks. This local ‘tacit’ knowledge therefore makes it difficult for graduate job-seekers to transfer from one market to another even though their degrees are comparable through the intra-European educational system and their general employability is high. On the other hand employer involvement enables to incorporate demands for training with ‘tacit’ knowledge into locally specialised educational programmes. Such locally specialised – as opposed to completely harmonised – programmes would function as a gradual transition mechanism from study to work, praised for beyond its merit in education-job matches (e.g. over-education, see Barone & Ortiz 2011).

Difficulty to communicate supply and demand of employability at the stage of choosing study programmes or shortly thereafter often leads to job mismatches – job-seekers obtaining jobs unrelated to their educational training – and it influences graduate employees’ well-being. Bárcena-Martín *et al.* (2012) find mismatched workers earn 11.7% less than their well-matched counterparts on average in Europe. At the same time Bardhan *et al.* (2013) measure responsiveness of higher education institutions in the US to short-term wage signals and long-term employment conditions, and find a time lag particularly on the former: we can easily assume that the situation is similar in Europe where higher education programmes are often required to go through rigorous regulatory scrutinies. The time lag in turn results that ‘a measure of departmental involvement in explicit teaching and assessment of employability skills is not significantly related to labour market performance’ (Mason *et al.* 2009) – a good intention with insufficient outcomes.

Sectoral differences in wages – or the perception of such differences – also influence job mismatches in the graduate labour market as the former is often a guide for choosing a degree. Kosovo for example is a highly agriculturally oriented economy. Yet, students in Pristina prefer to study economics (6,540 students in 2010/2011), law (6,095) and education (4,688) rather than agriculture (683)⁷ as partially

7 University of Pristina, Central Administration. Qtd. in Radošević, S. (2013) ‘Smart Specialisation Strategies: Lessons from Slovenia for Croatia’, Presentation at the SEESOX/Bank of Albania Workshop (Oxford, March).

noted earlier. Reliable sector-by-sector data for average wage in Kosovo is not yet available which keeps the argument within the realm of speculation. Nevertheless the image of low-paid and less-subsidised agricultural jobs as well as the social impression of agricultural jobs as ‘rural’ as opposed to ‘urban’ and ‘high class’ contributes to the above degree choice. Accumulating such degree choices in turn accelerates further job mismatches until the economy ‘catches-up’ to a more innovation-driven model by creating ‘high class’ jobs⁸.

These findings might be worrisome in Europe where labour mobility within the EU has been considered ‘good’ for economy (Eurobarometer 2010). It seems that educational institutions must provide adequate trainings to accommodate students’ disproportional interests in certain subjects, locally unique demands in labour (including those related ‘tacit’ knowledge), short-term wage signals *and* potential expansion of all of the above due to inter-European labour mobility. Furthermore custom-based employment practices among friends and acquaintances seem to be still observable in the Western Balkans even though a reliable data does not exist – an additional burden for education-job matching. In other words, aforementioned disproportional selection of degree programmes tends to reflect the lack of flexibility on the education providers’ side to facilitate education-job matches for graduate labours *as well as* complex and mixed signals from the employers as for their employment practices. Higher visibility of employers in the educational setting through co-ordination of degree courses is an available option.

3. JOB-MISMATCHES AND OVER-EDUCATION: ARE THEY TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?

Job mismatches can easily be transformed into the issue of over-education – obtaining a job which requires a lower level of qualification – as one of the individual-level solutions for job mismatches is to obtain several degrees to increase employability. In Poland, Kiersztyn (2013) finds that over-education becomes more visible during recession. Given the vitality of economy strongly observed in recent Poland, this finding is alarming to more problematic economies elsewhere in Europe. Even during recession however the incidence of over-education has been less visible in Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Italy (Barone & Ortiz 2011); the relation between recession and over-education is yet questionable. Nevertheless those four countries have more structured higher education systems which limit the number of graduates, while the transition from the educational to business environment is well institutionalised through various transitory training programmes – perhaps a solution to the situation in Kosovo. At the same time, over-educated workers in Germany experience ‘markedly lower relative wage growth rates than *adequately* educated workers’ (Büchel & Mertens 2004). On the other hand Rubb (2006) attempts to confirm ‘occupational mobility theory’ that over-educated workers experience higher wage return compared to *under*-educated workers. The latter however seems to confirm a lower relative wage growth rate among under-educated workers rather than upward occupational mobility among over-educated workers. Therefore, the total number of over-educated workers in a labour market is one issue, but their well-being is yet another issue, recession strongly influencing the latter.

In the Western Balkans the number of students who receive tertiary education has significantly

⁸ This positive (as opposed to normative) observation is similar to the supply-driven issues in the labour market often associated with high-skilled labour migration (cf. Chaloff & Lemaître 2009).

increased⁹ even though some of those private institutions' educational quality is questionable. There are two immediate consequences of such rapid expansion in the higher education sector. First, governmental organisations would capture only a partial reality regarding the respective graduate labour market, which means that many of their education-job matching policies are delayed, if not rendered ineffective. Second, the rise of the so-called 'degree mills' – 'higher' education institutions which practically sell their qualifications without adequate training being provided – increases the incidence of over-education in terms of qualifications on paper, but not in terms of actual skills. Thereby, the costs of training shift from educational institutions to businesses, which slows down the growth of small and medium sized enterprises within the graduate labour markets. Even when the quality of higher education programmes are tightly regulated or supervised as in the case of some countries in the EU, graduates from the same educational qualifications possess different sets of skills (also known as 'heterogeneous workers'). Accordingly, Green and McIntosh (2007) analyse their data with caution noting that some incidences of over-education may be considered appropriate based on employers' skill assessment.

In providing adequate policy and reform measures against skill-mismatches and over-education, therefore, a working paper (Desjardins & Rubenson 2011) published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) calls for the distinction between 'skill mismatches' and 'education mismatches'. The report further notes that education-job mismatches do not necessarily lead to skill mismatches as educational qualifications can signal a variety of skill-sets in the graduate labour market beyond those perceived by the labour suppliers. Indeed, experiences from mismatched jobs may provide an additional layer of skills which make the job in question more 'matching' as experiences are accumulated (cf. Frei & Sousa-Poza 2012). Hence, echoing the above statement, the issue of education mismatches does not necessarily lead to *prolonged* skill-mismatches, and over-education does not necessarily lead to being over-skilled (i.e. obtaining a job which require lower level of skills). All in all, it is about the perception held by the suppliers in the graduate labour markets which stresses the issue of over-education beyond the issue of skill-mismatches.

Hence, the issue of over-education from a labour supplier's point of view can be misleading. Drawing on Labour Force Survey data in the UK, Alpin *et al.* (1998) conclude that the issue of over-education can be exaggerated 'since it may represent a rational response of individuals to labour market conditions'. The incidence of over-education is thus temporary for many workers until they find matching jobs. Likewise, the issue of over-educated employment as a whole is often cyclical from a demand-side perspective, and the proportion of such incidence within long-term unemployment is rather small (Croce & Ghignoni 2012). Yet, the demand for high wage labour in Europe might have been limited since the sovereign-debt crisis. In labour markets with a prolonged high unemployment rate, the issue of over-education can be a life-long issue. Reflecting those issues on the Western Balkan setting, over-education in the form of pursuing multiple degrees may be a solution to fill in the gap between the skills demanded and skills taught in each programme until the thorough educational reforms take place. Thus, while over-education can be a wide-spread phenomenon in the Western Balkans, its assessment in terms of employability and well-being of graduate labours can be ambivalent during the transition towards innovation-driven economies.

⁹ UNESCO Institute for Statistics (various years) 'Table 14:Tertiary Indicators', *Public Reports – Education*. Available at: <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=167>.

4. THE DEGREE IS NOT ENOUGH: IS IT TOO OBVIOUS?

Labour economics – or economics in general – often consider that competition is ‘good’. It motivates labour suppliers to earn qualifications and to polish their skills in order to obtain a higher wage. Employers in turn provide an attractive package including further training to competitive workers. Yet, the highly competitive graduate labour market gives an impression that ‘the degree is not enough’ (Tomlinson 2008). Moreover, a degree from well-known higher institutions may be worth more than a set of practical knowledge and skills (e.g. Moreau & Leathwood 2006). Roulin and Bangerter (2013) statistically illustrate the importance of extra-curricular activities, which have become a regional trend in the Western Balkans (e.g. model United Nations, student newspapers, debate clubs). These analyses do make sense and sound somewhat too obvious. What else can we learn from the issues of mismatches within the education-skill-job triangle?

Echoing Andrews and Higson (2008) cited earlier in this study that graduate job-seekers understand rather ubiquitous skill demands in the graduate labour markets, Tomlinson (2012, 2007) argues that graduate job-seekers do not anticipate education-job matches these days, and that they strategise their entry to the labour market by individualising and differentiating their resumes. Strategies, the study implies, include intentional over-qualification (e.g. obtaining an additional statistics degree for a business management job). Reflecting easy access to over-qualified workers, ‘some employers have re-categorized jobs as requiring a degree, when they were previously filled by non-graduates, and many have not altered pay scales accordingly’ (Di Pietro & Urwin 2006). It thus results for further confusion in over-education and skill-mismatches in the graduate labour market.

Such a seemingly exploitative picture in the graduate labour market is accompanied by a more nuanced picture provided by Rubb (2013). Rubb argues that under-educated workers may have human capital strengths (e.g. good inter-personal communication skills, sense of humour, punctuality) relatively unknown in the labour market due to the lack of qualifications to measure such skills. The flip-side of this is that over-educated workers may have human capital weaknesses (e.g. attention deficit, low self-esteem) which are unnoticeable on their resumes. Thus, Rubb concludes that under-educated workers are more likely to experience upward occupational mobility (i.e. promotion) by developing long-term relationships with their employers while over-educated workers may be better off by switching firms. In other words, the spatio-temporal flexibility (e.g. moving to other cities, waiting for next opportunities, switching jobs) seems to have been forgotten from the analysis of skill-mismatches and over-education. Indeed, Devillanova (2012) finds that commuting increases the quality of the education-job match while ‘the link between migration and over-education remains unclear’. This is due to the fact that the graduate labour market in capital cities become more and more similar to each other (cf. Andrews & Higson 2008, Chaloff & Lemaître 2009), and hence, graduate job-seekers migrating to other major cities may find a similar dilemma of skill-mismatches and over-education.

Hence, we made a full circle in our argument that any assessment on job-skill-education matching in the Western Balkans can be further complicated due to expected intra-European labour mobility. At the same time, however, locally specialised trainings incorporated in the early stage of employment is one of the solutions briefly discussed in the earlier section of this survey. To be honest, nothing noted

here is new and graduate job-seekers in the Western Balkans are as much aware as those in the rest of Europe, of individually employable strategies to overcome job mismatches – or to simply find a job in the increasingly competitive graduate labour markets.

5. CONCLUSION

This short survey begins by associating innovation-driven economies with higher education and attempts to conceptualise the effective/efficient education-skill-job triangle in a wider European graduate labour market. Noting a remarkable similarity in the skills and knowledge demanded by businesses across Europe, the study briefly comments how graduate job-seekers are vulnerable to job-mismatches and over-education in the recent competitive labour markets. Nevertheless, two points have been raised in the subsequent argument. Firstly, the issues of job-mismatches and over-education can be exaggerated depending on definitions and perceptions of those terms. Here, it is suggested that separation of qualification-mismatches from skill-mismatches is useful. Secondly, the issues of skill-mismatches and/or over-education can be temporal and intentional. This is partially due to asymmetric information regarding qualification-skill matches on the individual levels, as well as due to limited resources and methods job-seekers can utilise to communicate with potential employers.

Therefore, ‘correcting’ the education-skill-job mismatches in the Western Balkans seems to be a long-term task which involves policies dedicated to higher education reform as well as close monitoring of labour market in question. Yet, as the last section roughly illustrated, the spatio-temporal mobility on the individual level may provide aggregate labour flexibility as well as further complication for institutional reforms. As the Western Balkans seems to further integrate with the European Union in every dimension of socio-economic activities, policy makers and stake holders must address both the education-skill-job matches within the local labour market as well as on the European level. The latter dimension of labour mobility/flexibility seems to be a yet additional key for the transition towards innovation-driven economies in the Western Balkans, reflecting the spirit of both the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda.

Lastly, the author suggests that not only higher education institutions and governmental offices, but also businesses and human resource management agencies in the Western Balkans should incorporate the issue of graduate employability into their strategic thinking. As the number of Erasmus exchange and joint-degree programmes has increased in recent years, the link among higher education institutions in the EU and the Western Balkans has become stronger. In such a new environment of higher education in a wider Europe, innovative thinking is also needed in higher education programme *planning*. At this planning stage, businesses have opportunities to reflect their demands for graduate workers regarding their skills, knowledge and experience by lobbying higher education institutions.

The Western Balkans embodies diverse cultural and historical experiences and they have been a source of conflict in several occasions. Perhaps the successful establishment of regional higher education programmes may turn such diversity into their strengths. Such thinking increases the graduate labour mobility throughout the region, and the intertwined graduate labour markets raises

a sense of regional cooperation. Flexible cooperation strategies in higher education and innovative production on both the governmental and business level would mean not the solid harmonisation of educational programmes but locally specialised training to incorporate educational and business trainings. That could be the Western Balkan version of the growth strategy 'Europe 2020'.

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The Young Precariat in Greece: What Happened to “Generation 700 Euros”?

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ABSTRACT

Despite important problems associated with young age and transition to employment, there are also specific challenges associated with particular generations at particular politico-historical and economic settings. They may not be considered natural because of young age and the life cycle associated with it. The present contribution describes the economic and social situation of the young generation in Greece before and after the crisis, in comparison to older age-groups and where possible to the previous young generation when its members took their first steps into the job market. The “young generation”, in Greece, codified as “generation 700 Euros” before the crisis, may be understood as a broader “actual generation”, the “young precariat”. The “young precariat” comprises of people, born between the late ‘70s and the late ‘90s, who are exposed to a set of generationally defining social and economic historical experiences: a) a prolonged transition to independence, b) “precarity”, c) generational tension and d) the economic crisis. Focusing on precarity and generational tension, we show, using statistical data and secondary analyses that first: the “young precariat” experiences worse socio-economic conditions in comparison to their parent generation when they were at a similar life cycle in 1981. Second, the economic crisis has increased the levels of “precarity”, however, an ongoing pension reform seems to be levelling the generational game to the benefit of the younger generation.

Keywords: young generation, intergenerational relations, youth unemployment, precarity

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INTRODUCTION

Just before the unfolding of the debt crisis of 2010, “generation 700 Euros” was widely adopted and used as a term best codifying the challenges young people in Greece faced at the time. The term “generation 700 Euros” was coined in January 2007 by G700, a political advocacy, “net-root” organisation, and it refers to a silent majority of young Greeks aged between 25 and 35, who are overworked, underpaid, overtaxed, debt-ridden and insecure, if lucky to even have a job. According to this definition (G700 2007), the phenomenon of “Generation 700 Euros” is about much more than simply low wages. It refers to a range of problems facing young people, especially knowledge workers aged 25 to 35: poor working conditions, few prospects of professional advancement, job insecurity and intergenerational imbalances in the way public goods are allocated in society.

“Generation 700 Euros” is not unique to Greece. Since 2000 a number of similar “generations” has sprung up in many European countries. The “iPod” (Insecure, Pressurised, Over-Taxed and Debt Ridden) generation in the UK, the “Milleuristas” in Spain, the “Millieuristi” or “Generazione 1000 Euros” in Italy, the “Generation Precaire” in France, the Generation “Praktikum” in Austria, to name but a few, have all been used in the public discourse as descriptive terms codifying aspects of what we argue here to be a similar pan-European phenomenon: the emergence of the “young precariat”, widely defined as a young generation experiencing “precarity” and generational tension.

The problems besetting the “Generation 700 Euros” predate the financial meltdown of 2008–2009 and the debt crises of 2010–2012, but these events have worsened them to an extreme extent. The signs in Europe are indeed disquieting with one out of five young persons aged 15–24 being unemployed and 14 million being not in employment, education or training (Eurostat 2013). In Greece, after the completion of three years of economic adjustment and an unprecedented economic recession, which led to massive youth unemployment and a job market entry wage of 511 Euros gross, the term “generation 700 Euros” has come to sound at least like a euphemism. New terms like “generation 300 Euros” have started to emerge trying to make sense of the new income poverty young Greeks are facing.

The aim of the present contribution is to describe the economic and social situation of the young generation in Greece before and after the crisis. In so doing we will argue that “generation 700 Euros” may be understood as a name codifying a distinctive generational unit within a broader young generation, the “young precariat”. What is the “young precariat”? What are its fundamental dimensions and how does the crisis impact upon them? Is there room for optimism or are we heading for a lost generation?

Our analysis will proceed in two main sections: in the first section we will define our basic terms and unit of analysis, also providing a working definition of the “young precariat”. Our definition will be constructed using a synthesis of conventional definitions of youth along with K. Mannheim’s (1952) theory of generations and G. Standing’s (2011) definition of the precariat and precarity. In the second section we will provide evidence for those aspects of the young precariat, we consider to be more important: a) “precarity” and b) generational tensions. For this we will use descriptive statistics from secondary sources, as well as data from secondary analyses. As far as precarity is concerned data collection will focus on unemployment statistics, labour market flexibility indicators and levels of income. Cohort analysis will be used where appropriate for generational comparisons. In relation to generational tensions our data will focus mainly on age related spending especially pensions. We are going to see that on one hand the economic crisis, through the recession and the strict policy conditionality of the Economic Adjustment Program, has increased the levels of “precarity”. On the other hand, thanks to a successful pension reform, which started in July 2010 and is continuing up to this very moment, the crisis seems to be levelling the generational game to the benefit of the younger generation.

1. THE YOUNG PRECARIAT: A YOUNG GENERATION FACING PRECARIETY AND GENERATIONAL TENSIONS?

When it comes to the “young generation”, discussion in international organisations and the EU follows a particular convention: young generation equates to “youth”, defined as the period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence (UNESCO 2013, EC 2009, p.6). In this respect, youth is a more fluid category than a fixed age-group. The European Commission (EC 2009, p. 6) points out that different societies, might acknowledge the increasing maturity of young people in different ways. However, for reasons of statistical consistency the conventional definition of “youth” is considered to comprise persons either in the 19-25 or the 19-29 age-group. In the following section we are going to use K. Mannheim’s (1952) theory of generations and G. Standing’s (2011) analysis of the constituent elements of the “precariat” in order to show that when it comes to the “young generation”, we need to move beyond conventional notions of youth, age-groups and the transition to independence through employment. As much as there are particular problems associated with age and transition to employment, there are also specific challenges associated with particular generations at particular politico-historical and economic settings. As much as problems and social attitudes may be explained by age and the life-cycle stage it is associated with, they may also be associated with the characteristics of a particular period, and of equal importance also membership of a generation or cohort.

1.1 GENERATION

The word generation is widely used in everyday life to locate particular age groups in society and more importantly in a particular historical period vis a vis older or younger age groupings. We thus talk of “our generation”, “our parents’ generation” or “our children’s generation”. However, the notion of generation goes far beyond this “common currency” use of the term (Pilcher 1994, p.480). It is important to establish a theoretical framework when talking about generations. What are they? What is the relationship between biology, the social and time? Does membership in a particular generation result to particular challenges or does it all come down to life-cycle challenges, historical period characteristics and other social features like gender and class? Are generations significant in accounting for social continuity and change? For some scholars generations are not important. Their significance is overshadowed by factors like gender, education, race and social class. For the vast majority of social science generation is used synonymously with cohort. We are going to argue here that social generations, widely understood as “people within a delineated population who experience the same significant events within a given period of time” are significant and shall be used as such for analytical reasons (Pilcher 1994, p.481-482).

The first scholar to use systematically the concept “generation” was Wilhelm Dilthey in 1870. According to Dilthey a generation consists of a limited number of individuals “who are combined to form a homogeneous unit on the basis of having been confronted by the same momentous facts and changes during the time of their susceptibility, in spite of differences brought on by additional factors” (Rosenmayr, 1979 p.60). The German sociologist H. Schelsky in the 1930s developed a special kind of generational concept based on common attitudes developed in distinct “epochs”, perceived as distinct historical periods linked to specific generations. He thus spoke of the “political youth” in Germany in the period 1930 to 1945 and the “sceptical generation” after the Second World War. In contrast to Schelsky, Bernfield, already from the 1920s developed a concept based on the socialisation of youth and how young people integrate into society (Rosenmayr 1979, p. 64-65). After a period between 1950 and 1965 when the concept of generation lost much of its sociological relevance, it was Margaret Mead (1970) who re-introduced it in the public discourse coining the term “generation gap”. After Mead, Ortega y Gasset came up with the notion of *vigencias*, while more recent contributions on the “significance of biological age groupings for processes of social change and continuity” came from the French Annales School and the notion of *mentalities collectives* (Pilcher 1994, p.480-481). In the 1990s Strauss and Howe (1991) developed a generational theory on the historical sequence of American generations and thus reignited interest in the sociology of generations.

Among all these scholars it was K. Manheim as early as 1923 who offered the most “seminal theoretical treatment of generations as a sociological phenomenon” (Pilchner 1994, p.481).

According to K. Manheim (1952) generation is a “social location” phenomenon quite different from the mere facts of birth, ageing, and death. Generation is a concept quite similar to social class. As he put it: “the fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action” (Manheim 1952, p.168). To put it more simply, Manheim argued that in the same way that there are social classes, there are also generations, the identity of which depends upon particular historical circumstances, events and experiences.

Manheim discerned among two types of generations: the “actual generation” and the “generational unit”. “Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation units” (Manheim 1952, p.184). Within a generation one may find numerous differentiated, but antagonistic generation units (Rosenmayr 1979, p.61). Furthermore, though not a concrete group, the generational unit might have in its nucleus an association, which develops the most essential concepts, meanings even slogans, thus serving as an integrative and formative force for the whole unit. In this respect we might talk of the post war generation of Baby Boomers in a demographic, social and cultural context, of the May ‘68 generational unit, which actively participated in the historical process striving for social change, and the National Student Union of France (UNEF) one of the many important associations driving the process of protest and change, shaping concepts and slogans.

Having established the notion of social generation as we perceive it we now need to operationalise it for reasons of research. For reasons of feasibility and scope of the current study, this can be done by placing it in a cohort context, while at the same time establishing indicators for generation research. The most important indicators will be socio-economic, codified under the notions of precarity and generational tension respectively.

1.2 PRECARIY AND THE PRECARIAT

The word precariat was first used by French sociologists in the 1980s to describe temporary and seasonal workers (Guy Standing 2011, p.8). In the end of the ‘90s, beginning of the 21st century, authors like Bourdieu (1998), Paugam (2000) and Castell (2000) saw precarity as the root of the new social question. The term, which has been used widely to describe the spread of insecure living conditions, has been used differently among scholars and countries, either to specifically describe temporary workers, or the jobless and the working poor. Mouriki (2010) speaks of the new proletariat in Greece, while Matsagganis (2011) defines the precariat as distinct analytical category which is characterized by forms of work and employment that go beyond non-standard part time and temporary work patterns. Finally, in Standing’s use of the term (2011, p.1-2), which we are going to use here for our analysis, the precariat “is a new group in the world, a class-in-the-making... It is not “the squeezed middle” or an ‘underclass’ or ‘the lower working class’. It has a distinctive bundle of insecurities and will have an equally distinctive set of demands”. While falling into the precariat might happen to everyone, there are groups with a higher probability of being at the precariat than others. These are usually immigrants, women over men and youth compared with old agers (Standing 2011, p.43)

According to G. Standing (2011, p.8), the precariat consists of all those people who lack seven fundamental forms of labour-related security: labour market insecurity, employment insecurity, job insecurity, work insecurity, skill reproduction insecurity, income insecurity and representation insecurity. These forms of insecurity (summarised in Standing’s words in box 1 below) make up the phenomenon of “precarity”. The assumption here is that the young generation, defined above as

an “actual generation” and labelled the “young precariat” are particularly exposed to labour related insecurity in all its forms. For reasons of feasibility, the present contribution will focus only on labour market, income, employment and work security. The indicators we will be using to measure the level of insecurity will be unemployment, measuring labour market security, level of income, measuring income security and level of employment protection regulation, performance in actual protection and market flexibility as a measure of employment and work security.

Box 1: Forms of Precarity

“Labour market security, which refers to adequate income-earning opportunities; at the macro-level, this is epitomised by a government commitment to ‘full employment’.

Employment security – Protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulations on hiring and firing, imposition of costs on employers for failing to adhere to rules and so on.

Job security – Ability and opportunity to retain a niche in employment, plus barriers to skill dilution, and opportunities for ‘upward’ mobility in terms of status and income.

Work security – Protection against accidents and illness at work, through, for example, safety and health regulations, limits on working time, unsociable hours, night work for women, as well as compensation for mishaps.

Skill reproduction security – Opportunity to gain skills, through apprenticeships, employment training and so on, as well as opportunity to make use of competencies.

Income security – Assurance of an adequate stable income, protected through, for example, minimum wage machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, progressive taxation to reduce inequality and to supplement low incomes.

Representation security – Possessing a collective voice in the labour market, through, for example, independent trade unions, with a right to strike.”

Source: Guy Standing (2011), *The Precariat*, p.9

1.3 GENERATIONAL TENSIONS

In 2004, the American Economist Laurence J. Kotlikoff and the Finance Columnist Scott Burns (2004), in their book “*The coming Generational Storm*”, presented the problems caused by the mass retirement of the baby boom generation and analysed the financial impact of this event, including the future burden of what they termed “fiscal child abuse”. Using fancy titles such as “generational tsunami”, “tip of the age-berg”, “perfect demographic storm”, “fiscal child-abuse” and “snake-oil cures” the authors tried to explain how the US government was “saddling the younger generations with unbearable debt”.

It has been argued that one of the fundamental features of the “young precariat” is the experience of tension among its members and those of the older generation (Standing 2011, p.57). Our argument here is that this tension is not adequately accounted for by the conventional notion of generational gap. Nor may it be solely researched within the sphere of family and kin relations, dominant in many sociological perspectives. Generational tension is fuelled by perceptions and even realities of unbalanced and unequal intergenerational relations, due to unequal intergenerational transfers and outcomes in the public sphere. One such perception is that the upward mobility ladder has broken down. This decline in upward social mobility features as a fundamental characteristic of the young prrecariat (Standing 2011, p.41-42). According to many scholars (Cohen 2009, Wilkinson 2009, Sawhill 2009, Goos 2007, quoted in Standing 2011, p.43), in many developed countries, including the US, intergenerational mobility is currently very low. Those born in the ‘70s and later on are less likely to have risen in social status than those born before the ‘60s.

However, where intergenerational inequality takes gigantic dimensions, is in age-related public spending. With demographic projections showing a declining young population and an increase in

the numbers of economically dependent persons the burden of financing the system falls upon the shoulders of the younger generation. In 2007, according to the European Commission Ageing Report (EC 2009) age related spending in the EU as a whole was bound to rise by 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ % and by 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ % of GDP in the Eurozone from 2007 to 2060.

2. THE YOUNG PRECARIAT IN GREECE

In generational terms, applying our above defined parameters pertaining our unit of analysis to Greece, we may talk of certain significant generations that appeared in the course of the last '60 years. It may be argued that the most significant generation is the post-civil war "actual generation" of the '50s and '60s, born between 1946 and 1960 whose members were exposed to a constant political and democratic destabilisation. Within the post war "actual generation", we find the "114" and later the "Polytechnio" generational units, projecting a plethora of organisational and political associations like the Lambrakis Youth in the "114" movement. The former fought for the protection of the constitutional democratic order in the mid '60s, while the latter resisted the Junta in 1973 calling for "bread, education and liberty". Today, when we talk about the "young generation" in Greece, we are talking about an "actual generation", whose members, born between 1979 and 2000, are exposed to concrete historical problems, this time round primarily social and economic: a) a prolonged period of economic dependency, which may last till the mid '30s, b) "precarity", c) generational tension beyond conventional notions of generational gap and d) the momentous formative event of the 2010 debt crisis. Using G. Standing's (2011) terminology, we may call this "actual generation", the "young precariat". On the contrary, "generation 700 euros" may be seen as one generational unit, among other antagonistical such units, fighting for generational justice and reform, within the "young precariat". Moreover, the G700 net-root organisation should be regarded as a "concrete group", an association developing new concepts within the "generation 700 euros" generational unit such as intergenerational justice. In this respect G700 might be seen as having provided more or less an adequate expression of the particular social location for the members of the generation unit as a whole. In the present contribution our focus is uniquely on the "the young precariat".

In the following section, in order to analyse and measure the constitutive elements of the Greek young precariat, we are going to use descriptive statistics from secondary sources, and data from secondary analyses in order to measure "precarity" and "generational tension" in the 15-34 age-group in Greece, as well as compare the position of our generation under investigation before and after the crisis, across age-groups and generations. As we have already mentioned above, cohort analysis will be used where appropriate, while for both the notions of precarity and generational tension specific socio-economic indicators will be used for measurement. For precarity, previously narrowly defined for reasons of feasibility as labour market insecurity, income insecurity and employment and work security (only four out of the seven precarity parameters) we will use the following indicators: unemployment, to measure labour market security, level of income to measure income security and level of employment protection regulation, performance in actual protection and market flexibility to measure employment and work security. As far as generational tension is concerned our focus will be on age-related spending and particularly spending related to public pensions. Our timeline starts in the second quarter of 2008, at the peak of the Greek economy's performance since 1998 and also just before the global financial meltdown, and stops in the end of 2012, two and half year after the entry of Greece into the international bailout mechanism. Comparisons, where data for cohort analysis permit it, will be attempted with the baby boom, post civil-war generation, born between 1946 and 1960, the year of comparison being 1981, when Greece was experiencing stagflation due to the second oil crisis, but more importantly when the members of that generation were at a similar age and consequently life-cycle with the members of the young precariat today.

2.1 LABOUR MARKET INSECURITY AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT EPIDEMIC

Labour market security is closely linked to the idea of “full employment”. A high level of employment and a low rate of unemployment indicate a high level of labour market security. In such an optimal state of affairs, we would expect to find adequate income earning opportunities for all. In Greece, a whole generation suffers from intense labour market insecurity, primarily due to an unemployment epidemic. In December 2012 the overall unemployment rate in the 15-24 age-group was 57.5%, while in the 25-34 age-group it reached 34%, giving a 45.75% overall unemployment rate in the 19-34 age-group (ELSTAT 2013, p.2). The situation is equally disturbing if we take into consideration the share of youth neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET). In July 2012, the NEET rate stood at the very high rate of 17.4% for the 15-24 age group, while for the 25-29 age-group the rate stood at the extremely high rate of 32% (Eurofound 2012, p.29).

The current situation signifies a steep deterioration from the pre-crisis situation in 2008, which despite the then low 7.1% total unemployment rate (the lowest since 1998) remained comparatively high for the 15-34 age-group at 15.55% (ELSTAT 2008, p.2). Referring only to the 15-24 age-group, the OECD (2010, p.2) has argued that “despite these improvements [reduction of NEET from 18% to 13% and reduction of unemployment from 35.2% to 22.85% since 1998], in 2008 Greek youth still lagged behind most of their OECD counterparts in terms of their labour market performance”. Greece was amongst one of the worst performers internationally with youth unemployment 7 percentage points above the OECD average, the employment rate 20 percentage points below and the incidence of long term unemployment twice as high.

We may contrast the above unemployment rates in the age-group 15-34 before and after the crisis, 15.55% and 45.75% respectively, with those of prime-aged workers in the 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64 age-groups. In July 2008, unemployment for the 35-64 age-group was only 4%, almost four times lower in comparison to our age-group of reference. This breaks down into 5.1% for the 35-44 age-group, 4.4% for those aged 44-55, and only 3.1% for the 55-64 age-group, that part of the baby boom generation still at work. In generational terms a first observation is that in 2008, at the peak of the Greek economy’s economic performance, the unemployment rate for the “young precariat” was five and a half (5.55) times higher compared to that of the “Polytechnio” and “114” generations (ELSTAT 1981, 1981-2012, 1998-2012).

In December 2012, unemployment for the 35-64 age-group increased to 19.75%, a bit more than twice below the rate of our age-group of reference. Breaking this down into smaller age-groups we see that unemployment reached 23.4% for the 35-44 age-group, 19.5% for those aged 44 to 55, and 16.3% for the 55-64 age-group. It is evident that unemployment has taken a heavy toll across the whole age spectrum of the Greek population. However, unemployment in the 19-34 age-group is consistently at least twice as high, while in comparison to the baby boomers of “114” and “Polytechnio” it is almost 3 (2.8) times as high (ELSTAT 1981, 1981-2012, 1998-2012).

Arguably, the young have higher unemployment rates everywhere around Europe. According to Eurostat (2013), “youth unemployment rates [for the 19-24 age-group in the EU27] are generally much higher than unemployment rates for all ages”. They have been “twice as high as the rate for the total population throughout the last decade”. However, this does not justify either the differences, or the actual level of unemployment as a natural state of affairs. Greece, much like Spain, Portugal, Slovakia and Lithuania has been projecting bigger differences than say, Denmark, Sweden or Germany. Despite having experienced a whole decade of very fast growth since 1998, Greece made very little progress on that front in comparison to Germany, for example, which with lower growth did more to combat youth unemployment.

More importantly, the level of the young generation’s unemployment in Greece today is colossus in comparison to what the members of the previous generation had to encounter, when they were taking their first steps into the job market. In 1981, when the first offspring of the “114” and “Polytechnio” generational units were coming to life, unemployment for the 25-34 age-group, in which those generations then belonged was just 4.2%. This is two and a half times lower than the lowest annual rate ever encountered by “generation 700 Euros”. Taking the baby boom, post Civil War generation into

consideration, we see that unemployment in 1981 was 6.9%, almost two and a half times lower than the lowest ever encountered for the “young precariat”. For the 15-34 age-group, which in 1981 comprised of the baby boom cohort and those of Generation X born till the mid 60s, unemployment was 8.5%, two times lower than for today’s young generation. Finally, if we compare the 15-29 age-groups across time (using the conventional EU youth definition) we will see that in 1981 unemployment was at 11.56%, while in the best year for youth unemployment, 2008, it was almost double, 20.2%.

Table 1: Comparing unemployment rates across time, youth, age-groups, “actual generations” and “generational units”.

	Unemployment Total	Youth (15-29)	Young Precariat (15-34)	Baby boom + early Gen X (15-34)	Baby Boomers (20-34)	“114” & Polytechnio Generations (25-34)	Generation 700 euros (25-34)
1981	4.04%	11.56%	X	8.5%	6.9%	4.2%	X
2008	7.65%	20.2%	16.46%	X	X	X	10.8%
2012	23.64%	51.4%	43.63%	X	X	X	32%

Source: ELSTAT Monthly Labour Force Surveys 2008-2012, Census 1981

2.2 INCOME INSECURITY: FROM “GENERATION 700 EUROS” TO LEGALLY POOR

The level of monthly pay has been one of the fundamental characteristics with which public discourse in Greece identified the young generation before the crisis. The G700 political advocacy net-root organisation used the minimum net monthly wage not only symbolically, in order to talk about a new type of poverty the members of this generation were facing, but also took it at face value in order to criticize the unfair level of income in comparison to qualifications, as well as highlighting the difficulty of living on such a low income. In the Greek Press, the problem was widely presented as the “basic wage generation” (Eleytherotypia, 16/4/2007). The same was true for the foreign media too, where headlines like “Angry Young Greeks Blog for better pay” and “Generación 700, los jóvenes griegos denuncian su precariedad salarial en Internet” dominated the headlines (Grohmann 5/6/2007, El Pais 6/6/2007). Indeed, as it has been argued by Chiotaki-Poulou and Sakellariou (2010, p.22) the wage issue, that is “the material earnings through work in comparison to age and qualifications” has probably been “the major parameter of the whole issue of generation 700 Euros”. The question here is to what degree has income insecurity, defined as the dominance of low wages in our generational unit of analysis, been prevalent before the crisis and whether the economic adjustment program has further decreased income levels.

Given the high statutory Greek minimum wage in comparison to other EU and OECD countries before the crisis, one could easily argue that in fact the problem of low wages is over emphasized. According to the OECD (2007, p.8) “for Greece, minimum wages, as a share of the median wage, are not exceptional in international comparison. However, the absence of a specific sub-minimum means that they do rank among the highest for youth”. In addition, it may be argued that the level of pay in the generational unit under analysis is very diverse so there can be no cohesion among people with such diverse positions in the income distribution, not to mention a unifying basis for a common social identity (Chiotaki-Poulou and Sakellariou 2010, p22-23). Furthermore, it has been also noted that in many cases income insecurity does not derive from a demand to reward hard work, but rather the desire to retain a high level of consumption (Chiotaki-Poulou and Sakellariou 2010, p.23-24). Comparing with their first steps into the job market many decades ago, certain scholars have outright rejected the existence of a wage problem in the young generation (Ioakeimidis 2008).

Unfortunately, there is no available data on the distribution of income according to age-groups to test the above claims across generations. This can be the focus of a future research. There is however convincing evidence that beyond the statutory wage, in reality, the generational unit under investigation has been facing an increased problem of income insecurity, defined primarily as persistent low wages both in

comparison to other age groups and in comparison to other countries. Referring to the actual (not statutory) pay level of the 15-24 age-group just before the unfolding of the fiscal crisis, the OECD (2010, p.2) pointed that: “the entry jobs are often low-paid ... [they] ... pay less than two-thirds of the median wage”. Furthermore, in “2006, low pay affected 57% of working youth – the highest incidence across the OECD countries for which this statistic is available – and it was hard for them to move to higher-paid employment, particularly for the least qualified”.

Moving a bit higher up the age-group ladder, we see that it is not only the entry jobs in the 19-24 age-group that are often low paid. According to a study (Karamesini 2008, p. 80) on university graduates during the years 1998-2000, carried out in 2008, young Greeks, five to seven years after graduation, were paid as following: 15% of dependent workers less than 700 euros per month, 32% below 900 euros, 36% below 1100 euros, while 15% enjoyed a monthly salary above 1300 euros. These numbers exclude workers with no university diploma and as such they cannot be compared to data for the general population presented in the INE/GSEE Annual Economy and Employment Report (INE 2008), according to which 26% of dependent workers in 2007 were being paid less than 750 euros net. However, they could be compared with the monthly cost of life, estimated by the Hellenic Consumer Center (ELKEKA 2008), which for a worker with no dependent family members ranges between 840 to 1170 euros net. This in turn means that, according to a rough estimate of the data in hand, in 2008 almost 45% of the survey’s graduates were earning below the minimum monthly cost level of 840 euros and 85% below the maximum monthly cost level of 1170 euros.

Having established the presence of adequate reasons to believe that income insecurity might be regarded as a fundamental characteristic of our “actual generation” under analysis before the crisis, we may now examine the impact the economic crisis has had on income security. On statutory terms the impact is beyond doubt. In 2011, under the strict policy conditionality of the First Economic Adjustment Program and given that the “tripartite dialogue did not deliver a strategy to boost competitiveness and employment”, the government legislated a reduction in minimum wages (EC 2012, p.37-38, Ministry of Labour 2012). The wage floor in the National General Collective Agreement (NGCA) was reduced by 22%, while for workers younger than 25 the reduction reached 32% (EC 2012, p.38, Ministry of Labour 2012). Among other arguments, mainly relating to increased competitiveness and a better matching of the minimum wage to GDP per capita and the average wage, the reduction was further justified on the ground that by reducing minimum wage levels, the government would be able to “fight informality and undeclared work, pulling employment into the legal sector, as well as helping to support the employment of low-skilled workers”.

From income insecure, the “young generation” was pulled into becoming legally poor. In absolute numbers, the minimum wage for the non married young worker with zero to three years of work experience dropped to 510.95 euros gross per month, while for workers above the age of 25 the minimum wage dropped to 644,69 euros gross per month (Ministry of Labour 2012). This is a significant reduction in comparison to a) the previously agreed upon minimum gross wage of 751,39 euros, b) the minimum gross wage of 739,56 Euros in 2009, just before the fiscal crisis unfolded, and c) the minimum gross wage of 657,89 Euros in the beginning of 2007, when the issue of “generation 700 euros” came to the fore (NGCA 2006-2007, NGCA 2008-2010). The above reduction in the gross monthly minimum wage has generated a wave of media reaction and a new generational narrative, where a new “generation 300 euros” has now taken the place of the previously “prosperous generation 700 euros”. What we argue is really happening though, is that the ability of the “generational 700 euros” identity to create meaning as a distinct “generational unit” is eroded, as the broader phenomenon of the “young precariat” as an “actual generation” intensifies.

Moving beyond the new statutory minimum wage to the actual reality of income distribution in our generational unit of interest, once again, we come face to face with the problem of lack of relevant available data. However, given the radical decrease in the gross statutory minimum wage, the reduction of the labour cost index to 82.9% of its 2008 level in the third quarter of 2012 (EUROSTAT 2012), the lagging behind decrease of the inflation rate (+1.3% in January 2013 on a yearly basis) we may assume that the crisis has led to a considerable income insecurity to the young generation. Referring to the whole population the European Commission (2012b, p.45) in its first review of the Second Economic

Adjustment Program for Greece pointed: “Overall, wage cuts in the order of 20% have been observed on a growing number of collective agreements – something unseen at such a large scale in the EU or other developed economies. These trends may well continue until mid or late 2013”.

2.3 EMPLOYMENT AND WORK INSECURITY: FROM “RIGID-ANOMY” TO “FLEX-ANARCHY” IN A SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKET

In terms of employment and work security –widely defined as the legal and actual state of employment protection- Greece has traditionally represented a segmented labour market. Matsagganis (2011) distinguishes three major categories according to levels of protection enjoyed:

- a) The protected “insiders”: public sector employees (35% of all dependent workers) as well as employees in banks with more secure jobs, even jobs for life, and more comfortable working conditions.
- b) The less protected “mid-siders”: employees in large and medium sized private companies with less attractive wages and benefits, and a lower level of job security.
- c) The unprotected “outsiders”: employees in micro and small enterprises, which are “serial infringers” of labour, social security and tax regulations.

According to Mouriki (2010) a “new proletariat” characterised by “precarity” has emerged. According to her estimates, in 2009, the “precariat” in Greece consisted of 400,000 small duration, low pay jobs in the formal sector, 273,000 part time jobs, 355,000 fixed term contracts and 1,000,000 undeclared, non-socially secured jobs in the informal shadow economy sector. This is almost 40% of total employment at the time. According to Matsagganis (2011, p.16) “this estimate might be a bit excessive ... however, precarious work is widespread especially among migrants, unskilled workers, youth and women”.

Although we lack specific data, the indications are strong that the majority of young workers have been traditionally piled into the unprotected “outsider” category and to a diminishing extent the “mid-sider” category, with only a small fraction being “insiders”. Similarly it is mainly older workers, in particular the workers of the previous generation, who mostly belong to the most protected sectors. Trade union representation, where the typical representative is a middle aged white male usually from the public sector or a previously state owned bank, is evidence of this very fact (Matsagganis 2007). According to the latest data on the number of public sector employees in Greece, the 20-29 age-group represents only 55,330 out of a total of 621,906 public sector workers (Public Sector Electronic Pay Register, April 1 2013). This constitutes only 11.5% of 475 thousand employed young people in the age 20-29 for the fourth quarter of 2012 (ELSTAT 2012). This in turn supports the argument that the young generation has a high probability of working in precarious jobs and the previous generation in protected ones.

The young generation “mid-siders” and “outsiders” are positioned in those labour market segments, where the phenomenon of “rigid-anomy” is most pronounced. “Rigid-anomy” is a descriptive term coined by G700 (2008) and it refers to the combination of a rigid employment and work protection legislation and an inflexible labour market with the reality of a labour market jungle, where none or very few of the formal rules apply (anomy = anomia in Greek meaning lawlessness). The rigidity of the Greek regulatory framework has been thoroughly analysed by scholars and international organisations and there is no need to analyse it further here. Greece has been categorised as having “overly rigid labour market institutions” and an employment protection legislation, which though in line with other OECD members is especially restrictive for white collar workers as well as for temporary employment, making it one of “the most stringent in the OECD” (OECD 2007, p.2, 9). However, this “rigidity” and “stringency” of the regulatory framework in Greece, did not in the past result to a high level of employment protection. Infringements of labour law have traditionally taken the form of:

- a) A large shadow economy, defined narrowly by Schneider (2011, p.3-4) as “all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities among others for reasons of avoiding social security contributions, meeting certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards”. According to Schneider (2011, p.20),

in 2007 the unofficial economy accounted for over a quarter of Greece's GDP. Although we have no data on the participation of young workers in the shadow economy, given the fact that the majority of young workers is employed in the private sector, the assumption here is that they, along with migrant workers and women, form the most numerous group in the total unreported work activity category.

b) The provision of services to only one work provider by self-employed workers, who in this way act de facto as employees, but without the benefits of being an employee (OECD 2010, Matsagganis 2011). According to Karamesini's study (2008, p.76), in 2008, five to seven years after graduation 16% of university graduates were working as independent workers to a single employer. This makes 21% of the total number of dependent workers (Karamesini 2008, p.78). In a similar study (Athanasouli 2003) 27% of the graduates of the National Metsoveian Polytechnic University were found to be working as "pseudo-independent workers": usually full-time, on successively renewed contracts with the same single employer

The first and second Economic Adjustment Programs tried to move Greece down the path of a more unified and overly flexible labour market. Measures have been taken to make wages more responsive to changes in economic conditions, boost part-time work, facilitate more flexible work time, and increase spending on activation and training programmes (OECD 2011, p.14). Moreover, the collective bargaining system was revised. A new type of firm-level wage agreement has been established, "allowing employers and employees to agree on wages that are less favourable than those stipulated in sectoral agreements" (OECD 2011, p.14). In the meantime collective agreements cannot be imposed automatically in companies not covered by them, their maximum duration is set at 3 years, the "after-effect" regime is revised to the benefit of employers and recourse to arbitration is allowed for only if both parties agree to it (EC 2012a, p.40). Moreover, Greece made a commitment to take measures in order to align privileged labour conditions in former state-owned firms (SOEs) with those in the rest of the private sector. Finally, the fight against undeclared work needed to be stepped up since, according to the European Commission (EC 2012a, p.41), there was "evidence suggesting that the evasion of social contribution payments has increased in recent quarters".

By December 2012, things seemed to have been moving at a satisfactory pace on the flexibility front. According to the European Commission (EC 2012b, p. 44) "significant action has already been taken to reform the Greek labour market in the past two years". However, "more efforts are needed in face of high levels of unemployment and the still high non-wage labour costs" (EC 2012b, p.44). As a result, in the first review of the second Economic Adjustment Program, Greece agreed to take "new measures in order to further improve the functioning of the labour market" (EC 2012a, p.45). Among others they comprise the further easing of the degree of employment protection, less restrictive regulations for the adjustment of working hours, lower non-wage labour costs, more efficient approaches to control undeclared work and informality, curtail excessive and costly reporting requirements. Added to the above, it was decided that the "excessively high" severance pay would be capped at 12 months of pay. In addition, the aim to align privileged labour conditions in former state-owned firms with those in the private sector was re-instated, as was the need to clamp down on the shadow economy.

The above attempts at flexibility would be applauded, if they also increased security for the system's outsiders. After two years of consecutive attempts to create a less segmented and at the same time a more flexible labour market, it may be argued that the Greek government and the Troica are missing the target. There is evidence to suggest that in the short and medium terms the Greek labour market might be moving towards a situation where high statutory flexibility will be combined with a reality of an increased disrespect for the new minimal employment protection legislation. Despite formal commitments to align public sector companies with existing private sector regulation, labour market segmentation into "insiders", "mid-siders", and "out-siders" still persists. SEO's top managers have been refusing to implement the new framework to the point that the general economic prosecutor had to step in to control legality. Furthermore, there is the paradox of the private sector being burdened with the core of the internal devaluation policy, while the public sector still remains untouched and well protected in most fields, but wages, where cuts have been indeed severe. Finally, the fight against undeclared work does not seem to be yielding any results. It may be argued that it has not even started. In the December

2012, the European Commission (EC 2012b, p. 46) argued that “the fight against undeclared work and informality is being stepped up”. But, the justification behind this claim is at least preposterous. According to the European Commission stepping up translates to securing “an independent external assessment of the Labour Inspectorate covering its mandate, activities and structure, and the enforcement and penalty structure for infringements of labour arrangements” (EC 2012b, p.46). Overall, we may call this scandalous new state of affairs “flex-anarchy” in a persistent segmented labour market background. This is where we are today in terms of employment and work security.

2.4 GENERATIONAL TENSION: OFF “VAMPIRES AND CANNIBALS”

In 2004, in his book *“Vampires and Cannibals”*, Mimis Androulakis (2004) presented the main protagonists of what was expected to become the most predicted crisis of the 21st century: the pension crisis resulting to a full blown generational storm. According to Androulakis (2004) on the one side stood the numerous “vampires”, the “114”, May ‘68 and “Polytechnio” generations, all within the baby-boom demographic cohort, who wanting to prolong their youth, squeeze the blood out of their working children in order to safeguard high levels of pensions and social benefits from an early age. The “vampires” are sided with politicians in “political cartel-vampire parties”, who in view of the reality of rapid population ageing are obliged to respect an “omerta” around the issue of pensions and old age spending, so long as they want to keep having a political career.

Against this grey status quo stood the “cannibals” of generation X and those of the Millennium generation. The less numerous and more precarious children of the “vampire” generation who would rise up to cannibalise their parents, unless a new generational social contract was agreed. Addressing a Conference on Intergenerational Justice organised by the General Secretariat for Youth in June 2010, a G700 representative encouraged his peers to “eat their parents” (Stampoulidis 2010). “Cannibalism” in the sense of a radical paradigm shift from the economic and social status quo was presented as the only way for the precariat to overcome the crisis. According to the vivid analysis of the G700 representative “it was generationally unjust that a whole generation, [the “Polytechnio” generation], holding the flag of democracy and social rights in its hands, considered that it was legitimate for its members to exhaust the country’s financial, productive institutional and environmental resources so that they may have a good time and god bless ... thus it threw its children into debt up to their throat, so that it may leave early in pension most times using a golden parachute, or get pension on better terms than the younger generations ...”

Moving beyond sensational language and fancy frames, we have already argued that one of the fundamental features of our generational unit under analysis is the presence of a continuous tension with the older generation. This tension does not resemble the conventional notion of generational gap, to be found in intergenerational relations from the beginning of time. It is fuelled by perceptions and realities of unbalanced and unequal intergenerational transfers and outcomes in the public sphere. One such perception is that the upward mobility ladder has broken down or that the present generation will be worse off than the previous one. Chiotaki-Poulou and Sakellariou (2010, p.28) consider this to be a clear reality in Greece too: “the previous generations in Greece achieved a better standard of life, better wages, pensions and social security in comparison to “generation 700 Euros” to which they offered only the possibility of education with no reward”.

Where intergenerational inequality takes gigantic dimensions, though, is in public age-related spending. According to the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee (2011) age-related public spending is measured on the basis of demographic projections (fertility and life expectancy), economic projections (labour productivity, employment, growth) and budgetary projections in health care, long term care, education and pensions. In 2007, the year when the “generation 700 euros” issue broke into the public discourse, Greece’s age-related public spending was bound to increase by 10%. According to the European Commission (EC and EPC 2009) the challenge that Greece faces is to ensure the long-term sustainability of its public finances at the back of an ageing population. In 2007, Greece was a high risk country when it came to age-related public spending. Given that the main driver behind this development is public pension expenditure, already very high as a percentage of the GDP and expected to rise dramatically in the coming decades, we will focus our attention on the recent pension reform.

The question is this: is the generational game being leveled?

In 2007, Greece belonged to the group of states whose pension expenditure stood at 11.7% percent of GDP, the fourth highest among the EU-27, with an EU-27 average of 10.1% (EC and EPC, 2009, p.26). Even worse, public pension expenditure was projected to approach 24.1% of GDP by 2060, in what would have been the second largest increase in the EU-27, whose average was projected to approach 12.5% (EC and EPC, 2009, p.26, EC 2010, p.43). The main driver behind that negative development was said to be the demographic transition to an older population. According to the European Commission Joint Report on Pensions (EC 2010, p.43) “this effect alone would push up expenditure significantly in Greece, by 12.7 percentage points of GDP (compared to 8.6 for the EU-27 as a whole)”.

Furthermore, the Greek pension system faced additional structural problems. It had been highly segmented, contributing to high inequalities in terms of benefits received by pensioners across professions and across age-groups. As with the labour market, segmentation into “insiders”, “mid-siders” and “outsiders” had been also evident in the case of the pension system. Moreover, pension reform in the past has usually taken the form of “salami slicing” the workers into old and new (for example those insured before 1993 versus those afterwards), with those belonging in the most recent slices shouldering the biggest burden of the adjustment. Referring to the system of auxiliary pensions in Greece, the European Commission (EC 2012a, p.37) argued that “the existing setup appeared to give rise to persistent inter- and intra-generational differences, and as such is not socially equitable”.

With the crisis unveiling the dire straits of the Greek economy, pension reform was considered fundamental in ensuring the sustainability of the public finances at the back of a rapidly ageing population. The overall target of the reform was to curb growth in public pension expenditure below the euro-zone average, as well as make the system more equitable by unifying its structure and major parameters without exempting particular age-groups.

Though it is beyond the scope of the current paper to analyze the specific pension reform measures, it is of crucial importance to point out that, among others, pension reform merged the existing pension funds into a unified new pension system with a pay as you go basic pension pillar (3 funds) and a notionally defined contribution auxiliary pillar (one fund) for all current and future employees, while abolishing all special rules for the persons insured before 1993. In addition, the new auxiliary pensions’ formula was decided to be applied to pension rights accumulated since 2001. From a generational point of view it may be argued that pension reform has been a significant success. Privileged groups both across generations as well as within the same generation were forced to lose many of their rights and become shareholders into a new public pensions system for all. In addition, under its unifying logic and the move towards longer working lives, the new system sends a very important political and social message across the board: work and employment are the primary means of acquiring income, not early pensions, nor any type of benefit gained on the basis of clientelistic exchanges between the system’s “insiders” and the political executive.

Finally, seen from a public expenditure perspective, pension reform has substantially improved the dynamics of public pension expenditure (EC 2012a, p.37). Though the reform of the auxiliary pensions system has not been taken into account the European Commission (EC 2012c, p.34) Ageing Report for 2012 argues that reforms in Greece are having visible positive impacts, “sharply reducing the projected increase in public pension expenditure, diminishing the budgetary impact of ageing”. According to the Report (EC 2012c, p. 403) public expenditure in 2060 is projected to reach only 14.6% in comparison to 24.1%, which was the projection of the 2009 Ageing Report. Because of this progress on the pensions front, the overall increase in age-related public spending will also be more moderate, 4 p.p. of GDP or less, placing Greece in the group of countries with the lowest such burden along with Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. (EC 2012c, p.35)

CONCLUDING REMARKS: CAN WE BE OPTIMISTIC?

In the present contribution, we used K. Manheim's (1952) theory of generations, to show that the "young generation", in Greece, codified as "generation 700 Euros" before the crisis, may be understood as a broader "actual generation", the "young precariat". "Generation 700 Euros", in Manheim's terms may be seen as a generational unit within the "young precariat" and G700, the political advocacy group who first coined the term, as an influential concrete group creating concepts, that lead to a shared identity among the generational unit's members. Using G. Standing's (2011) constituent elements of the precariat, as well as conventional uses of the term "youth" by international organisations (EC 2009, OECD 2010, UNESCO 2013), we showed that the "young precariat" comprises of people who are exposed to the following defining social and economic historical experiences: a) a prolonged dependency up to their mid '30s, b) "precarity" in the form of labour market insecurity, income, employment and work insecurity, c) generational tension, defined as the reality of unequal intergenerational transfers due to the increasing level of age-related public spending, especially pensions and d) the debt crisis. The focus of this contribution has been on "precarity" and "generational tension".

The evidence in hand suggests that the problems of the "young precariat" predate the crisis. "Generation 700 euros" had been a real social phenomenon. In 2008, at the point of the Greek economy's peak performance, we observed high labour related insecurity and high generational tension. After the crisis though, due to the combined effect of the recession and the measures implemented under the strict policy conditionality of the economic adjustment program we observe two contrasting phenomena. On the one hand a rapid increase in "precarity" with the deterioration of labour related security on all fronts. The unemployment epidemic is interacting with lower incomes and a situation of flexible anarchy in a segmented labour market. The young generation is as much of an outsider as it has ever been. On the other hand, we observe a rapid levelling of the generational game. The adjustment for the young precariat is negligible in comparison to what the older generations have to shoulder in terms of cuts and systemic structural reorientation in the pension system. This is in line with Kotlikoff's (2003) argument referring to Argentina in 2002 that when a country follows persistent generationally unjust policies then the time comes when these generations will also pay the price for those policies. In the Greek case, if pension reform leads also to a lowering of non-wage costs through a significant decrease in social contributions, as programmed in the Economic Adjustment Program, then it may be argued that the scene would have been set for a generational game "flattening". The "vampires" would have lost without the "cannibals" having shot a single bullet.

Does this mean that from the point of view of the "young precariat" there are reasons for optimism? Given that the tectonic plates of change are still on the move in Greece, it would be hard to make any medium, even long-term prediction. Focusing on the present we see nothing but a grim picture of insecurity, lack of prospects and pessimism. The big exception here, being the rebalancing of intergenerational relations, especially in relation to pensions. Looking into the future, there are of course reasons for optimism. The destruction of the old Greek growth model, based among others on generationally and socially unbalanced relations, is indeed a long awaited and much needed process that in the long run should work to the benefit of the young generations and even more so to that of future generations. Much will depend though, at the pace of structural change, upon whether Greece manages to exit the deep recession as well as change its productive paradigm on time, and whether it will also maintain sustainable public finances in the coming years. In case the present decade is lost in growth-less and job-less incremental structural change, then the "young precariat", especially those in their late twenties and early thirties, belonging to the "generation 700 Euros" generational unit, are looking into totally wasting the prime time of their working lives: under those circumstances they will de facto become a "lost generation" and "baby losers". Furthermore, an important parameter that needs to be taken into consideration (left out from this research for reasons of time and space) are the changing political attitudes of the young generation. The 15-29 age group polls 14% for Golden Dawn, the neo-nazi party, and 27% for SYRIZA, the party of the radical Left, leaving traditional mainstream political heavyweights, the Conservative New Democracy and the Social Democratic PASOK at 7% and 2% respectively. However, life under the leadership of the populist extremes might prove to be even more precarious than before.

For Europe, currently in a process of trying to tackle youth unemployment, through the EU2020 Youth on the Move Flagship Initiative and the Youth Employment Pact, the discussion on the young precariat is an opportunity to deepen its understanding of the social phenomena it is currently dealing with. The “young precariat” is not a phenomenon unique to Greece. Future research might be able to show that it constitutes a growing south European, if not pan-European “actual generation”. Along with it grow the politics of populism and anti-european sentiment, fuelled by specific generational units that build identities in extremism. The challenge we face is beyond reducing the NEET rate of the 19-24 age-group, important as this might be. The challenge is whether the European venture can be re-legitimised in the eyes of a young generation, the members of which have many important reasons to doubt it. To conclude, many issues remain open for investigation. Future research on the young generation may focus on: a) the development of measures and their use for a more thorough comparison across generations across time and across countries in relation to all forms of labour related security, b) the measurement of intergenerational transfers in the public and family spheres, c) the study of representational insecurity as a specific type of labour related insecurity, which leads to the erosion of mainstream political institutions, d) the advancement of the sociological theory of generations. After all, understanding generations is a helpful guide in understanding new social and intellectual movements.

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Living (Critically) in the Present: Youth Activism in Mostar (Bosnia Herzegovina)

Giulia Carabelli¹

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ABSTRACT

This paper reflects upon the conditions and implications of living in a protracted state of social and political crisis. Through these considerations, I will explore the strategies implemented by a youth organisation in Mostar that deals with the socio-political inconsistencies of the post-conflict scenario. The paper starts by unravelling the significance of the particular form of normalised crisis by discussing how the problem-solving approach to the Bosnia Herzegovina emergency created by the wars in the 90s led to the creation of a political and administrative system unable to guarantee stability. In particular, the paper critically engages with the present of Mostar, characterised by stillness, immobility, stagnancy, and the general withdrawal from a proactive engagement with politics. The specificity of Mostar as a city, where nothing seems to happen, leads to the perception that change is difficult to achieve or even to imagine. Yet, this paper is also interested in providing a glimpse of how living in a critical present empowers young activists who feel the urge to create moments of urban disruptions in which the very possibility of a more just and peaceful future could be imagined. In particular, this paper critically examines the activities implemented by Abart, a platform for art production and urban research with the aim of exploring the ways in which creative practice becomes an instrument of political intervention. Further, this paper argues that by embracing nostalgia, as a means of re-appropriating Yugoslav ideals of peace and togetherness among different ethno-national communities, young activists draw on the past to critically imagine how a different future could be built.

Keywords: Mostar, Crisis, Nostalgia, Grassroots Social Movements, Politics of Art.

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INTRODUCTION²

Much of the scholarship concerned with Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) was written in the late 1990's – in the aftermath of the wars – when former Yugoslavia became the main protagonist of international news networks. The academic response to the unfolding wars reflected dismay and shock in their titles: *Balkan Babel* (Ramet, 1992); *Yugoslavian Inferno* (Mojzes, 1995); *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (Rieff, 1996); *The Death of Yugoslavia* (Silber, 1996); *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Allen, 1996) – to mention a few. For two years (1992-1993), TV screens filled houses with reports of war atrocities: death, famine, concentration camps, rapes, destruction, desperation, and anguish. This was an emergency that needed to be resolved internationally; discussions about the necessity of an armed intervention were periodically aired right up to the moment when peacekeeping compounds finally arrived with their *expert know-how* in settling protracted conflicts. Secret and public meetings among national and international leaders were arranged, pacts and treaties drafted, and a definite agreement for “peace” finally signed in Dayton, Ohio (1995).

Twenty years after the end of the wars, Bosnia Herzegovina is a nation state that failed to become sovereign. Despite the efforts made by the many international agencies, governmental bodies, and non-governmental networks intervening with the intent to create infrastructures for a democratic and independent state, Bosnia Herzegovina maintains its (continuous and ongoing) position on the verge of social and political crisis. And yet, around the world new states of emergency, new wars, new camps, new bombs, and new peacekeeping compounds sent to help those in dire need, deprive Bosnia Herzegovina of its previous international fame. This new lack of visibility (or withdrawal of interest) in the international arena consigns Bosnia Herzegovina as a nation seemingly no longer in its state of emergency. The country has officially entered its “post-war” phase – for two decades – with little and slow progress towards the projected (and vaunted) status of “normalcy”. Much of the strategic interventions developed by the main international players had as their main goal the establishment of this notion of social *normalcy*. As a result, new norms were to be written guaranteeing the serene development of a democratic country from the ashes of the socialist failure. With this project of national renewal came the creation of new laws, new civic rules, new voting systems, as well as new borders, new meanings of being Bosnian(s), new languages and so on. There is much to be considered and debated with regards to the ways in which BiH was re-imagined and built. Unfortunately, much of these considerations exceed the scope of this paper. Instead, I wish to discuss the very notion of “crisis” by exploring the question of what it means to live in a period of prolonged and seemingly unending crisis. I am interested in critically engaging with the concept of crisis in order to discuss what happens after emergencies are “solved” and social life re-starts. In particular, I will take into consideration how crises affect the everyday of young people in the city of Mostar, where I lived for a year while conducting fieldwork for the completion of my doctoral dissertation (2009-2010). This investigation prompts several questions: what does it mean to grow up in a post-conflict city whose stability is threatened by the very system created to govern it? What does it mean to be young – and vulnerable – in a place where nothing seems in place, and where the temptation to slip into the discourse and mentality that “nothing works” thwarts the necessary effort of identifying that which needs to be actively changed? Accordingly, this paper will critically enquire into the process of *the normalisation of crisis*. What happens when crisis becomes the norm? What does it mean to live in a perpetual state of crisis (after the “official” emergency phase)? As a way to

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ground these considerations empirically, I will take into account the Youth Cultural Centre Abrašević in Mostar and, in particular, discuss the aims, goals, and activities implemented by a platform for art production and urban research created in 2009 within the premises of the Youth Centre: Abart where I have been working for the past three years in the capacity of Research Consultant and fundraiser. By delving into the history and rationale of this platform and its visions about the future of Mostar, I aim to interrogate the positions of young people in the city especially in the context of questioning how *crises* limit, obstruct, yet also enhance and empower young people's political activism.

1. ON THE NOTION OF CRISIS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH STATES OF EMERGENCY

The notion of crisis shares a close resonance with the “state of emergency”. A crisis unsettles an achieved balance, disrupting social, economic, and political processes, upsetting the path to the realisation of political goals. As such, crisis comes about as a painful event that needs to be dealt with swiftly by mobilising all available resources. What is specific about crisis is that it feeds an atmosphere of utter urgency, requiring an engagement within the present; quick solutions are to be found by drawing on past events and experience, and by assessing archives and databases to single out the ways in which practical solutions could be used to overcome problems. In this way, crises often lose their spatial and historical specificities, becoming mere representations of the never-expected, but always acute interruptions that need to be solved within the limits of the present. The fundamental antithesis of crisis, being simultaneously the state into which crises resolve, is the *return to normalcy*. As such the resolution of ‘states of emergency’ forms the basis for new socio-political balances to be created. In the case of BiH, the peace agreements included a new Constitution and institutional arrangements for the newborn state, which crucially shaped the country's post-war scenario and informed the modalities of its (re)construction. A consociational (power-sharing) system was envisioned as the best option among those available. In a manner that differed from all other former-Yugoslav Republics, BiH was declared a multi-national state constituted by three distinct peoples: Bosnian-Muslim/Bosniak, Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Serb. Needless to say, what is *normal* is what has been *normalised* through processes of continuous re-assessment and the establishment of norms capable of discriminating between what is acceptable and what it is not. In post-war BiH, the legitimacy given to the three constituent peoples failed to create infrastructures for the creation of a cohesive nation state, instead empowering ethno-national(ist) discourses that led to further fragmentations and the drawing of official and unofficial internal borders. Mostar became the epitome of this process of segregation; the city was officially divided into six units and between its two main ethno-national groups under the international supervision of the European Union in order to placate animosities.³ The resolution of the Yugoslav-emergency did end the conflict and its related atrocities, but it also *normalised* an understanding of citizenship as an ethno-national matter, which maintains the country on the constant verge (and permanent status) of political crisis.

³ From 1994 to 1997 the European Union was in charge of the administration of Mostar. In 1997 the Office of the High Representative took direct control until the city was reunified in 2004.

1.1 PRACTICALITY AS THE ROAD TO CRISIS SOLUTION

These aspects of the normalisation of crisis and its contradictions can be seen through the political deadlock that gripped the city of Mostar during its post-war life. In 2004, after years of aborted attempts to reunify the city of Mostar under a single administration, the then High Representative Paddy Ashdown decided to establish a special commission with the intent of drafting a reunification strategy. The plan collapsed, but Lord Ashdown was not to be defeated by the local politicians' inability to agree on the reform. Thus he imposed a new Statute for Mostar declaring that the city was now a united and continuous territory with a single administration. In a previous open letter written to the citizens of BiH, Ashdown had already explained his take on politics, as "a practical business. It is about identifying problems and solving them. And that is what the reform process is ultimately about. About creating a better life for you, and for your children" (Open Letter from the HR to the Citizens of BiH, 27/05/2003)⁴. The decision to reunify Mostar was given (and taken) as an imposition in order to quickly solve a state of (protracted) emergency. All the documents written pre-2004 by international officials describe Mostar as dysfunctional and its citizens in need of help, which compelled the direct intervention of the international community in order to *normalise* the situation. Mostar, the divided city, was for international peacekeepers an emergency to be dealt with in its own right. After the reunification, the state of emergency could be legitimately written off. Mostar eventually became a ('model') city and could inch towards its (imposed) target to become a 'European City'.

The temporary urban *sickness* – a type of *abnormality* with no clear diagnosis – was therefore healed by the imposition of a more functional structure and a new administration elected according to ethnic quotas following national schemes instructed by the power-sharing system. Crucially, the construction of identities according to ethno-national membership had never been challenged in the reunification process; yet it is the legalisation of political subjectivities *as ethno-national* that must be addressed as problematic. In fact, by de-linking political subjectivity from ethno-national belonging, it could have been possible to imagine and discuss political and social issues as urban-affairs, rather than ethnic-affairs. Instead, there is a double contradiction embodied in a simultaneous and superimposed abstraction of political subjectivity (ethnic differentiation) *and* political territoriality (urban unification).

From the (ir)rationality of this superimposition, even if formal democratic mechanisms are in place their social value will come to nothing as long as they are fractured along lines of subjectivity that subvert any meaningful social reconciliation.

To be sure, the imposition occurred in the context of a 'democratic apparatus'. But the nature of this apparatus itself, being merely 'representative' (of whom, or what?), circumscribed the very possibility of legitimate opposition to the implementation of abstract unification (cf. Džihic and Segert, 2012). Indeed, there was never a question of whether categories of political representation were the key factors in producing political deadlock. Elected councillors, who never approved the statute, were willing to sabotage the imposed *normalcy* on several occasions creating new crises. For instance, the city was without a mayor for over a year in 2008-2009 and elected councillors had hardly approved any new plans because of their irreconcilable differences. The manipulation of democratic tools in order to keep the space of Mostar divided must also be appreciated by looking into the problematic provision of services in Mostar. Local political authorities targeted the existing parallel companies (electricity

⁴ http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29958
Last accessed: 23/08/2012.

and water providers, or garbage collection) in order to initiate a reform capable of reunifying services, but the result was nothing particularly radical, such as the creation of new companies working for the entire city. Rather, existing companies were either formally united but kept in operation as separated, or worked for a third company owned by the city (IGC, 2000; 2009). The reunification was literally paper-thin.

The somewhat ambiguous international representation of Mostar as unified was welcomed by local political elites as a step towards *normalisation* although the High Representative had to intervene several times after the 'reunification' in order to solve political impasses. And yet there is an important difference that must be accounted for; the reunification happened in a state of emergency while the following interventions to solve political deadlocks happened without that feeling of urgency that characterises emergencies. Somehow, even the international actors started dealing with new political crises in Mostar as if they were *normal*: part and parcel of the dysfunctional city that is unable to follow the guardian's instructions to become – eventually – *normal*.

2. "HEY IT'S MOSTAR!"

When I first moved to Mostar, in November 2009, the city had been without a mayor for over a year. There was no administration, no city budget, public employees had not been paid for some time, while all the main construction and reconstruction sites had been interrupted due to the lack of allocated funding. This was a crisis, I thought. Yet surprisingly there was no desperation, anger, or sense of urgency. The attention of the local media on the ongoing crisis was high, and yet, it felt to me as if nobody had enough energy to intervene. When talking to young people and friends I could not help but sense a widespread feeling of defeat. It seemed as if nobody could clearly understand what was going on, thus the impossibility of predicting what could be done about it. The main problem of Mostar was – I often heard – *politics*. *Politika* came into being as a space where all that is immoral, corrupted, distant and amenable should be positioned (Kolind, 2007) and, as such, to become involved in politics was not recommended. Rather, those involved in politics were the ultimate cause of problems, *de facto* facilitating a process of mass withdrawal from *participation* in a discussion on the future of the city.

As a result, a sense of *stillness* came about as my first assessment of the city: nothing was happening at all. Mostar had become *stagnant*, *immobile*, and *uneventful*. Stillness was caused by political boycott. Councillors were procrastinating the election of the mayor to express their political disappointment and promote their divisive agendas. Immobility was the consequence of *withdrawal*. Once politics became associated only with corruption and immorality, there was no willingness to dirty one's hands and participate in the game. Immobility materialised as *apathy*. The dysfunction of the city induced a lack of interest and certainly enthusiasm. If nothing works, there is nothing to do. Immobility was translated into general *boredom*. I cannot recount how many times, sitting in front of a coffee, I found myself engrossed in collective complaints because of the lack of something interesting to do.

However, when I tried to question my young respondents about the political deadlock and the many inconsistencies I was noticing, I often heard the same remark: "Hey! It's Mostar!" This statement was

pronounced with a sarcastic tone as a way to take critical distance from the abnormality of the city, and yet confirming its exceptionality. On the one hand, it helped to make sense of what did not make sense (contradictions and inconsistencies); thus, it is explanatory. On the other hand, it allows citizens to deal with bureaucratic or social malfunctions with flexibility and inventiveness. Nothing is impossible, if *seriously* needed! As I could notice, there is always a way – legal or illegal, following or not following existing procedures – to obtain a service or a certificate or a favour; after all, *It's Mostar!* A complicated bureaucracy, malfunctioning services, and a general sense of uncertainty are the reasons for, and the means by which, the creation of new forms of urban informality are realised. My respondents were aware of their ethno-national positionality in the city and often behaved accordingly, reproducing such divisions. However, everyday movements and actions were not always dictated or limited by the division, although there was an awareness of it. This could be seen in the choice of frequenting certain cafés, in the avoidance of certain areas of the city, and in the presence of urban markers such as political graffiti. However, rigidity and immobility are constantly negotiated according to contingencies.

Despite being aware of the problems created by ethno-national polarisation, which creates political deadlocks and a continuous state of crisis, procrastination belongs to (and possesses) Mostar. People are never rushed into things in the present; rather they dwell in the space of *tomorrow*, which represents the ultimate potential for anything to happen. When trying to arrange interviews with officials, I was always invited to call again: *tomorrow*. Even when talking with friends to arrange meetings or appointments, I could not help but notice the *normalised* attitude to postpone any decision to *tomorrow*.

Tomorrow represents a potential future when (where) there will be time (and space) to think about what is not possible to deal with today – even though there is no practical impediment to solve the addressed contingency in the present moment. Tomorrow becomes a version of *the future* without a sure tempo. It embodies *the future* per se – a potential. The accustomed tendency to procrastinate and to postpone decisions, work, and actions translates into (provokes and is the effect of) the general attitude *not to move* (stillness). Drawing on the work of Lauren Berlant, I argue that the detected attitude to *stay still* must also be acknowledged as a *survival strategy* in the sense that, to stay still preserves the present by perpetuating it in the future as it is (slowing down its tempo). In other words, the instability of the political situation prevents citizens from *making change* because being (pro)active in such a situation cannot assure life improvements; rather it could reveal the perils of social life. Accordingly, the presented multifarious understandings of the term *immobility* could all converge in the temporal practice of procrastination, which becomes, accordingly, the instrument to maintain *stasis*, whichever was the cause of the stillness, to *survive*.

In *Cruel Optimism*, Berlant (2011) takes into close analysis films, novels, and art practice to enquire into the effects of “the contemporary mode of production” in everyday life. Crucially, she pictures *our time* as the “post-Fordist sensorium... making its way through a postindustrial present, the shrinkage of the welfare state, the expansion of grey (semi-formal) economies, and the escalation of transnational migration, with its attendant rise in racism and political cynicism” (p. 19). Significantly, this *present* – which is incontrovertibly problematic – does not produce *revolutionary atmospheres*, but rather “a feeling of aspirational normalcy, the desire to feel normal, and to feel normalcy as a ground of dependable life, a life that does not have to keep being reinvented” (p.169). As a result, citizens’ dissatisfaction leads

– paradoxically – to the “reinvestment in the normative promises of capital” (*ibid*). Despite the fact that the situation I am exploring differs from the more general assessment of western society in all its historical and social particularities, I argue that immobility, and the associated difficulties involved with making change under such conditions, must be understood in a similar way.

Thus, at the level of Mostar’s quotidian the very notion of change could mean the disruption of an everyday that, although difficult, assures existence within acceptable parameters (and instructs rights and duties). Life in Mostar is difficult, but acceptable. Making change to achieve balance (even though dysfunctional) creates disruptions that might possibly worsen the situation. Thus, immobility becomes a survival strategy, and in this way agency must be understood as “the activity of maintenance, not making, fantasy without grandiosity, sentence without full intentionality, inconsistency without shattering, embodying alongside embodiment” (Berlant, 2011, p. 114). Lefebvre hit upon precisely this problem of human agency operating under stifling conditions that continuously put into question the efficacy of *particular* modes of practice – those thoughts and actions that are not in conformity with the dictates of the dominant mode of social life:

“The silence of the ‘users’ ... may be explained as follows: consumers sense that the slightest shift on their part can have boundless consequences, that the whole order (or mode of production) weighting down upon them will be seriously affected by the slightest movement on their part” (1991, p. 383).

This conception also relates to one type of agency identified by Colas (2002, p. 66), those “that are routinised by custom, tradition or other sets of norms, and which therefore lack an inherent political purpose”. This is not to suggest that the prevalence of immobility is somehow expressive of an innate Mostarian “tradition”, but rather, that the reproduction of stillness and procrastination becomes *routinised* in and through the socio-spatial structures of which it is a part.

3. MOVING WITHIN STILLNESS AND BEYOND CRISIS: YOUTH POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MOSTAR

To live in a situation of permanent (and ‘normalised’) crisis has made it more difficult for grassroots movements to have an impact on the present and future of Mostar. It is indeed difficult to plan activities and develop strategies to intervene in a city where the very notion of being involved in politics is unappealing and demonised. And yet, the very difficulties associated with living in a city where crisis became the norm made even stronger the commitment of those who still believe that a different future is still possible. One of the main civil society actors working towards reunification is the Youth Cultural Centre Abrašević.

Abrašević existed during the socialist era as RKUD (Workers’ Cultural-Artistic Society) where folk music was played and people gathered after working hours. The centre was one of the many in former Yugoslavia named after the poet Kosta Abrašević (1879-1898), whose artistic work celebrated socialist ideas. The centre’s premises were almost completely destroyed during the war due to its position in the middle of the battlefield (the Bulevar). After the war, a group of local activists, artists, and international

NGOs gathered on the centre's ruins to claim a space in which young people would be provided with possibilities to be creative, and to sponsor intellectual freedom (2002). In 2003, the owners of RKUD Abrašević donated the space to the newly formed youth group, while the City Council granted the association with access to, and use of, the ruined premises. Thanks to international support (Pro-Helvetia, German Embassy, Spanish Government) and goodwill, the centre was partially reconstructed by August 2005 and registered as an NGO. It now consists of a café, a multi-purpose concert hall, and several containers (donated by the Foundation *In defence of our future*) used as office space.

Abrašević is a special place in Mostar. First of all, it is the only cultural centre that vocally refuses to be identified along ethno-national lines. The centre is a politically engaged actor that works towards the reunification of Mostar by critically engaging with the legacy of war and post-war dynamics. The Manifesto of the centre reads:

“The Youth Cultural Centre ABRAŠEVIĆ believes that a different Mostar is possible and wants to build an open society based on civic ethics. In fact Abrašević is seeking for and applying alternative formulae in the fields of culture, economy and politics as an answer to negative trends present in BiH society.” (<http://www.okcAbrašević.org>; *translation mine*)

Abrašević' activists form a *community-other* in the sense that they take a stand against divisive and nationalist logics in order to reclaim a (political) space from where to operate: “In our space there is room for the promotion of various social and cultural movements, [for the development of] different thoughts about the world and our local community, to engage with polemics, discussions and sustain dialogue” (*Ibid.*). Furthermore, “our duty is extremely important because we are directly involved in actions willing to articulate alternatives for a more democratic decision-making process. We work towards changing the current unsustainable situation and to raise awareness of and oppose segregation, nationalisms, fascist and racist political attitudes” (*Ibid.*). The centre has attained visibility within and outside of Mostar by organising concerts, reading groups, theatre performances, exhibitions, and various trainings in the fields of music and media activism. In particular, the centre speaks through its radio (www.abrašMEDIA.info) and news-portal (<http://www.okcAbrašević.org>), which help to promote their critical stands.

Abrašević is part of several networks of similarly engaged cultural actors in the region of former Yugoslavia and it is also known internationally thanks to the (mainly) international donors that financially support the existence of the Centre. Since 2003, it has worked as an umbrella organisation for the associations working within its premises.⁵ In fact, the various partner-groups apply for funding and keep their financial accounts through Abrašević, which also provides a space from which one can work and be part of an activist network.

Clearly, Abrašević is politically positioned in the left-wing end of the political spectrum. The refusal of ethno-nationally-managed politics has to be appreciated as the active engagement with (broadly) *socialist* ideals. In the Centre there are anarchists, socialists, revolutionaries, but also people who are not *interested* in politics (by their own admission), though they believe in justice and solidarity.

⁵ Such as AbrašMedia (media activism) and Abart (art production).

While conducting fieldwork, I spent the majority of my days observing and interacting with people in Abrašević; my main interlocutors were activists whose main goal is to change the *status quo*. The fact that my data comes from engaging with such a distinctive layer of the population certainly requires further critical reflections. First of all I have to clarify that the group of people I am referring to is not representative of the Mostar population as a whole, and therefore should be acknowledged as such. On average, around 30 people frequent Abrašević every day; their age group spanning from 18 to late 30s. The centre could gather over 500 people for special events (often music concerts), but I am unsure regarding the political orientation of those attending these events (although the centre has a clear political orientation and I doubt it will attract those who are in total disagreement with it). This could easily lead to the dismissal of my informants as non-representative from a statistical point of view. However, this centre organises more than 150 events a year (in 2010, during my fieldwork) and this is the only cultural organisation proactively seeking to reduce urban polarisation and promoting radical change.

I certainly developed a more than academic interest in the centre and its activities up to the point when I became personally involved in the activities of Abart, one of the groups working within the centre. Abart is a platform for art production and urban research founded in August 2009 in Mostar, whose political strategy is to organise cultural events with the aim of engaging with art practice as a tool for social change. In fact, all the initiatives implemented thus far were born with the intent of designing performances and exhibitions targeting the problematic polarisation of the urban fabric in order to create awareness and facilitate discussion among citizens on the possibility that the future of the city could be other than divided. Further, Abart was created with the specific aim of re-animating the moribund cultural life of the city. As such, and through various national and international collaborations, Abart has invited several artists to work in Mostar's public spaces to create events. More importantly, in 2010 Abart has started collaborating with university students to support their artistic careers as well as to involve them in the process of critically engaging with the present of Mostar to creatively think about the very possibility of change.

There are several reasons for the personal attachment I felt towards the centre, and particularly Abart. First of all, I noticed the unrelenting passion shown on behalf of politically engaged actors, especially in a city where political engagement is to be avoided and politics equated with corruption. I observed their willingness to impose themselves as an alternative voice and I joined their efforts (in only the small way I could), driven by my personal commitment to the creation of a more just and equal society. My exposure to everyday conversations and practices among this particular part of the population made me conscious of the necessity to expose and examine their presence in Mostar and to understand how they interact with the main divisive practices in the city, as well as to explore the reasons why they failed to attain more visibility. I strongly believe that their small numbers are balanced by their highly vocal engagement – especially in a city where *silent immobility* had become *normal*. More generally, I believe that to single out moments of disruptions, which in their own terms are creating spaces of *difference*, is consistent with the idea of challenging the dominant 'visibility' of Mostar as a divided city and to the representation of its inhabitants as solely belonging to antagonistic ethno-national groups. One of the ways in which such a challenge can be mobilised is through the process of re-imagining and reclaiming the past.

3.1 BUILDING A DIFFERENT FUTURE BY CELEBRATING THE YUGOSLAV PAST

As Kappler has already noticed, Abrašević is a place where nostalgia feeds the willingness to fight for a different future. In the centre “Yugoslav holidays are still celebrated... this is not limited to a nostalgic and passive consideration of the past, but it represents an attempt to deal with the past in its intersections with the present and future” (Kappler, 2012, pp. 216-7). For instance, Kappler explains how the Centre is still frequented by elder groups of people, thus creating a space where cross-generational encounters are made possible. Hence, the centre provides (and creates) a space for the past (elders) to meet the present (youth), in order to explore “the benefits of the past as they may be used to creatively construct the present and the future on the one hand, or deconstructing those elements of history that impede the construction of the present and the future on the other hand” (*Ibid.*). It could be said that the politics of the centre critically engage with *nostalgia* as a *reflective tool* (Boym, 2001, pp. 49-57).

Boym (2001) writes extensively about *nostalgia* and, in particular, she classifies different typologies of *longing for*, as a means to expanding on how the concept could engage with the analysis of the present and the future. In particular, she makes a clear distinction between nostalgia as *reparative* and nostalgia as *reflective*. The former has the value of bringing a snapshot of the past into the present. This kind of nostalgia is typical of post-revolutionary moments, when (after upsetting history) there is a felt desire for a return to the past; the security of *stasis* (Boym, 2001, p. 49). Whereas *reparative nostalgia* embraces a historical narrative to resuscitate national sentiments of past grandiosity, *reflective nostalgia* is less concerned with history than it is with the individual. As the nomenclature suggests, this nostalgia is *flexible* (re-reflective) meaning that there is no necessary willingness to re-establish a frozen (and idealised) past in the present. Rather, reflective nostalgia could be understood as a critical tool that aims at “mediating the passage of time” itself (*Ibid.*). In fact, it *cuddles* fragmented memories and displaces them in the present to forge affective bonds with the past, often in ironic and humorous ways. I believe that the celebrations of Yugoslav festivities in Abrašević should be understood within this framework. As Djokic and Ker-Lindsay observe, “Yugoslavia was more than a country – it was also an idea ... an example of how a shared vision, based on ethnic and linguistic proximity and inspired by a united purpose, could bring together cultural, religious and regional differences to create a single, united polity” (2010, p. 1). Thus, the celebrations of the Day of Youth, or the Day of Workers, become a route to celebrating the *togetherness* of a (lost) time when (and where) people were able to negotiate their differences and *share*, rather than *be separated*.

To be sure, many in Abrašević are too young to remember what Yugoslavia was, or what it meant to live ‘as a Yugoslavian’ at the time, but this is exactly the reason behind their commitment to the Yugo-idea(l). Palmberger (2008) captures this tension by comparing the stories of two women in Mostar, both asked to elaborate on the significance of Yugoslavia. There is an important age difference between her interviewees; the first spent her childhood and adolescence in Yugoslavia, while the second was born shortly before its collapse. While the older woman is nostalgic of the carefree years of her youth, the other employs nostalgia to express her political views: “nostalgia for Yugoslavia is a tool for overcoming the troubled relationship between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in her country. She uses memories of Yugoslavia and a good co-existence as a ‘guiding star’ for the future” (Palmberger, 2008, p. 366). The younger woman is able to select from the past what she thinks could contribute to a better future – the possibility of being peacefully *together* – whereas the first woman’s memories are grounded in her own past – lost and distant. Lindstrom, who also explores the categories of restorative and reflective nostalgia in Yugoslavia, arrives

at similar conclusions: “the audience for these more reflective incarnations of Yugonostalgia is largely made up of young people; a generation who came of age when Yugoslavia was disintegrating” (2006, p. 241). To remember and celebrate Yugoslavia becomes a way to commemorate the (idealised) past when peace and tolerance were still possible, yet it is also a way to articulate the desire for a different future through the discourse of such a past. In this way, the future is constructed upon ideals of tolerance, peace, togetherness, commonality, solidarity, and mutual understanding that are foundational to Yugonostalgia. Thus, *nostalgia* becomes a critical tool to envisioning a different future (and to fight for it).

In order to explore the extent of Abart’s political engagement, and to assess its implemented strategies that intervene in the present in order to build a different future, I will critically explore one of the projects implemented by the platform: the Festival of Arts in Divided Cities. While a more in-depth focus on all of the activities and interventions of the Festival would go far beyond the space afforded here, I will focus on one particular activity that brought to bear on the process of memory and history, narrative and fantasy, as a way of understanding (and transcending) the present by way of the past.

4. FESTIVAL OF ARTS IN DIVIDED CITIES – 2009/2010

“We will point to the fact that there are various forms of ‘borders’ that divide the city in physical and in spiritual way. Besides the obvious division on the national and religious basis, we will point to divisions within the ‘homogeneous nationalist constructions,’ which are dissolving under the influence of new neo-liberal ideologies, so they can be further manipulated for profit interests. We will try to improvise architectural and artistic solutions – bridges on land – which can act as non-conflict passages between the parts of the city, and which are more essential today than the reconstructed bridges over the river Neretva.”

(Application for funding to the European Cultural Fund for the “Festival of Arts in Divided Cities”, Courtesy of Abart)

The project “Festival of Arts in Divided Cities” was Abart’s first internationally sponsored event, which provided a wide visibility to the group. It started in October 2009 and received financial assistance from the European Cultural Fund (EFC). The idea was to engage with artists and researchers from other divided cities to better understand how art practice is challenged by the contested nature of their urban settings. The invited participants came from Beirut, Berlin, and Kosovska Mitrovica. The project developed through three main phases. The first two were research based, while the last consisted of a four-day festival in Mostar. Phase one aimed at setting up a virtual platform to facilitate dialogue among the participants. The main goal was to exchange information regarding their own art practices in relation to the constraints and specificities of the cities in which they worked.

The second phase began by reflecting upon how to include art practice in the process of research. Three artists from BiH were invited to comment on the theme of *borders and divisions* by producing an art piece. The three works (two installations and a video) were presented in an exhibition hosted by Abrašević; “Interspace – I am there, there where I am not” (December 2009).

The third phase of the project culminated with the *Festival of Arts in Divided Cities* (14-17 April, 2010). The programme presented two exhibitions, two lectures, and various performances. On the second day, a group of interested citizens and the international guests were invited for a special tour of the city – the highlight of the festival.

4.1 LAŽNE PRIČE IZ HISTORIJE MOSTARA – THE FALSE STORIES OF (THE HISTORY OF) MOSTAR

The tour lasted around two hours and took the participants in front of unexpected locations to listen to stories re-counting the history of the monument addressed by the tour leaders (Abart team). At the end of each story, a specially designated aluminium plaque – summarising the presented story – was placed on the monument for the wider public to read.

The particularity of this tour is that the organisers re-wrote the history of selected urban locations by way of fantasy rather than historical evidence. They creatively drew on global history to form impossible connections between ancient rituals, pyramids, actors, and contemporary artists as a means of critically (and sarcastically) reflecting on the contested nature of Mostar's urban fabric. Spatial and temporal boundaries were broken in order to write eight stories, which sounded surreal but at the same time (and indirectly) targeted real issues and formulated critical assessments of the socio-political present of the city. For instance, one of the new shopping centres - Piramida (Pyramid) – was addressed as the Pyramid of the Capitalist Grave built by the Third Capitalist dynasty in the Valley of Neretva.

“The role of this pyramid represents the final decisive step in the evolution of the Third Capitalist Dynasty in the Valley of Neretva. [...] It provides a connection between the private owner and the eternal cosmic order through a direct connection with the supreme deity of Stock Market” (Abart, 2010, p. 42).

The clear invective was directed against rampant neo-liberalism and the ways in which Mostar's insertion into the global market economy changed the urban fabric of the city. In fact, within Mostar – a partially destroyed and medium sized city with a high level of unemployment – there are seven new shopping malls (the seventh – Mepas Mall – was inaugurated in April 2012 and brought to Mostar its first McDonald's fast-food outlet).

Another chosen monument was the Staklena Banka (Glass Bank); formerly a bank, it is now a ruined building dangerously overlooking Spanish Square on the former buffer zone and unofficial internal borderline. In the new narrative, the building became a monument designed by (Hollywood actor) Steven Seagal and commissioned by the Spanish Knight De Sade for the United Spanish Emirates on the Mostarian Archipelago. In this case, the story sarcastically addressed the location of the building – Spanish Square – and the international interference in the political life of the city (and that of the new-born nation state). In particular, the story questioned the need of the international compound to mark the (foreign) territory by giving their nationality to a square, which now had its own outstanding monument – a collapsing glass bank.

The aim of the tour was twofold. On the one hand it questioned the authority of history and history-writers by challenging the ways in which stories are told and evidence provided. On the other hand, the fantasy level in which stories took shape allowed for the authors to express their critiques outside the public/political arena.

The stories were written for unexpected monuments; malls, ruins, empty plots, and sites under construction were in fact chosen against more traditional tourist spots such as the Old Bridge. The authors played with names, architectural history, and global history, to re-create bizarre stories, which became (temporarily) true for the audience. The very authority of the storyteller was being questioned – who has the right to validate history? But also, the stories required the audience to be vigilant and ready to filter what they had heard in order to discern the truth from fantasy and to read between the lines in order to decipher hidden contents.

The curious (and confused) crowd was taken in front of banks and (ruined or brand new) shopping centres. The tour leaders presented a city struggling with the inconsistencies and contradictions of the post-war political and economic transition. In particular, they chose to erase the usual characters of Mostar's stories such as the war, the ethno-national groups, and the territorial division to expose how ethno-national tensions and diatribes have also been manipulated to hide and silence other problems such as the difficult transition to a market economy.

Interestingly, there was no incident with the security officers patrolling the private spaces of the shopping centres. When the crowd stopped at the side of Piramida, the man in charge approached us and asked for explanations. He seemed more curious than hostile and quickly left with a Festival leaflet having possibly assumed that an art intervention is nothing harmful. I am unsure whether the security guard read through the False Stories or what he made of it. Certainly, the fact that nobody stopped us, despite not having permission to hang plaques, must be highlighted. On the one hand, rules and laws are always quite flexible in Mostar (It's Mostar!) and the effective application of norms heavily depends on established relationships among individuals (rather than with the Law). Thus, I was not surprised that nobody stopped the Festival from disseminating surreal stories engraved in aluminium (the one-to-one conversation with the security guard solved the breach of private space in five minutes). On the other hand, as Abart thought, art practice was perceived as innocuous. In fact, behind the idea of engaging with art as a tool of change, there was the intuition that to discuss politics through art would not be perceived as politics at all, but simply art. Thus this space of creativity would have allowed the making of more radical political statements without entering the (proper) arena of politicians (the space of corruption).

4.2 RE-ANIMATING THE CITY: THE EPHEMERAL (AND CONTRADICTIONARY) ART OF FESTIVALS

The main goal of the festival at large was to *re-animate* the city beyond its state of crisis-ridden *stasis*. Given the fact that the cultural life of Mostar is moribund, the festival (and the initiative in general) was meant to revitalise urban life. People could experience something different and playful. Yet, as opposed to many contemporary urban festivals, this one had a sour political twist engraved in the dispirited title – Festival of Arts in *Divided* Cities. It is certainly uncommon to gather and celebrate the contested nature of cities especially in consideration of the associated violence. Indeed, the playful reunion wanted to celebrate the possibility for these cities to imagine a different future as well as to explore the potential of art as a tool to support the envisioned change. Yet the choice to design a festival could be seen as problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, urban festivals became part of what Lefebvre called the *commodification* of leisure on the global scale (Lefebvre 1991, p. 383). Secondly, festivals are ephemeral in nature; how do they (if at all) effectively contribute to social change?

4.3 URBAN REGENERATION AND URBAN FESTIVALS: A CAPITALIST MARRIAGE?

While celebrating the revolutionary potential of festivals, Lefebvre warned against the increasing commodification of leisure (1991, p. 383). In fact, he argues, leisure-spaces *appear* to have escaped the control of the established order to constitute counter-spaces understood as liberated from the burdens of everyday life duties and commitments. In reality, however, this illusion is crafted by the state itself (and its bureaucratic apparatus) to reinforce its hegemonic power. Evidence for this more critical view could be found in the proliferation of festivals as instrumental to urban regeneration processes worldwide. As Quinn noticed (2005, p. 927), festivals have been burgeoning since the 1980s to accompany processes of urban renewal and gentrification. Ultimately festivals became a way to boost the economy and to create jobs within the field of culture, rather than creating moments of disruptions to reflect upon radical change.

In post-conflict areas, the promotion of cultural initiatives has been widely embraced by international funding bodies as a way to support the process of reconciliation, democracy building, and the transition to a market economy. Since 2010, when I first became actively involved in the process of fundraising for Abart, I noticed how donors tend to emphasise the role of culture as viable way to create jobs, to boost the economy, and *celebrate* the culture of *minority groups* as a means of democratically supporting their (endangered) traditions. For instance, the calls for application I have processed⁶ always included specific requirements for potential projects to provide training – which could help the targeted group find employment in the cultural sector – or to develop activities capable of fitting into wider (national and international) cultural schemes that might lead to further funding and assure sustainability. From this perspective, art initiatives and cultural events are imagined as ways to create profits to support cultural actors and accompany them in the period of transition to a market economy, all the while failing to address the central social and political aspects that keep ethnic minorities or ethnic tensions firmly in place.

In contrast, Abart believes in developing projects capable of sharpening analytical and critical tools. Working in the cultural sector means, for Abart, doing research that engages with the present in order to produce a space from where one can *think* about a different future. It is an intellectual activity rather than a business. The “Festival of Art in Divided Cities” was not meant to sell or gain profits. Rather, it was organised to have fun. The final tour, for instance, presented ridiculous stories that made the participants laugh. Yet also, behind the nonsensical collage of facts and figures, there was a strong condemnation of the inconsistencies of the present. The Festival aimed to *produce* a different space within the routinised everyday; a platform from where to pause, to listen, and to reflect upon the problematic present. The group of wandering participants materialised the attempt to resist this state of affairs by allowing time and space to form a critical front.

⁶ Culture for understanding, MGD-F (2010: implemented by Abart); International Fund for Cultural Diversity, UNESCO (2011: unsuccessful); Gender Integration, USAID (2011: unsuccessful); Youth Leadership Development, USAID (2011: implemented by Abrašmedia); Youth Interethnic Exchange, US Embassy in BiH (2011: unsuccessful); Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation, USAID (2012: unsuccessful).

5. CONCLUSIONS

The main goal of this paper is to reflect upon the meanings of living in a protracted state of crisis by exploring how the activities promoted by the Youth Cultural Centre Abrašević deals with the uncertain socio-political present of Mostar while attempting to propose more just future scenarios. After the end of the state of emergency caused by the wars that accompanied the dismantling of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia Herzegovina was recognised as a legitimate nation state. New democratic infrastructures were established to re-create *normalcy*. Yet, after two decades, the country still faces the urgency of dealing with always-present political crises. The city of Mostar is often taken as an example of the post-war inconsistencies and, in particular, its problematic process of reunification offers a poignant instance of how the legitimisation of ethno-national citizenship initiated further processes of territorial and social division that ultimately led to protract and permanent political crisis. The present of Mostar is that of a city where the state of crisis has been *normalised*, manifested in the social patterns and practice of stillness. In this framework, the possibility of intervening politically to produce change are limited both by the lack of viable infrastructures facilitating democratic participation as well as by a widespread sense of withdrawal from politics, which is associated with corruption. Yet, the difficulties of the present simultaneously strengthen the commitment of those who are willing to change the *status quo* by other means. This paper introduced the manifesto of the Youth Cultural Centre Abrašević as a way to explore how young people engage with the problematic present in order to imagine a future of peace and reconciliation. Importantly, this paper engaged with the ideals behind such a commitment by arguing that nostalgia plays a key role in this process. Young activists are often too young to remember Yugoslavia and yet, the very idea of a country where different ethno-national communities could live together sets the goals for their political activism. As a way of discussing strategies implemented by young people in Mostar, the paper presented one of the projects implemented by Abart, a platform for art production and urban research working within, and expanding the goals of, the Youth Centre Abrašević. As discussed in the paper, the main aim of the platform is to initiate cultural events and design artistic interventions in Mostar's public spaces in order to create moments in which the citizens of Mostar, and in particular its youth, could gather together and critically reflect upon the inconsistencies of the present. As such, the main goal of the group is to support a *process of criticality*, with the capacity to pause and think are understood as powerful instruments of imagining a different future for the city.

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Making Kosovo Work Again: Challenges and Opportunities for Young People

Florinda Baleci¹, Hans Heeman²

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ABSTRACT

The main aim of this article is to identify the underlying causes of youth unemployment in Kosovo and propose possible solutions. As one of the youngest countries, Kosovo is also home to the youngest population in Europe. One of the biggest challenges it faces is the high rate of youth unemployment. There are several structural, multisector and interrelated constraints to employment in Kosovo, ranging from a defective state system, resulting in legal uncertainty, to stagnant labour demand. One of the ways in which young Kosovans try to reduce the risk of unemployment is by migrating. Particular attention will therefore also be given to migration and its impact on economic development in Kosovo. We will argue that, in order to face the challenge of youth unemployment, a comprehensive approach is required, focusing inter alia on an efficient transition from school to the labour market and the increase of political and legal certainty, which as a result will attract foreign investment. Creating jobs does nevertheless not suffice; these measures should be accompanied by improved labour standards, social security laws and safety-nets.

Keywords: Kosovo, economy, youth unemployment, poverty, migration

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1. INTRODUCTION

On 17 February 2008 Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia, thus becoming one of the youngest countries on the European continent. It was the last country emerging from the Former Yugoslav Republic. After its unwilling occupation and annexation by Serbia in 1912, Kosovo integrated in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945. Since then, Kosovo was considered to be an autonomous province, gaining more and more esteem and status throughout the years until 1989. During this period, Kosovo had a mainly agrarian territory, almost without developed industry due to a lack of foreign investment and a closed economy.

After it lost its autonomy, a repressive police and military regime was set up by Belgrade. During the time of conflict, unemployment and informality rose sharply, as a consequence of the dismissal of Albanian Kosovans from public employment. Throughout the 1990s, Kosovo was ruled directly from Belgrade, with the local Serbian community playing a significant role in implementing Serbia's rule over Kosovo. In order to defy Serbian authority, a system of parallel government institutions was set up by Albanian Kosovans. The situation led to an armed conflict in 1998, which was ended by the military intervention by NATO forces in the spring of 1999. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established an international administration in Kosovo which set up an interim constitutional framework for provisional self-government in 2001 and consequently organized democratic elections on 17 November 2001. At present, the country is in the final stages of transition towards self-governance in economic and financial affairs. The country's reconstruction is mainly led by a focus on economic development and a political orientation towards the European Union. Kosovo is also home to the EULEX mission. This EU-sponsored mission mainly focuses on implementing the rule of law and establishing a functioning justice system that lives up to EU standards. Furthermore, EULEX concentrates on the fight against corruption. In this regard, for example, the mayor of Prizren recently got indicted on corruption charges. (Koha, 2013)

Kosovo has always been the poorest country of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and became even poorer after the country broke apart. Since the end of the conflict in the late '90s Kosovo's economy has made progress, mainly due to foreign aid, remittances and the establishment of its own public administration. The impact of the recent debt crisis on Kosovo has remained limited, given its restricted integration into cross-border financial markets and its small export base. However, despite a positive growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in the previous years, the country's economy continues to face tremendous challenges, the most important ones being poverty and unemployment.

Nowadays, Kosovo remains one of the poorest countries in the region, with 45 % of population living in general poverty and 15 % living in extreme poverty. Its unemployment rate is estimated at a rough 45%. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012) Kosovans between the age of 15-24 are mostly affected, which renders youth unemployment the country's biggest defiance. (Labour Force Survey, 2009) The fact that the country harbours the youngest and fastest growing population of Europe will only continue to add pressure to its labour market and social services.

A high youth unemployment rate can have a long-term impact on the individual, as well as the society. Firstly, it can lead to an enormous pressure on the public budget. High and rising unemployment levels among youth are also associated with higher crime and social instability.³ On an individual level, being unemployed can generate frustration and low self-esteem. Marginalization and social exclusion of young people can also be one of the pernicious consequences of youth unemployment. (Dietrich, 2012) Lastly, low labour demand is also very likely to expose youth to greater risks of lower future wages, repeated periods of unemployment, longer unemployment spells as adults and income inequality. (International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2012) Given these possible negative social and economic repercussions, youth unemployment has become a matter of great concern for the Kosovan government.

As mentioned before, Kosovan youth are facing many difficulties in finding appropriate and stable employment. This paper seeks to underline the root causes of youth unemployment in Kosovo by addressing the historical background of the country, investigating the Kosovan labour market, Foreign Direct Investment, infrastructure, legislation and education. Furthermore, gender-related complications and government programs are discussed. In a third chapter, possible solutions and certain improvements deemed necessary are presented such as stimulating labour demand in Kosovo, the need to set up government programs to promote the acquisition of new skills by young people, the improvement of labour conditions and the creation of safety-nets. In a fourth chapter, migration as a very common phenomena in Kosovo is further discussed, however not only focusing on its negative impact on the Kosovan society but also highlighting positive effects of remittances and brain gain. In the final chapter of this paper, the different chapters of the paper are discussed together in order to produce a comprehensive and brief overview of the main conclusions of this paper. This paper does not seek to provide a pessimistic conclusion of youth unemployment in Kosovo, but will focus on the opportunities for Kosovan youngsters and provide recommendations for a better use and training of Kosovo's human capital.

The literature used in this paper is mainly provided by international organisations such as the World Bank and the European Commission, also documents form the Kosovan Government, NGO's and scientific literature is being used in this paper. However, little research has been done on the specific case of youth unemployment in Kosovo. As the country has a very specific background, most European theories on youth unemployment were not sufficiently applicable to the case of Kosovo. We therefore feel that this paper may well contribute to the body of literature.


³ Cincotta, Engelmann & Anastasion have identified 4 stress factors that make states more vulnerable to instability and conflict: (1) the political volatility of youthful population age structures, (2) rapid urban population growth, (3) competition for cropland and fresh water, (4) proliferation HIV/AIDS. The presence of one or more factors at the same time, in this case a large youth population, may create the conditions for a conflict. (Cincotta, Engelmann & Anastasion, 2003, p. 38)

2. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN KOSOVO: UNDERLYING CAUSES

2.1 BACKGROUND

Kosovo has a relatively young population: almost one third of the population is under the age of 15 years. Each year the labour market is flooded with young newcomers, finding themselves in the impossibility to get a job. According to the 2009 Labour Force Survey approximately 73% of the people in the age group 15-24 were unemployed. (Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2009)

Figure 1.1: Population Pyramid of Kosovo (2009)



Source: Statistical Office of Kosova (2009), Demographic, Social and Reproductive Health Survey in Kosovo, Pristina, pp 9.

Besides a high unemployment rate, we notice that unemployment has a long-term character, often lasting for longer than 12 months. (World Bank, 2010) This is a worrisome phenomenon, given the fact that we can assume that the longer an individual spends time in unemployment, the more chances increase that he or she will lose motivation to look for new job opportunities which in turn will cause idleness. Long-term unemployment will also lead to a lack of experience, which is a great disadvantage given that most employers are often reluctant to recruit inexperienced young employees.

Another alarming finding is a long transition period from school to the labour market. (World Bank, 2008; World Bank, 2010) Similarly to long-term unemployment, this can also lead to a lack of experience, disillusionment as a result of the difficulties looking for a job, thus adversely affecting the future success of young Kosovans in the labour market. During this transition period people risk poverty, or even social exclusion in the most extreme cases, if they can't rely on family or public support structures. According to available data, only 15,7 per cent of Kosovan young people between 15 and 24 years of age have completed the transition from school to work - e.g. are employed in a career or regular job with no immediate plan to change or to return to education. More than one third (37,5 %) of them have not started their transition, e.g. are still being educated or are inactive and not in school, with no intention to work. As much as 46,6% are still in transition, e.g. are either unemployed, or employed in a non-

career or temporary job or inactive, but planning to work later. (Kosovo Youth Strategy and Action Plan (Kysap), 2009, p. 30)

Some categories are more affected by unemployment than others. (World Bank, 2010; LFS, 2009; World Bank, 2008) Unemployment rates are higher for young females than for young males, even though a slight improvement is noticeable. This difference is mainly due to level of education, cultural norms and labour legislation. The high unemployment rate for women points to an untapped source of economic potential. Evidence from other countries show that increasing female employment can reduce poverty, boost economic growth, and lead to improvements in social indicators such as health and children's education outcomes. Greater economic equality between women and men is associated with poverty reduction, higher GDP, and better governance (Klasen, 1999). The situation for minority groups such as Serbians, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians is also very worrisome, especially with regards to long-term unemployment. Unskilled persons are also more affected than medium and high skilled ones.

If young people manage to find a job, these jobs often display low quality, low returns and high levels of informality. (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 2008) Some sectors such as the construction and agriculture sector are more prone to youth informality than others. Due to necessity, young Kosovans are forced to accept jobs, despite the poor working conditions or to engage in work in the informal economy with a less permanent outlook. In addition, a large share of youngsters between the ages 15 and 19 engage in unpaid family work, but this number decreases rapidly with age. Only a very low share of young Kosovans engage in self-employment or entrepreneurship. (World Bank, 2010)

2.2 UNDERLYING CAUSES

Labour market. There are several structural, interrelated and multisector constraints to employment. (World Bank, 2008) Kosovo's labour market is characterized by a sluggish labour demand: job creation is lagging and not enough jobs are being created to reduce labour market pressure, despite the country's positive GDP growth in the past decade. Given that most of the economic growth has been stimulated by donor aid, which has heavily decreased, and the inflow of remittances, it is to be feared that the foundations for a sustainable economic strategy are lacking, which leads us to believe that labour demand will not change for the better in the near future without a serious and fundamental shift in labour policies.

The private sector in Kosovo is thin and weak: there is no tradition of a well-regulated private industry. Most workers in the private sector are employed in micro businesses, mostly employing less than 5 workers in low value-added sectors, with low-skilled occupations. The most important sectors for employment are wholesale and retail trade, followed by the public sector (education and public administration). Other important private sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and agriculture, tend to have low productivity. Lots of firms are small and only provide for an uncertain income, resulting in low and stagnant labour demand. Since most firms didn't experience any increase in revenue, and sometimes even a decrease, demand for new labour forces did not change for the better. There is also a considerable share of firms that operate in the informal sector, which affects their productivity adversely (World Bank, 2010).

During its transition period, inflows of foreign aid and UNMIK administration have generated jobs. With the diminishing of UN presence and the reduction of aid flows, labour demand may be adversely affected in the short to medium run. (World Bank, 2010) In the long term however, a viable replacement of this services, along with job opportunities should be discovered.

In addition, Kosovo seems to be facing difficulties in attracting investors. According to the World Bank's Doing Business Report 2013 data, Kosovo ranks 126 out of 185 economies. Despite its progress in comparison with the data from 2012, the country still ranks lower than its neighbouring countries. (World Bank, 2012)

Even though its low labour costs, proximity to the EU and availability of natural resources could provide the basis for an attractive investment climate, there has been very little foreign direct investment (FDI) into Kosovo. According to the Kosovan Central Bank's 2011 Annual Report the share of FDI to GDP in Kosovo in the recent years on average stood at the level of 9 %. FDI in Kosovo is primarily concentrated in the economic sectors such as construction with 32,8 %, manufacturing 12,6 %, finance 11,7 %, real estate 16.0 %, followed by the transport and telecommunications sector with a share of 5,9 % of total FDI. EU countries continue to represent the main source of FDI in Kosovo. (Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK), 2012) The lack of FDI has been mainly due to Kosovo's difficult political context, the absence of legal certainty and the country's poor infrastructure. (Dervisholli, 2012)

After its declaration of independence in 2008, several European and other countries recognized Kosovo. Until today, a considerable number of countries, even within the European Union, doesn't recognize the country's independence for a variety of reasons. The uncertainty about the status of Kosovo and its North as well as its difficult relationship with Serbia continue to dissuade investors. Exports towards the Serbian market remain impossible as well as the use of the Serbian market as a transit for exportation towards northern Europe. In this regard, the recently concluded agreement between Kosovo and Serbia may improve relations between the two countries and establish more trust to foreign, an mostly European, investors in Kosovo. In addition, Kosovo's government doesn't seem to be able to generate trust amongst investors. Its state apparatus has been characterized by corruption, nepotism and clientelism. The credibility of the current as well as future government(s) will play an important role for investors in assessing the security of their investments. EULEX efforts to reinforce the rule of law and battle corruption as well as organized crime remain insufficient to help create a trustworthy investment climate. (World Bank, 2012; EC, 2011; World Bank, 2010)

Legal uncertainty and the protection and guaranteeing of the right to property remain a defiance for Kosovan authorities. The difficult, lengthy and costly legal enforcement of contracts continues to hamper business environment just as corruption in the public administration with regards to registration and licensing. (European Commission (EC), 2011)

The dilapidate and poor infrastructure remain another big barrier for investment. The provision of electricity remains uncertain due to insufficient capacity and the lack of payment of electricity bills by consumers. Nevertheless, plans are being made to construct a new power station. Whereas mobility has for a long time been a defiance, we notice that in recent years the government seems to be investing more

and more in the construction of new roads and highways. (EC, 2011) Still, most of the neighbouring countries continue to have a competitive advantage over Kosovo in terms of getting their products to the destined export market. (World Bank, 2010)

On the positive side, we also notice that an important privatization process has been initiated, which might be able to lead to an increase in the country's productivity. If this process were to be led in an orderly, transparent way, it can send a positive signal to investors.⁴

In 2011 the government of Kosovo also adopted the Public Private Partnership Law, in order to further open Kosovo to foreign investment.

Education. The second most important reason for poor labour market performance is the low skill attainment of the population. (World Bank, 2010; World Bank 2008) Unemployment is strongly related to education: people with a lower level of education often display worse employment outcomes. This is also the case for young Kosovans. A lack of access and quality make education a difficult challenge for Kosovan authorities. (Kysap, 2009)

Kosovo has for a long time struggled to set up a high quality education system. In the early '90's a parallel system of education was established by Albanian Kosovan educationists as a means of resistance to Serbian repression. During the period of conflict, Kosovo relied on an informal education system of rather low quality which was often disrupted and whose physical facilities were massively destroyed. The absence of a developed schooling system is still noticeable today. More than half of all the teachers in elementary and secondary schools received secondary or higher education. Educational results are generally poor. The rate of school dropouts is remarkably high. This is partly due to low outcomes from education, inappropriate learning facilities and private costs for education purposes. However a survey conducted by authors of the Strategy on education in rural areas of Kosovo indicates that the reasons behind school abandonment include migration of families, travelling distance, parents who do not see the need for education, uninterested children, and the need for employment or to assist with home work. The reasons presented for abandoning secondary education include low family income, lack of transport means, marriage (women) and no future prospect from secondary education. (Kysap, 2009, p. 25)

Politics are also considered to play a role in the education system in Kosovo, as well as nepotism and lack of transparency. (Kysap, 2009)

According to the LFS 2009 about 41% of males and over 65 % of females aged 15 years and above had completed less than secondary school. Only one out of twelve males and one out of sixteen females hold a college or university degree. (LFS, 2009) These figures are far from optimistic given the important link between unemployment and education.

With the economy slowly moving from agriculture and heavy industry towards services and lighter industry, the skills demand continues to change. However this change in skills demand doesn't reflect

⁴ This seems however not to be the case. Several local media have already reported possible corruption with regards to the privatization process. (Koha, 2012)

itself in the education and training system. An improvement in the education and training system will become indispensable to generate sustainable growth and employment. A better education would in turn lead to a stimulation of domestic demand. With successful entrepreneurship being based on having a certain set of skills, having more people with technical skills (from vocational training) or university degrees, and equipped with better general working skills, would lead to greater entrepreneurial activity, which would generate labour demand. (World Bank, 2010)

Labour legislation. Labour legislation can also have an effect on labour demand, although this effect is minimal for Kosovo. (World Bank, 2008) In November 2010, the Kosovan government adopted a new Labour Law, which introduces more protection to workers. While this new law improves the employment quality of those with jobs, it will also lead to higher labour costs. This will affect the rigidity of the employment index, which has long time been one of the lowest in the region, and contribute adversely to labour demand. It is also very likely that this will lead to higher informality. Much will depend however on the execution of the Labour Law and the capacity of the government to monitor employment conditions. At present the enforceability of the law seems to be lacking. (EC, 2011)

Active Labour Market Programs. Several efforts have been made by the Kosovan government in order to address the problem of unemployment (and more specifically youth unemployment) and more in particular by developing Active Labour Market Programs (ALMP's). In 2005 a draft law on Promotion of Employment and on Protection of Unemployed was submitted to the Kosovan Assembly, to "regulate the forms of promotion of employment and the protection of unemployed, the rights and duties of being unemployed, the active and passive employment policy instruments, the financing of employment instruments and the institutions implementing employment policies and other issues of employment." The draft law lists a whole range of Active Labour Market Program measures, but has up until now not been promulgated due to the lack of financial means and, moreover, because it relies on contributions from firms and workers. (World Bank, 2008) The latter would increase labour costs, again leading to both a decrease in labour demand and a further informalization of the economy. With regards to the financing of these ALMP's Fretwell & Goldberg (1993) argue that a country with high unemployment or an undeveloped formal sector will need to depend, at least initially, on central budget support for most, if not all employment programs. As the labour market matures, financing may be split between the central budget and employer/employee contributions and in long term be shifted to employers and employees. In determining how different programs are financed, particularly in countries with rapidly growing unemployment rates, it is critical that a legal and budgetary distinction be made between the source of financing for income support and that for other employment programs. Without such distinctions, income support program expenditures will 'crowd-out' investments in employment service and other active programs. (Fretwell & Goldberg, 1993)

3. MAKING KOSOVO WORK AGAIN

In the previous chapter we have seen that youth unemployment is mainly due to a lack of labour demand and the low skill attainment. In order to improve labour market outcomes, the Kosovan government needs to invest in increasing the demand for labour, as well as in education. Labour conditions should

also be improved, especially for women. Given that it will take time to implement the aforementioned measures, it is necessary to create safety-nets for the most vulnerable youngsters.

3.1 INCREASE LABOUR DEMAND

The lack of labour demand was considered to be the main constraint to employment in Kosovo. According to OSMANI the best way for the labour market to absorb workers is by strengthening the dynamism of the demand for labour in general. (OSMANI, 2002)

In first instance this requires political stability. A prerequisite for political stability is clarity on the status of Kosovo. With the adherence of Kosovo to the IMF and the World Bank, perceptions of political stability have improved. The situation in the North of Kosovo seems nevertheless to continue posing problems. Hence, the recently concluded Kosovo-Serbia agreement can in this stage be considered as a first step in the right direction to built more trust of foreign investors in the region.

A strengthening of the demand for labour also requires a solid macroeconomy and economic growth. Up until now, economic growth has been mainly due to donor aid and remittances. We believe that it is necessary for Kosovo to engage more in private sector growth, domestic as well as foreign, hereby replacing donor aid and remittances with export earnings, foreign investment and the strengthening of the domestic economy.

Kosovan products have free market access to the European Union (EU) and Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) countries, so exports could become an important pillar of growth. (World Bank, 2010) Nowadays, most of the exports go to the EU and the South East European countries (SEE). Since Kosovo uses the euro, it can not use exchange rate policy to increase export competitiveness. Therefore, structural reforms are needed in order to increase export competitiveness. By using its abundant natural resources, labour force and its access to the regional and European market ⁵, economic growth could be stirred. This not only implies bringing on line the three most important production factors land, labour and energy and minerals, but also overcoming obstacles produced by the government. (World Bank, 2010)

The high perception of corruption in the public administration and the judiciary in particular was considered to be another important barrier for investment. Although weaknesses in the rule of law have been identified as one of the main constraints for investment, Kosovo's legislation is fairly favourable for investors. In many business-related areas Kosovo has tried to introduce modern legislation, often based on EU principles and standards thus mostly being in compliance with EU requirements. (EC, 2011) Despite efforts to improve labour conditions, the flexible labour legislation with low labour market rigidities remains an asset. In addition, Kosovo's tax system is also very beneficial for entrepreneurs due to its low taxes and relatively simple procedures. However low taxes do not guarantee compliance: under-reporting is predominant, which is worrisome. This way the Kosovo government loses part of its income, which in turn can lead to a decline in investments by the government. Therefore it is necessary to strengthen tax administration. (World Bank, 2010)

⁵ However, the lack of recognition of Kosovo's independence by some countries, such as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, hampers trade with Kosovo. The only way for Kosovo to overcome this obstacle is by coming to a political solution with all aforementioned countries.

3.2 IMPROVEMENT OF SKILLS

We have seen that the lack of relevant skills is another important constraint to employment in Kosovo. First and foremost the Kosovan government should invest in quality basic education for all and make sure that education, training and school curricula match the demands of the labour market. This requires investment in teaching material and teaching infrastructure, as well as the development of new teaching and learning methods. This also implies that teachers have the necessary educational background and are well-prepared for their task.

In June 2004 the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology launched the Kosovo Strategy for Development of Higher Education for the years 2005-2015. The main aim of this strategy is to set up a modern system of higher education in Kosovo.

Since there exists a long transition period between school and work, the connection between school and the local economy needs to be strengthened. One of the means by which the link between school and the local economy can be improved, is by the organisation of training programs and internships. At present these are very limited, even in vocational education. However training programs and internships allow students to get acquainted with the labour market and gain experience, which can be of use when looking for a job. (Kysap, 2009)

At the moment, higher education institutions do very little research. Partnership models between education institutions and industry need to be developed and implemented. (Kysap, 2009)

Given the current high rate of unskilled youngsters and school dropouts, it is important to offer lifelong learning experiences, such as second-chance education opportunities. This way changes in skills demand can also be met. Education should also be oriented to the domestic labour market and meet the demands of the labour market, in order to quickly fill in vacant positions.

3.3 IMPROVEMENT OF LABOUR CONDITIONS

In order to generate productive employment and provide workers with protection, while ensuring a flexible and dynamic labour market, well-functioning labour market regulations and institutions need to be set in place. (World Bank, 2010) We have seen that labour legislation is not a main constraint to employment in Kosovo. There are nevertheless restrictions to flexible work arrangements, which mainly affect women. Due to a lack of enforcement of the Labour Law and incentives for firms to comply with this law, many workers work without a contract and/or without benefits they are supposed to get by the law.

3.4 CREATION OF SAFETY-NETS

Investments in the labour market and in the education system are very likely to be long-term projects, only generating effects after a certain amount of time. Therefore it is necessary that the government already takes steps in order to ensure the well-being for the considerable share of young Kosovans who are more vulnerable and risk falling in extreme poverty by creating safety-nets.

4. MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

4.1 MIGRATION AS A COPING MECHANISM

By migrating young Kosovans try to reduce the risk of unemployment, thereby ensuring their own livelihood as well as the livelihood of their family members in Kosovo. Over the years, migration has played a very significant role in Kosovo's economic, political and social landscape and will very likely continue to do so in the future. (Vathi & Black, 2007)

International migration from Kosovo is one of the highest in the world and is mainly driven by economic reasons. About 43% of migrants stated to have left Kosovo for economic reasons. Even though migration has known some slowdowns during the economic crisis, the interest to migrate remains very high. The main destinations have traditionally been Germany and Switzerland, where almost 60 percent of all migrants have gone. More recently, other European countries, such as Italy, Sweden and Slovenia, have also become destinations for migrants. (World Bank, 2011)

It is estimated that around 30% of Kosovo's families have one or more family member(s) living abroad. Most of the migrants come from rural areas. More than 90% of migrants are aged 20 to 35, which corresponds to the age group with higher unemployment, leading to the departure of an important part of Kosovo's prime-age work force. Nevertheless a difference exists between males and females: only 35 % of migrants are female and most of them leave for reasons like marriage and family reunification. (World Bank 2011, LFS 2009)

4.2 MIGRATION AS A DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The migration of a large share of young Kosovans is not without consequences. Their emigration has several positive and negative effects on the labour market, their families and their person. Given the substantial number of migrants and their impact, it is important for Kosovo to develop policy strategies in order to promote economic and social development by strengthening migration's positive effects.

4.2.1 LABOUR SUPPLY

Migration will directly influence labour supply by leading to a decrease in the unemployment rate, given the high number of work forces leaving the country. For Kosovo this seems mainly the case for male unemployment rate and less for female unemployment rate, as mentioned above. Kosovan authorities could use the promotion of migration as a means to manage the country's high unemployment rate and demographic evolution. In order to do so, the government needs to design policies for the different stages of the migration process. In order to better prepare emigrants the Kosovan authorities could negotiate labour migration agreements with partner countries hence improving the legal status of emigrants. Policies destined at building the skills of potential emigrants and providing them with information about the host country will improve the economic well-being of the emigrant.

4.2.2 REMITTANCES

One of the most tangible effects of migration on Kosovo, is the rise in income in the home country from remittances. One in every fourth household receives remittances and they form the second largest source of income.

They are also the most important external source of financing for Kosovo. Remittances received in Kosovo mainly come from EU member countries, such as Germany (33,2 % of total remittances), Switzerland (23,1 %), Italy (7,0 %), Austria (5,5 %), and a smaller percentage from Slovenia, USA, Sweden, etc. Remittances from the EU countries may be considered to have remained quite stable despite the increase of unemployment and the deterioration of employment conditions in EU countries themselves. (CBK, 2012)

4.2.2.1 REMITTANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HOME COUNTRY

The sending country's context, as well as migrant selectivity and the recipient's use of remittances influence their macro and microeconomic impacts. (De Hass, 2009) The dependency on local (origin country's) institutional structures was added to the previous criteria by Ahoure, who discovered that remittances had an adverse impact in countries with poor governmental structures. (Ahoure, 2008) A common and very important feature of remittances is their counter-cyclical nature: ability to protect households in countries of origin in times of economic recessions, political conflicts or natural disasters. (De Hass, 2009, pp. 24-26) But heavy reliance on remittances can also have negative effects, especially in case of a global economic crisis. Therefore, remittances can have a microeconomic, macroeconomic and a social impact on the home country. (World Bank, 2011)

Microeconomic. In first instance, remittances will lead to poverty reduction. In addition to alleviating poverty, remittances can also have a positive effect on human development, depending on their use. The average annual value of cash remittances is €1.747 per household, whereas in-kind remittances received by households amount up to €3.273 per household (Kosovo Remittances Household Study (KRHS), 2012). The main expenditure categories of recipient households are similar to those of non-recipient households, yet their share differs. Remittances are mainly used to finance the basic consumption needs of recipients and improvement of housing conditions. In terms of human development, remittances are used for education and health care. Only a very small share of remittances is used for productive activities. If the Kosovan government succeeds at improving the investment climate, the share of investments through remittances will most probably rise, hereby positively affecting labour demand.

Macroeconomic. On a macroeconomic scale, remittances can stimulate economic growth: they increase the gross income level of recipients, which in turn increases the demand for consumption of products and services, leading to a rise in demand for local labour.

Given that Kosovo is mainly an importing country, this effect remains quiet weak. However a rising demand for consumption will lead to an increase in import and a rise in government revenues, due to the imposition of different kind of import taxes. A rise in demand is also stimulated by the expenditures made during the visits of migrants to Kosovo. The amount of cash spent during these visits amounts up to an average of €2.353 (KRHS, 2012). Despite the fact that remittances have helped decrease poverty in Kosovo, their effect on stimulating economic growth has remained weak. (World Bank, 2010)

Despite their positive effects on households, remittances can adversely affect labour supply. Households with migrants participate less in the labour market than households without migrants. Unemployment seems also to be higher in these households. This can be explained in two ways. The head of a migrant household is more likely to be female, elderly, and living in rural areas and it is therefore more likely

that this kind of person would be unemployed. But, the lower labour force participation may also be due to the higher reservation wage that remittances set. The fact that the same share of individuals from migrant and non-migrant households say that they are willing to work points out that the reservation wage might not be a major deterrent to work. (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 2011; KRHS, 2012)

Social remittances. Lastly, migrants also remit ideas, behaviours, and social capital to their countries of origin, or so called social remittances. According to Hass migrants can play an important role in the stimulation of political debate, the strengthening of civil society, enabling and encouraging education for non-migrants, and the emancipation of women and minority groups in countries of origin. (Hass 2006) Although being the case during the years of conflict in the 90's, this is less observed nowadays.

4.2.2.2 REMITTANCES AND THEIR TRANSFER

Most remittances are still being transferred through informal channels, which is mainly due to the high transfer costs. Given the high impact of remittances on the Kosovan society, its promotion should be one of the main policy areas of focus for Kosovan authorities. In most developing countries foreign currency payments for remittance transfers can only be made by banks. Given that most banks are located in urban areas, rural areas tend to be neglected leading to the creation of informal channels. Allowing non-bank financial institutions to make remittance transfers could help reducing informality and costs. In Kosovo microfinance institutions (MFI's) have developed networks in rural areas, allowing these MFI's to transfer remittances would help formalizing and lowering the costs of remittances as well as increase access to financial services and improve financial literacy of the sender and the recipient. This will however also require a link between banks in the destination and in the originating country. Examples from banks in other countries such as the Caixa Catalunya in Spain, that has concluded agreements with partners in Morocco, Bolivia and others show that the financial institutions as well as the clients on both sides win. Clients benefit from having a savings account and a reliable means of transfer, whereas financial institutions attract new clients and increase their revenue from transaction fees. (World Bank, 2011)

4.2.2.3 SUSTAINABILITY OF REMITTANCES

It is unclear whether the inflow of remittances will continue to be this high. We foresee that in the long term the share of remittances will decrease due to several different factors. Firstly, we think that once the direct link with a family member is lost, remittances will drop. Second generations will be less likely to maintain the link with the home country. In addition, a considerable share of the Diaspora also tries to reunite with their closest family members in the host country, thus reducing the number of dependents in Kosovo.

Secondly, we assume that due to the lack of opportunities in the home country, Kosovans will focus themselves on integration in the host country, thereby loosening their bond with Kosovo and alleviating the moral obligation to remit money to the country of origin. Integration in the host country also requires additional investments, which leaves less money to remit. (FDI, 2009)

Thirdly, we predict a continuous drop in Diaspora visits to Kosovo, which can have adverse effects on the economy given that Diaspora tourism fuels economic growth.(KRHS, 2012)

4.2.3 BRAIN DRAIN – BRAIN GAIN

The departure of a large number of young work forces can lead to brain drain as well as to brain gain. Up until some years ago, the risk of brain drain was considered to be very low, given the fact that a high rate of migrants had no more than secondary education. (World Bank, 2010) In the future however, brain drain can pose a bigger problem, especially given the long transition period from school to the labour market. This way the Kosovan authorities also loose the investment they make in education in the home country.

But migration can also lead to a brain gain and improved working conditions for returning migrants. Kosovans who have migrated have better employment perspectives than those that haven't. Returned migrants seem to have higher wages on average at all skill levels. Employment rates of returning migrants are higher than for those who have never migrated. (World Bank, 2011)

Upon their return, migrants bring knowledge and experience obtained abroad to Kosovo, which could partially satisfy the need for skilled workers. Among returned migrants, those in high-skilled occupations are more likely to have increased their education level and be contributing to Kosovo's labour market. (World Bank, 2010) Nevertheless, the problem of low labour demand remains, which makes it very difficult to absorb educated and experienced returning migrants.

Another way in which migration enhances human capital and can lead to brain gain, is by being an incentive for people to study more in order to migrate, which can be very beneficial for a country given that not all people that desire to migrate, do migrate. (Stark, Helmenstein & Prskawetz, 1997) At the same time, migration can be driven by the desire to acquire skills and education abroad. With the return of these people, Kosovo could also experience brain gain.

In order to increase brain gain, the Kosovan government could adopt policies which focus on the integration of returning migrants into the home-economy, such as the promotion of employment and investment opportunities among the Diaspora.

4.2.4 ILLEGAL MIGRATION

On the downside we see that migration removes youth from their social environment, family and friends. It can also put youth at greater risk of exploitation or abuse. Given that free movement is still restricted and most of the possible receiving countries require visas, illegal emigration continues to be a challenge. In order to fight and to prevent all forms of illegal migration and to promote legal and circular migration, the Kosovan government adopted a National Strategy on Migration 2009-2012.

5. CONCLUSION

As one of the youngest countries, Kosovo is also home to the youngest population in Europe. The country's demographic evolution will continue to put pressure on the country's labour market, hence making youth unemployment the number one challenge for the Kosovan government.

We have seen that unemployment mostly has a long-term character and mainly affects women, minority groups and unskilled youngsters. If young people manage to find a job, these jobs often display low quality, low returns and high levels of informality.

Low labour demand as well as a lack of skilled workers have been identified as the root causes for high unemployment rates. We have argued that in order to reduce unemployment rates, firstly the dynamism for labour demand should be strengthened. Secondly, the Kosovan government should invest more in education and lifelong learning. Since these measures will most likely demand a large effort from the Kosovan government and only generate effects after a certain amount of time, we believe that the Kosovan government should provide for safety-nets, to ensure the well-being for the considerable share of Kosovo's youth who are more vulnerable and risk falling in extreme poverty. In addition, the Kosovan government also needs to invest in better employment conditions for the young Kosovans who manage to find a job.

At present Kosovo's youth has two ways to constrain the risks of unemployment: by entering the informal labour market or by migrating. Migration remains the most common way for young Kosovans to ensure their livelihood. Given its enormous impact on the Kosovan society and economy, we suggest that the Kosovan government develops policy strategies in order to promote economic and social development by strengthening migration's positive effects.

The large number of young Kosovans poses an immense challenge for the Kosovan government, but also provides it with an enormous asset: we therefore believe that investing in its youth is, without a doubt, the key to success for the Kosovan state.

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Security Culture of Slovenian Youth

Erik Kopač¹

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ABSTRACT

Security culture is a category that is very complex. Therefore it is difficult to assess its level in the given society or in a social group. The easiest way to identify a security culture is by using indicators such as the prevailing values of the society, the level of political culture, the relationship of citizens to the national security system, security behaviour of people, their interest in the political and security affairs and their interest for cooperation in this area. Using these indicators in researches “Slovenian youth and military occupation” we try to determine the level of security culture among young people during the most intensive inclusion of the Republic of Slovenia in the Euro-Atlantic integrations. We found out that on issues affecting their cognitive, value and behavioural component of security culture the vast majority of Slovenian youth knows how to define them.

Key words: youth, values, security culture, Slovenia

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INTRODUCTION

Security culture is a set of values, norms and rules, the link between the individual and his/her emotions versus national security system, his/her tendencies to protect society as a whole, and its active security behaviour (Jelušič, 1988). Consequently, the security culture is a very complex category, the level of which in a particular society or a social group is very difficult to assess. The issue of security culture from the perspective of the national security system is very important because it affects the organization of the national security system and the planning of all activities to ensure national security. In this the role of young people is of a significant importance, because they are the future holders of their national security and all activities that are associated with it.

The last two decades have been influenced by a number of very important events that directly or indirectly affected the security culture. With the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed so many geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic processes on a global scale that have caused a number of important movements and thereby substantially transformed the international security environment to even more complex, unpredictable and interconnected. Significant changes have also occurred in the value systems of individuals and social groups, therefore they now dominate the so-called post-materialist values, such as quality of life, self-awareness, emancipation, hedonism and environmental awareness.

The purpose of this article is with an examination of the political orientations and security behaviour determines what Slovenian youth considers as a security culture, and with longitudinal analysis check whether security culture design has been influenced by the inclusion process of the Republic of Slovenia in the Euro-Atlantic integration. In the article, we will with the help of the relevant scientific literature, theoretically defined values of young people and security culture in general. With the results of the empirical analysis »Slovenian youth and military profession» we will examine security culture among Slovenian youth during the process of the Republic of Slovenia in the Euro-Atlantic integration.

1. YOUNG AND VALUES

The concept of youth as a distinctive stage of life was developed by psychologist Stanley Hall in 1904². Term adolescence emerges later, often in the context of problematic youth and adolescence crisis. Youthfulness and youth are not natural facts but social construct (Ivelja and Vogrič, 2003). This is a period of time whereby a young man is not a child anymore, and yet not a grown man. It is a short period "between two relatively well-defined and identifiable life periods, namely childhood and adulthood" (Ule, 1996).

In the past, they believed that the transition to adulthood occurs suddenly and that adolescents achieved all the criteria for entry into adulthood simultaneously. It was a time of adolescence. The period was followed by the end of the apprenticeship training and student youth. Young people gain economic, political and socio-cultural emancipation. After World War II different autonomous youth culture and subcultures occurred. Adolescents were given the opportunity to gain independency and a chance for "life experiment". Youth has begun to be recognized as an important period of life "entering into adulthood." Adulthood has "moved away" in a later period, as it has situated between youth and adulthood period called post adolescence. Many were eager to maintain their youthful lifestyle as long as possible (Ule, 1989).

² Hall has included in the concept of youth two mythologies, which were consolidated during the modernism and postmodernism. The first myth is the idealization of youth, as young people considered to be hope and promise. The second myth underestimate youth, as youth considered a problematic period of life (Hall, 1904).

Today youth is characterized by a prolongation of an education. Training of new generations for productive integration into society and for takeover of production and reproduction social roles is longer and more complex than before. Changes that have up hilled economic conditions and the entry into the world of work, has led to the creation of the third stage of youth, following post adolescence called young adulthood (Ule, 1996). It is referred to young adults who have autonomy and responsibility in some areas that are typical for adults (e.g. consumerism and partnership), before by definition “grow up” (Ule and Kuhar, 2002).

Modern youth is burdened mainly with the basic existential problems. Unemployment among young people is particularly developed in spite of increasingly higher education. Young people are no longer interested in politics and idealism, but they highly value privacy and are not willing to take risks. They are withdrawn from the public to the private world and rekindle support in the family. Young people are characterized by a fluid, disorganized and usually nonhierarchical set of values, goals and ideals, which are conceptually difficult to identify. The quality of daily life, material and social security, occupational development and self-realization, friendship, health, peace, family and personal freedom are of a significant importance. Today's youth is more oriented to personal set of values. There has been a material and career transition to postmaterial and personal values. At the same time, the values of young people are less and less “typical” young, as are increasingly relying on adult ones (Miheljak, 2002).

2. THE THEORETICAL CONCEPT OF SECURITY CULTURE

When it comes to a security culture, we firstly have to define the concept of security. Security is a complex and dynamic category. The need for security is present in humans since they became thoughtful beings. Security can also be defined as a situation in which threats have been overcome. This state of mind is of course only a theoretical assumption and it is possible to speak only in relative terms. In this individual optimal operate as a human being that meets the needs in a way, as it only wishes and wants. For a human, security activity has always meant much more than just a survival. It meant one of the fundamental drivers of human development, as human response to threats went on developing new protective equipment and its consciousness (Grizold, 1992). Therefore security is not related to only one area of human activity, but the need for security is present in all areas of human activity and of the wider community in which the human is associated.

In the first forms of social life security was primarily regulated with practices and certain moral norms. With the development of social life, subsequently the level of organization of security activities has lifted. Gradually the transition of rights or the need for defence and security transfer in the sphere of a state. In this context, national security is defined as “security of the national territory, population, and property, the preservation of national sovereignty as the provision of adequate conditions for the exercise of the basic functions of a society”. National security on one hand ensures the security of its citizens and eliminates threats, while on the other hand become through its security organs a source of threat to individual security (Grizold, 1999).

Until the eighties of the last century, studying security paradigm was based primarily on realistic and idealistic approach. The realists were starting from theories of power, particularly emphasized the importance of the state and its power to ensure their security. If the security of the state understood as a goal, they emphasized its power as an instrument to achieve this goal. Idealists on the other side tried to solve the problem of security issue with the resulting the problem of the war. They argued that solving conflicts between states mean solution to the problem of national security. At the end of the Cold war, the field of study security is greatly expanded, which is mainly the result of practical experience and the result of the impact of processes of globalization and internationalization. A new concept of modern

security paradigm, which is based on the idea of collective security (international, global or universal security), is the result of logic synthesis of the realistic and idealistic school ³.

Security paradigm is not contained in the life structure, this is in security activities, relations and states that structurally connect the individual with the world, but it is its result. It is carried out through its operations in interaction with the environment, and it is thus continually amended and supplemented. Partly it also refers to past behavioural patterns. Parallel with other changes in society that take place in a specific time and space, the ways of solving security problems, which are included in the security culture are changing. Society with its environment at the same time exists, works and doesn't lag behind in the past and overtake in the future. As the events in security paradigm take place simultaneously, it can explain itself as dimension of meaning, as a point of difference between the past and the future (Luhmann, 1998). Collective security paradigm, which is a product of the successful past experiences of addressing security problems in a society, can be called a security culture, which maintains, provides and defines social continuity and integrity of the overall image of security. It is a source of dynamic constraints and possible alternative choice of the security behaviour in interaction with the environment (O'Connor, 1991).

Security culture therefore includes both individual values and attitudes to key issues in the area of national security and it is intertwined with the political culture ⁴. Values and attitudes of individual are directly related with the perception and understanding of security culture. For society it is important that there is consensus between individual and social values. Since the values are internal nature, the consensus on the values is usually measured as agreement on the objectives. Values in the society have to be clear and there must be consensus about them. At the same time members of the society must be actively and emotionally committed to them (Berger, Katzenstein, 1996, pp.326). In the broader conception of security culture we can place issues such as: the role of individuals within the national security system, what is their attitude towards armed forces or peace movements, whether they are willing to cooperate with the intelligence and security services, etc. Meanwhile, the security culture in the strict sense deal within the sphere of organizational and political culture, respectively it is their integral part and includes issues as loyalty, credibility, affiliations, trust, secrecy, security, etc. (Jelušič, 1988).

Security culture has a strong social substance that gives meaning to everyday tasks and objectives of the organization and emphasizes the human side in the organization. Culture is a tool for achieving organizational goals of security system. It is affected by the distribution of power, governance, basic guidance, features, etc. Consequentially we distinguished within the security culture: culture of power, culture of roles, culture of tasks and culture of personalities. Efficiency of organization is a function of correlation between strategy, environment and culture, at the same time for the efficiency are important also aspects such as adaptability, mission, involvement and viability, therefore culture affects the performance of civil and military organization combined with the important aspects. Culture as a system must be separated from other elements of action, because of its special attributes. The most important is that it is transferable. Culture is transmitted from one person to another and from one group to another by learning and from one social system to the other by diffusion. Anthony Wallace (1968) has developed a comprehensive classification of the elements of culture. He classifies them in relation to the level of observation (individual, group, society). According to Talcott Parsons, culture consist "ways and orientation of which are embodied in the symbols of meaning" (Parsons, 1959, pp.159). At the level of personality, the methods of orientation and interaction in the system need dispositions and tendencies can be observed in the present functioning of individuals. At the level of the group and society orientation, roles and expectations of applications can be observed by the demands of society to individuals.

³ International security is an internal security problem of the state system and the world as a whole; is the collective good of international global society, and not just a good of individual country or alliances of countries (Grizold, 1992).

⁴ The concept of political culture refers to the cultural beliefs and values that shape the orientation of a particular individual and society toward the political system (Rosenbaum, 1975).

For analytical-empirical research needs Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba determined elements of political culture, such as emotional, cognitive and value orientations. In this emotional orientation of individuals to social and political goals include emotional mood and attitude to politics, feelings of what is right and what is wrong in political relations. Cognitive orientation is conscious awareness, knowledge and information about the political system. Value orientation contains judgments, opinions and views on policy objectives (and Almond Verba, 1965, pp.13-14). More recent authors have added activity-component of political culture, which is contained in what is called concrete political behaviour or political style (Južnič, 1973, pp.197-198). The concept of Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba was used also for the study of the so called strategic culture (Lantis, 2002). Ljubica Jelušič (1988) later adapted it to the needs for studying security culture.

3. SECURITY CULTURE: A CASE OF SLOVENIAN YOUTH

Researching the elements of security culture among young people in Slovenia dates back to 1985, when the Defence Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences started with implementation of a three-year research project "Slovenians and military-defences professions." Similar researches which among other study security culture of the youth, the Defence Research Centre conducted also in the years 1989, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006. The empirical analysis in this article includes the last three surveys »Slovenian youth and military occupation«. In this way we could examine the changing security culture of Slovenian youth through a period of intensive inclusion of the Republic of Slovenia in the Euro-Atlantic integration.

All three surveys were carried out using a standardized questionnaire, where respondents answered questions with encircling selected answers. Sample of the population of young people has changed slightly between the surveys, but it always included third-year students¹⁶⁵ of different types of secondary education programs: 1) a three-year technical, 2) a three-year other, 3) a four-year technical, 4) a four-year other, and 5) a high school. At the same time all selected research samples were also structured according to 12 school regions according to the methodology of the Ministry of Education and Sport of Republic of Slovenia. In formulating the regional sample the place or school centre was selected bias because the places or school centres with all or as many of in the sample anticipated educational programs had the advantage¹⁷⁶. In 2000, a questionnaire answered by 1.398 students enrolled in 57 classes at 36 secondary schools or educational centres. In 2003, when a survey was conducted in 75 classes at 41 secondary schools or educational centres, the number of students who responded to the questionnaire, increased in 1.468. The upward trend of students who answered the questions has continued in the 2006 survey, when the questions were answered by 1.514 students from 70 classes at 39 secondary schools or education centres.

Security culture falls in the conceptually broader concept of political culture and represents all forms of consciousness, ideas, values, attitudes, beliefs, motives and practices dealing with security, protection and defence of a political system. Within researches »Slovenian youth and military occupation» we directly measured primarily cognitive, value and behavioural component of security culture. The emotional component was measured more indirectly, since we would need to insert in the survey a number of additional, special variables only for the direct measurement of an emotional component of the security culture.

5 Although it makes sense to include older students in these researches, the fourth-year students have been extracted from a sample. The experiences gained in past researches have shown that fourth-year students already formed their professional (for those who intend to continue their studies) and employment decisions (for those who are considering after high school to employ), therefore the risk of indifferent and frivolous answers from their side is much greater.

6 If more such places or school centres were available in the same region, the place or school centre was determined with random selection. The same logic was followed in selection of classes within the program on selected schools.


3.1 COGNITIVE LEVEL OF SECURITY CULTURE

Cognitive orientation of a security culture, which represents the knowledge and information about security matters, we measured through verification, where and how often youth is actually acquainted with the national security system. Results from 2006 survey immediately show that the school is definitely not a key source of their knowledge about national security, because more than quarter respondents say that they never discuss security, defence and military issues in the school (26,1%). Talking about these things is apparently retreating also from families, as almost one-fifth of respondents (19,4%) never talk about it at home or in the family. Among the most likely sites where youth discussed security matters are peer group as the sum of the responses “sometimes” and “often” shows that almost 45% of respondents sometimes and often talk with friends and acquaintances on security, defence and army.

We already know this pattern of responses from research conducted in 2000. It was confirmed also in a similar survey in 2003. This means that a majority of young people do not consider schools to be a place to discuss the security and defence issues for some time (six years measured through surveys). Indeed those types of conversations take place between peers, and quite often also in their families. Because we conclude that the parents, relatives, friends and acquaintances are also the most important source of information about military occupations (52%), it is obvious that the promotional messages of national security system on possibilities for recruitment mostly gone through a kind of informal sieve, through family-friendly discussion about such kind professions.

With regard to the interest of young people in information on a national security, we found out that Slovenian youth shows a good interest. In 2006, only 10% respondents were not interested in anything in this respect. In comparison with the results of previous researches there has been a slight increase of those who are very interested in information about national security (3 percentage points), mainly at the expense of those respondents who find the information in the field of national security little interested (Figure 1). In all surveys the group of respondents that are very interested in information on national security, consist about two-thirds of boys and one third of girls.

Figure 1: Interest in the information in the field of national security (in percentage)



Source: Obramboslovni raziskovalni center, 2000, 2003 in 2006.

A closer look at what respondents say about their acquaintances with some important political and security issues, we see that in 2006 respondents were most acquainted with the participation of Slovenian Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations (entirely and mainly acquainted with 37%). The worst are acquaintances of young people with the national security system and political system of the Republic of Slovenia (41,7% not at all and mainly not aware of the first, and 40,6% not at all and mainly not aware with the latter). Compared to 2003 there is to achieve greater awareness of young people with contemporary armed conflicts resolution in general, and especially with the participation of Slovenian Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations, mostly due to increased engagement of the Republic of Slovenia in various international operations. At the same time the biggest drop was detected in young people acquaintances with the political system of the Republic of Slovenia.

3.2 VALUE LEVEL OF SECURITY CULTURE

Values of youth are measured in the variety of researches, so we limited ourselves to few indicators, such as rulings, opinions, attitudes and beliefs about the main objectives of the society. Therefore value orientation of youth was the issue of the criteria on the assessment of objectives in Slovenia, from the most to the least important. On a scale where it is possible to put more answers at the same time, the answers were pointing to the country's stability and social security. These are aimed at strengthening the political position of the country and they can be called materialistic. There are also objectives that are considering being more post-materialistic, more cosmopolitan and are strengthening the role of the individual in the environment and promote the ideals of an individual self-realization for the benefit of a mankind. Among the objectives that indicate the need for a social security and a strong state are: economic growth, strong defence, fight with growing prices, strong economy, fighting crime, maintaining order in the country. In the post-materialist goals we include clean and orderly environment, free speech, humane society, consideration of ideas; more influence on the government and equality among people.

Table 1: Objectives which are the most important for Slovenia by the opinion of young people (in percentage)

	First most important objective	Second most important objective	List important objective
Economic growth	14,6	7,9	4,9
Strong defence	8,8	4,6	11,2
Clean and tidy environment	6,9	8,9	5,2
Struggle with rising prices	3,4	4,2	9,8
Freedom of speech	6,4	7,5	5,5
Strong economy	15,6	9,9	1,1
Fighting criminal	8,1	12,2	2,1
Humane society	5,6	6,6	3,9
Maintaining order in the country	6,6	10,9	1,0
Consideration of ideas	0,8	3,7	13,2
More influence on the government	1,9	3,5	8,6
Equality among people	17,5	15,2	5,0
I do not know, undecided	3,8	4,9	28,4

Source: Obramboslovni raziskovalni center, 2006.

Ranking responses shows that firstly placed goals aim at stable and secure country, while young people in the first place rarely put objectives in the field of self-realization. At first glance, it is strange that as the most important goal we see equality between people, which is believed to be a post-materialistic value. It is possible that young people perceived this goal post-materialist, but it is also possible that they

understand it as social equality among people. Such a goal may indeed be one of the more materialistic ones and is heavily depended on the state. To compare it is interesting to see whether the previous generation of young people thought in a similar way. The results from the survey in 2006 show that the four most important goals were considered: strong economy (27,8%), equality between people (14,1%), clean and tidy environment (9,9%), and fight against crime (9,0%). This means that a strong economy and equality among people are always in the top two positions, only positions were changed (Table 1).

Ranking objectives on a scale from the least to the most important, confirms that as the least important objective is consideration of ideas. This is an objective which was the least well positioned at the forefront of importance. More reliable ranking of objectives would be summing the percentages of those who have a specific goal to qualify as first and as second most important one. This shows that young people consider the most important objectives are those who show an economically strong country. That means they are able to maintain equality among people, a strong economy growth, while leading the fight against crime and keeping order. After these objectives are the objectives that point to the importance of the individual and the environment, such as clean and tidy environment, freedom of speech, influencing the government and respect for ideas. In the 2003 survey the sums of the responses on what is first and what is the second most important goal for Slovenia showed the following order: a strong economy, equality between people, combat crime, clean and tidy environment, maintain order in the country, economic growth, strong defence, free speech, human society, influence on the government, fight with rising prices and finally taking into account ideas.

3.3 BEHAVIOURAL LEVEL OF SECURITY CULTURE

We are aware that the behavioural level of security culture of youth, which in practice is seen as a preparation for action in crisis situations and active engagement in the activities of security policy, can be measured purely hypothetically. We felt that young people can form their opinion in subjects that directly affect their student life. Therefore we asked them what course they would introduce in school if they could decide ⁷. The most frequently selected course, based on the answers in the survey of 2006, include "protection and rescue". From 2000 and 2003 studies the second most frequently selected course is a defence education. Followed by a peace education and ecology, far behind them is religion. The average rank of 4,39 indicates that young people allocate this course in the fourth or fifth place. Although we cannot do a direct comparison with the survey in 2000 and 2003 (the question was slightly different), we see just from the answers that there is the same lack of knowledge and the same desire of youth for specific topics in the field of the national security.

At the same time behavioural level of security culture between youth can be measured with their attitudes towards social phenomena, such as militarism and intolerance. The respondents, especially the ones with more traditional values, were put into a situation when they are in the military service, their colleagues or superiors are people who are from traditional point of view not typical for military profession. At the same time, we measured the degree of social tolerance towards diversity, because we asked youth about their attitude towards women in the armed forces in general and especially in command positions and for a relationship towards gay colleagues. Three-quarters of young people would work with women if necessary. Further 10% do not mind. Some are even those who believe that women do not belong in the military. In contrast to previous surveys this did not reveal significant changes (Table 2).

⁷ Courses on security issues are presently not available in Slovene primary or secondary schools.

Table 2: Cooperation with women in the military (in percentage)

	2006	2003	2000
Yes, always	55,4	55,2	64,3
Yes, if it would be necessary	26,6	22,3	19,1
I do not care	10,0	12,9	11,9
Women do not belong in military	5,0	6,5	2,0
I do not know, I cannot asses	3,0	3,1	2,7

Source: Obramboslovni raziskovalni center, 2000, 2003, 2006.

However, much more interesting is to look at who are the ones with whom women soldiers can easily participate, or with those who believe that women should not be attributed to military service. We have found that among the students with higher school performance, especially with an excellent performance, the vast majority (more than two-thirds) are willing always to cooperate with women soldiers. The opposite picture is with those students with inadequate and adequate success. In particular, the inadequate one believes that women do not belong in the military and that they would not be accepted as officers or noncommissioned officers. This opinion is shared also with those young people who proclaim to as religious. Those who say they are not religious or even opponents of religion, are very open and tolerant towards women in the military. It also shows that the vast majority of young women are comfortable to women in command in the army. At the same time we have noted that almost a fifth of young people admitted to have concerns if a female noncommissioned officer is in command. However, the social tolerance of youth is improving, as compared with 2000 research where almost a third of young people (31,5%) had concerns of women in command.

Degree of tolerance to the social groups which in the Slovenian history did not appear as military personnel is similar when the question arises whether people would accept homosexual soldiers. A quarter of the respondents believe that homosexuals do not belong to the military. Slightly less than half of respondents said that they would work with homosexuals in the military, some of them only when necessary. A fifth of the respondents would not care. Although compared to the survey in 2000, the number of young people who believe that homosexuals do not belong to the army has decreased; the proportion of those who are always willing to work with homosexuals in the military has equally significantly increased. In both cases the share changed by 13 percentage points - and in this case we are still talking only about the relative tolerance to young gay colleagues (Table 3).

Table 3: Cooperation with homosexuals in the military (in percentage)

	2006	2003	2000
Yes, always	25,2	23,5	12,3
Yes, if it would be necessary	20,3	22,7	15,8
I do not care	21,0	21,6	19,4
Homosexuality do not belong in military	23,7	24,9	36,7
I do not know, I cannot asses	9,7	0,1	15,8

Source: Obramboslovni raziskovalni center, 2000, 2003, 2006.

If we consider that in the Slovenian Armed Forces no homosexuals were asked to serve – homosexuality was regarded as a disease, because of which they were exempt from military service, we would suggest that young people present their attitude towards homosexuals in the military build otherwise in a relation of young people to homosexuals, but not to any knowledge of what has happened in this area in the Slovenian Armed Forces.

3.4 EMOTIONAL LEVEL OF SECURITY CULTURE

The emotional level of security culture includes emotional relationship of people towards the national security system. In this category we can identify all emotions that are associated with national pride, national consciousness, patriotism and historic pride. In the light of this, we were interested in the assessment of young people opinion about what kind of nation the Slovenians are considering the quantity of military traditions. We felt that on the basis of knowledge about the cooperation of the Slovenes in the different wars and conflicts, they are able to conclude whether Slovenian nation has more or less military traditions. Despite of such assumption the majority of young people decided that Slovenians are a nation with little or no military tradition (69,4%). Young people are self-critical in this respect for many years. As early as in the survey in 1997 68,8% of respondents have the same view. In the survey in 2000 the percentage of young people who thought that Slovenians are a nation with little or no military tradition was 70,8%, and last in 2003 72,8% (Table 4).

Table 4: Classification of the Slovenian nation according to military tradition (in percentage)

	2006	2003	2000
Among nations with great military traditions	8,9	6,7	9,5
Among nations with little military traditions	61,3	66,1	61,3
Among nations without military traditions	8,1	10,3	11,7
All nations have about the same military traditions	5,5	3,4	7,5
I do not know, I cannot asses	16,1	13,5	10

Source: Obramboslovni raziskovalni center, 2000, 2003, 2006.

4. CONCLUSION

Based on the research findings we can conclude that security culture of Slovenian youth is relatively developed, though they don't have many opportunities to acquaint themselves in an organized manner with the content of the national security. On issues affecting their cognitive, value and behavioural component of security culture the vast majority of young people know how to define them, and few of them do not know or do not have the answers to the questions. The security issues are mostly brought up with friends, sometimes with family. In a regulated system of their socialization, in school, this is not the case. Young estimates that Slovenes are among the nations with little or no military traditions. They would be tolerant and cooperative to women and gay soldiers and superiors. Among courses in the school they would prefer to introduce protection and rescue. Although in its value system they are still materialistic, due to fact that they consider strong economy, economic growth, combating crime and maintaining order in the country for key national objectives. Nevertheless far from all of these objectives they put in the first place the post-materialist objective - equality among other people.

In the light of the security culture it is also worth mentioning the relationship of the Slovenian youth towards the strong defence. 8,8% of whole sample in research done in 2006 put this objective on the first place. If we add those who put it in second place among the most important national objectives, we come to 13.4% of young people. On the other side 11.2% of youth consider a strong defence as the least important objective in Slovenia. Consequently the strong defence is an ambivalent objective for Slovenian youth, that is – percentage of young people considered it one of the most important objectives which is almost the same proportion as of those which considered it the least important. For other objectives, this dualism was not observed.

Finally, the results show that inclusion process of the Republic of Slovenia in the Euro-Atlantic integration influenced only indirectly on the security culture of Slovenian youth through the relative increase of their cognitive level. The increasing engagement of the Republic of Slovenia in various international

operations and active employment policy in the Slovenian Armed Forces, due to its professionalism, resulted in increasing youth's interest for information on a national security and to a greater awareness of young people by addressing contemporary armed conflicts and especially with the participation of Slovenian Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations.

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How do Young Members of Slovenian Minorities in the Neighbouring Countries See Their Future?

Dejan Valentinčič¹

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ABSTRACT

Slovenians live as indigenous national minorities in Italy, Austria, Hungary and Croatia. Their status differs from country to country. Moreover, the young members of minorities also have different views on their future perspectives and different relations towards traditional minority organisations. In Italy, young people are involved in traditional organisations, whereas in Carinthia they are very critical about them and thus prefer to socialise in youth clubs. In Styria, Hungary and Croatia, there are very few active young members of minorities and youth organisations practically do not exist. The article illustrates how the young members of Slovenian minorities in all four neighbouring countries perceive different aspects of the organisation of minorities, especially political representation of the minorities and how they see their involvement in minority's public life in the future. Firstly, the traditional organisation of the minorities is shown, followed by the visions of the young.

Keywords: Slovenian minorities, neighbouring countries, Western Balkans, young people, minority organisations, intergenerational relationships.

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INTRODUCTION

The consequences of tumultuous events which Western Balkans has experienced throughout the last century, especially throughout the last three decades, are visible in the wider area as well. Slovenia gained its independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which united almost the whole territory known today as Western Balkans. Slovenian ethnic territory stretches beyond Slovenia's borders and Slovenians constitute indigenous national minorities in all four neighbouring countries. According to the usual interpretation of the notion of Western Balkans, only Slovenians in Croatia should fall into this category but the consequences of the events in the Balkans can also be felt among Slovenian communities in Italy, Austria and Hungary. Firstly, this is due to the natural attachment of Slovenian minorities to their mother nation, because of the Yugoslavia's policy towards the minorities in the neighbouring countries, as it favoured only those parts of minorities which were ideologically compatible with Yugoslavia. This has introduced dissension within the community which has not been eliminated to this day. Last but not least, one of the reasons is also the cultural attachment of Slovenian minorities to the entire Slavic region in the southeast Europe. This can still be seen today also among the young as they often establish contacts with young members of Slavic nations who live in their country. It is a well known fact that interethnic relations in the Balkans are strained and that peace is fragile and vulnerable. In order to assure a peaceful future and permit the region's development in the long term, it is of vital importance the attitude of the young towards their future. Today, the young in Western Balkans are still traumatized by the tragic events of the last decades. But one observes that their perception differs from the one of the older generation and many times evolves in different directions. In this context, it is very interesting to also examine the young members of Slovenian minorities in the neighbouring countries.

In the last seventy-five years, these national communities (with the exception of the Slovene minority in Croatia) have not developed within the framework of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, they have always been attached to this region because of the connections with their mother nation. In individual countries, as well as in areas of settlement within individual countries, Slovene minorities vary greatly in terms of number, degree of national consciousness, legal protection they are provided with, degree of assimilation and self-organisation. This is a consequence of the political environment in which a particular minority lived in the past and still lives today, of the legal protection it was provided with in the past, of the possibility of contacts between the minority and Slovenia in the past, of the tolerance of the majority population towards the minority and of ideological and political divisions within the minority. These differences are clearly visible also in the way the young members of these communities see their future, which is, in all cases, different to the vision of the older generation. This is, on the one hand, a consequence of a different perception of the (Slovenian) identity, which resulted mainly from a growing assimilation or integration into the environment of the majority nation. On the other hand, it is a consequence of the generation gap between the younger and the older generation of the members of Slovenian minorities and, in some places, a consequence of non-identification or disagreement about the way the minority is organised, with the functioning of the minority organisations and with the manner in which the minorities are politically represented.

The article illustrates how the young members of Slovenian minorities in all four neighbouring countries perceive different aspects of the organisation of minorities, especially political representation of the minorities and how they see their involvement in minority's public life in the future. Firstly, the traditional organisation of the minorities is shown, followed by the visions of the young. Lately, there have been quite a few palpable tensions between different generations of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia, so this situation is the starting point for the comparison between Slovenian minorities in Styria, Italy, Croatia and Hungary. The article answers the following research question: "How do young members of Slovenian minorities see their future, specially the manner of minority organisation?" and the research sub-question: "To what extent are the visions of the young regarding the future in different countries similar to one another and to what extent are they different due to a different historical development and a different current situation?". In order to answer the research question, descriptive, comparative, analytical, synthetic and the method of compilation are used in the article.

TRADITIONAL ORGANISATION OF SLOVENIAN MINORITIES IN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Indigenous Slovenian national minorities live in all four neighbouring countries (Italy, Austria, Hungary and Croatia). They were separated from their mother nation in different historical periods and the conditions for their development throughout the history were different as well. Consequently, their life today varies greatly between individual countries and within different areas of individual countries. The manner in which the minorities have organized themselves differs completely as well. The first regions to be administratively separated from the mother nation were the valleys of Natisone², Torre³ and Resia⁴, which were annexed to Italy in 1866 (Kacin Wohinz and Pirjevec, 2000, p. 17). A year later, the Habsburg Monarchy reorganized itself into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The majority of Slovenian territory was placed under Austrian authority, except for Prekmurje and the Raba region⁵, which were placed under Hungarian authority. Since then, the Raba region has never again been administratively united with the Slovenian ethnic territory (Zwitter, 1990, pp. 484-488). After the First World War, Gaital⁶ in South Carinthia⁷ and the region of South Styria⁸, where Slovenians live, were automatically placed under Austrian authority. It was left to the plebiscite to decide under which country's authority the Rosenthal⁹ and the Jauntal¹⁰ in South Carinthia will be placed. The majority of eligible voters voted for Austria and the border which is still valid today was drawn. (Klemenčič, 2006/07, pp. 29-30). After the First World War, a quarter of Slovenian ethnic territory was placed under Italian authority. After the Second World War, the better part of the territory populated by Slovenians was placed under Yugoslavian authority, while the province of Trieste¹¹, the province of Gorizia¹² and

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- 2 In slovene Nadiške doline.
 - 3 In slovene Terska dolina.
 - 4 In slovene Rezija.
 - 5 In slovene Porabje.
 - 6 In slovene Ziljska dolina.
 - 7 In slovene Koroška.
 - 8 In slovene Štajerska.
 - 9 In slovene Rož.
 - 10 In slovene Podjuna.
 - 11 In slovene Tržaška pokrajina.
 - 12 In slovene Goriška pokrajina.

Val Canale¹³ in the North, together with the rest of the province of Udine¹⁴ – the valleys of Natisone, Torre and Resia – remained a part of Italy (Vouk, 2004, pp. 125-133). There had been no mention of a Slovenian minority in Croatia until the dissolution of Yugoslavia as Slovenians were one of the constituent nations of the former country. There are indigenous settlements of Slovenians as well as immigrants from Slovenia in Croatia. In practice, there is no difference between the two categories as they are interwoven. Slovenians live in Gorski Kotar, north Istria¹⁵, Medžimurje, the Sotla Valley, the Kolpa Valley and in numerous cities (Zagreb, Rijeka¹⁶, Varaždin, Poreč, Umag, Buje, Čakovac, Split ...) (Žagar, 1995, pp. 347-348).

ORGANISATION OF THE SLOVENIAN NATIONAL COMMUNITY IN AUSTRIA

After the Second World War, Carinthian Slovenians had to re-establish their organizations as all Slovenian organizations were prohibited and dissolved after the annexation of Austria to the Third Reich. In 1945, Carinthian Slovenes did not take part in the first elections, because Yugoslavia forbade the Regional Committee of the Liberation Front (RCLF)¹⁷ from participating, which was the only Slovenian organisation in Carinthia at the time. Namely, Yugoslavia expected to annex this territory and therefore considered the participation in the elections meaningless (the allies demanded that the RCLF sign a declaration stating that the party will not address the open question of the border in the election fight). This led to a sharp political division among the Slovenians in Carinthia. Therefore, the National Council of Carinthian Slovenians (NCCS)¹⁸ was founded in 1949, uniting democratically oriented Slovenians. Shortly after, the Democratic Front of the Working People¹⁹, which was favourable to Yugoslavia, was founded under the auspices of the RCLF. Its current successor is the Union of Slovenian Organizations (USO)²⁰ (Jesih, 2007, p. 82). Carinthian Slovenians have not yet overcome the political division up to this day. Yugoslavia was opposed to the foundation of NCCS and did not acknowledge it until 1965. The organization was in a clearly underprivileged position up until Slovenia's attainment of independence. The USO holds diametrically opposite views on two essential items of the program of the NCCS: the idea of having a democratically elected joint representation, which the NCCS strongly advocates, but the USO does not approve of, and the second the dilemma about whether the minority should take part in the elections with its own ethnic party or should it join Austrian national parties.

The NCCS is an ardent advocate of independent participation and is closely connected with the Unity List (UL)²¹, the Slovenian ethnic party in Carinthia (Jesih, 2007, p. 102). The UL was founded in 1974 under the name the Carinthian Unity List (CUL)²². It was founded by the NCCS and the Club of Slovenian Members of Municipal Committees²³ to participate in the 1975 regional elections (prior to that, the NCCS had already stood for the 1965 elections with the independent list called the Carinthian

13 In slovene Kanalska dolina.

14 In slovene Videmska pokrajina.

15 In slovene Istra.

16 In slovene Reka.

17 In slovene Pokrajinski odbor Osvobodilne fronte (POOF).

18 In slovene Narodni svet koroških Slovencev (NSKS).

19 In slovene Demokratična fronta delovnega ljudstva.

20 In slovene Zveza slovenskih organizacij (ZSO).

21 In slovene Enotna lista (EL).

22 In slovene Koroška enotna lista (KEL).

23 In slovene Klub slovenskih občinskih odbornikov.

Electoral Community²⁴). The CUL was registered as a political party as early as 1979 (Jesih, 2007, p. 116). The CUL stood for the 1983 regional elections together with the Greens, or the Alternative List Austria, as it was called, and stood as a candidate in all four districts. Together they stood also for 1989 regional elections, but did not enjoy much success in neither of the regional elections. The biggest success of their joint participation were the 1986 national elections, when Karel Smolle, the leader of the CUL, was elected to Austrian parliament. They did not join forces again in the 1990 elections, as quite a few problems emerged within the parliamentary group during the mandate, because the parties were politically completely different (Jesih, 1988, p. 1). Karel Smolle was re-elected as member of Parliament for the period between the years 1998 and 1999, when the UL and the Liberal Forum stood together for elections (Državnozborske volitve, 2013²⁵). The most recent municipal elections in 2009 were won by their candidate for the first time. Jožef Smrtnik, an UL candidate, was elected mayor of Eisenkappel-Vellach (Železna Kapla). The UL stood for the last municipal elections in twenty-three bilingual municipalities and have elected fifty-two members of municipal committees (Občinske volitve, 2013²⁶).

The USO has stressed from the very beginning that it wants to be a unifying organisation, but it actually united mostly left-wing political circles and relied mainly on the ideas of the anti-Nazi and Partisan movements. Since its beginnings to this day, the organization has refused independent political participation and advocated the integration into majority parties, especially into the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPO). In 1970, the vice president of the USO Hanzi Ogris, an SPO candidate, was elected to the regional parliament. Otherwise, sympathizing of the USO with the SPO or its integration into it did not produce the desired results, mainly because the SPO allowed only individual membership in the party, not the membership of an organization as a whole (Jesih, 2007, pp. 92-93). After Slovenia gained its independence, the USO lost much of its traditional influence and tried at first to substitute it with an increased activity in the Advisory Council for the National Communities, which was organized in the office of the Chancellor of Austria. The USO is today also involved with the Consensus Group which unites some Slovene organizations and some extreme anti-slovene organizations with the aim of improving their relations. This has also increased the dependence of the USO on the Austrian authorities. They are opposed to the common representation of Carinthian Slovenes and advocate the standpoint that different views within a minority are natural and that there is no need to try to unify them. In their opinion, the only common standpoints that should be adopted within the minority are those regarding the matters which are of vital importance for the minority (Valentinčič, 2012, pp. 64-66).

In addition to two traditional organisations, a third organization was founded in 2003, which gradually gained (or is still gaining) the status of an umbrella organization. The Community of Carinthian Slovenian Men and Women (CCS)²⁷ was created as a consequence of a major dispute within the NCCS, which led to resignation of the president of the NCCS Bernard Sadovnik. He then established a new organization – CCS – together with a group of like-minded people. The CCS wants to be seen as a non-ideological organisation of the future which is interested only in the struggle for the rights of Carinthian Slovenians and in the fostering of the intercultural dialogue (Skupnost – SKS, 2013²⁸). The relations

24 In slovene Koroška volilna skupnost.

25 Elections to the National Assembly. Available at: <http://www.elnet.at/stranka/C32> (6. March, 2013).

26 The Municipal elections. Available at <http://www.elnet.at/stranka/C30> (6. March, 2013).

27 In slovene Skupnost koroških Slovencev in Slovenk (SKS).

28 Community – CCS. Available at <http://www.skupnost.at/kdo-smo/skupnost-sks/> (7 March 2013).

between the NCCS and the CCS have been rather strained ever since the foundation of the latter. The CCS cooperates more closely with the USO, as they share similar standpoints. The USO also recognizes the status of the umbrella organisation of the CCS, whereas the NCCS refuses to. Although this has been a long-lasting controversy, there is every indication that the CCS will receive the status of an umbrella organization as well, as it has already become an equal member of the Advisory Council for the National Communities and also of the Council of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Slovenians Abroad. In contrast to the NCCS and the USO, which hold clear views on their political activity, there are two camps in the CCS. Some are active in Austrian parties, (e.g. Zalka Kuchling, a member of the Greens) while the others participate with the UL (e.g. Bernard Sadovnik, a municipal member of committee, a member of UL and a deputy mayor of Globasnitz (Globasnica)).

Apart from politics, the traditional political division among Carinthian Slovenes can be also seen in cultural organisation. The Slovenian Cultural Union (SCU) ²⁹, a member of the USO, unites the left-wing cultural societies. Today, the SCU unites forty-four societies. On the other hand, the Christian Cultural Union (CCU) ³⁰ unites the societies which identify themselves with the Christian Democratic tradition. In comparison to the SCU and the USO, the relations between the CCU and the NCCS are different. The CCU is not a member of the NCCS, but the two organizations function independently and are not formally connected, they only share similar ideological foundations. Today, the CCU unites fifty-three societies and groups (Slovenska kulturna društva na Koroškem, 2013 ³¹). These duality is a result of the political process and could not be done away with without negative consequences. The incentives to do so appeared after Slovenia gained its independence, but they later died away, or were at least not as strong as with the unifying of political organizations. Malle (1997, p. 5) thinks that without the two organisations, “the activity of the local societies would soon diminish and completely die away with time”. For a long time, the two cultural organisations were rivals and did not cooperate, but in recent years they have been connecting more and more. They also prepare joint projects and divide fields of work. Approximately twenty-five local societies are today members of both umbrella organisations (Lesjak Klun, 2010, p. 12).

The situation in Austrian Styria is completely different. Due to a smaller number, dispersed settlement, assimilation and aversion of the majority population, Styrian Slovenians were never able to organise themselves on the same level as in Carinthia. The only organisation is the Cultural Society Article 7 ³², which was founded in 1988 (until then Slovenians in Styria had not had their own organisation since 1919, when the Slovenian Catholic Educational Society was dissolved, because Matej Pintarič, its leader and initiator, was killed) (Todorović, 2006, p. 51). In 1998, the society acquired its premises and today, it is located in the Pavel House ³³ in Laafeld ³⁴ near Bad Radkersburg ³⁵. The society emphasizes multilingualism, multiculturalism and a friendly symbiosis between Slovenian and German-speaking inhabitants of this area (Gotthardt, 2010, pp. 4-5). According to the President of the society Susanne Wetlainer, the society has today some 150 members, while some 1500 people are interested in their

29 In slovene Slovenska prosvetna zveza (SPZ).

30 In slovene Krščanska kulturna zveza (CCU).

31 Slovenian Cultural Societies in Carinthia. Available at http://www.kkz.at/drustva_skupine/C16/ (10 March 2013).

32 In slovene Kulturno društvo člen 7.

33 In slovene Pavlova hiša.

34 In slovene Potrna.

35 In slovene Radgona.

activity. It is estimated that there are some 4000 speakers of Slovenian. The society organises about five major events yearly and publishes their journal *Signal* once a year. Beside in Laafeld, the society has its premises also in Graz ³⁶ (Valentinčič, 2012, pp. 80-82).

THE ORGANISATION OF THE SLOVENIAN LINGUISTIC MINORITY IN ITALY

The Slovenians in Italy live in three provinces of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region: Trieste ³⁷, Gorizia ³⁸ and Udine ³⁹. Trieste and Gorizia were annexed to Italy after the First World War, whereas the province of Udine (with the exception of the Val Canale, which was also annexed to Italy after the First World War) already became part of Italy in 1866. This is the reason why the status of the Slovenian linguistic minority in the province of Udine is very different from the situation in the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia.

Slovenian organisations in Italy were abolished and prohibited when the fascists came to power. They were reorganised following the Second World War and defining the border between the two countries. The same as in Carinthia, the Slovenian minority in Italy is politically divided and therefore separately organised. The left wing of the minority represents the Slovenian Cultural and Economic Association (SCEA) ⁴⁰, which was founded with the support of Yugoslavia in 1954. It was established by the existing cultural associations which remained faithful to Yugoslavia also in the period following the time of the Informbiro. Sergij Pahor (2010, p. 9) estimates that the individual associations played a very important role for the minority but had little political power in general. Until the collapse of Yugoslavia the SCEA had a dominant position within the minority especially in the economic field, since it had received a strong support from Yugoslavia. The other ideological side was solely dependent on voluntary work. Therefore, the SCEA could develop significantly stronger structures in the province of Udine. Until 2012, only organisations were allowed to become members of the SCEA, but now individuals can also join (Zgodovina, 2013 ⁴¹). In terms of politics, the SCEA strongly opposes the idea of functioning in an independent ethnic party and advocates the integration of the Slovenians in the Italian left-wing parties. The SCEA coordinates the activities of more than 160 affiliated associations, organisations and institutions. In Italy, the separation of political and cultural umbrella organisations is not as clear as in Carinthia. There are two umbrella organisations that bring together all minority structures and represent the minority at all levels. Cultural organisations are organised in associations which are also the members of the umbrella organisations (Članstvo, 2013 ⁴²).

Slovenian associations in Italy which did not accept the Communist ideology established the Council of Slovenian Organisations (CSO) ⁴³ in 1976. Comparing with the SCEA, the CSO was in an subordinate position because it was not funded by Yugoslavia. Therefore, it could only play a representative role (Pahor, 2010, p. 9). The situation in Italy is similar to the Carinthian one with more and more associations joining both umbrella organisations. The CSO is closely related to the Slovenian ethnic party in Italy

36 In slovene Gradec.

37 In slovene Trst.

38 In slovene Gorica.

39 In slovene Videm.

40 In slovene Slovenska kulturno gospodarska zveza (SKGZ).

41 History. Available at <http://www.skgz.org/zgodovina> (8 March 2013).

42 Membership. Available at <http://www.skgz.org/clanstvo> (8 March 2013).

43 In slovene Svet slovenskih organizacij (SSO).

called Slovenian Community (SC) ⁴⁴. The organisation has traditionally been stronger in the province of Gorizia with more conservative rural communities. In the province of Trieste the structures of the CSO were established by the refugees from Yugoslavia who settled in Trieste after the Second World War. Comparing with the SCEA, the CSO is in the minority in the province of Trieste. In the province of Udine its structures began to develop after Slovenia gained independence and the CSO began to receive the financial support from the newly formed Slovenian state.

A very important role in the political life of the minority has the Slovenian ethnic party in Italy called Slovenian Community (SC). It was founded in 1975 with the integration of different independent political lists of the Slovenian minority in the provinces of Gorizia and Trieste. In the province of Udine, the party has been more successful only in recent years. Since the establishment of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region in 1964, the party has always had a representative in the regional parliament, except between the years 1993 and 2003 when the electoral system was very unfavourable for the party and they failed to elect a member of the regional parliament. Since 2003 the SC has been cooperating with the Democratic Party. Most of the time, the SC can boast its elected regional representatives in the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia as well as municipal counsellors and members of district advisory committees. In the municipalities with the majority of the Slovenian population, they also managed to elect their mayors - in San Floriano ⁴⁵, San Dorlingo della Valle ⁴⁶, Monrupino ⁴⁷ and Duino-Aurisina ⁴⁸ (Izvoljeni, 2013 ⁴⁹).

The SC presents itself as a party uniting the Slovenians in Italy. Some people disagree with this because the party gets a smaller percentage of the Slovenian votes, since many people vote for the left-wing Italian parties. In addition to the SC, the Slovenians are also elected for the Italian parties. In these cases, it is more difficult to say if they are representatives of the Slovenian minority since some of them explicitly emphasise their nationality, whereas for the others it is not that important. In the province of Udine this is even more often the case. Since 1963, there has always been a Slovenian elected to the Senate or the Chamber of representatives. The Communist Party of Italy, and later its successors, has always placed one Slovenian high enough on the candidate list to be elected. A current member of the Chamber of Representatives is Tamara Blažina from the Democratic Party. The problem of the Slovenian deputies was that the Communist Party was always in the opposition and therefore their strength was very limited. The Slovenian representatives in the Italian parties were also always elected to the regional council of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, municipal and district councils, as well as to the several mayor's positions (Pahor, 2010, p. 5).

The Slovenian cultural organisations in Italy are organised in different associations functioning as a kind of cultural umbrella organisations. However, they were also founding members of both political umbrella organisations. The two political organisations are more important than the cultural and also have the most significant role in the cultural representation of the minority. The left oriented cultural organisations are organised in the Association of the Slovenian Cultural Organisations ⁵⁰. It was founded in 1945. Today it includes 87 member organisations and groups from all three provinces of the Friuli-

44 In slovene Slovenska skupnost (SSk).

45 In slovene Števerjan.

46 In Slovene Dolina.

47 In Slovene Repentabor.

48 In Slovene Devin-Nabrežina.

49 Elected. Available at <http://www.slovenskaskupnost.org/page/izvoljeni> (8 March 2013).

50 In slovene Zveza slovenskih kulturnih društev.

Venezia Giulia region where Slovenians live. The organisations based on Christian and democratic principles did not want to affiliate to this association. They do not have their representative association. The organisations from the province of Gorizia founded the Slovenian Catholic Union of Education ⁵¹ in 1959. Today it has 12 member organisations. Similar organisations from the province of Trieste founded the Slovenian Education Union ⁵² in 1948. It includes 31 cultural organisations (Tomšič, 2010, p. 13).

THE MINORITY ORGANISATIONS OF THE SLOVENIANS IN HUNGARY

Until the democratisation of Hungary, the Slovenians were organised with other South Slavs in the Democratic Alliance of South Slavs, which stopped working after the democratisation. All then existing cultural groups and associations merged into the Association of Slovenians in Hungary ⁵³. Today, the Association includes all 16 Slovenian associations in Hungary. Its main commitment is to improve the situation of the Slovenian minority in the Raba region ⁵⁴, in particular to coordinate the activities of various organisations, and to establish a dialogue with the authorities (Munda Hirnök, 1999, p. 3). Cultural activity of the Slovenians in the Raba region is exclusively amateur. Although the Association brings together cultural associations it is also an umbrella organisation in the field of politics, since the Slovenians in Hungary do not have any political organisations in the true sense of the word.

Hungary provides the so called self-governments for political and administrative representation of minorities. Self-governing communities are funded by the state and are the direct interlocutor of the Hungarian government. That gives them great importance. The Slovenians are organised in the local minority self-governments in all seven villages of the Raba region settled by the Slovenian minority and in the cities of Szombathely ⁵⁵, Budapest ⁵⁶, Mosonmagyaróvár and Szekesfehervár. These local self-governments form the general Slovenian self-government which is headquartered in Felsőszölnök ⁵⁷ and also has a representative office in Budapest (Just, 2009, p. 8). The self-government is a political organisation that closely cooperates with the Association of Slovenians in Hungary since both organisations fight for the same goals. (Just, 2009, p. 8).

ORGANIZATION OF SLOVENIANS IN CROATIA

Until the dissolution of Yugoslavia Slovenians were one of the constituent nations of the country and there was no mention of Slovenian minorities within the republics. Later, Croatia acknowledged their minority status and several Slovenian societies were founded as well. Today, there are sixteen Slovenian societies in Croatia. It is the Association of Slovenes in Croatia ⁵⁸ which unites them and is also a political representation of the minority of some sort. The Slovenian minority is not able to have a proper political representation and everything is organised by the societies (Kdo smo?, 2013 ⁵⁹).

51 In slovene Zveza slovenske katoliške prosvete.

52 In slovene Slovenska prosveta.

53 In slovene Zveza Slovencev na Madžarskem.

54 In slovene Porabje.

55 In slovene Sombotel.

56 In slovene Budimpešta.

57 In slovene Monošter.

58 In slovene Zveza Slovencev na Hrvaškem.

59 Who are we?. Available at http://slovenci.hr/si_ZVEZA/ (15 March 2013).

Croatian legislation provides also the councils of national minorities, which supervise the practical application of legislation. The councils of the Slovenian national minority were elected on the levels of counties, municipalities and cities. In a county where 100 Slovenes live, they have the right to elect their representative in the council, whereas in the counties where there are at least 200 Slovenes, they can elect their own council. So far, the Slovenian minority has never taken full advantage of its rights regarding the elections of the councils. From the eleven available county and city councils, they have elected only seven. The Council for Slovene National Minority is a member of the Council of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, which has a considerable influence on the minority politics of the country and also distributes funds (Valentinčič, 2012, pp. 187-188).

The Slovenians in the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia, and in Carinthia are therefore much better organised in terms of politics than the Slovenians in the province of Udine, in Styria, Hungary and in Croatia. This is due to their larger number and larger scope of liberties that they enjoyed in the past. To become politically active people has to develop a strong national consciousness. Minority education, the media and the church have a great influence on it. This is the basis for developing cultural activities that strengthen the national consciousness. The lack of those elements leads to poor political organisation in these areas and consequently to a lower level of rights.

VISIONS OF THE YOUNG MEMBERS OF SLOVENIAN MINORITIES IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FOR THEIR FUTURE, WITH EMPHASIS ON MINORITY ORGANIZATION

The young people in Carinthia do not hide their strong criticisms about the umbrella minority organisations. All youth organizations (the Club of Slovenian Students in Vienna ⁶⁰, the Club of Slovenian Students in Graz ⁶¹, the Club of Slovenian Students in Carinthia ⁶², the Young Unity List ⁶³, the Scholar Association of Carinthia ⁶⁴ and the Catholic Youth Association ⁶⁵) merged into a joint representation of the SYO – the Slovenian Youth Organizations ⁶⁶. The most notable initiative of the SYO so far has definitely been the 2011 negotiations on so the called compromise on bilingual signs and a new Law on Ethnic Communities. The SYO adopted a statement “Can Inzko, Šturm and Sadovnik (the presidents of the three umbrella organisations) waive the right that Slovene is an official language in Carinthia in our name? NO!” This statement created a great stir in the public. At the same time, they also adopted a statement demanding the resignation of the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Samuel Žbogar and the State Secretary at the Government Office for Slovenians abroad Boris Jesih because of their role in the above-mentioned negotiations (Ošlak, 2013).

Many young people are active in youth clubs, as well as in local cultural and sports societies, but very few are involved in the umbrella political organisations (Ježovnik, 2013, p. 12). The reasons they give for this disinterest are that in their opinion, the leaders of the umbrella organisations think and work in old mental frames which they do not agree with. The young representatives say that the umbrella

60 In slovene Klub slovenskih študentk in študentov na Dunaju.

61 In slovene Klub slovenskih študentov in študentk v Gradcu.

62 In slovene Klub slovenskih študentov in študentk na Koroškem.

63 In slovene Mlada Enotna lista.

64 In slovene Koroška dijaška zveza.

65 In slovene Katoliška mladina.

66 In Slovene SMO - Slovenske mladinske organizacije (They probably chose the abbreviation “SMO” due to its meaning in Slovene – “we are” as in “we are here!”).

organisations are run by more than 50-year-old men who became known and shaped their political views in youth protests during the 1970s and that their policy towards the minorities is today still highly influenced by the resentments and divisions of that era (Rajk, 2013). They also argue that the older generation does not accept them as equal interlocutors and refuses to listen to their opinions and criticisms (Ošlak, 2013, pp. 2-3). The experts dealing with the young in Carinthia say that the non-inclusion of young people in political organisations is not due to apathy and a lack of interest in politics, but believe that the young in fact have their own political views and are politically active, but do not see the point of integration into the umbrella organisations. They say that today, the youth clubs are not only cultural but also political organisations (Zeichen, 2013). Some young have also suggested that it is necessary to set up a completely new political umbrella organisation run by young people (Erklavec, 2013). On the other hand, some young people think that their peers are not active enough in public life and only want to criticize (Trap, 2013).

The representatives of the traditional cultural organisations admit that their programmes are intended primarily for children and adults and that it is more difficult to address teenagers and students (Erklavec, 2013). Hanna Erklavec (2013), a CCU employee, stated that however, some apathy among the young can be noticed and provided examples of events they organised for young people, but there was no response from them. Although youth clubs were first founded to perform the role of typical student associations, the claim that today they are also political organisations of Carinthian youth can be confirmed. It is, of course, questionable how big is their political role, since there is no doubt that neither Slovenia nor Austria consider them equal to the traditional political organisations.

Alina Zeichen (2013), a member of the younger generation, discusses the problem that the umbrella organisations are legitimate only because political authorities of both countries decided so. The younger generation often criticises the fact that the minority representatives are not actually elected by the members of the minority. The last elections for the President and council members of the NCCS were held in 2005. The other two umbrella organisations do not conduct elections at all, which makes the selection of their leaders even less transparent (Trampusch, 2013). The secretary of the NCCS Marko Oraže (2013), who can be classified as a member of the young generation and is therefore one of the few young people active in one of the umbrella organisations, agrees with this as well. The young share the common opinion that minority representatives should be elected democratically. Another common opinion is that the minority should have a single umbrella organisation instead of three. This idea appeared already immediately after the democratization and the attainment of independence of Slovenia, but did not materialize because the umbrella organisations held widely divergent opinions. The young strongly believe that all three umbrella organisations should include also the representatives of the youth before a new umbrella organisation representing the minority as a whole would be created (Wakounig, 2013).

Some young people are also self-critical and admit that a generation gap can be seen even in youth clubs. Many secondary school students do not want to participate in youth clubs because they do not feel comfortable around the older students who socialize in those clubs (Urban, 2013). Another problem the youth clubs acknowledge is that after someone has reached a certain age limit, it is no longer appropriate for them to participate in youth clubs and consequently, these young people have nowhere to go anymore. This problem exists especially in Vienna and Graz (Zeichen, 2013).

All three umbrella organisations operate mainly in their central office, whereas their local committees

are not active. The most active ones are undoubtedly the UL local committees, operating in many communities, where they have also elected fifty-two municipal councils and one mayor. Although the Young UL⁶⁷ is formally active and is also a member of SYO, its activity in the villages is very weak. The ones who usually work in local committees and stand for elections are the older members of the minority.

The young meet and socialize mostly in local cultural associations and groups and youth clubs in Klagenfurt, Vienna and Graz. The clubs in Vienna and Graz have had their own premises for long time, whereas the club in Klagenfurt relocated several times. It has had its premises in the building of a Slovenian institution Zveza bank since 2011, which it has taken on a lease. Slovenia has helped them much in finding new premises. Disagreements with some of the umbrella organisations on the rate levels and on the suitability of the premises remain to this day - eg. the disagreement with the CCS secretary Joza Habernik (*Uspešno sodelovanje med Zvezo Bank in mladinskimi organizacijami*, 2013⁶⁸). This is just one of continuing disagreements between the umbrella and youth organisations on the amount of financial support. In fact, the umbrella organisations have taken part in the decision-making process about the distribution of financial support by Slovenia up to now (2013), which they were also applying for (*Po napisih nov izziv: reforma struktur*, 2013⁶⁹). The young feel left out in terms of funding and constantly draw attention to this issue. This year the youth organisations received enough funds to employ a professional leader of the Klagenfurt youth centre for part-time. This has been their long-lasting demand (Ošlak, 2013, pp. 2-3). The civil workers who work for central organisations are also at the centre's disposition. This shows that nevertheless, there is a certain cooperation between the them.

The gap between the older and the younger generation is clearly visible, but so far this has not resulted in significant negative consequences as central organisations still have enough followers who are willing to be active in their structures. This March⁷⁰, there were some drastic changes on the political scene after the elections for the regional council had taken place. Perhaps this will be an important turning point also for the Slovenian minority and some changes in minority organisation and the relationship between the traditional and youth organisations will occur.

The situation in Carinthia is completely incomparable with the situation in Styria where youth organisations practically do not exist, because the assimilation rate is much higher. The Cultural Society Article 7 does not have a youth section. Currently the only Slovenian organisation in Styria that can be characterized as a youth organisation is the Club of Slovenian students in Graz, where primarily Carinthian students gather. Considering the fact that Slovenian language classes are more widely accessible in Styria, maybe this will encourage young people to become actively involved in the next years (Gotthardt, 2010, pp. 4-5, 10-11). The situation in Hungary and Croatia with poor participation of young people in minority organisations can be compared with the Styrian one.

Among sixteen Slovenian associations in Croatia only two of them have a youth section: the Slovenian

67 In slovene Mlada EL.

68 Successful cooperation between Zveza bank and youth organizations. Available at <http://novice.at/2013/01/10/uspesno-sodelovanje-med-zvezo-bank-in-mladinskimi-organizacijami/> (10 March 2013).

69 After bilingual signs there is a new challenge: to reform the structures. Available at <http://volksgruppen.orf.at/slovensi/novice/stories/152232/> (10 March 2013).

70 The March of 2013.

Cultural Society Gorski Kotar ⁷¹ and the Cultural and Educational Society Bazovica from Rijeka ⁷². The section from Gorski Kotar organises different meetings and trainings and they are well connected with the Slovenian group Young for the young from Trieste. The Association of Slovenes in Croatia and councils are led by older members of the Slovenian minority. In recent years some young people decided to pursue their studies in Ljubljana. Maybe they will become motivated for being active in the Slovenian organisations after returning home (Valentinčič, 2012, p. 219-222).

The situation in Hungary is similar, the Association of Slovenians in Hungary and self-governances are also led by older members of the minority. But in recent years they succeeded in attracting some young people to become active in the Slovenian organisations, especially those who are connected with the Slovenian centre Lipa in Szentgotthárd or with the Slovenian media (Valentinčič, 2013). Among sixteen Slovenian associations and groups in the Raba region none of them have a youth section, but some of them have child sections (Valentinčič, 2012, p. 190). Recently, a new connection between young people from both sides of the border has been established. The Club of Students from Prekmurje ⁷³ founded its Raba section, which is primarily targeted at students from the Raba region who study in Ljubljana, In addition they also organise joint events and other gatherings for young people from both sides of the border. In March 2013 they visited the European parliament in Brussels (Žumer, 2013).

Contrary to young people in Carinthia, the Slovenians in Italy are much more involved in the minority political organisations. However, it is difficult to give an accurate and only one reason why intergenerational dialogue and cooperation are more developed there. But nevertheless, young people in Italy often criticise the umbrella organisations. Their complaints can be compared with the Carinthian ones: the umbrella organisations are not democratically legitimized, there is a need for one common umbrella organisation, young people are disturbed by old ideological divisions and non-transparent funding, they claim that their opinions are not taken into consideration and that they do not get enough funds (XII. Vseslovensko srečanje Slovencev v zamejstvu in po svetu v Državnem zboru, 2013 ⁷⁴). Criticism is, however, not as sharp as it is in Carinthia. The most distinctive youth group is the youth section of the only Slovenian political party in Italy: Slovenian Community. It consists of two groups: Young for the Young ⁷⁵ in the province of Trieste and Future ⁷⁶ in the province of Gorizia. The two groups joined into a common organisation Youth for the Future ⁷⁷ at the Congress in September 2011 (Valentinčič, 2012, p. 139). The most notable action so far has been definitely the preparation of a CD with photos of all monolingual road signs which should be bilingual by law in the province of Trieste (Zgoščenka Mladih za Mlade o dvojezičnih tablah s pravno podlago zaščite Slovencev v Italiji je pripravljena, 2013 ⁷⁸).

Young people are party candidates at elections at all levels and some have also been elected to municipal

71 In slovene Slovensko kulturno društvo Gorski Kotar.

72 In slovene Kulturno prosvetno društvo Bazovica iz Reke.

73 In slovene Klub prekmurskih študentov.

74 10th meeting of Slovenians abroad in slovenian parliament. Available at <http://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/deloDZ/seje/evidenca?mandat=VI&type=magdt&uid=B5DDEF4503A5840BC1257A3300421BCC> (15 March 2013).

75 In slovene Mladi za mlade.

76 In slovene Prihodnost.

77 In slovene Mladi za prihodnost.

78 The CD of the group Young for the Young about bilingual signs is ready. Available at <http://www.slomedia.it/zgoscenka-mladih-za-mlade-o-dvojezicnih-tablah-s-pravno-podlago-zascite-slovencev-v-italiji-je-pripravljena> 8 March 2013).

councils. Young people are also members of the Italian left-wing parties, mostly of the Democratic Party, which also has an official Slovenian component. The centre of political power in Italy is, in comparison with Carinthia, less in the umbrella organisations and more in the political parties. Nevertheless, there are young people involved in umbrella organisations as well (XII. Vseslovensko srečanje Slovencev v zamejstvu in po svetu v Državnem zboru, 2013). Professor in Slovenian schools in Trieste Peter Močnik observes that national consciousness among young people is falling, but he says that there are also some students who can be compared with the members of TIGR (a patriotic Slovenian organisation which was fighting against the Fascism) (Srečanje "Pol stoletja samostojnega političnega nastopanja Slovencev v avtonomni deželi FJK" povsem uspelo, 2013 ⁷⁹).

Without a doubt, the Slovenian youth in Italy is the most active of all Slovenian minorities in the neighbouring countries. In addition to politics they are also very involved in cultural and other civil life of the minority (sport, scouts etc.). Lately, there have been some notable successes in the field of choral singing (Figelj, 2013). Unlike in the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia in the province of Udine the young people are either not politically active or are members of the Italian parties. This is the result of the fact that the Slovenians were hardly prosecuted in these valleys in the past. Today, a significant development of cultural activities among young people can be observed in this region. They are involved in both the preservation of ancient traditions (e.g. collecting old tales, dancing in the folklore group Val Resia etc.) (Mladi Benečani se trudè, de bi ustavili cajt an obvarvali domače pravce, 2013, p. 7 ⁸⁰) and in modern culture expression (e.g. theatre ⁸¹, music contest Senjam beneške piesmi, radio and youtube show Pismo iz Benečije etc.) (Mi smo tu, 2013 ⁸²). A common feature of all three Italian provinces inhabited by the Slovenians is that young people do not have their own youth clubs and their own premises. Young people recognise this as a disadvantage compared to Carinthia.

CONCLUSION

We can see that the general situation of the Slovenian minorities as well as the positions and visions of the young minority members in the neighbouring countries vary among different countries and regions so it is very difficult to compare them. Certain relevant parallels can be dragged between Carinthia and the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia on the one hand, and the province of Udine, Croatia, Styria and the Raba region on the other hand. Even when comparing Carinthia with Trieste and Gorizia we can see a significant difference in the youth organisation and attitudes of young people towards traditional structures. While young people in Italy are willing to become involved in traditional organisations, young people in Carinthia mostly reject traditional organizations. We can notice that the historical circumstances, the level of assimilation and the level of rights the minority has today influence on whether the young members of a certain ethnic community have enough national consciousness that they feel the need for youth minority organisations and their activation. The way of organisation and activation they choose depends on the relationships between generations, which is mostly influenced by relations between individuals. We can see that very small differences in decision-making and choices in the past have led to significant differences today. There is no doubt that national community has

79 The meeting "Half of a century of independant political perfomance of Slovenians in the region Friuli – Venezia Giualia" was a success.. Available at <http://www.slomedia.it/srecanje-pol-stoletja-samostojnega-politicega-nastopanja-slovencev-v-avtonomni-dezeli-fjk-povsem-uspelo> (15 March 2013).

80 The young are trying to stop the time and save old tales.

81 Beneško gledališče.

82 We are here. Available at <http://www.mismotu.it/> (15 March 2013).

a future together only by having conscious and active youth, which consider maintaining national consciousness, language and culture as an important value and goal.

The development of Slovenia has been different from the other Western Balkan countries since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Today neither Slovenia nor Slovenian minorities in the neighbouring countries do not face the same difficulties and challenges as the other countries of the Western Balkans. This year on the first of July Croatia will also enter the European Union and the entire Slovenian ethnic territory will be united in the EU. Accession to the EU is certainly a goal for all Western Balkan countries but it seems that the path to this goal is still long and painful. Being part of the EU is what the minorities in these countries long for, since it means that their lives will improve significantly. Slovenia's accession to the EU was a very important milestone for the relations between Slovenia and its minorities in the neighbouring countries. The abolition of borders meant a brand new start in relations with each other and immediately showed very positive results. So far, it seems that this is the future of all Western Balkan countries. Next to the abolishment of border crossings, entering the EU is important for minorities as it demands high standards for minority protection from its candidates. Preparations are in motion to gather signatures for the European Citizens' Initiative, which predicts a united standard for minority protection in each country of the EU. Chances for success are low, but if it does occur, it would be the best guarantee of the minorities' importance in the EU and that they will no longer depend on their countries only.

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reviews

FORCED TO BE FREE: THE PARADOXES OF LIBERALISM AND NATIONALISM

Zlatko Hadžidedić (Petra Trkov)

VELIKIH PET IN NASTANEK KRALJEVINE SRBOV, HRVATOV IN SLOVENCEV

LES CINQ GRANDS ET LA CRÉATION DU ROYAUME DES SERBES, CROATES ET SLOVÈNES.

Andrej Rahten and Janez Šumrada (Polona Mal)

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Zlatko Hadžidedić

FORCED TO BE FREE: THE PARADOXES OF LIBERALISM AND NATIONALISM

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Nationalism is commonly referred to as a doctrine that promotes particularist approach, is collectivistic and intolerant, while liberalism is by definition universalistic, individualistic and tolerant. And yet, they are both based on a set for common concepts, inter alia, liberty, equality, popular sovereignty; also, they both introduced the nation-state as a framework for their realization in society.

The author, Zlatko Hadžidedić, is a sociologist and a political scientist; he is working as an adviser at Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his book *Forced to be Free* he attempts to explain the ubiquitousness of the nationalism in the modern society from the historical perspective. Hadžidedić focuses on historical and conceptual relationship between nationalism and liberalism, through analyzing the works of five pragmatic classical liberal scholars from the seventeenth century on. He demonstrates that due to liberalism's fixation on the sovereign nation-state as the only legitimate model of governance nationalism emerges as an integral part of liberalism. Therefore, the ubiquitousness of liberalism in the modern society makes nationalism ubiquitous, too.

Although nationalism has been present for more than two centuries, the academia has been analyzing its philosophical origins only since the 1960s. Until then the nation was perceived as a natural form of society and nationalism as an excess in such natural state. However, still in the 1960s the debate was focused on the essentiality of the ethnic roots of the nation and nobody offered the definition of the term nation which could

explain the multiplicity of its manifestations. The only author who paid attention to nationalism's philosophical roots was Elie Kedourie, who identified nationalism as a doctrine developed in Germany in the nineteenth century. In his opinion nationalism "*pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively on its own*" (Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 1993, p. 1). The weak point of his theory is that it does not explain how is it possible that nationalism had not been known in the nation-states created well before Germany.

The book consists of three parts which are divided into five chapters. Each of the chapters is devoted to a distinguished scholar representing a particular century in liberalism's history. The first part of the book analyzes the relations between nationalism and contractarianism through the works of Algernon Sidney, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and John Rawls. The nation is explored as a source of legitimacy, liberty, and justice. The second part is devoted to the relation between nationalism and utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill's work is studied in order to examine the nation as the condition of freedom. In the last part, titled *A Liberal Against the Nation-state*, Lord Acton defines the nation as a negation of liberty.

In the inceptive chapter of the first part, the work of Algernon Sidney, British political theorist from the seventeenth century, is presented. He was one of the first authors who clearly and unambiguously proposed that nations have an inherent right to establish their own states with legislative institutions. However, while promoting nations as the sole source of the political

legitimacy he failed to provide a definition of what nations were supposed to be. For him - and the present-day nationalists - the sociological content of the nation is perceived as a “*variable, subject to arbitrary adaptations, depending on political circumstances*” (p. 9). He sees liberty “*as national self-determination by means of autonomous legislation*” (p. 12).

The following chapter is devoted to Jean Jacques Rousseau for whom the ability of the society to form its own legislative institutions is not in the focal point of liberty; rather, he focused on the self-identification of individual's will with the general will of society. For Rousseau the general will is achieved in political process through direct participation and public deliberation. The society is transformed into nation by formulating its general will through its legislative institutions. Individual's self-identification with the general will is therefore his self-identification with the nation. Thus, nationalism continuously articulates itself in the society through continuous identification of one's individual will with the presumed will of the society, ultimately generating the social phenomenon called the nation. Nationalism regards these mass-identifications of individuals with their nation, i.e. mass-manifestation of national unity, as the only possible manifestation of one's freedom.

The last chapter of the first part analyzes John Rawls's theory of justice, which is based on the idea of perpetual display of procedural reciprocity in individual relations. The ritual recognition, reciprocally extended between the members, is non-reciprocally denied to non-members. In *A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism* Rawls argues that the basic structure is a well-ordered society and that self-isolation constitutes a precondition for society to build its basic structure on the shared conception of justice and as a fair distribution of rights, duties, benefits and burdens between members as equals. This society is continuously homogenized on the basis of its values and norms, as opposed to other societies which are homogenized on the basis of their values and norms. Even if all societies adopt the same values and norms they cannot merge, they have to remain self-contained. Hadžidedić tries to establish that Rawls's well-ordered society does not intrinsically differ from the homogenous community known as the nation state.

The last two parts of the book are devoted to nineteenth century scholars John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton. In the second part, Mill equates free institutions with national institutions and argues that governmental boundaries which are identical to boundaries of nationalities form an essential condition for the free institutions. The institutional exercise of liberty is linked to homogenization as well as individualization. In these premises we can conclude that the autonomous individual from the liberal doctrine can be free only within the framework of its national institutions. Thus Mill's theory suggests that only national institutions can generate individual freedom.

The final part of the book introduces the work of the only classical liberal scholar who openly denounced both the nation and the nation-state, as they are the embodiment of illiberal and arbitrary power. In his theory classes and corporate interests, rather than individuals, are presented in the state institutions. Since the traditional classes and corporations are not present in the modern society, he found their possible equivalent in the multi-national state, which he saw as the only possible framework for liberty.

Throughout the book Hadžidedić successfully establishes that liberalism's fixation on the nation state as the only legitimate form of governance necessarily generates nationalism as a means to produce such a unit. He provides an original theory of conceptual and historical roots of nationalism and reasons of its lasting presence in modern society. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the book *Forced to be Free* has drawn a lot of public attention, especially among academia in the Balkan states, where the formation of nations or nation states is, from a historical point of view, a very recent occurrence.

Polona Mal

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Andrej Rahten and Janez Šumrada (ed.).

VELIKIH PET IN NASTANEK KRALJEVINE SRBOV,
HRVATOV IN SLOVENCEV

LES CINQ GRANDS ET LA CRÉATION DU
ROYAUME DES SERBES, CROATES ET SLOVÈNES.

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Paris Peace Conference in 1919 brought many changes in international community, starting with establishment of the League of Nations, setting foundations for current global institutional framework, as well as re-drawing the map of Europe. And it also provided for international recognition of a new state – Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SCS).

For the regions of South-Eastern as well as Central Europe, Paris Peace conference brought many changes. It influenced further development and history of the regions in the 20th century and is influencing the above mentioned regions even nowadays. Due to that it is not a surprise that the conference still attracts researchers, especially those dealing with political and diplomatic history and also those, dealing with international relations.

The monograph, written in Slovene and French, is part of *Studia Diplomatica Slovenica* book collection, which aims to present the research of diplomatic history of the Central and South-Eastern Europe. This systematic attempt to research diplomatic history in those regions is

rather unique and reveals promising future for the historic analysis of diplomacy in the region. It is based on primary sources from different national archives. The introduction, written by the editors, is followed by five chapters. Each of them focuses on one of the five most important delegations/superpowers of the Paris Peace Conference, namely France, United States of America, Italy, United Kingdom and Japan. The last two chapters are focusing on Slovenian expectations and reactions to the peace conference and on analysis of positions and beliefs of US president Wilson and their implications for Slovenes.

In the introduction the editors present existing studies of Paris Peace Conference that have also focused on the Kingdom of SCS. They also point out that the role of Slovenes still needs further research, in context of the Yugoslavian delegation as well as in the whole setting of the conference. Paris Peace Conference was a crucial moment for Kingdom of SCS. Interesting is the notion that with choosing to name the new state as Kingdom of three nations, Croats and Slovenes were recognised as nations for the first time in diplomatic history. They also briefly touch upon

the strong belief of Slovenes in US president Wilson's call for the right to self-determination.

In the first chapter Stanislav Sretenović presents French positions and its prominent role in the establishment of the Kingdom of SCS. He analyses French positions towards different possibilities for post-World War I landscape of South-Eastern Europe. After the Entente decided to support the division of Austro-Hungary in 1918, support of the Serbian goal to establish the Kingdom of SCS was part of their negotiating goals. France supported the Kingdom of SCS more in regard to the defeated Central Powers than in regard to Italy and Romania, also part of Entente. France was torn between keeping alliance with Italy and supporting the Serbian goal for a strong Kingdom of SCS. French diplomats were constantly looking for a compromise between those conflicting goals. They played an important but not decisive role in the establishment of Kingdom of SCS.

The second chapter, written by Uroš Lipušček, focuses on the role of the USA. Before the active engagement in the World War I US administration didn't know much about so called "Near East" and complex ethnical composition of the region. When the end of the World War I was on the horizon, they realised the need to familiarise with the situation in the region as well as with the plans of other allies for the post-war regime. Special expert committee was established that proposed possible solutions to the US Secretary of State and to President Wilson. In the last part of the chapter author focuses on President Wilson's "defeat" when he had to accept the power struggle among his allies. Despite his discontent with secret treaties he accepted several of their clauses when forming the final agreement. This was also evident in the decision on the border between the Kingdom of SCS and Italy. The establishment of League of Nations and "the new world order" was a priority for President Wilson.

Tanja Mljač analyses the complex relationship between Italy and the forming Kingdom of SCS in chapter three. Through the presentation of Italian diplomatic activities before and during the World War I as well as during the Paris Peace Conference and after, the author presents how Italy rather successfully followed its interests to ensure a leading role in the Adriatic. Italy was objecting to the establishment of the Kingdom of SCS, it was more supportive of Serbian territorial

expansion, but Slovenian and Croatian territories as part of Austro-Hungary shouldn't become part of it. With strategic and very capable diplomatic activities Italy even managed to ensure that the border between Kingdom of SCS and Italy was not determined at the Paris Peace Conference but in a separate treaty of Rapallo. Author stresses that this was a great diplomatic victory for Italy, but on the other hand the consequences for Yugoslavian population on new Italian territory were negative.

The positions of the United Kingdom towards the Kingdom of SCS are presented in chapter four by Gorazd Bajc. UK didn't know the issue of Southern Slavs any better than the US. During the war their Foreign Office and War ministry established an expert group which was tasked with preparation of analyses of the situation. This is, according to the author, indication that the UK had realised the geostrategic importance of the Kingdom of SCS, especially of its northern part. On the other hand, the UK was also a party to London Treaty, which granted Italy a large part of territory on northern Adriatic. British diplomatic activities continued after the Paris Peace Conference and British diplomats continued to talk with governments in Rome and Belgrade with the aim to secure a peaceful agreement on the border between the two countries.

Chapter five, written by Boštjan Bertalanič, uncovers the little known Japanese positions on Kingdom of SCS during the Paris Peace Conference. Special attention is given to the border issues between Italy and Kingdom of SCS and to the repatriation of citizens of the Kingdom of SCS from Japan. Japanese delegates were cooperating closely with their Italian counterparts on the border issue in Northern Adriatic, mostly because this strengthened their territorial claims in Asia. However, they managed to keep a neutral and comprehensive view on the Adriatic region. In the second part of the chapter the author presents – for the first time – the return of war prisoners that were captured on the Austro-Hungarian battleship Kaiserin Elisabeth.

In chapter six Gregor Jenuš focuses on the expectation of Slovenian politicians before the Paris Peace Conference and their assessments after the end of the conference. Slovenian delegation, that was a rather autonomous part of the delegation of the Kingdom of SCS, was very optimistic before the beginning of the conference. Their high

hopes were built on US positions and demands of President Wilson for self-determination principle and promises on righteousness. The author also presents the main points and decisions made about the northern borders of the Kingdom of SCS that were especially important to Slovenes. In the eyes of Slovenian delegates at the conference it failed to deliver the recognition of Slovenian territorial claims, based on ethnicity of population.

Last chapter, written by editor Andrej Rahten, analyses points of divergence and points of similar positions among US President Wilson and Slovenes at the Paris Peace Conference. High hopes of Slovenians to be united in one state were unrealistic even at the beginning of the conference. During the negotiations in Versailles Wilson had to give in to many demands of other allies, based on existing secret agreements. The author also presents several pleas of Slovenian delegation regarding the possible plebiscites on the northern (Carinthia) and western parts of Slovenian territory. Author concludes with a presentation of the expressions of disappointment of prominent Slovenes over the outcomes of Paris

Peace Conference for Slovenes.

The whole monograph is based on materials from different archives, which means that all analyses are based on primary sources. Systematic research of archives resulted in the presentation of several new facts about Slovenian history in the 20th century; one of those is definitely the description of how Slovenes and other nationals of Kingdom of SCS returned from Japanese captivity. Through presenting new facts and information from national archives of winning powers of World War I, it is also relevant for the broader region as Slovenian story is set in the wider frame of establishment and international recognition of the Kingdom of SCS.

In conclusion I would like to recommend this monograph to all that are interested in the history of World War I, geopolitics and diplomatic history. The monograph is also interesting for historians, as it is based on primary sources.

Sarajevo 2014

BE CREATIVE, EXPRESS SPIRIT

Jure Apih

Be Creative, Express Spirit

Jure Apih¹

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ABSTRACT

The contribution focuses on the issue of creativity and its importance for human beings, in particular for encouraging their ability to absorb and radiate genius loci as well as to stimulate and stipulate creativity process as a tool of progress. The Young Cup, which is a part of the Istanbul Intercontinental Advertising Festival, stemming from the Slovene–Turkish initiative, is a place and point where young creators from all over the world come together and present the strength of young generation. Although advertising festivals are a somewhat controversial institution of the marketing industry, they pursue and to put it bluntly sell creativity. They can sell that magic thing which exists, but it is difficult to grasp – creative, witty, original, and effective communication, which functions as the most efficient accelerator of economic currents when it is right. Imagination, compassion, wit, eloquence, artistry, insight, open-mindedness, and sharpness of thought are the characteristics, which try to open horizons and show the way.

Keywords: Creativity, advertisement, Golden Drum, Young Cup, Slovenia, Istanbul

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THE IDEA

In the old times (or the modern, however one looks at it), when our world was still being built, it was supposedly ruled by the gods, while man meddled in. Those who wish to understand everything still cannot agree on who created whom – man the gods or the gods men. Be that as it may, they were never too far from each other. The ancient Greeks – if one believes their myths – enjoyed the company of the gods, made love to them, and even bore them demigods, forever implanting in us the wish to be like them. Naturally, it must first be established what are the actual key differences between them. There are only two abilities which make the gods godlike and which man has wanted to possess since the dawn of time – power and creativity. Power is the ability to change the world, to control the destiny, life, and death of others. Creativity is to produce something that did not exist before. First there was nothing, then there was man, the Great Pyramid of Giza, Cologne Cathedral, the Mona Lisa, the wreath of sonnets (like that of Prešeren), Beethoven's Sixth Symphony. Divine. And when power and creativity are combined in one person, people such as Alexander the Great, Hadrian/Cesar, and Napoleon are born. The world is not fair and divine characteristics are divided as they are. Younger generations, smaller nations, and the deprived world cannot pride themselves on power. In order to challenge the gods (and non-gods), they have to be creative. One has to be resourceful, they say, if one has no "God-given gifts"; one has to be inventive when in difficulty, which was caused by the unfairness of life. Imagination has no end and thoughts fly faster than light. Priceless.

CREATIVITY AND GENIUS LOCI

Two million Slovenes who are angry at each other do not have and cannot have much power. Those in doubt regarding the plebiscite on Slovene independence were encouraged that with four million capable hands, we do not have to fear the future. Today we know that diligence does not suffice and that these hands are too weak. In reality, wisdom, shrewdness, and creativity are essential.

When the most market-oriented republic split from Yugoslavia, it remained alone out on the open. The relatively developed marketing infrastructure found its modus operandi then in the market of four hundred million, which was basically untouched and suddenly flowed over the Berlin wall. The Golden Drum, the advertising festival of the New Europe, integrated the shattered advertising industry, which was newly emerging, in that time and helped create its own identity in the unequal relationship with the Western Big Brother.

Almost two decades later, the festival achieved its aim to a large extent and new goals had to be set, as well as a more ambitious mission.

Advertising festivals are a somewhat controversial institution of the marketing industry. Advertising agencies sell mainly creativity. Without it, they basically have no real purpose. They can sell that which companies cannot develop on their own or have a difficulty developing – creative, witty, original, and effective communication, which functions as the most efficient accelerator of economic currents when it is right. Imagination, compassion (understanding people), wit, eloquence, artistry, insight, open-mindedness, and sharpness of thought are the characteristics, which are not very common and are cultivated, worshiped, and marketed in advertising agencies and their chains. The market, which is transparent in principle, and the customer, who "is always right", often make a harsh selection when it comes to soft, sometimes dreamy, at times seemingly foolish saving or encouraging of the entire banal industry. The creative work force, which sells its dreams, privacy and passions to the customer, requires other evidence and encouragement, which can be provided only by the cruel, merciless market and the customer, who inappropriately has the last word. At festivals, where there are established judges, renowned creative workers and the professional public, the situation is reverse. The customers can only be by-standers, because the professionals, who understand and see more, make the decisions. The winners have higher prices and pays and their arguments carry more weight in the next confrontation with the inflexible client.

Advertising as the most visible market manifestation is of course not excluded from global processes. The armies of globalization are led by advertisers, who take orders from the commanders standing on the high towers of transnational corporations. Power wins everywhere, where the tsunami of globalization hits. But the world battle has a communicational flaw. Global communications, which are taking over the planet, have to have no roots, color, or scent, typical for every place that has been touched and marked by man, if they are to address and be understood by everyone. The unification of the world is driven by the motto “think globally, act locally”

GENIUS LOCI or the spirit of the place is the trump card in the hands of those who are engaged in the political, economical, and communicational fight against the globalized supremacy of the misappropriated capital. They are fighting alongside their people, the fellow men in the space, to which they belong; they communicate in the ethos of that space, in the language, in the culture, in the manner, which is theirs and which they understand better than anyone else. The spirit of a space are the tales, the sad and happy stories, laughter and tears, melodies, poems, jokes, which no one else understands; the experience of good and evil. The spirit of a space is the collective intimacy, which the anemic communication of globalization usually does not access.

THE (YOUNG) CUP

The Istanbul Intercontinental Advertising Festival (The CUP) is a joint project of four of the most important advertising festivals in Asia, Ibero-America, and Europe, which wish to enable the advertisers who are in the shadow of Anglo-Saxon globalizers to be recognized, acknowledged and encouraged for their excellence and sensitivity in communication. Only the best works from the four large regional contests are placed in the international selection each year and are evaluated by the jury of all the (four) juries and are presented with awards. The best of the best, the *crème de la crème* of the four continents, is not only evaluated by the most credible jury, but also the most competent, because all the works in the competition have already been seen, evaluated, awarded by at least a fourth of the jury members. The story repeated itself six times – from Valencia, Bled, Sarajevo, to Istanbul – the only real intercontinental cultural capital, where the International Advertising Cup has already taken places three times. The evaluation process and the following ceremony where the nominees are announced and the awards are presented – the trophies – is usually accompanied by a professional program – the creative international summit – so that this formal event does not simply pass but is in accord with the future times. The thoughts of dr. Danilo Türk, the former President of the Republic of Slovenia, (on ethics and creativity in international relations), in which he explains that humanity is capable of making large steps forward as a civilization only after severe catastrophes and that today, we live in ‘a non heroic time’, rounded the entire image of creativity as a voice from beyond.

Perhaps the strongest advantage of the ideas, which can change the world, is that they are usually free. Though they might not be entirely cost-free, because their presentation and elaboration does require some money, but it is not necessary for them to be realized in order to evaluate them. This is why young creators, who can put their ideas into the competition completely unburdened (and are uncorrupt?) in the spirit of the space and time to which they belong.

A few hundred competitors under the age of thirty from all over the world attend the *YOUNG CUP* every year with their works with a theme, determined by the organizers. The award for the best work represents an invitation to the International Advertising Cup in Istanbul. Payed vacation, school, and the touch of the future.

This is the cherry on top, which could be called the mission.

P.S. This is how we try to make it each time, attract creativity and encourage outreach, perhaps also show the way.

YOUNG CUP ISTANBUL AWARD – 3.

BE YOURSELF, EXPRESS SPIRIT OF YOUR COUNTRY

Genius loci, spirit of the place is a motto of Intercontinental advertising Cup and the general item of 2013 Istanbul Young Contest

We are looking for new, inspiring fresh ideas based on local culture and specific kind of habits, values and communication. Send us your creations, advertisements, posters, illustration,...advertising messages with strong genius loci note of yours or whatever others recognizable country spirit for product or service by your choice.

The best, the most recognizable, the most inspiring idea will be awarded with free visit of Istanbul Cup 2013

CROQUIS



Film Festival - Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie

Sarajevo is the capital and largest city of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity). As such, Sarajevo is the leading political, social and cultural centre, as well as historically famous for its religious diversity (Islam, Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Judaism) and therefore called “Jerusalem of the Europe”. The city has developed under the Ottoman Empire (in 15th century). Sarajevo is well known all over the world as the place of the assassination of the Archduke of Austria Franz Ferdinand that caused World War I. In 1984 it hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics.

Sarajevo was tragically famous and has gained international attention during the Bosnian war for independence (1992-1995) when thousands of Sarajevo’s inhabitants lost their lives under the bombardment and sniper shooting at civilians by the Serbs. It was the longest siege of a capital city in the history of modern warfare. Many terrific pictures have rounded up the television screens all over the world, making civilised society breathless and shocked how it is ever possible to see such evil events at the end of the 20th

century. But the city and its people survived. *A survival.*

Maybe like no other city in the Balkan region, Sarajevo has its own specific soul which comes out of the great suffering during the Ex-Yugoslav war and the enormous multi-religious and multi-ethnic character of this unique place. Remembering the pulse of Sarajevo, Baš Čaršija with its numerous touristic attractions, specific image, smell and vividness – it is not possible to separate Sarajevo with one the most important event, which is going on every year in summer – the Sarajevo Film Festival (with awards named “Heart of Sarajevo”).

And indeed the festival represents the “heart” – the heart of the new life for the metropolis so rich on history and of tragedy. The most important artists and film makers from all over the world have recognised the unique *aura* of Sarajevo and have contributed that Sarajevo has become one of the most significant place for contemporary film.

Film festival was founded in autumn 1995 when the siege of Sarajevo was still going on. Surprisingly, 15000 people came to see the films, of which they were 37 from different countries.

The current director of the Festival is Mirsad Purivatra. Festival is hosted at the National Theatre with screenings at other places. The Festival has been attended by the celebrities such as Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, Jeremy Irons, Juliette Binoche, Bono Vox, Stephen Frears... to name just some of them.

In 2001 the European Film Association made the Sarajevo Film Festival one of the eleven festivals that could nominate a film for the award of “Europe’s Best Short Film”. In the same year, the winner of the Sarajevo Film Festival, Danis Tanović’s *No Man’s Land* win the Oscar. In 2007 the *Sarajevo Talent Campus* has been added to the festival – the platform for coming young film professionals.

Anja Fabiani

GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

ARTICLES

European Perspectives is a scientific journal that publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific articles focusing on relevant political, sociological, social, security, economic and legal as well as ethnic, cross-cultural, minority and cross-ethnic issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and South-Eastern Europe.

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Ernest Petrič et al.

**Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu
(Slovene Diplomats in Slavic Countries)**

2010 / 472 pages / ISBN 978-961-92839-0-5

Price: € 40




This is an excellent and rare book which analyses and reflects the role of Slovene diplomats in the Slavic countries up till 1990. The main message of the book is that Slavic component is part of the Slovene diplomatic experience. It has contributed to enhanced diplomatic relations between the Republic of Slovenia and several Slavic countries. Contributions are published in Slovene, Czech and Russian languages. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Andrej Rahten

**Izidor Cankar – diplomat dveh Jugoslavij
(Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias)**

2009 / 420 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-8-2

Price: € 40



The biography *Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias* is an account of the diplomatic career of Izidor Cankar in the first and second Yugoslav states. The book outlines Slovenia's progress from the end of the 19th century to the late 1950s in broad social terms as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the monarchist and communist Yugoslavias. Special attention is given to the international point of view – debates on the Slovenian issue in correspondence involving Slovenian diplomats serving at Yugoslav missions. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Franc Rozman

Baron Josef Schwegel – spomini in pisma (Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters)

2007 / 376 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-0-6

Price: € 34



The book *Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters* contains an autobiography of Baron Josef Schwegel and his notes from the Congress of Berlin. The book sheds light on Schwegel's work in diplomacy and foreign affairs based on his memoirs and the letters he wrote his wife when he was a member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation at the Congress of Berlin. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.


Ernest Petrič

Slovinci v očeh Imperija - Priročniki britanskih diplomatov na Pariški mirovni konferenci leta 1919

(Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919)

2007 / 524 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-1-3

Price: € 35



The book *Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* includes a collection of handbooks prepared by the Historical Section at the British Foreign Office for the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Political analyses, texts containing historical and general information (Slovenes, the Yugoslav movement, the Austrian Primorska (Littoral) and Kansan (Carniola) regions, Koroška (Carinthia), Štajerska (Styria)) that were intended to help shape British policy on Central and Southern Europe following World

War I. The book was published as part of the *Fontes* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič

**Zunanja politika – Osnove teorije in praksa
(Foreign Policy - Basic Theory and Practice)**

2010/509 pages/ISBN 978-961-92839-2-9

Price: € 45




The author, an experienced professor of international law, ambassador with remarkable career and currently the president of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, presents in this book a comprehensive overview of foreign policy. He combines in-depth theoretical expertise and long year experience both in foreign policy decision-making process and in its exercising through diplomatic means. This monograph is the first of its kind in Slovene language and represents a pioneering contribution to science.

Andrej Rahten, Janez Šumrada (ed.)

**Velikih pet in nastanek Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev
(Les Grands Cinq et la création du Royaume des Serbes,
Croates et Slovènes)**

2011/510 pages/ISBN 978-961-92173-0-6

Price: € 35



Book is based on the research in the archives of the Great Powers for the period 1918–1920, with a focus on the Slovenian role in re-defining the borders of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference. For the first time in one place and on the basis of primary sources, the research describes the policy of the “Big Five” – the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan – towards the establishment of the Yugoslav state.



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