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# EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

*Special Section: Active Citizenship*



## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans

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# Letter from the Editor

This spring of 2014 is not just an ordinary spring, as they usually come and go. For us, clustered around the European Perspectives journal, it also means the anniversary spring. Namely, this issue is the 10<sup>th</sup> in a row. One could dare to say that we are a strong community of not only the editorial board members, team and reviewers, but above all of the contributors and readers. It is our humble opinion that during that period we have fulfilled our mission and the expectation of the publisher. Still, our ambition does not stop here.

We started in the autumn of 2009 with the first issue, which was at the same time also the special one, dedicated to the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Two special issues followed. One about Turkey in autumn of 2011, with which we tried to point out the necessity of reviving the negotiation process between the EU and its biggest candidate country so far. In the summer of 2013 we released the third special issue, in that case dedicated to the young generation. We are glad to be the frontrunner among those who focused on one of the most important, acute and frustrated topics of the current international politics.

All in all, we published 57 articles in the journal's main section, and in addition to this nine of them in the Sarajevo 2014 section. This makes a substantial volume of 65 peer reviewed contributions from various fields, like politics and policy, security, the EU affairs, diplomacy, economy, history, minority questions, cross-border cooperation, even linguistic, to name only the most visible ones. We presented nineteen book reviews from similar areas, all of them pointing out works that help to understand the broader region, its complexity and interconnectedness. The Croquis section has brought nine *policy-ethno* refreshments to otherwise dry scientific contemplations. There was the same number of contributions from distinguished guests, who expressed their views as a *credo* for the region's future. All of them are listed in a special section at the end of this issue. Consequently, one could say that the journal is an opinion showing venue and possibility, not only because of the fact that the majority of contributors come from the region. We are particularly glad to offer an opportunity to those, who are beginning with their search for a place in the academic community. That is, at the end of the day, *our* contribution: to focus on the region and its potentials, and to try to promote promising authors from the very region.

That much about the past endeavours. The current issue begins with a special section, devoted to the active citizenship and brings four articles, in addition to the four ones, discussing the EU related topics (citizen's perception, visa liberalization and communication strategies) as well as security cooperation model for the region. The current Guest View discusses the role of think tanks and focuses in particular on one increasing aspect of their work: delivering awards. Why do they do this, what is their aim and fulfillment. The Turkish TASAM shows the example. This time the Croquis reflects a person that stood out in a hot late June day in Sarajevo a hundred years ago. It was Gavrilo Princip, a young activist, who pulled the trigger that by a chain of events later led to the unimaginable confrontation of great powers. The World War I or the Great War is a break even point in the history of mankind and its message should be universally understandable and acceptable, although political reality teaches us it is not just like that.

Sarajevo 2014 section therefore remains not a single remembrance of the historical avalanche, but is for us also a *memento* that spans over its concrete reasoning. This means that the section will remain as a corner element of the journal's structure. As a recollection of mind, the present author discusses five classical novels from the region and searches for diplomatic elements in their narrative. Innovative and challenging.

This year is rich with anniversaries, reaching back not only to the already mentioned beginning of the WWI, but also even twice as much backwards to the famous Congress of Vienna, which de facto started in November 1814. Too much of history for one year only. So let's better stick to this jubilee issue.

Wishing you, as usual, but this time even more fruitful and critically coloured reading. Thanks for being with us and hope to see you again in the autumn of 2014.

The Castle of Jable, April 2014

M. J.



The Role of Think Tanks in a Transformed World  
*Süleyman Şensoy*



# The Role of Think Tanks in a Transformed World

Süleyman Şensoy<sup>1</sup>

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The 21<sup>st</sup> Century is witnessing major changes and transformations with walls crumbling and paradigms shifting. This transformation is, of course, of utmost relevance to countries and communities.

Undoubtedly, the majority of the think tank organizations in developed and developing countries and especially in new regional/global power candidate countries have continued their work with the cooperation/social responsibility of public institutes, private institutes, universities and media. The capacity of institutional think and network which rise with the efforts of think tanks, provides related country's public administration, civil society and private sector to be in boundless innovation.

Turkey is a country that has achieved significant progress in democratization and accomplished enduring success in the areas of human rights and personal freedoms in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Furthermore, the prevention of numerous attempts to establish a political tutelage and the implementation of major reforms in the political sphere, the economy, social life, etc. puts Turkey in an exemplary position. Looking at it from this perspective, there is a significant accumulation of 'Turkish Experience'.

## THE TURKISH ASIAN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES – TASAM

The Center, which has been operating in the institutional body of an NGO, as a private and independent think tank for ten years, has become an international brand with its activities and the capacity it has built by deeply penetrating the areas it affects. TASAM has taken it upon itself, since the beginning, to impartially and scientifically carry forward and share the values of Turkey's historical and cultural background. For this reason, it has made countless projects and works that develop the strategic vision for the future's civilization. These works and projects have been embodied in

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meetings, symposiums, congresses, seminars, brain storms, books, tours, activities, journals, and reports.

There are 10 foreign policy fields that TASAM acts on. These are continentally Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and Caribbean and North America. The regional ones are Balkans, Middle East, Black Sea - Caucasus and Mediterranean which are - in every parameter - the security zone of these four continents in terms of Turkey. Also Turkic World and Islamic World are called as identical fields. TASAM activities turn into concrete results by its final reports, strategic reports, refereed journals, books, agreements, institutes, networks, platforms and Web Sites within the extent of continuously increasing studies regarding these 10 foreign policy fields.

Combined with public diplomacy, these results develop bottom to top consciousness and interaction and give effective information, ideas and suggestions to the related decision makers; thus bring about strategic contributions to a Turkey-and-its-allies-centered perspective on the basis of power and justice.

TASAM, studying to reflect its experiences concerning 4 continents, 4 subregions and Turkic and Islamic World to every parameter in Turkey by projects all around the country, has been carrying out many of its institutional processes, being in the first place the Turkey's Strategic Vision 2023, which has been performed in 81 provinces under the auspices of the Presidency of Turkish Republic. TASAM activities, which are developed with the perspective to provide strategic contributions to Turkey's institutional capacity building, together with its institutional network have reached a level of global importance. Around hundreds of leading experts and academics contribute to TASAM's institutes, platforms, projects and other activities which span nearly 100 countries.

Additionally – the TASAM WORLD was founded by TASAM and is an umbrella organization that steers and coordinates the activities of a wide range of institutions, networks and platforms serving as a centre for capacity building management and cooperation.

In this context, the following are the related institutions; TASAM Development and Cooperation Institute, African Institute, Institute of Islamic Countries, Institute of Public Diplomacy, Political Communication Institute and Balkan Communication Network, World Turkish Forum, Think Tanks Platform of OIC Countries, Turkey Nuclear Technology Platform, Think Tanks Dialogue of Turkey, International Development & Cooperation Platform of NGOs and also Turkey's Strategic Vision 2023 Pro-

ject (under the auspices of the Presidency), Turkey Management and Expertise Program, Strategic Vision Development Program and Turkish-Arab Cooperation Project.

## **TASAM STRATEGIC VISION AWARDS**

The TASAM Strategic Vision Awards have been given since 2006 with aim of honoring statesmen, bureaucrats, scientists, public institutions, businessmen, artists and journalists - writers who share Turkey's strategic vision with their different ideas, works and scientific approaches in order to improve continuously Turkey's respectable position in its region and world on the basis of power and justice and who make serious endeavors for bringing Turkey over contemporaneous civilization level. These awards are also given to the successful people, statesmen and institutions from abroad that have a good relationship with Turkey and loved by Turkish society.

The board consists of Chairman of TASAM, Director of TASAM, Management Board of TASAM, 5 Academic Members who involves the Studies of TASAM and 3 persons from Studying Team of TASAM.

### ***Purpose***

TASAM Strategic Vision Awards are given to honor and encourage statesmen, bureaucrats, politicians, scientists, corporations, businessmen, artists and journalists-writers who work for development and modernization of Turkey, have strategic vision with their impartial, different, creative ideas, works and scientific approaches, and create synergy through combining symmetric and asymmetric interactions based on national interests and objects.

### ***Categories***

Strategic Vision Award offered for Statesman (Since 2006)

It is given in order to honor and encourage the politicians and statesmen who contribute to the Turkey's Strategic Vision and pave the way for Turkey's future by their successful works, creative decisions and valuable policies. All candidates will be evaluated equally without taking their organizations or work areas into account. Only their successful works and developed strategic visions will be considered.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Bureaucrat (Since 2006)

It is given in order to honour and encourage the bureaucrats who make contribution to the process and functionality in the public institutions with

the positive results of their method, governing and behaviour. All candidates will be evaluated equally without taking their organizations or work areas into account. Only their successful works and strategic visions will be considered.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Politician (Since 2009)

It is given to politicians who advance the vision of Turkey's politics by their performance and political contributions and their approaches Turkey's and nation's needs and sensitivities.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Scientist (Since 2006)

It is given in order to honour and encourage scientists who prepare Turkey for the future and make contribution to creation of strategic vision and foresight with their successful scientific research and studies in natural and social sciences. The scientists with title of Professor and Associate Professor can be evaluated for this award category.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Corporation (Since 2007)

It is given in order to honour and encourage private, public and civil corporations contribute to Turkey's strategic vision with their successful projects and decisions for solution of problems and development in the sectors or areas where they are active.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Businessman (Since 2006)

It is given to businessmen who improve vision of Turkish economy and advertise Turkey in the international arena through successful investments and works both in the internal economy and international business. This award can be given both to the businessmen who make investments in different industrial branches and the exporters who create new and great expansions in the international commerce.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Artist (Since 2007)

It is given in order to honour and encourage artists who are Turkey's voluntary cultural ambassadors in the world with their aesthetic and strategic vision and who create cultural agenda, affect masses and articulate and forward people's emotions and opinion to the governors, and contribute to the permanence of our national values with their professional arts and quality works.

Strategic Vision Award offered for Journalist – Writer (Since 2006)

It is given in order to reward journalists and writers from print and/or visual media who encourage researches and contribute to the creation of

strategic vision with their successful works such as television programs and articles, columns on newspapers.

## **GENERAL ESSENTIALS**

### ***Assigning Candidates and Contents***

The Award Board and the TASAM staff either identify a person or particular work/project as a candidate. Surveys and recommendations from outside TASAM are also taken into account when developing the candidates list. The Award Board takes the advice of academic institutions when needed. If the Award Board deems it suitable, chosen representatives hold talks with candidates.

The Award Board gets together in September each year and makes an assessment including the topics about the branches and the content of the awards and determines the candidates. The candidate list is announced through the Internet and additions are made during the following two months. The award holders are finalized by the Award Board in November, announced in December and the awards presented to the recipients at the ceremony.

### ***Attribution of Awards and Principles***

Every year, the awards are designed as an original object in accordance with the decision of the Award Board. TASAM is a research center based on scientific approach that respects all political views and stands in an equidistant position, instead of adopting one political discourse. The awards are given after an assessment which considers whether the works involving “strategic vision” characteristics or not.

According to the decision taken by the Award Board every year, one or more individuals can be rewarded in the same category, and in some years, one or more categories may fall out of the arrangement.

In the aim of contributing to Turkey’s strategic vision and strength, “Strategic Vision Awards” can be given to the individuals coming from allied and friendly countries of Turkey, on the condition of stating the reason. In the aim of contributing to Turkey’s strategic vision and strength, “Strategic Vision Awards” is given to individuals coming from allied and friendly countries of Turkey, on the condition of stating the reason. The Award Board has the right to determine the quality, the number, the categories and the topics of the awards.

## **FINALLY**

At this difficult historical process where parameters and balance of power have been redefined, our need for institutions and administrators with “strategic vision” is vitally essential. The main idea of TASAM Vision Awards is to encourage our development model which is based on quality of human resource and multi-dimensional innovation. We will present these awards to the people who have strategically contributed to build a life space in Turkey where public administration is developed through innovation that is produced by dynamics of strong critical thinking; cities, companies, social and cultural textures, justice, human development is so strong that everybody would say “I want to live in Turkey”.

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# Slovenian National Independence in Public Education: In Quest for National Identity Among the Slovenian Youth

Janja Vuga, Vladimir Prebilič<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

The country plays an important role in the reproduction of national identity from the individual's early years through the secondary socialization, especially through the public educational system. Further on the national historical events constitute among other elements national identity and for Slovenia the key historical event of the nation's recent history is achieving the national independence. Therefore for the purpose of this article we have analysed the high school pupils' knowledge and evaluation of the Slovenian independence process. We have focused on the secondary socialization, manifested in the public educational process. The research included 997 high school pupils expressing their opinions in standardized questionnaire. The results show following: 1) pupils' self-evaluation as well as de facto knowledge about the independence process is low; 2) the primary source of information is not school but other sources; 3) pupils relate the state-building and independence with positive values.

**KEY WORDS:** national identity, secondary education, independence process, Slovenian youth, state-building

## POVZETEK

Država ima poseben položaj pri izgradnji nacionalne identitete pri posamezniku zlasti ko govorimo o procesu sekundarne socializacije, ki poteka v polju javnega izobraževalnega sistema. Četudi je težko osa-

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miti, izločiti in ponderirati posamezne elemente pri oblikovanju nacionalne identitete, je nedvomno utemeljitev samostojne in neodvisne Republike Slovenije mogoče ali celo nujno obravnavati ločeno. Članek temelji na analizi poznavanja procesa osamosvojitve na srednješolski ravni, kot izjemno pomembnem dejavniku sekundarne socializacije. Raziskava vključuje 997 dijakinj in dijakov, ki so odgovarjali na standardiziran anketni vprašalnik. Rezultati kažejo sledeče: 1) tako samoocena kot tudi dejansko znanje anketirancev o procesu osamosvajanja sta nizka; 2) primarni vir informacij o osamosvojitvi ni šolski sistem; 3) anketiranci povezujejo proces osamosvojitve s pozitivnimi vrednotami.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** nacionalna identiteta, srednješolsko izobraževanje, osamosvojitve, slovenska mladina, izgradnja države

## INTRODUCTION

Nations are seen as natural communities which manipulate the loyalty of their members through birth and socialization (Fenton, 2007, p.322). According to Južnič (1993, p.310), national identity also evolves through national history, therefore the authors of this article study national identity and sense of belonging to the nation among the Slovenian youth based on their perception and knowledge of the process of achieving national independence, which took place between 1989 and 1991. Fenton's (2007, p.323) claim that the willingness of people to die in defence of national causes is a supreme indicator of the intensity of commitment to the country and the nation and Robbins's (Featherstone, 2001, p.123) finding that the national identity (and consciousness) is the ultimate value worth dying for, combined with the Slovenian public opinion data showing that merely one fifth (20 percent) of Slovenians would fight with weapons in case of an armed aggression towards the Republic of Slovenia, indicate a lack of national consciousness or perhaps even weak national identity among Slovenians. Hence, it is possible to assume that the coming generations will not be able to develop a stronger sense of national consciousness and national identity through the process of socialization, if the adult generation itself lack the commitment to the nation and the country.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> According to the ISSP (2003) and the WVS (2005), Slovenia rates quite high in globalization index (72 out of 100), while the level of the patriotism is only a bit lower (around 50), placing Slovenia among countries with positive attitude towards globalization as well as patriotism (Ariely, 2012).

For the purpose of this article we have analysed the Slovenian independence process as the key historical event of the nation's recent history and case of profound manifestation of national identity. We have focused on the secondary socialization, manifested in the educational process (i.e. high school).

The purpose of the article is to establish the level of awareness about and importance of the national independence (in 1991) among the Slovenian youth, as an event in nation's recent history that, among other sources, constitutes national identity. This will be measured by assessing: 1) the knowledge of the independence process among the youth (i.e. their *de facto* knowledge, the self-evaluation of their knowledge and the level of discrepancy between the self-evaluation and the *de facto* knowledge); 2) the interest in the national independence that Slovenian youth express; 3) values related to the national independence among the Slovenian youth.

### **National Identity in the Variety of Social Identities**

In different periods of their lives, people usually feel adherence to different groups. An individual is included in various groups, thereby knitting a network of social relationships, in which they assume different roles (Stryker and Burke, 2000; Tajfel and Turner, 1985). Membership of an individual in different groups forms their social identity and as a consequence of variety of identities that define an individual, a conflict can occur among them. Ashforth and Mael (1989, p.29-30) claim that social environment forms an individual's personality and that the latter, in turn, co-shapes the social environment with their behaviour. The formation of identity is thus about a mutual relationship between an individual and the social environment. However, the identities that individuals develop in social interactions in various periods of their lives are not merely a reflection of individual's personality, values, beliefs and norms, but also of the social environment, that is, of groups amongst which they move.

In the period of primary socialisation, individual's identity is co-shaped by the family and during the secondary socialisation by the wider social setting, represented by kindergarten, school and subsequently workplace plus the groups an individual gets included in. At the same time, the process of enculturation of an individual within a certain cultural environment takes place (Južnič, 1993).

An important source of individual's identification is represented by the nation, whereby certain authors (Južnič, 1993; Rizman, 2005)

claim that the nation-state has an important role in the reproduction of national identities, namely by formal rituals (e.g. national symbols – national flag, anthem, etc.), the intention of which is to reinforce the national identity and adherence/cohesion (Handelman, 2004; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008), as well as indirectly through the state education system.

The sources of national identity, as a collective identity, are symbols, memories, values, language, historical events, heroes, etc. (Južnič, 1993; Guibernau, 2001; etc.) and is inherently related to the national culture (see for example Hofstede, 2001). It has been previously established that certain historical or recent events play an important role in the perception of national identity, consciousness or commitment (Fenton, 2007). According to the performance perspective, national identities are continually performed and connect formal ceremonies as well as every-day routines, such as popular events and family events (Lavi, 2013). Based on the performative perspective, national identity is something people *do* rather than something they *have* (Woronov, 2007). Južnič (1993) defines personal, group, cultural and national identity. During the French Revolution, the concept of a nation became synonym of the state and the people (Južnič, 1993, p.307). A nation is kept together by a common national culture composed of values, rituals, symbols, etc. National history is an important part of national identity and culture as well. It is manifested through the events that have influenced a nation's course of development, the development of nation's language and heroes relevant for the formation of national consciousness. However, because forced identification is not always efficient when it comes to the identification with the nation or country and the development of national consciousness (Južnič, 1993), the process of socialization, through which national consciousness is being subtly developed, is important. The latter is reproduced through the public discourse (De Cillia et al., 1999) as well as by national symbols that citizens see every day and therefore become part of our sub-consciousness (Fenton, 2007).

National consciousness is partly also a product of historical nationality, i.e., of events that, during the course of time, gradually and selectively seeped through into a nation's consciousness (Južnič, 1993). Južnič further states that in the development of national identity, intellectuals, bourgeois social stratum and, of course, the *public education system* in particular, play an important role. If the latter is the dominant arena of (re-)defining the meaning of national identity and national consciousness, then in Slovenia, due to the

public educational system, the country should still have high impact on the youth's national identity.

It has been established that the process of secondary socialization (e.g. public school) is an important factor in shaping individual's identities. Therefore public school with its socialization and education functions plays an important role in shaping youth's identities in general as well as the national identity in particular. In accordance with the presumption that certain acts (e.g. constitution of a country) in national history are of fundamental importance for the nation's identity, our hypothesis is the following: *National identity is co-shaped in the process of secondary socialization, which gives the school a notable role, being the main source of information about national history.*

### **National identity and values**

What symbols represent for the development of an individual's cultural identity, what values represent for the development of personal identity (Bachika, 2011, p.201) and what symbols as well as values along with history, language and other components represent for national identity. Bernik (2003, p.130) defines values as higher principles and higher aims towards which individuals strive and which the society accepts and to which it adjusts its activities. Values are the supreme measure of society (Bernik, 2003) and as such steer social development, are built into the social system and relations among people (Toš, 2009).

Featherson (2011) emphasizes the changing nature of values or the *re-valuation* of society. Namely, in different historical periods, various values were predominant in different societies. In this context, we speak of the changing or fluid nature of both values and culture. Values<sup>3</sup> are an expression of the core of humanity and human cultures, hence there is no society or social system without a system of values that directs the preservation, reproduction and progress of a society and its culture and makes sense of them (Musek, 2003).

Similar to Hofstede (2001) and certain other authors, Featherstone (2011) confirms the thesis of the so-called national culture or specific national values. However, consensus as to the existence of national values and national culture has not yet been achieved, which is primarily due to the dilemma concerning the role of the nation-

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<sup>3</sup> Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) define values as an ideal towards which individuals strive, whereas norms are the ones in accordance with which people actually live.

state in defining a nation. Seton-Watson (1977) claims that ... “no scientific definition of a nation can be invented; certainly, though, this phenomenon existed and still exists”. In this context, Anderson (1983; second edition 2003) talks of nations as *imaginary communities*, stressing the artificial origin of the formation called state and questioning the equalization of state with nation.<sup>4</sup>

Stories, traditions, mythology, records of milestone historical events and heroes who gave up their lives for a country, language, etc. make up a nation out of inhabitants who share a certain living space within state borders (Featherstone, 2011: 123). Furthermore, Anderson (1993) claims that, in order to achieve a strong identification, more than just a feeling of *common humanity* is required. All this and maybe more is what forms a national system of values and is manifested through societal and individual respect and obedience of values.

### **National identity and globalisation**

There is no consistency in the interpretation of the nexus between national identity and globalization (Ariely, 2012). Some authors (Meer, 2006; Modood, 2007) identify the rise of the globalization in parallel with the decline of the national identity as a cause of the societal fragmentation, where the multiculturalism seems to undermine the national identity, while others claim that national identity is not in contradiction with the globalization (Guibernau, 2001; Kymlicka, 2003; Kaldor, 2004). The multiculturalism and globalization are often related to the lack of a common source of identification in modern societies; hence individuals often identify themselves with extreme ideologies, etc. (Modood, 2007, p.151; Guibernau, 2007, p.189).<sup>5</sup> Similarly, Castells (2004) says that the globalization offers certain parts of the society to turn towards cosmopolitanism, while there is still another part which will develop so called resistance identities. The latter might break out in its extreme form of nationalism. Although that is not necessarily the case, multiculturalism has influenced and reshaped the perception of national identity and also forced members of certain nations to reflect upon the meaning of national identity and the function of the nation (Smith, 2007).

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<sup>4</sup> There are several explanations of the nationalism, for example modernists place nationalism's roots in the specific era – modernity, while primordial explanation of nationalism places its roots way before the modern era, claiming that nationalism is identical with the common identity (Ariely, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> Guibernau (2007, p.189-190) lists the terrorist attack in Great Britain as an example when a terrorist, acting in total absence of national identity or any sense of belonging to the environment in which he had been socialised, killed a larger number of fellow citizens, because of the identification with a certain extremist ideology.

Hence, globalization along with multiculturalism might influence the redefinition of national identity and nationalism. Of course, national identity must not be associated with the nationalism (with a negative connotation) where negative values prevail, manifested through a policy of exclusion, racism and militarism but with positive values of allegiance to the state and the nation (commitment to the country and national consciousness). Multiculturalism or multicultural identity can only be enacted in the presence of a strong national identity, which is being formed and consolidated through common history, values, symbols, etc., as well, while accepting cultural diversity (Modood, 2007). In doing so, one needs to preserve the ability of critical evaluation of new cultural patterns and values in the context of universal positive civilisation values, such as freedom, equal opportunities for sexes, human rights, solidarity, tolerance, etc. (Guibernau, 2007).

The multicultural structure of societies is by no means a new phenomenon but in the past, at least until the 1970s, most states pursued a policy of assimilation, which was not only broadly accepted, but also expected (Modood, 2007). In the recent decades, this policy became less acceptable in the context of globalisation, multiculturalism and supranationalism. Especially the young express their fondness of global values and supranational loyalty or cosmopolitanism (Fenton, 2007), whereby Tilley and Heath (2007) establish that the young are less attached to and proud of the state in comparison to the older generation. On the other hand, Jung (2008) assumes that this is the life-cycle effect and that, in the long run, no reduction in the strength of the national identity occurs. For example, Ariely (2012) finds a negative correlation between patriotism and ethnic national identity on one side and the globalisation on the other, whereas he does not confirm a negative correlation between national identification and nationalism versus globalisation.<sup>6</sup> The latter is once again confirming the aforementioned presumptions about national identity not being negatively correlating with global identity.

A research among the British youth (see Fenton 2007) has revealed that young people mostly correlate national identity with the nationalism, while the latter has strong negative connotation. Secondly,

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<sup>6</sup> Ariely (2012, p.474) establishes that there are certain countries with high levels of globalization and high levels of patriotism (i.e. the USA, Ireland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand), however these are exceptions.

the youth showed positive attitude towards what Fenton (2007) described as moral universalism ('we are all the same') and could also be labelled as equality (of rights, perhaps) or supranational identity as well as towards individualism in sense of identifying myself as 'just me' and not part of a broader community (or nation). Fenton (2007, p.335) draws our attention to the fact that the youth is quite indifferent towards the national identity or even disregard it.

Nowadays, the youth live in a global world but do they still adopt the sense of belonging to the nation, a national identity, in the process of socialization? Since the act of achieving a country's independence is understood as a fundamental act in Slovenian nation's identity we propose the following hypothesis: *During the educational process in mostly public high schools, Slovenian youth gain a high level of historical knowledge about the creation of Slovenian state.*

An act of achieving independence is one of the most important in the national history and a source of national consciousness. National identity in its healthy form is related to positive values. We propose the following hypothesis, based on the presumption that the act of achieving independence as a source of national identity is related to positive values:

*The constitution of the Slovenian country is related to the positive values such as freedom and democracy.*

## **ANALYSIS**

### **METHODOLOGY AND THE SAMPLE**

The analysis is based on the research project *Patriotism among the Slovenian Youth* which was conducted in 2008 among high school pupils. For the purpose of this article, the data collected among high school pupils are used. The data have been analysed with the SPSS statistical tool, using bivariate and multivariate tests.

#### ***The Sample***

The sample of the survey consists of 997 high school pupils. There were 63 percent of male and 37 percent of female respondents, who were approximately 19 years old.<sup>7</sup> 23 percent of pupils were attending the secondary/grammar school, 34 percent of pupils were

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<sup>7</sup> In the Slovenian curriculum for high schools, the history of Slovenian independence is discussed in the last (third or fourth) year.

attending a three-year school programme and 42 percent of pupils were attending a four-year school programme. The survey included high schools from all Slovenian regions (approximately 10 percent of schools were from Gorenjska, Goriška, South-eastern, Podravska, Pomurska and Savinjska region; 7 percent of schools were from Koroška, Obalno-kraška and Zasavska region; 5 percent of schools were from Osrednja and Spodnje-posavska region; 4 percent of schools were from Notranjsko-kraška region).


The majority of respondents declared themselves as Slovenians (88.7 percent), while the rest declared themselves as Serbs, Muslims/Bosnians or Croats. The relative majority declared themselves as religious (62.3 percent; they either attended the holy mass regularly or only on religious feasts). About a quarter (24 percent) declared themselves as not religious and 13 percent were undecided.

## AWARENESS OF THE SLOVENIAN INDEPENDENCE PROCESS AMONG PUPILS

### *Sources of information regarding the Slovenian independence*

The prevailing source of information about Slovenian independence among high school pupils are TV shows and stories told by parents, while the school ranks third as the most common source, followed by the internet (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Sources of information about Slovenian independence



The t-test shows there are significant differences ( $p < 0.05$ ) between male and female pupils in the assessment of the information sources. The only exception is the high school history course ( $p = 0.084$ ), which seems to be perceived equally among boys and girls (see table 1). As the data analysis shows, high school boys ( $M = 2.7$ ) are also significantly more interested in the history course ( $p = 0.001$ ) than girls ( $M = 2.5$ ).<sup>8</sup> As a rule, those who are more interested in the history course, also evaluate different sources of information higher.

Table 1: Sources of Information about Slovenian Independence according to Respondent's Gender:

	Gender	N	Mean	SEM
parents	male	624	3.26	.044
	female	368	3.11	.056
family and relatives	male	621	2.66	.045
	female	366	2.36	.057
friends	male	615	2.35	.042
	female	363	1.99	.047
high school history course	male	627	3.16	.049
	female	367	3.02	.065
TV shows	male	624	3.64	.043
	female	367	3.22	.057
radio shows	male	621	2.09	.047
	female	367	1.88	.054
newspapers and magazines	male	624	2.74	.048
	female	366	2.54	.062
internet	male	623	3.00	.054
	female	365	2.48	.068
other sources	male	268	1.59	.071
	female	113	1.28	.076

### *Perception of the quality of school as a source of information*

Since the analysis shows that pupils rank school as a third source of information regarding the Slovenian independence, we analyse when and how intensively they actually discuss this topic during various courses at school. Firstly, we measured whether Slovenian independence was part of the curriculum of the history class. 50 percent answered positively, 26 percent of the answers were negative and 25 percent of pupils included in the survey did not remember whether during the history class Slovenian independence was discussed (see table 2). Among the latter, the majority (52 percent) of pupils were attending the 4-year programme, 38 percent the 3-year programme and only 10 percent the secondary/grammar school.

<sup>8</sup> The data was measured with a 4-point scale, with 1 standing for the lowest interest and 4 for the highest.

The most surprising was the finding that among the secondary/grammar school pupils, a high majority (66 percent) declared that Slovenian independence had not been discussed in history classes, while among pupils of the three-year programmes, the same was claimed only by 9 percent of the respondents. Hence there is a significant difference between various school programmes ( $p = 0.00$ ), even though the results show the opposite situation to the one that was expected. A possible explanation for such a result could be that secondary school pupils who do not choose history as a course to take exams in at the *Matura* exam (the final exam which constitutes graduation) might be deprived of the topics that should according to the curriculum be taught during the final year.

Table 2: Slovenian independence: a topic in curriculum for various courses

	yes	no	don't know
history	50 per cent	26 per cent	24 per cent
Slovenian language	29 per cent	38 per cent	26 per cent
geography	27 per cent	42 per cent	24 per cent
sociology	10 per cent	59 per cent	22 per cent
philosophy	2 per cent	68 per cent	18 per cent
elsewhere	3 per cent	33 per cent	17 per cent

As the data in Table 2 shows, Slovenian independence is discussed mostly during the history class and somewhat also during the Slovenian language and geography classes, while this topic is very poorly incorporated with lessons in other courses.

Further on, 26 percent of all pupils declared that the time assigned to Slovenian independence in all courses together and in all 3- or 4-year programmes was limited to one to three hours, while 20 percent of pupils claimed that the topic was presented in greater details (i.e. in four to seven hours). The majority of respondents (52 percent) could not assess how much time was assigned to the discussion of Slovenian independence. There is a significant difference between schools ( $p = 0.000$ ). The majority of those who claimed that merely one to three hours had been assigned to Slovenian independence were from among the pupils of 4-year programmes (44 percent), somewhat fewer among the secondary/grammar school pupils (37 percent) and the fewest among pupils from 3-year high school programmes (20 percent).

Further on, we measured the pupils' evaluation of the sufficiency of time allocated to the Slovenian independence and we identified a significant difference between schools ( $p = 0.000$ ). The data reveal

that the overwhelming majority (80 percent) of secondary/grammar school pupils felt that time was insufficient for a suitable understanding of the topic. Among pupils from 4-year programmes, the share of unsatisfied with the time assigned to Slovenian independence was 57 percent, whereas among the pupils in 3-year high school programmes, this share was the lowest (48 percent).

Altogether 59 percent of pupils from all three types of high schools believed that the time assigned to Slovenian independence was insufficient for an appropriate understanding of the topic.

### ***Pupils' knowledge about Slovenian independence***

First, high school pupils were asked how important the knowledge of the Slovenian independence process was for the youth in Slovenia (using a 4-point scale). 27 percent believed that it was very important, 44 percent believed it was fairly important and 28 percent believed it was of little or no importance.

To test how their perception of the importance of knowing the facts about the establishing of Slovenian country corresponds to their *self-evaluation* and their *de facto* knowledge, we used a series of questions related to Slovenia's independence.

Self-evaluation was measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 standing for the lowest and 5 for the highest level of knowledge. The mean value is 2.52, while a majority (52 percent) of the pupils evaluated their knowledge as insufficient and 12 per cent evaluated their knowledge as sufficient. 37 percent evaluated their knowledge as medium.

Further on, pupils were asked the following questions (for each question, multiple answers were offered and only one of them was correct): 1) When were the first multiparty elections after the World War II?; 2) Which political option established the first government that governed Slovenia during the independence process?; 3) What was the question posed to the Slovenians at the Plebiscite in December 1990?; 4) Who was the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia during the independence process (1990-1991)?; 5) Who was the Prime Minister of Slovenian government during the independence process (1990-1991)?; 6) What is the number of civilian and military casualties during the war for independence?; 7) Which countries recognised Slovenia as an independent state?; 8) What was the main demand of the document *Majniška Deklaracija*?; 9) When did Slovenia declare its independence?; 10) Define the period when armed conflicts took place during the independence process?; 11) What act assured Slovenia international recognition?.

The analysis shows that merely 11 percent of all high school pupils know when the first multiparty elections were held in Slovenia (i.e. in April 1990). Slightly more (20 percent) know which political option won the elections and formed the first<sup>9</sup> Slovenian Government (i.e. the DEMOS). However, only 9 percent correctly answered who was the first Slovenian Prime Minister, who was heading the Government during the independence process (i.e. Alojz Peterle). About one fifth of high school pupils included in the survey knows when the war for Slovenian independence broke out (27<sup>th</sup> of June 1991) and how long it lasted (10 days) and the same share (20 percent) knows when Slovenia ultimately gained international recognition (membership in UN). Merely 11 percent knows what was the demand expressed in the *Majniška deklaracija* (i.e. a call for human rights and the establishment of a democratic system), while even less (10 percent) knew what the approximate number of civilian and military death casualties was during the war for independence (50 – 150).

The only three questions that exhibited remotely satisfactory knowledge of the Slovenian independence among the Slovenian youth were: 1) When did Slovenia declare its independence? (68 percent); 2) What was the question posed to the Slovenians at the Plebiscite in December 1990? (67 percent); 3) Who was the President of the Presidency during the independence process? (45.1 percent).

### ***Values that Slovenian Independence presents for the Youth***

We were observing the values related to the independence process and to the establishing of the state of Slovenia. Pupils were asked to evaluate to what degree they relate a certain value to the establishment of Slovenian state, using a 4-point scale with 1 representing 'no connection at all' and 4 representing 'strong connection'.

The analysis reveals that all of the offered values are to a certain degree related to the creation of the independent state, since none of them was evaluated with less than 2 (see table 3). However, pupils perceive the founding of a state as an act of freedom, equality, patriotism and national identity. They also perceive it as the opportunity for economic development, for enhancing the reputation of Slovenia in the international environment, for the establishment of democracy and the expression of courage.

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<sup>9</sup> In most cases, they mistakenly thought it was Dr. Janez Drnovšek, who was actually the prime minister for several years and later on even the president of Slovenia.

Table 3: Values related to the State building

	N	Mean	STD	SEM
Freedom	920	3.7	0.623	0.021
Equality	921	3.6	0.751	0.025
Patriotism	931	3.6	0.676	0.022
national consciousness	911	3.5	0.735	0.024
economic development	907	3.4	0.762	0.025
Slovenia's reputation in the world	904	3.4	0.785	0.026
democracy for each citizen	871	3.4	0.789	0.027
Courage	947	3.4	0.796	0.026
abolition of socialism	853	3	0.842	0.029
national 'purity' of the country	902	2.9	0.882	0.029
Exploitation	892	2.7	0.986	0.033
suffering caused by the war	902	2.7	1.031	0.034
injustice	877	2.6	0.965	0.033

T-test revealed significant differences between male and female respondents only regarding two values related to the creation of Slovenian state. Girls relate Slovenian independence process with democracy for each citizen ( $p = 0.013$ ) and equal rights for all people ( $p = 0.017$ ) stronger than boys.

Further on, using a factor analysis, we were able to form two prevalent groups of values related to the Slovenian independence: 1) courage, patriotism, national consciousness, democracy for each citizen, freedom, equality; 2) injustice, suffering caused by the war, exploitation. We named the first group *positive values* and the second group *negative values*. The Pearson's test of correlation reveals a correlation between values within both groups of values, however the strength varies. Among the positive values, a medium correlation was identified: between patriotism and courage ( $R = 0.539$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ), between patriotism and national consciousness ( $R = 0.575$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) and between freedom and equality ( $R = 0.642$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ). Whereas among others, correlations are low, yet positive. Among the negative values, a positive correlation was: between injustice and suffering caused by the war ( $R = 0.524$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) as well as between suffering caused by the war and exploitation ( $R = 0.604$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ).

T-test shows a significant difference in ranking positive and negative values ( $p = 0.000$ ). Namely, in the first group, the mean value is 3.53 and in the second it is 2.68. There are no differences either between the genders as regards the perception of positive values ( $p = 0.418$ ), or in perceptions of negative values ( $p = 0.411$ ). Nor there are any differences between pupils enrolled in different school programmes in opinions concerning negative values, while there

are significant differences in opinions regarding the positive values ( $p = 0.000$ ). The pupils of 3 year-programmes attributed positive values to Slovenian independence to a lesser degree ( $M = 3.35$ ) than pupils of grammar/secondary schools ( $M = 3.65$ ) and those attending 4-year programmes ( $M = 3.55$ ).

## DISCUSSION

The analysis shows that the independence process is very poorly included in the curriculum for high schools.<sup>10</sup> Hence, due to time limits, history teachers present the independence process very briefly. According to the 'Chrono-Work' 'as a conceptualisation of the national identity as the outcome of perpetual ordering of national moments along the chronological continuum...' introduced by Lavi (2013), the performance of rituals and the manifestation of national symbols, as well as continuous repetition of important milestones in the national history during the educational process is an important foundation for the future feeling of national identity, consciousness and commitment.

In the course of our research process, we observed the national flag along with the municipality and EU flags in front of every educational institution. We have established that pupils participate to a certain level in the preparation of ceremonies for national holidays. Furthermore, pupils are supposed to learn the national anthem. However, it is questionable how often they actually hear or sing it (outside of official national ceremonies). Therefore, we observed certain repetitive performances of formal rituals (e.g. ceremonies, symbols) during the educational process, which enable the youth to internalize the sense of national belonging and to develop national identity. The interest in recent national history, in the process of achieving independence, was identified among the youth. The vast majority (71 per cent) of the Slovenian youth included in the survey believe that the knowledge of independence process is important. However, according to what a majority of the respondents revealed, the amount of time and the period in which the topic was presented (end of the final year) are insufficient. We can assume that, due to the time limitation and consequent brief presentation of the topic, the

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<sup>10</sup> Until 2008, when the survey was conducted, the time allocated to studying recent national history had been limited to a few school hours at the end of the last year of high school (either third or fourth year).

school ranks only third among the important sources of knowledge about the independence, with parents and TV shows being ranked higher and thus perceived as more important. The role of school in the interpretation of national independence and the reproduction of national identity is also questioned by the perception of grammar school pupils who showed the highest level of the *de facto* knowledge, while on the other hand they claimed that during the history course they had attributed the least amount of time to learning about Slovenia's independence. Hence it is possible to assume that they are motivated to gain their knowledge from sources other than school.<sup>11</sup> The *de facto* knowledge of important events in the process of achieving Slovenian independence also indicates that the sources other than school (e.g. ceremonies, everyday routine) are very important for the reproduction of national identity. Take for example familiarity with a President of the Presidency identified among a relative majority (45 percent) of the youth, while on the other hand merely 9 per cent knew who the Prime Minister had been during that period. This could be attributed to the fact that the former had been a publicly known politician whom respondents' parents and older relatives were well-acquainted with and the latter was an opposition politician less known to the public at the time. Since the youth recognize parents as an important source of information about the independence, their good knowledge of the President of the Presidency could be attributed to their parents' influence rather than that of school. Further on, the data shows that the youth know very well when the independence was declared and what Slovenians were deciding upon at the Plebiscite in December 1990. Both events are related to Slovenian national holidays, hence pupils participate in the preparation and implementation of formal ceremonies organized by schools and the two holidays are free days in school as well. It seems that the ceremonies related to both events and the fact that those are official free days work as stimulation for remembering the background/reason for both holidays.

We could not say that, in general, there are significant differences between male and female respondents, since a higher percentage of boys knew answers to some questions and girls to others; hence all in all, their knowledge is similar. There are certain differences between

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<sup>11</sup> Although pupils generally express high level of trust in the public education system, the country seems to be incapable of using this trust for developing national identity through learning about the independence.

types of high school programmes, since at the majority of questions, pupils from grammar school answered correctly in the highest percentage. This is interesting, taking into account that the same pupils claimed they had spent the least amount of school hours on this topic. It could be concluded that they received more information from sources other than school.

Based on youth's opinions, we cannot completely verify the first hypothesis *National identity is co-shaped in the process of secondary socialization, which gives the school a notable role, being the main source of information about national history*. The school is important for a reproduction of national identity however it seems that it is not the main source of information.

Further on, we have identified some differences between male and female respondents. In general, girls rate most sources of information lower than boys. This could be partially explained with differences in interests among the two sexes, since men are said to be generally more interested in and have clearer opinions about war and military issues than women (de Konink, 2000) and since the war was an important part of the independence boys expressed higher interest in the whole independence process. Further on, this could be explained in the context of de Konink's (2000, p.227) thesis of men being more self-confident and more often expressing their opinions even on the topics they are not familiar with. Therefore in this case, we could conclude that, firstly, girls are not as interested in the military as men are and, secondly, men are more self-confident regarding the quantity and quality of received information about the Slovenian independence.

It is evident that the pupils perceive knowledge about the independence as important (71 per cent) for Slovenian youth. Yet, the results of *de facto* knowledge do not completely correspond to pupils' self-evaluation, since no more than one half of pupils included in the survey evaluated their knowledge as insufficient. Whereas the data presented above show that poor knowledge of Slovenian independence was detected among more than one half of the pupils questioned. We could conclude that high school pupils understand that knowing the nation's history and especially the act of independence as one of the most important events in country's history is important. However they do not receive enough information neither on the TV, from family nor at school. Further on, they feel a lack of knowledge, even though they are still not critical enough in their self-evaluation.

The analysis shows that the public school plays an important role in the recognition of the meaning of national celebrations, the gaining of knowledge of national symbols, the meaning of cultural holidays, etc. However, a large deficit is evident as concerns the presentation of recent national history, namely of one of the more important events, that is, of Slovenia's achievement of independence. Thereby we reject the second hypothesis *During the educational process in, mostly public, high schools, Slovenian youth gain a high level of historical knowledge about the creation of Slovenian state*. Albeit data for recent years indicate that the independence process has been taught at classes other than history as well, hence the increase in pupils' knowledge could be expected.

Furthermore, we established that Slovenian independence is strongly related to positive values, despite the short war it was accompanied by. The youth draw a clear distinction between the negative connotation of war and exploitation on the one hand and the positive connotation of patriotism and national consciousness along with democracy and equality on the other. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be verified: *The establishment of Slovenian State is related to positive values such as freedom and democracy*. It has been established by aforementioned foreign authors that, young generations are more inclined towards global identity or cosmopolitanism, showing multicultural tolerance as opposed to patriotism or even an expression of national identity. We cannot argue on the part of cosmopolitanism in case of Slovenian youth, since they were not questioned directly on that topic. However, they have expressed: 1) a sufficient level of awareness about the importance of the independence process; 2) the urge to have it more intensively incorporated in the educational process in order to learn more about it; 3) and the positive connotation of national independence, which they relate with positive values. We have not identified any negative correlation between values like national identity or patriotism and democracy or equality.

Therefore, it is possible to say that Slovenian youth do not develop negative attitudes either towards the recent national history or towards national identity. However it should be taken into account that the disputes between political parties regarding the independence process, could have long term negative consequences on the perception among the youth.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Starting from the assumption that national history is an important country's instrument for the reproduction of national identity, we establish that the process of gaining independence is insufficiently incorporated into the high school educational process at various classes, but especially so at the history class.<sup>12</sup>

The results show that Slovenian youth perceive national identity as a positive value in relation to Slovenian independence. The analysis also shows that the youth strive for more information about national independence and evaluate their knowledge as insufficient. It could be concluded that Slovenian youth recognize national independence as an important milestone in Slovenia's recent national history and an important act that, among others, constitutes national identity. However, they are aware of their poor knowledge on the topic and they do not express negative attitudes towards gaining more information on the topic. Fenton's findings imply that the young generation in Britain are indifferent or even have negative attitudes towards national identity, while Slovenian youth indirectly express positive attitudes towards the national identity, which is evident in their opinions about national independence.<sup>13</sup> The positive attitude also indirectly influences the willingness to actively participate in the society among the youth, hence to develop active citizenship.

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<sup>12</sup>Our own participation in the education process, by preparing a lecture on Slovenian independence process, shows that, for the last few years, pupils have been given certain information about the independence process as well as national symbols and ceremonies within the courses other than history (e.g. civil education and ethics).

<sup>13</sup>Even though it should be noted that national identity is formed on different levels and can not be reduced merely to one historical event.

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# Antagonistic Political Communities within State Borders as National Security Issue: The Case of Montenegro

Uroš Svete<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

Having overcome the fundamental global ideological differences and technological development at the end of the Cold War, many hoped for a period of continuity and stability in the world. Unfortunately, empirical data has revealed a very different truth. The number of interstate conflicts may have decreased, but we are instead witnessing the failure of many states, internal conflicts and asymmetric modes of conducting war. In this article we will attempt to explain some of the fundamental social events that have led to this international and national security issue. In doing so, we assume a concept of political community and demos, where demos is defined as a nation that is politically constructed and is considered to have a common identity which results in loyalty, trust, solidarity, even the victim to maintain a system of democratic governance. The problem that we want to highlight is that the demos or political communities within the borders of nation-states are increasingly falling apart in the sub-communities. On the other hand, the newly formed nation-states in particular are unable to homogenise their political community, which is vital to their national security and stability. Internal social fragmentation, which is the basis of political pluralism and competitive representative democracy, can be fatal to the country's further development. This thesis will consider the case of Montenegro, a country whose independent statehood was restored in 2006. However, its historical variations with periods of armed conflict i.e. civil wars led to the point where the entire political rhetoric and dialectic is reduced almost only to the question of existence of the

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state and its positioning in relation to superpowers or regional power centres. Although at first glance there seems no way out of the situation, certain theoretical concepts and empirical examples do offer a potential solution, particularly in transnational associations and the creation of a common identity of a political community. However, this is time-consuming and thorny path.

**KEY WORDS:** political community, demos, national security, Montenegro, history, foreign influence

#### **POVZETEK**

Preseganje temeljnih globalnih ideoloških razlik ter tehnološki razvoj po koncu hladne vojne je mnoge navdajal z upanjem, da bomo vstopili v obdobje trajnejšega in stabilnejšega sveta. Žal pa empirični podatki kažejo precej drugačno resnico. Število meddržavnih konfliktov se je morda res zmanjšalo, po drugi strani pa smo priča številnim razpadlim državam, notranjim konfliktom in asimetričnemu načinu vodenja vojne. V pričujočem članku želimo pojasniti nekatere temeljne družbene dogodke, ki so vodili to takega stanja mednarodne in nacionalne varnosti. Pri tem smo izhajali zlasti iz koncepta politične skupnosti ter demosa, ki ga razumemo kot politično konstruirano nacijo s skupno identiteto, ki se odraža v lojalnosti, zaupanju, solidarnosti in celo pripravljenosti na žrtvovanje za ohranitev demokratične vladavine. Problem, ki ga želimo izpostaviti, pa je, da demos oz. politične skupnosti znotraj meja nacionalnih držav vse bolj razpadajo v podskupnosti oz. da po drugi strani zlasti novonastale nacionalne države niso sposobne homogenizacije politične skupnosti, kar pa je ključnega pomena za njihovo nacionalno varnost in stabilnost. Notranja družbena razdrobljenost, ki je seveda lahko osnova političnega pluralizma in kompetitivne predstavniške demokracije, je lahko usodna za nadaljnji razvoj države. In to tezo smo dokazovali na primeru Črne gore, ki je svojo samostojno državnost obnovila leta 2006. Vendar pa so njene zgodovinske razlike z obdobji državljanskih oboroženih konfliktov oz. vojn vodile do točke, ko je skoraj celotna politična retorika in dialektika zreducirana zgolj na vprašanje obstoja države in njenega pozicioniranja v odnosu do velikih ali pa regionalnih sil. Čeprav se na prvi položaj zdi brezizhoden, tako določeni teoretični koncepti kot empirični primeri kažejo, da je lahko rešitev zlasti v nadnacionalnih asociacijah in oblikovanju skupne identitete oz. politične skupnosti. Seveda pa je to dolgotrajna in trnova pot.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** politična skupnost, demos, nacionalna varnost, Črna gora, zgodovina, zunanji vpliv

## INTRODUCTION

Monitoring the fundamental shifts in the international structures and relations is crucial for understanding the formation of a new socio-political context in the international community. Over the past twenty years, we have observed several processes that have caused a range of important shifts in international relations on a global scale and which have crucially transformed the security image of the world. The end of the Cold War reduced the probability of a large scale military conflict with weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the concept of a (global) community acquired new meanings. Consequently, certain structures, relations, values and terms that seemed unchangeable and which had defined international stability and security in the entire period following World War II lost their significance and disappeared entirely or at least partially, causing extensive and deep shifts in the global power structure (Gaddis, 1993: 8).

For some, the end of communism symbolised the end of the last stabilising factor in a bipolar international system. The goal of Western democracies was no longer to prevent the expansion of communism, but to promote democracy, regional stability and economic development (Sullivan and Dubik, 1993: 16). This does not mean that peaceful societies have been created, for states are becoming increasingly pluralist and institutionalised; the political process is losing its integrating role and is becoming increasingly confrontational (Drucker, 1994: 154). The bipolar certainty of the Cold War period is being replaced with a multi-polar uncertainty, accompanied by an emerging complex risk structure. Consequently, it has become considerably more difficult to define national interests, to determine sources of risk, to identify one's opponent, and to explain the content of national security policy to the public (Wallerstein, 1993:5). It had been assumed that the end of the Cold War would herald a more peaceful international environment. But this has not proved to be the case. Globalisation has reduced the power of modern states, and even divided societies (as Ulrich Beck has regularly observed). Our main hypothesis is that political plurality opens a Pandora's Box of political diversification, especially in those countries where more than one political community has tended to exist. Furthermore, more political communities have been appearing within nation states; this potentially represents a destabilising factor and poses a serious threat to national security.

Because national security is based on a consensus of key stakeholders within the polity<sup>2</sup>, what priorities as well risks in the society are. Although many definitions of national security exist, we will use David Jablonsky's (see Phahlamohlaka, 2008: 98). Jablonsky defines national security as that part of government policy whose objective is to create national and international political conditions that are favourable to the protection or the extension of vital national values against existing or potential adversaries.

Another important theoretical background for our analysis is the concept of political community, which was applied in the case of Montenegro, society on important strategic crossing and so on drafts of many foreign forces and actors. This definitely could not be the only case for testing the hypothesis<sup>3</sup>, but certainly historically deterministic enough with the necessary analytical complexity.

## THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THEORY AND CONCEPT

The political community is a particular form of active community. Communities may refer to religion, profession, cultural and recreational interests, or to the advocacy of various causes, such as peace, civil rights, Christian values, women's rights, etc. All active communities have some form of legitimate decision-making authorities. The political community differs from other active communities in that its legitimate authority, hereafter referred to as the government, makes the most binding and inclusive decisions for a given territory (Juviler, Stroschein, 1999: 436).

The next term that forms part of the conceptual framework of a political community is the concept of demos, which in this context is defined as 'the nation, in terms of people for political purposes, or 'civil body', not a nation' (Jolly, 2005:12). The term 'demos' applies

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<sup>2</sup> The Polity is the community where politics occurs.

<sup>3</sup> In Serbia, there has been a debate for some time about divided political identity. Political community can only exist as a kind of belonging, or of patriotism. In that way it is possible to overcome divisions the so-called 'Two Serbian. Dokić represents the thesis that this division arises two irreducible ways to interpret the past in terms of the collective memory. The aim is to locate the current implications of the traumatic past the political identity of Serbia, as well as to show the ways in which we can overcome subversive dynamics of collective memory (Dokić, 2012).

to the political community while the concept of 'nation' is confined to the as yet unformed ethnic group. The demos in this sense is defined as a nation that is politically constructed with a common identity that results in loyalty, trust, solidarity, even in the readiness for victimisation to maintain a system of democratic governance. Thus defined, demos is a group of people, most of whom share a common sense of belonging and who are subsequently willing to participate in the democratic decision-making process. For the purposes of this study, we ought to indicate the difference between the two schools of socio-psychological theory of identity formation of a particular nation, bearing in mind the classic division between, on the one hand, the essentialists who propose a primordial conception of identity formation and, on the other hand, the constructivists who propose a utilitarian conception. The thesis of the essentialist school is that, without any public pre-set memory (internalised symbols, myths, legends, heroes, beliefs, traditions, values and norms, etc.), the political community opposes any further step in the development of the political system (Lončar Mrkoci, 2008: 141-142). This is very typical of Montenegrin society. Montenegrins display an extraordinary degree of attachment to their own past and are willing to sacrifice themselves for the political community. In this context, such behaviour can also be distinctly patriotic. Patriotism becomes an expression of the love that unites the people who are consequently prepared to support their nation state (Kautz, 1997: 37). Tocqueville talks of an instinctive love of one's own country, and he suggests that patriotism is a natural phenomenon (Kautz, 1997: 139). Hence, there is a natural tendency toward territoriality, which, together with one's family, represents the primary bond of an individual's personality along with their subconsciously internalised territorial community. People become devoted to the people and places that are familiar to them; they also become devoted to the education to which they have been subjected, a process which is at the root of their patriotism (Schaar, 1981: 287). It is, however, difficult to associate such patriotism with national security, which would otherwise be a logical cause and effect association. Such an association is advocated by Prebilič and Juvan (2012), who note that there are some elements of the military traditions that create certain armies that represent the essence of those systems. This demonstrates the close and direct connection between the national identity and the military or national security identity, which is emotionally complementary to patriotism.

## **THE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES IN MONTENEGRO – IN THE MIDDLE OF FOREIGN INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE**

The emergence of political parties almost always precedes an extended period of action in which there exists political power, factions, tendencies, as yet known and loose political ambitions and aspiring individuals. According to most authors, these are considered to be the forerunners of modern political parties. They used to have a greater or lesser role in the society in which they existed, but whatever it gave the one important dimension of the ruling system, are expressed and represented in different interests and options for seeking political path has to be realized. Lacking the institutional framework, they operated and owned a certain type of organisation. But political currents are mainly the result of the inspiration of high government officials who seek to recruit greater support, under the guise of latent relations and relations. It is however almost impossible to grasp the legitimate political dimension of society in a qualitative way when studying the conditions and events in the formation of the first political party without reference to the historical forerunners of political power. The best examples of this are the Whigs and Tories in the UK who were proponents and opponents of absolute monarchy, from which would later develop the two famous British parties - the Conservatives and the Labour party.

As in other societies, we can find the outlines of the existence of political power guided by different interests and characteristics. It could be said that the political currents in Montenegro were quite specific; one of the currents (there were almost always only two, political elites or communities) commanded the support of powerful external allies and supporters, whether Austria, Russia, Serbia, or even in some periods Venice.

## **THE LONG LASTING TRANSFORMATION PROCESS OF POLITICAL POWER INTO POLITICAL PARTIES.**

The first party in Montenegro was formed in 1907, shortly after the adoption of the Constitution; a second was formed a few months later. The profiling of the first Montenegrin political Parties has actually just been started, when interruption by the First World War followed.

Two of the original Montenegrin parties, however, left a deep imprint on the statehood that has endured to the present day.

However, short party history left a strong influence on Montenegrin constitutional nation-building, psycho-social well-depth human being.

Rather than a historiographical analysis of Montenegrin statehood, our intention is to identify the roots of today's division, which at times calls into question the very existence of the country. To achieve this, we will review the basic social milestones of Montenegrin social development of the last three centuries.

In 1697, the General Montenegrin Assembly elected the spiritual and political masters of the country, in accordance with the old law of the people. Šćepčev Danilo Petrović (1697-1735), the new bishop and ruler of Montenegro's priesthood was elected, and became founder of the famous dynasty. During this period Montenegro cooperated with its powerful neighbours, especially the Venetian Republic. However, Bishop Danilo, as a wise and effective ruler, established foreign policy ties between Montenegro and Russia on the initiative of the Russian government in 1711. As a result, Montenegro gained powerful friends and patrons, driven by Russia's political interests in the Balkan Peninsula.

After the Bosnian pasha's attack in 1714 (see Ćorović, 2001), Bishop Danilo visited Russia to ask for help and support, which he duly received. The Russian Tsar, Peter the Great, recognised Montenegro's alliance with Russia in the war against Turkey and agreed to provide permanent financial assistance to Montenegro. At the same time, Montenegro took part in the war on the side of Venice; as a result of which the Venetian senate ratified the Treaty of Venetian-Montenegrin cooperation on 7th March 1717. Maintaining good relations with Venice in the same year, the General Montenegrin Assembly established a gubernatorial authority. The first governor, Vukadin Vukotić, a former regional court president, was determined to be the main mediator in the regulation of Venetian - Montenegrin relations. From that moment Montenegro led intensive foreign policy with Russia and the Venetian Republic at the same time, leading to its vital interests. This created the conditions for the emergence of the first factions:

- the pro-Russian splinter group, led by Bishop Danilo and his close circle, which advocated intimate bonds and friendship with Russia and
- the pro-Venetian (later pro-Austrian) splinter group, which advocated an alliance with the Venice Republic, was led by Vukadin Vukotić and his followers who had interests in this strategy.

Initially these contraries have not so much been expressed but it became clear that the leadership of this Venetian institution can lead to serious divisions in Montenegro. The governors did not initially enjoy a great reputation; since their role had not yet been established, and they were the only intermediaries between the two countries. Venice provided their salary and the necessary facilities in Kotorin exchange for which the governor would support Venetian interests. But basically it was great state concept difference in background. The first approach was to create a nation/state on a religious (Christian orthodox) basis, where the 'vladika' would simultaneously be a political as well as a religious master/ruler. The second approach, which was much more Western-influenced, was to establish secular authorities separately from the religious authorities (Radonjić, 2009).

Until 1907, there was no real political organisation or party in Montenegro. With the adoption of the Constitution, the conditions were created for the first political parties. In the first constitutional assembly in 1906 deputies began performing in own name (not party tied), but immediately came to allocating parliamentary group of like-minded. From this sprang the Club of Deputies, whose president was Duke Sako Petrović, also President of the Montenegrin National Assembly. This club was the basis for the formation of the first political party in Montenegro in March 1907 - the People's Party, which was popularly called 'Klubaška' (club) and its supporters 'klubaši'. The party programme was printed in Dubrovnik and was signed by the majority in the Assembly; soon local organisations were created across most of the country. The main members of the party were teachers, priests and some tribal captains and other prominent individuals. The People's Party announced its programme in Nikšić. Among other things, this programme's goal was to make Montenegro economically strong and militarily prepared. The party advocated close ties with Serbia and full support for Russia, and worked towards the realisation of the Yugoslav idea. The National Party opposed the

regime of Prince Nikola. It led the campaign to obtain broad constitutional powers of parliament and therefore met with opposition from the authorities. Prince Nikola succeeded in convincing 14 deputies of the People's Party to join his supporters in parliament, which was a heavy blow for the People's Party. Successive governments led by the People's Party struggled to oppose the Prince's policy because he had enormous authority of citizens, based on numerous merits, personal and familiar for the country in its freedom. At the same time he was an authoritarian and relied on loyal aides, most of whom were his close relatives from powerful Montenegrin families. Supported and encouraged by Serbia, some leaders of the People's Party tried to assassinate the Prince in 1907 in what was known as 'the bomb affair.'

There was also a Montenegrin university youth club, an organisation of students who were educated in Belgrade, who opposed the autocratic rule of Prince Nikola.

People's Party of Rights called 'Pravaši' was established a few months after the People's Party in 1907. This party was sympathetic and loyal to Prince Nikola. The People's Party of Rights had neither a programme nor statutes. Rather, it proposed general programme guidelines in its founding Proclamation stating its intention of achieving Prince Nikola's vision of a prosperous, happy and educated Montenegro, where people are free to manage their state and enjoy full legal and property security. The People's Party of Rights considered themselves as representatives of the Prince's position on the fight for the freedom of Montenegro and the rescue of the country's oppressed brothers. According to its political programme Montenegro tend to be based on traditional values, and its cultural and economic development should not lead to the fact that it loses the characteristics which had for centuries and for which it became famous.

The People's Party of Rights insisted that it wanted to increase national wealth as well as to provide freedom, justice, and equality for all Montenegrins. After two 'Klubaši' governments, the government of the People's Party of Rights, headed by Dr. Lazar Tomanović came to power. Tomanović's government sought to deny the aggressive 'Klubaši' opposition and refused their extremely harmful and destructive effects on the Montenegrin state, nation and dynasty (Popović, Šuković and Pavićević, 2002; Andrijašević, Rastoder, 2006).

The next big milestone for the Montenegrin society was without doubt the First World War, which massively impacted on the emerging South Slavic state. As had occurred many times before, and would occur again later, Montenegrin politics were extremely divided. There were two distinct competitive political communities with different interests. This time the divisions were based on the question of integration with Serbia under the crown of the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty.

The first group was called 'zelenaši' (the Greens). They opposed the unconditional unification of Serbia and Montenegro and supported King Nikola of Montenegro's government in exile and were supporters of equal unity. They were so named according to the green posters on which they printed the names of their delegates of the Podgorica Assembly who favoured equal union. Programme basis of this motion was the proclamation of King Nikola who pleaded for the Yugoslav confederation. Their supporters came mostly from the old power structures and numbered many military officers, intellectuals close to the Montenegrin court and government, former government officials and the peasantry. They also opposed both the unconditional unification and annexation at the Assembly of Podgorica.

The second group were the 'bjelaši' (the 'Whites'), so-called because their candidates were proposed on white lists. They argued for the unconditional unification of Serbia and Montenegro under the dynasty of Karađorđević. Since the 'Whites' dominated the National Assembly, the final decision of the Assembly is a good example of what came to be called the 'white' national idea in Montenegro. The majority of support for the Whites came from the young people. The central government in Belgrade set a special commissioner for Montenegro. Deploying their Youth Troops and National Guard, the Whites suppressed the armed resistance of the opponents of unconditional unification. These formations were under the command of the Yugoslav army and police authorities who supplied weapons, food and financial compensation for the duration of the conflict. The Whites were organised in companies. Their duty was to stand at the ready on the call of the police and the military authorities. Eight mobile companies were formed with 100 people in order to deal with any opponents of unconditional unification. The 'Whites' programme was inspired by the idea of full unification with Serbia and the creation

of a united Serbian and later Yugoslav state. They advocated the administrative division of the country based on economic needs of the particular regions and villages without any exceptional privileges for individual provinces (Rastoder, 2000; Vujović, 1981, Troch, 2008).

As Troch (2008: 35) observes, a wide range of political views on Montenegro's future were formulated and reformulated to find a solution for the political and economic situation in Montenegro. These political views were legitimated by national ideas that were either based on one of the two dominant proto-national traditions in pre-modern Montenegro, or on a mixture of both. At the beginning of the interwar period, the differences in national thought only consisted of the different grades of importance ascribed to the proto-national Montenegrin elements within the Serbian national identity. The Whites rejected any proto-national Montenegrin elements in their national idea, whereas the Greens emphasised the proto-national Montenegrin elements – mainly the Montenegrin state tradition – in order to claim the existence of a separate Montenegrin historical entity apart from the Serbian nation, with its own political rights. In the course of the interwar period, owing to the growing dissatisfaction with Montenegro's political and economic situation in Yugoslavia, the Greens increasingly emphasised the proto-national Montenegrin elements in their national thought in order to legitimise their political demands. By the end of the interwar period, certain groups among the political elite proclaimed the existence of a Montenegrin nation, with an identity that was based solely on the proto-national Montenegrin elements. Based on this, they argued for a reinterpretation of the Serbian proto-national elements in Montenegrin history and culture. In response to this proclamation of a strictly Montenegrin national idea, the Whites were forced to formulate their own Serbian national idea in greater detail and to interpret proto-national Montenegrin elements from their national point of view.

### **IMPLEMENTATION OF YUGOSLAV IDEA: BETWEEN (CON)FEDERATION AND UNIFICATION.**

Although there had always been contradictions in Montenegrin society, these began to escalate into armed conflict following World War I. After the decision of the National Assembly and the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the 1st of

December 1918, the Greens revolted against the unification of Serbia and Montenegro. From the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 1919 –the so-called Christmas Insurrection (*božićna pobuna*) – a few cities in Old Montenegro temporarily fell under the control of the Green rebels (Rastoder 2003: 130–131; Zeković, 2003). The proclamation made by the leader of the Greens in Cetinje, Krsto Popović, offers a good example of the ‘Green’ national thought. Popović states that ‘the Assembly, gathered in Podgorica on the 11<sup>th</sup> of November, opposes the regulations of the national constitution, and most of all is against the will of the absolute majority of the Montenegrin people’ (cited in Zeković 1990: 187). The Greens demanded that “Montenegro enters a single Yugoslav state, equal to the other regions”(cited in Zeković 1990: 187). After the 7<sup>th</sup> of January, the Serbian Army, with the support of the Whites, managed to regain control of Old Montenegro, although the Green armed resistance was not completely vanquished until 1924 (Rastoder 2003) or even 1926 according some sources (Christmas Uprising, 1919). However, this uprising might have taken a different course had King Nikola not been deceived by the Great Powers, who promised (but failed) to re-establish the sovereign state of Montenegro by diplomatic means if he ceased his support for the uprising. Based on this promise, the king issued a proclamation in January 1919 calling for the resistance to cease. Although the core of the resistance was crushed in a severe, comprehensive military campaign in 1922-23, the guerrilla resistance continued in the highlands for several more years. An estimated three thousand Montenegrins lost their lives, another three thousand were wounded, and thousands of homes were burned and destroyed. The already large emigration, particularly to the United States, accelerated. At that time, Montenegro was a country of only 300,000 (Christmas Uprising, 1919; Zeković, 2003).

This, however, does not mean that the Green national thought vanished in Montenegro. On the contrary, the national question became an important political issue during the interwar years and gained a new and bloody dimension during the Second World War. This marked a new period of unresolved conflicts from the past, particularly misused by the occupying Italian troops who simultaneously supported both the Whites (Chetniks) and the Greens (Separatists).

## CIVIL WAR IN MONTENEGRO IN A PERIOD 1941-1945.

In April 1941, Montenegro was invaded both by Italian Forces from Albania and German forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Germans withdrew almost immediately, and the Italian 'Messina' Division assumed the military occupation of Montenegro. Civil affairs were managed by the civil commissioner Count Serafino Mazzolini, who answered to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Italy was determined to use the Montenegrin-Italian dynastic connection to reconstitute Montenegro as separate 'independent' state. The plan went awry, however, when Prince Mihajlo Petrović-Njegoš refused the offer of the throne. Undaunted, the Italians convoked a Montenegrin Assembly at Cetinje with the help of Montenegrin separatists – the Greens. On July 12, 1941, the assembly issued a declaration (prepared by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) that annulled the decision of the Montenegrin National Assembly<sup>4</sup> of November 26, 1918, unifying Montenegro with Serbia, and instead 'proclaimed a sovereign and independent state of Montenegro as a constitutional monarchy'. The following day, July 13, the Communist Party initiated a general uprising. Many non-Communists and a substantial number of former army officers, some pro-Communist but most strongly nationalistic<sup>5</sup>, joined the uprising (Tomasevich, 2000: 138, 140).

The Italians and Montenegrin separatists, or Greens (*zelenaši*), under the leadership of Sekula Drljević, and the old Montenegrin General Krsto Popović all opposed this rebellion. The uprising was not well organised and suffered serious defeats after just few successful weeks. The pro-Serbian nationalists admitted defeat and ceased fighting; the (Communist) Partisans, however, continued the struggle. This led to a division within the rebel camp. Sometime in the autumn, the nationalists came into contact with the Italians offering to them help against the Partisans. Aspiration for collaboration became much stinger after Montenegrins heard for brake up between Mihailović's Chetniks and Partisans in Serbia. During the second half of December, they started to mobilise men in Montenegro and organised them into special units as counterparts to the Partisan detachments, so that, by the middle of January 1942, these units found themselves

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<sup>4</sup> Podgorica Assembly

<sup>5</sup> Those who were pro-Serbian were called Whites (*bjelaši*).

in open combat with the Partisans. The conflict between these two groups was accelerated by two events on the Partisan side. The first was the defeat of the Partisan attack on the Italian garrison in Pljevlja at the beginning of December in which the Partisans suffered several hundred fatalities and wounded, which caused some supporters to leave the ranks of the Partisans and cross over to join the Chetniks. The second event was the 'left turn' amongst the Partisans and the use of terror against real and potential enemies.

By the middle of February 1942, individual Chetnik commanders and the commanders of the Italian Divisions began to make the first formal agreements together. The first agreement was made on 17<sup>th</sup> February between Colonel Baja Stanišić and the commander of Italian Division 'Taro'. This was soon followed by an agreement between Captain Đurišić and the military governor and commander of the Italian Troops in Montenegro, General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli. The agreement concerned the collaboration of Đurišić's Chetniks with the Italian forces in the area of Division 'Venezia'. On 6<sup>th</sup> March, an agreement was concluded between Colonel Stanišić and General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli. All these agreements affirmed either joint action or independent Chetnik actions against the communist Partisans. In both cases, the Italians provided arms and supplied Chetnik formations. On 9<sup>th</sup> March, numerous Montenegrins, who were either professional or reserve officers of the Yugoslav Royal Army, called a conference in Cetinje at which General Blažo Đukanović was chosen to become the commander of all the nationalist forces in Montenegro. It was a choice which Mihailović accepted and had maybe even proposed. (Chetniks in Montenegro, <http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/montenegro/chetniks/>).

The Second World War in Montenegro is a good example of how a foreign invader took advantage of the significant differences and conflicts of the society they occupied. This resulted in the paradoxical coalition between the nationalist pro-Serb Chetniks, the Italian occupiers and the Montenegrin separatists, all of whom were united against the Partisan Communists. As elsewhere in the Balkans, the Second World War deepened the social conflicts in Montenegro that persist to this today to affect marked divisions within societies which continues to make political cohesiveness nearly impossible.

## RESTORING INDEPENDENCE 2006.

The divisions within Montenegro were once again apparent in the referendum on Montenegrin independence in 2006. Independence was approved by 55.5% of voters, narrowly passing the 55% threshold (OSCE, 2006).

Table 1: Referendum results

Municipality	Number of Registered Voters	Voters Who Voted		Valid Votes for 'Yes'		Valid Votes for 'No'	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Andrijevisa	4,369	3,928	89.91	1,084	27.74	2,824	72.26
Bar	32,255	26,382	81.79	16,640	63.67	9,496	36.33
Berane	28,342	24,051	84.86	11,268	47.17	12,618	52.83
Bijelj Polje	40,110	35,051	87.39	19,405	55.69	15,437	44.31
Budva	12,797	11,199	87.51	5,915	53.32	5,179	46.68
Danilovgrad	11,784	10,669	90.54	5,671	53.71	4,887	46.29
Žabljak	3,407	3,096	90.87	1,188	38.67	1,884	61.33
Kolasin	7,405	6,820	92.10	2,852	42.22	3,903	57.78
Kotor	17,778	14,897	83.79	8,200	55.70	6,523	44.30
Mojkovac	7,645	6,923	90.56	3,016	43.93	3,849	56.07
Nikšić	56,461	50,737	89.86	26,434	52.63	23,790	47.37
Plav	12,662	8,941	70.61	7,016	78.92	1,874	21.08
Plužine	3,329	2,959	88.89	716	24.30	2,230	75.70
Pjethylja	27,882	25,268	90.62	9,115	36.28	16,009	63.72
Podgorica	129,083	113,915	88.25	60,626	53.67	52,345	46.33
Rožaje	19,646	15,239	77.57	13,835	91.33	1,314	8.67
Tivat	10,776	8,800	81.66	4,916	56.45	3,793	43.55
Ulcinj	17,117	13,985	81.70	12,256	88.50	1,592	11.50
Herceg Novi	24,487	20,220	82.57	7,741	38.66	12,284	61.34
Cetinje	15,077	13,538	89.79	11,532	86.38	1,818	13.62
Šavnik	2,306	2,123	92.06	906	43.08	1,197	56.92
Voters in Prison		495		379	77.82	108	22.18
<b>Total for Montenegro</b>	<b>484,718</b>	<b>419,236</b>	<b>86.49</b>	<b>230,711</b>	<b>55.50</b>	<b>184,954</b>	<b>44.50</b>

Source: OSCE, 2006:23

One of the most important findings is still presented significant difference between the North (Brda) and other regions incorporated only after the First Balkan War and the rest of Montenegro (Old Montenegro). This socio-geographical divide between the two regions has never been fully transcended (Malašević, Uzelac, 2007: 698). The same

pattern has played out throughout the modern history of Montenegro. For example, Pavlović in Malašević and Uzelac (2007: 701) argues that the majority of Zelenaši supporters came from so-called Old Montenegro, while the supporters of unification were predominantly from the territories of the Brda and those acquired after the Balkan Wars. But according to Boehm (in Malašević, Uzelac, 2007: 700) the roots of this division lie in Montenegro's segmented society. The basic unit of Montenegrin society was the *kuca* (the house), a patrilocal extended family or a type of *zadruga*. Houses of unilinear descent usually formed a *bratstvo* (a clan, literally a brotherhood) over a relatively homogeneous territory with a strong sense of solidarity and group identity. Each *bratstvo* belonged to a *pleme* (tribe). Historical records mention some twenty-one tribes of so-called Old Montenegro, and seven tribes of the Brda area (Rastoder 2003: 113). Therefore, the question is how supporters of independence actually achieved their 55% majority. The answer is simple: with the support of the various national minorities (the ethnic Albanians, Muslims, and Croats). Therefore we can concur with Malašević and Uzelac (2007), that Montenegro is a nation state without a nation. We could even argue that Montenegro cannot survive as nation state. This idea is put forward in Andrijašević's (2014) idea of the state, in which the main proponent should be the majority nation, whose character should be supranational so that the majority of nations within it prioritise the shared national identity over their ethnic identification.

## CONCLUSIONS

Montenegro is without doubt a country built on a sparsely populated territory with a geographical terrain that historically has not facilitated internal communication lines. On the other hand, its raw living conditions have forced its inhabitants into a state of interconnectedness. This is also scalable with the relatively small population size. Consequently we can witness quite a different identity pattern from those of larger societies in which communication has traditionally been easier. The tribal and family loyalties, and the divisions between Old Montenegro and the so-called 'Hills' (in the north) would not be unusual and controversial if these divisions did not relate to the essence of the country's current foreign policy and its vision for the future. Therefore, if there would be a consensus in society on the fundamental development paradigm, which is also the basis for national security, while the latter refers not only to the state but also on parti-

culate societal stakeholders. In brief, our historical analysis of the emergence of these two differences within Montenegro confirms that we are in fact not dealing with a single political community or *demos* but actually with two. These two communities are in a distinctly competitive relationship and even deny each other's legitimacy and right to exist. However, these differences become critical in times of international instability and major events. These events not only expose the internal differences within Montenegrin society, they even intensify them. In Montenegro, we are witnessing yet another phenomenon, namely, in that the main differences are arising in relation to foreign political players, who have been vitiating and exploiting these differences in order to gain control of the Montenegrin territory. Once again it has been shown that history is not the preserve of historians, but should be approached in the spirit of the constructivist 'Software', which is passed from generation to generation and concerns the functioning of each and every one of them. This glimpse into the past is particularly important in the case of Montenegro, where is extremely important history/past, as wider community as the ancestors individual members. This is without a doubt social specification that needs to be taken in to consideration.

In this article, we have shown that despite the ancient roots of division within the Montenegrin political community, today's situation has strongest attribute in last 100 years, two world wars, ninety years of termination of the statehood and the Civil War in two phases (occurring immediately after the unification of the common South Slavic State under the dynasty of Karađorđević and the so-called Christmas Resistance), which reached its most bloody expansion during the Second World War and immediately after it. The next stage of the conflict between the two competitive political communities was non-violent regarding the decision to restore independent statehood via the referendum held in 2006. Despite the completely different international political and technological context, it once again became clear that the political communities were deadlocked. It was only due to the votes of the minorities (Catholic Croatian, Bosnian-Muslim and Albanian) that Montenegro recovered its independent statehood and barely passed the 55% threshold set by the European Union as a legitimate outcome. Some authors (Malešević, Uzelac, 2007) argue that the Montenegrin state is a nation state without a nation. Others (Andrijašević, 2014) suggest that the only solution is some sort of civil i.e. non-national Montenegrin state modelled on the example

of the European Union. Here again, we need to specify the concerns regarding a common European identity highlighted by Lončar Mrkoci (2008). So is there a solution? Yes there is, but it would take a long time to be implemented. The foundation of every political community or demos, or national or trans-national, is a consensus of common interests in the field of security enforcement. This can be achieved in two ways. The first is the Swiss model, where three very different Cantons originally drafted a defensive alliance against the Habsburg Empire and in the following centuries formed different linguistic, ethnic as well as religious communities based on a common Helvetian identity (Holy, 2007). This method constructs a political community on a 'we-they' relationship based on a perception of external threats. To form a collective identity of a particular nation, it is important to identify the (ethnic) 'other' in order to create a stronger sense of national identity. (Lončar Mrkoci, 2008:142). The second method is the so-called (bio) political approach of defining a community. Křivák (2010:119) presents the dialectic of 'communitas immunitas' when it comes to locating a community. Usually we consider a political community, to be something that is shared between all members of that community. On the other hand, what is not mine therefore belongs to all. Is there a common Montenegrin society? Currently, the only achievable consensus appears to be the question of Montenegro's accession to the European Union, which is a question that appears to transcend the internal divisions between the two political communities. In this way, security not only represents the absence of threats but an actual balance between the economic and spiritual development of both the individual and the community.

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# Religion, Patriotism and Nationalism: The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 - 1995

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## ABSTRACT

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 represents a good example of an armed conflict in which religion did not play a decisive role in the outbreak. However, with the development of events, the religious factor - reinforced by extreme nationalism - became an increasingly important factor of identification. Religious affiliation became more important than any other tie that had previously united the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the pre-war decades. This article examines the impact of the two factors, nationalism and religion, on the events during the period prior up to the outbreak of war, and it highlights their role during the armed conflict.

**KEY WORDS:** war, religion, nationalism, patriotism, Bosnia and Herzegovina

## POVZETEK

Vojna, ki je potekala na ozemlju Bosne in Hercegovine med leti 1992 in 1995 predstavlja dober primer oboroženega spopada, pri izbruhu katerega religija ni imela odločilno vloge. Pa vendar je z razvojem dogodkov, ta dejavnik, podkrepjen z ekstremnimi nacionalizmi, postal vedno pomembnejši identifikacijski dejavnik. Verska pripadnost je postala pomembnejša od vseh vezi, ki so se desetletja pred tem spletla med prebivalci BiH. Članek obravnava vpliv dveh dejavnikov, nacionalizmov in religije, na dogodka, v obdobju pred izbruhom vojne na ozemlju BiH, kot tudi osvetli njihovo vlogo v času trajanja samega oboroženega spopada.

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**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** vojna, religija, nacionalizem, domoljubje, Bosna in Hercegovina

## 1. INTRODUCTION

One of the defining characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the close intertwining of national identity with religion. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are of common Slavic origin and can easily communicate with one another, but tend to differentiate themselves according to the God they worship: Orthodox, Catholic or Muslim. Despite the ethnic and linguistic similarities, the differences between the nations of the former Yugoslavia were deeply felt; the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina are a good example of how these differences are almost entirely derived from religion. These religious divisions could not be overcome by any Yugoslav identity. Events in Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to 1992, as well as during the war itself, must be considered in the wider context of the changes taking place within Yugoslavia, as well as the changes in the international community at the time. This was a time when the bipolar division of the world came to an end following the collapse of the communist and socialist ideologies; and the human identities based on these ideologies also collapsed. Many people no longer identified themselves as communists, or as Yugoslavs. They began to search for new sources of identity and some of them found these in religion. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a war in which religious identity in conjunction with political and national identity became a fundamental factor during the development of war.

This article examines the impact of two factors, nationalism and religion, on the events in the period prior to the outbreak of war on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as during the armed conflict. We proceed from the fundamental assumption that the war on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not sparked<sup>2</sup> by religious differences, but that these in conjunction with other factors, such as extreme nationalism, and with the escalation of hatred and the fighting among people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, became increasingly important. Thus, the period 1992 - 1995 witnessed major abuses of religion and religious feelings by various nationalist politicians to achieve their goals.

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<sup>2</sup> Causes for war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 - 1995 are not the subject of this analysis.

Article is based on the analysis of the existing literature on the topic of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the role of religions in the war, on the role of religious communities, and on the analysis of official documents and communications of religious communities during the 1992 – 1995 period.

## **2. NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM**

Južnič (1981: 135) defines nationalism as a »consciousness of identity, of belonging to the nation. It is also an awareness of diversity... A certain state of mind, a psychological condition, from which can follow an emotional moulding of this belief, which can be linked to patriotism. Only this is often expressed through beliefs about the increased value of its own nation in relation to other nations«. According to Južnič, nationalism should be placed within its specific historical context, only then can it be clearly identified. Klinar defines nationalism as »socially regressive attitude that rejects the quality of other nations, and is aggressive toward them« (Klinar 1983: 42). The phenomenon of negative nationalism is characterised by a limited cohesiveness of the wider community which makes it difficult or impossible to exercise its fundamental objectives. Manifestations of negative nationalism are associated with processes of discrimination, segregation and ethnic stratification (Klinar 1983: 42). Every kind of nationalism shares the perception that the nation is somehow endangered and that nationalist activities should be escalated under the auspices of defending supposedly threatened national interests.

Most often, patriotism is defined as a devotion to one's country. Some authors regard it as a dedication to one's nation. Such thinking leads to an understanding and assimilation of the country and homeland. As Sruk (1995: 72), notes »...in political expression homeland is very often equalised with state, which can be problematic especially if it is a multinational country.« Such simplifications are therefore not suitable because the notions of nation and state cannot simply be equated with one another, for a nation is neither a state nor an ethnic community. Furthermore, a nation is not a state, since the concept of a state refers to institutional activities, whereas the concept of a nation refers to a kind of community. A nation is not an ethnic community either, as it usually does not bear any political label and often does not include public culture or territorial dimensions. A nation has to populate its homeland for some extended period of time in

order to establish itself as a nation. It must also develop its own public culture and strive for a certain degree of self-determination. Additionally, a state represents a dimension that enables ethnic groups to formulate into nations. The state formation allows nations to assert their positions as subjects of international politics, and allows their members to be regarded as political subjects with civic rights and liberties (Nahtigal, Prebilič 2011: 28). Therefore, it is necessary to conclude that the concepts of nation and state cannot be easily equated with each other, for a nation does not derive from a state or an ethnic community. The nation is not the state, since the concept of the state refers to the institutional activity, while the concept of the nation indicates the type of community. A nation is not an ethnic community; it usually has no political labels and often does not include public culture and the territorial dimension. It is therefore not possible to equate patriotism with nationalism, despite the fact that they share the same value base - nations exist, the existence of one's own nation has a particular moral value for an individual, which is why the nation is worthy of special affection. Every nationalist is certainly a patriot, committed to belonging to his own country and his own people. But every patriot is not necessarily a nationalist in the sense of seeking the compliance of the nation. It follows that patriotism ranks highly among positive global values; this is not the case for nationalism. On the contrary, nationalism has anything but a positive connotation and is often publicly condemned.

The identification of the individual with the nation is called 'national consciousness' and 'national feeling'. 'National awareness' comprises the conduct of the individual of a national community or country. 'National feeling' refers to the emotions that are associated with the national community or country. Nationalism and patriotism are linked to the knowledge of the national community and country. This behaviour (knowledge) is neither given nor inherited, but must be passed on through research and transferred to the younger generation. National consciousness is developed through cultural content and knowledge of one's country. This awareness exists in both objective and subjective terms that vary, because no individual can know everything about their nation and homeland; therefore a certain minimum must be defined in order to form any solidarity between members of the national and state community. At the same time, other concepts can occur alongside patriotism and national consciousness which

are associated with national identification. For example, nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobia.

### ***2.1. The strengthening of nationalisms***

Among the factors responsible for the events in the former Yugoslavia in the early nineties, Vrcan also ranks nationalism. What caused the war crimes? It was not a pathological hatred of people of other nationalities, cultures or religions, but nationalism which incited hatred to a pathological degree.' (Vrcan 1996: 93). One of the features of the final decade in the existence of Yugoslavia was the remarkable reinforcement of nationalist policies. The socio-political scene became more aware of the nationalist discourse, encouraged by politicians and religious leaders of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and the Islamic community (IS). For this reason, nationalist politicians as much as religious leaders bear the responsibility for mobilising the radical motions that swept Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early nineties (Cohen 1998:54).

Grand Serbian nationalism hit the Yugoslav political scene with full force with the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) (Judah 1997: 58; Silber and Little 1996: 29). The most 'dangerous' and worrying parts of the Memorandum were those related to the lives of Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia. It marked the beginning of intensive Serb nationalist propaganda, whose primary goal was to portray Serbs outside Serbia as victims of genocide (Moses 1994: 162; Velikonja 1998: 290). As the only possible solution it presented the unification of all Serbs within one country. »In addition to the construction of the alleged genocide in Kosovo, Serbian nationalists began to draw attention to the inevitable recurrence of the Ustasha genocide from the Second World War« (Sells 1996b: 61). The Serb nationalists not only targeted the Kosovo Albanians, they also targeted the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whom they blamed for the Second World War. Their basic assumption was that the Muslims had been silently exercising their domination over Bosnia, and that the Muslim population had been disproportionately increasing in comparison to the number of Bosnian Serbs. Meanwhile, the Serbian exodus from Bosnia and Herzegovina was presented as a direct consequence of their subordinate economic and political situation and the pressures of living in a society which was heading towards an Islamic state (Duraković 1993: 195).

Croatian nationalists also increasingly began to express their aspirations for parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. »Bosnian Muslims found themselves in the middle of a family dispute between Croatian and Serbian Christian nationalists« (Sells 1996b: 102). Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered to be a natural part of Croatian interest zones (Cohen 1998:56). Just as Serbian nationalism was based on the Serbian Orthodoxy, the renewed Croatian nationalism identified with a number of religious characteristics. Once again it began to consolidate the link between the Croatian national and religious identities (Velikonja 1998:323). Sells believes that the religious element in Croatian nationalism was more subtle than the Serbian religious nationalism, though no less effective (Sells 1996b:92). Moses (1998:90) notes that the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia has forged close ties with the nation of Croats. Because the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia could not due to canonical reasons proclaim itself to be a Croatian Roman Catholic Church, it instead named itself the »Church of Croats«. Moses (1998: 90) also observed that the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia acted as though people of other nationalities did not inhabit the territory of Croatia, and that the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina was exclusively concerned with the fate of Croats.

Powers (1998: 233) notes that the Muslim role in the occurrence and the strengthening of nationalism differs from that of the Serbian and Croatian nationalist leaders on two points: the majority of Serbian and Croatian nationalist politicians were former Communists who did not develop any special (or any) emotional attachment towards their religion. The president of Bosnia and Herzegovina and many politicians were by contrast »deeply motivated by a political version of Islam«. While the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church had for a long time been identified with 'Croatianism and Serbianism' the Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has largely been the product of the war.

### **3. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AS 'PROTECTORS OF NATIONAL INTERESTS' DURING THE WAR**

Some religious leaders saw in the awakening of nationalism an opportunity to revive the declining role of religion in all spheres of public life. Within a short frame of time it became a widely held view that a man who did not support his faith could not be faithful to his nation (Djordjevic 1998: 154). What began was the period of »over

emphasising religious-national identification: a Serb-Orthodox, a Croat-Catholic and a Bosnian-Muslim« (Radaković 1997, 199). A similar opinion can also be noted by Huntington (1998: 330), who argues that religious identity became increasingly important. Each ethnic group increasingly identified with its own cultural community and began to define itself religiously.

The electoral laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina prohibited the active involvement of religious organisations and their representatives in the political process. However, this was the case in the pre-election period (Duraković 1993: 201). Political parties which were almost entirely organised on a national basis attempted to express support for religion and religious institutions in order to fix their nationalist image and to mobilise the masses as much as possible (Moses 1998: 81). Croatian and Serbian nationalist politicians wanted to gain support and legitimacy by accepting assistance from the church. »Religious communities suddenly found themselves in the very heart of the action, their attention was sought by politicians, the media ... They were not accustomed to such attention, which made them even more vulnerable to manipulation« (Moses 1998: 81). All three religious communities on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina felt an obligation prior to the elections to 'advise' their adherents on their political opinions. »To the soldiers on the frontlines simple religious symbolism allowed the rationalisation of violence and the complete collapse of incumbent interethnic relations« (Cohen 1998: 65). Vrcan (1994: 368) believes that religious symbolism in the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was »widely and intentionally used«. To confirm this thesis, Vrcan (1994: 369) lists some arguments, including the fact that the warriors were »on all sides using religious symbols to designate their own identity and to express the objectives for which they were fighting ....thus for self-identification and identification of the enemy«. Similarly, Moses (1994: 125) notes that the »underlying causes of war were of an ethnically-national nature. However, a large proportion of nationalists assumed religious labels to express their own identity, whilst religious institutions and their leaders did not oppose this«. Religion therefore became a national identifier.

Religious symbolism was not only reflected in the symbols worn by soldiers on their uniforms.<sup>3</sup> It was also reflected in the persecution,

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<sup>3</sup> Some Muslim soldiers had embroidered *Allahu akbar* onto their uniforms and wore green scarves around their heads embroidered with Islamic symbols (Glenny 1992: 164).

torturing and killing of believers of other religions, in the destruction of religious buildings, cemeteries, cultural heritage, and in the statements of political leaders and military commanders who sought to shape exclusive national troops. »War criminals and political leaders often hid their actions behind the shield of religion« (Velikonja 1998: 320). Mirko Jovic, commander of the Serbian White Eagles units called for a »Christian, Orthodox Serbia, without Muslims and non-believers« (Sells 1996b: 80). Radovan Karadzic<sup>4</sup> stated that the Serbs were defending Europe against the incursions of Islam in the West and against a fundamentalist country in Europe (Murad in Velikonja 1998: 320). His solution to the Bosnian problem was to propose that all Muslims should be converted to the Serbian Orthodox faith (Sells 1996b: 82).

It was precisely the fear of an Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was used to rationalise and to justify the actions of the Serbian and Croatian nationalists. Their crimes were portrayed as a 'defence of the Western world against Islamic fundamentalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Sells 1996a: 38).

Another example of the abuse of religion for military purposes was the use of religion as a motivating factor for the conflict. Rasim Delic, Chief of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, agreed that »in times of war religion always gets more followers« and that for them »is very important to motivate people in this way« (Cohen 1998: 43). The political and religious leaders of Bosnia's Muslims encouraged a reliance on »the spiritual aspects of the historical heritage of their communities as a means of strengthening morality and responsibility« (Cohen 1998: 68). One of the characteristics of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the systematic destruction of religious buildings, cemeteries and monuments, all of which could be connected to the religious 'other'. Sells has stated that what occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina was »genocide, whose aim was a systematic destruction of the Bosnian multi-religious culture, the Bosnian Muslim culture and the Bosnian Muslims as a nation« (Sells 1996a: 27). Religious symbols, rituals and institutions were used to promote the ideology of genocide (Sells 1996a: 43). Thus we can talk of »religious geno-

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<sup>4</sup> Radovan Karadzic was fond of emphasising the good relations between the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church. For him, the »voice of the church was the voice of the highest authority ... All I have in my life I owe to my faith and church, everything I do, I do with my mind on God« (Radić 1998: 177).

cide that was largely encouraged by religious nationalism, financially supported by Serbia and Croatia, and grounded in religious symbols« (Sells 1996b, XIII, 27 - 28, 144). There is no accurate data on the number of mosques, Orthodox and Catholic churches destroyed. Velikonja (1998: 309) states that there were in total between 1000 and 1100 mosques destroyed, while Sells (1996b: 3) states that Serbian and Croatian nationalists together destroyed 1400 mosques. Within the territory of the Bosnian archdiocese more than 600 Catholic Church buildings were destroyed or severely damaged. The Diocese of Banja Luka suffered the greatest in this war, with 98 per cent of its Catholic Church buildings being destroyed or seriously damaged. The Serbs destroyed most of the mosques in the areas they occupied. HVO<sup>5</sup> units were responsible for the destruction of the famous old bridge in Mostar. The Croatian commander in Mostar stated that »it is not sufficient to clean Mostar of Muslims, we must also destroy the mortal remains« (Sells 1996b: 93). The HVO destroyed the Orthodox Monastery Žitomislići, south of Mostar, the Orthodox Church in Mostar and hundreds of Orthodox churches in the villages (Sells 1996b: 194 - 195).

### ***3.2 Religious communities in wartime***

According to Moses the contributions of religious communities to events did more harm than good (1998: 96). Religious leaders in the war made a major mistake in not condemning in clear and unequivocal language the violence and the crimes committed by their own side. Instead, they reported in great detail on the suffering of their own nation, while the suffering of others was rarely mentioned. Ecclesiastical institutions could be attributed some responsibility for this because »every religion is responsible for the actions of its believers who refer to it, even when it comes to war crimes, as happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina« (Flere and Kerševan 1995: 102).

Among the three major religious communities, there is no doubt that the most damaging role was played by the Serbian Orthodox Church (Moses 1998:84). »The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church leadership in the war in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina was unfortunately anything but positive« (Radaković 1997: 176). This does not mean that the Roman Catholic Church and the Islamic commu-

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<sup>5</sup> *Hrvatskovijeće Obrane*, the official military forces of the Bosnian Croats.

nity did not contribute to the outbreak of war and the escalation of hatred, but that their negative influence was considerably less. »The Serbian Orthodox Church in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina acted as a background to and at the same time as the extended hand of nationalism« (Velikonja 1998: 314). Orthodox priests constantly repeated the claims that the Serbian Orthodox Church always had and always would defend Serbian national interests, and that Muslims and Catholics represented the greatest threat to the Serbian nation and to Orthodoxy (Moses 1994: 137). In the Orthodox monastery near Sarajevo, the Serb priest blessed the paramilitary groups led by Vojislav Šešelj, while at the same time, the names of Bosnian cities in which the greatest crimes against the Muslim populations had occurred were triumphantly read aloud (Sells 1996b: 80). Serbian nationalistic leaders swore unity and the defence of the Serbian nation to the Patriarch (Radaković 1997: 176 - 177). The Holy Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church, at its special plenary in January 1992, adopted a declaration in which they expressed their support for the Serbian people in Bosnia and Krajina. In this declaration it was also written that »the ruling government in Serbia has no mandate to represent the entire Serbian population; other arrangements with representatives of the Federation or command structure of the Yugoslav People's Army are not bound to all Serbs, without their agreement or without the blessing of their spiritual mother, the Serbian Orthodox Church« (Radić 1998: 171). The clergy of the SPC explicitly requested that »the highest state representatives who are not Orthodox or, who do not have a spiritual connection with the SPC, or who do not regularly attend liturgy, cannot be legitimate representatives of the Serbian nation« (Radaković 1997: 201). The clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church consistently defended the theses on the impossibility of Yugoslav nations living together, on the right of Serbs to self-determination and a denial of the existing AVNOJ<sup>6</sup> borders. Therefore, they also supported Slobodan Milošević' side that all Serbs should live in one country; they withdrew their support for him when he abandoned this idea (Moses 1998: 85).

The Serbian Orthodox Church was particularly effective at denying the crimes caused by Serbian troops. They insisted that the Serbs were being falsely accused of the sins of others (Moses 1998: 86).

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<sup>6</sup> AVNOJ borders were borders among the Yugoslav republics as established after the end of the WW2. AVNOJ is an abbreviation for *Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije*.

Even when it was beyond doubt that a crime had been committed by Serb soldiers, then the Church claimed that these were the crimes of individuals, or soldiers simply acting in self-defence (Radić 1998: 162). In official statements, the Patriarch distanced himself from war crimes and called for peace and humanity while at the same time emphasising the necessity of active countering »in the blessed defensive fight in this imposed war« (Radić 1998: 178). Moses (1994: 140) notes that both the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church had problems recognising the crimes committed by their own side; yet had no problems accusing others. The leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church also categorically denied the rapes committed by Serb soldiers, and instead accused Muslims and Croats of these crimes (Moses 1994: 139). They denied the existence of 'death camps' in the Serb-controlled territories, even after the international community had uncovered evidence of their existence. In their public statements, the SPC strongly exaggerated the number of Serb victims, the number of destroyed Orthodox Churches, and Serbian defeats were described as »apocalyptic« (Moses 1998 and 1994: 84, 146). In this way they contributed to the war propaganda. The most obvious negative role of the SPC was reflected in the open cooperation of priests in the armed conflict. »Many priests voluntarily joined the military units as warriors rather than as chaplains, justifying this by the need to prevent Muslim domination« (Moses 1994: 146). The blessing of weapons and soldiers was a daily routine, performed by priests of all levels (Moses 1998: 87). »Therefore, a great historical injustice hangs over the leadership of the SPC which will take long time to disappear« (Radaković 1997: 177).

In terms of the Roman Catholic Church's role during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to distinguish between the official positions of the highest Catholic dignitaries and lower positions and actions of the Catholic clergy, especially those in Herzegovina. »The Bosnian and Croatian Catholic clergy reacted differently to the outbreak and course of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The differences were mainly evident in the observations of the church leadership in Zagreb and the Herzegovina clergy« (Velikonja 1998: 324). The Roman Catholic Church officially recognised the inviolability of Bosnia's borders and strived for its indivisibility and unity; they opposed any division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic and religious lines as well as the abuse of religion for military purposes (Sells 1996b: 105; Cohen 1998: 68; Powers 1998: 229; Velikonja 1998:

324). The views of the Herzegovinian priests were more nationalistic (Moses 1998: 75) and in the opinion of some (Sells 1996b: 105) »not so different from the Serbian nationalist positions«. In fact the Herzegovinian clergy acting unilaterally encouraged anti-Muslim hatred and spread Croatian propaganda. »What emerged was obvious militant, nationalist clericalism, completely opposed to the vision of the Roman Catholic Church« (Velikonja 1998: 326). Eventually, Cardinal Franjo Kuharić and the RCC increasingly distanced themselves from the official Croatian policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially as it became clear that the policy would lead to the »dismemberment of Bosnia and ethnic cleansing' and Croatia's acquisition of Herceg-Bosnia with Mostar« (Moses 1998: 90). Cardinal Kuharić also condemned the crimes of the Croatian units in Bosnia and warned that they would tarnish the reputation of Croats and the whole of Croatia (Cohen 1998: 67).

Relations between the Church leadership in Zagreb and the Herzegovinian clergy finally deteriorated with the outbreak of armed conflict between the Croats and Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiment also grew. The Archbishop of Sarajevo, Vinko Puljić, expressed his fear that Bosnia and Herzegovina would become a Muslim country and a theocracy, because »for Muslims, state and religion are much more connected than ours are« (Cohen 1998: 67). The Franciscan friar, Tomislav Pervan, head of an order of 250 Franciscan monks, supported Franjo Tuđman's propaganda, that Bosnian Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to create an Islamic state; meanwhile, the Franciscan priest, Vinko Mikolić, compared the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Turkish occupiers (Sells 1996b: 106). Mostar was divided into Croatian and Muslim parts, while Catholic clergy had long since been divided owing to an ancient conflict between the Franciscans in Medjugorje and the Herzegovinian bishops (Moses 1998: 91). The views of the Roman Catholic Church were often criticised by both the Croatian and the Muslim sides. At the end of November 1993 in Split, Bosnia and Herzegovina's Catholic bishops met with representatives of the Bosnian Croatian civil authorities. Zovkić (1998: 214) writes that the civil authorities were strongly critical of the bishops' lack of support for the Croatian ethnic cause and their harsh condemnation of the crimes committed by HVO<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Hrvatskovijeće Obrane*, the official military forces of the Bosnian Croats.

units. When the international community in 1993 learned of the existence of Croatian camps in Herzegovina, foreign media criticised both the Catholic bishops in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina for not having condemned these violations of human rights and the very existence of these camps (Zovkić 1998: 213). Moses (1998: 89) believes that the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church was by far the most effective at providing informative material with their interpretation of events, which was more easily accessible to the international public than either the Serb or Muslim sides. The more the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina escalated, the more the Roman Catholic Church started to follow the example of the SPC and the IS in publicly condemning war crimes, but never condemning any specific crimes of their own soldiers (Zovkić 1998: 214). On the Croatian side, as well as the Serbian side, many priests actively participated in armed conflicts (Moses, 1998:91). Moses quotes Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, who in an interview for the magazine *Danas* was asked whether he condemned the Franciscan monk who had carried weapons and accompanied the Croatian soldiers; the cardinal replied that »chaplains by rule should not be involved in the battle, but when father Duke is wearing the uniform and carrying a gun, he is not doing so as a representative of the Roman Catholic Church, but it is his personal matter« (Moses 1998: 130). When analysing the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to mention the views of Pope John Paul II. Sells (1996b: 108) believes that the Pope's response to the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina »is difficult to assess«. The Pope repeatedly expressed his support for the Catholic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He organised a »joint prayer meeting for ending the war and a just peace for all nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia« (Blazevic 1998: 194). During the war, the Pope raised Bosnian Archbishop Vinko Puljić to Cardinal, for his »recognition of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the struggle for its sovereignty« (Blazevic 1998: 374). The Pope had been scheduled to visit Sarajevo on 8 September 1994, but this was cancelled at the last moment when Radovan Karadzic stated that he would be unable to ensure that the Pope would not be killed by Muslims, for which the Serbs would be blamed (Blazevic 1998: 371; Velikonja 1998: 329). Sells points out that »the Pope never publicly condemned the role played by the clergy in Herzegovina in the Muslim-Croat conflict, nor their open support for the violent religious nationalism of Croatian troops in Herzegovina« (Sells 1996b: 108).

The role of the Islamic Community during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina differs from the roles and actions of the SPC and the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church and the SPC were particularly active in the pre-war period and in preparing their nations for war, while the IS became increasingly active as the armed conflict escalated. As the war progressed, it strengthened the role and the presence of the IS and Islam in all spheres of Muslim public life. »The war has without a doubt taken Bosnia and Herzegovina in a more Islamic nationalistic direction« (Cohen 1998: 69). Velikonja (1998: 333) shares his opinion and notes that the war strengthened the religious component of the national identity of Muslims. »The faithfulness of Muslims is the result and not the cause of the war«. Huntington (1998: 330, 331) described the changes in the Muslim community in Bosnia in terms of a »dramatic rise of civilisational identity« and even talks of »the Islamisation of the country«. »The defence of Muslims against Serbs and Croats has encouraged more radical forms of religious consciousness and behaviour, which was quite atypical for the traditional secular and moderate Muslim population« (Cohen 1998: 68). The Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was largely a product of the war (Powers 1998: 233). The Islamic Community had supported a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina and had strongly opposed its division since the very beginning of the war. They insisted on equality and the constitutionality of all three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Velikonja 1998: 336, Powers, 1998: 233). In April 1993, Dr Mustafa Cerić, the imam of Zagreb Mosque, became the new religious leader 'reis-ul-ulema'. Cerić was known as a proponent of radical direction and a bitter opponent of the Serbian and Croatian policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina (Velikonja 1998: 336). His radical approach became visible in all spheres of public life. Compulsory classes in religious education were introduced into schools (Cohen 1998: 68), and religious indoctrination also occurred in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Powers 1998: 232). By 1995, more than 90 per cent of the members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were of Muslim nationality and religion (Cohen 1998: 69).

Religious indoctrination in the military manifested mainly in the formation of national troops. While both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat units were present from the outset of the hostilities, the same cannot be said of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was initially nationally mixed. At the beginning of the war, the Army

of Bosnia and Herzegovina acted as an army of 'Bosnians' in terms of representing all the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the fighting escalated, however, it began to become dominated by members of Muslim nationality and religion (Moses 1998, 95; Cohen 1998: 69). In Zenica in November 1992, the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade was established; it was not Bosnian, but exclusively Muslim. Deputy Brigade Commander, Halil Brzina, stated that unit's aim was »to gather patriots of the Muslim nation to protect and defend religion, nation and state« (Brzina in Isaković 1997: 66). They accepted into their ranks those who »firmly believe that without faith in Allah, victory is not possible«. »Members of the 7<sup>th</sup> Muslim Brigade hold moral principles based on religious elements and will never do anything that is forbidden by Islamic laws« (Brzina in Isaković 1997, 67). An *emir* was present in the brigade to »take care of the moral and religious aspect of our brigade. The warrior ... is not afraid of the commander, but he is in awe of his religious obligations, because the fight to defend is a command of Allah« (Brzina in Isaković 1997: 67). Cohen (1998: 68 - 69) also mentions the Black Swans, an elite unit of the Bosnian Army which adopted Islamic law. Members of this unit received two hours of religious education each day carried out by the emir; alcohol, pork and contact with women were prohibited. The elite units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the most fundamentally »islamised« (Huntington 1998: 331).

Cerić, the new 'reis-ul-ulema', endeavoured to promote Islamic beliefs while limiting the rights of non-Muslim believers (Cohen 1998: 69). He prohibited the sale of pork and outlawed mixed marriages (Powers 1998: 233). The islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also evident from the fact that President Alija Izetbegovic was able to amend the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure that his successor had to be of Muslim faith (Cohen 1998: 70).

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

The causes of the war that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 are undoubtedly complex. Scientifically and historically it would be inappropriate and improper to attribute sole blame to nationalism and religion. Yet, both of these factors contributed to a considerable extent to inflaming transnational hatreds in both the pre-war period as well as during the conflict. Our analysis of the influence of religion in this article has proved this to be the case. With the collapse of Yugoslavia, people lost their Yugoslav identity and became instead citizens of the constituent republics or members of the nations. When war broke out and national identity became crucial for survival, the role of religion also increased in importance as one of the national identifiers. In order to emphasise their identities as Serbs, Croats and Muslims, all three groups embraced their respective religions. Nationalist political leaders realised that obtaining the support of their nation was possible only if they also obtained the support of their religious communities. Religious communities which had been pushed into the private sphere during the four decades of communism recognised an opportunity for a 'grand return' to all spheres of social life and the opportunity to increase their role and influence. Prior to the beginning of the war, the clergy of all three religious communities called for peace, for religious ethnic tolerance and the coexistence of all nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These official public statements supported a united and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once armed conflict had broken out, the highest religious leaders made several joint statements calling for a ceasefire and for peace. However, these attempts at peace were overshadowed by the extremely divisive role these religions played in the conflict.

Our analysis has shown that the religious communities directly, but much more indirectly and covertly, and perhaps even unconsciously, contributed to the sentiments of hatred between the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina both before and during the war. Even prior to the outbreak of armed conflict, the different regions supported political parties that were based on national identities. Thus the RCC, the SPC and the IS began to reawaken bitter memories from Bosnia and Herzegovina's recent history, particularly the tragic and bloody period of the Second World War that had never been forgotten. A large part of the responsibility for this rests with the religious communities who did not take sharp and decisive action against the misuse of religion by the nationalist policies. Furthermore,

the clergy of all three religions became openly involved in armed conflict, not as chaplains but as soldiers bearing arms. The highest level of the church hierarchy officially condemned these kinds of actions, but they did nothing to prevent such behaviour. Perhaps the biggest mistake made by religious leaders was their failure to condemn in clear and unequivocal statements the violence and the war crimes committed by their own forces. Rather, they emphasised the suffering of their own nation and highlighted the crimes of their opponents while denying the crimes of their own militaries and instead attributing them to a few individuals acting in self-defence. They falsified the numbers of dead and wounded, the numbers of refugees and religious buildings destroyed, all with the aim of portraying their own nation as the only victim of the war. Great historical responsibility rests with the SPC, the RCC and the IS for these tragic events. However, it is important to emphasise that the blame cannot be apportioned equally among these three religious institutions.

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# Patriotism as a State-building Strategy: A Case Study of Israel

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## ABSTRACT

The article analyses the role of patriotism in the process of state-building in Israel. The authors argue that, following the declaration of Israeli independence in 1948, the fostering of patriotism became a pre-condition for a cohesive society. This was not an easy task for the founding fathers of Israeli nation, who, as Jews from all over the world, had little in common except for the mythical notion that their predecessors had been expelled from the Biblical lands nearly two millennia ago. The cohesiveness of the Israeli nation became an inevitable tool of national security, and subsequently for the survival of the state. The analysis reveals that many of the pillars of Israeli patriotism have been based on half-truths and on dubious sources that lack historic evidence. Taking their cue from Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson's critical approaches to nationalism and patriotism, the authors argue that patriotism in Israel has served as a means by which the political elites have achieved their goals.

**KEY WORDS:** Israel, patriotism, patriotic education, civic education, national security, armed forces

## POVZETEK

Članek analizira vlogo domoljubja v procesu izgradnje države Izrael. Avtorja ugotavljata, da je bilo načrtno vzpostavljanje domoljubja od nastanka Izraela l. 1948 predpogoj, da se judovske priseljence iz različnih delov sveta – ki z izjemo kolektivne zavesti, da naj bi bili njihovi predniki domnevno izgnani iz biblijskih dežel pred dvema tisočletjema – poveže v kohezivno družbo. Kohezivnost družbe je bila

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v primerih, ko je bila nacionalna varnost države ogrožena, nujna za preživetje države in na novo ustvarjenega naroda. Analiza je pokazala, da velik del načrtno gojenega domoljubja v Izraelu še danes temelji na polresnicah ali celo na »podatkih«, za katere ni dokazov. Avtorja izhajata iz teoretskih premis kritičnega pogleda na nacionalizem in patriotizem (filozofska misel Ernesta Gellnerja in Benedicta Andersona) in opozarjata, da je patriotizem v Izraelu, podobno kot drugod po svetu, običajno v funkciji ciljev političnih elit.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** Izrael, domoljubje, domoljubna vzgoja, državljanska vzgoja, nacionalna varnost, oborožene sile

## INTRODUCTION

Due to the historical circumstances of its creation in 1948, Israel is a unique state. Jews returned to the 'Promised Land' in several waves of immigration from all over the world, and today form the majority of the population of modern Israel.<sup>2</sup> One of the major challenges facing the founding fathers of the nation was the question of how to bind such a disparate population which had come from all over the world and which shared neither linguistic nor recent historical connection. The question was how to build a cohesive society which could jointly resist foreign threats, as there were only two connecting elements for the Jews: their religion, and, stemming from it, their collective consciousness and common ancestors who had been expelled from Palestine two thousand years ago. When the Jews were granted a new (old) homeland in 1948 in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the need to instil patriotic feelings and an unconditional loyalty to the new nation was regarded as a survival minimum.

The main objective of this article is to analyse how Israel has been constructed as a state and how the state-building and nation-building processes have been associated with patriotism in the framework of

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<sup>2</sup> According to Israeli government statistics, since the establishment of Israel, 3 million Jews from 130 countries have immigrated to the country, mostly from the territory of the former Soviet Union (Branovsky 2008; Shohamy in Volansky 2007, 2). The majority of them, almost 240 thousand, immigrated in 1949 (Zand 2010, 9; Ynet News 2013). Today more than 8 million people live in Israel, of whom three-quarters are Jewish (6,102,000), one fifth Arab (1682000) and the remainder a mixture of Christians, Druze, Baha'i etc. This information is particularly interesting since at the time of Israel's establishment in 1948, only there were only 806,000 Jews (Jewish Virtual Library 2014b). The mass immigration of Jews, also known as *aliyah*, has raised strong opposition (mostly) among Arab nations throughout the Middle East and their allies around the world. These antagonisms have led to a series of Israeli-Arab wars.

educational system. Focusing on the case study of Israel, the article will demonstrate how educational system – as a formal source of learning – was an important agent that contributed to socialization of Israeli schoolchildren and students, as it has transmitted mostly the information, which were creating a sense of unity among them. In this context, we will demonstrate how the state institutions since the establishment of Israel, on 14 May 1948, have sought to strengthen the Israelites as a nation and Israel as a country on the basis of historical evidence as well as on the basis of forged interpretations of the evidence, or even half-evidences, half-truths, legends and myths. This paper builds on the theoretical foundations of patriotism. Our main method is the analysis and interpretation of secondary and primary sources. We will also apply a critique of the concept of Israeli patriotism as well as the methods of the socio-cultural prism of Ernest Gellner (1983/2006) and Benedict Anderson (2007) – the two scholars who have prompted revisions of the academic debate on patriotism. Due to its sociological, political and cultural specificities, patriotism in Israel has been scientifically examined for a number of years. In this regard, the purpose of our article is also to discuss the scientific and practical contribution of Israeli patriotism studies.<sup>3</sup> The relevance of the topic derives from the fact that Israel is one of the world's most radical examples of nation building through patriotism. The case study of Israel is also interesting because its Jewish population is an ethnic community whose patriotism and willingness to take up arms in defence of their country is one of the strongest in the world. In terms of issues relating to patriotism, the so-called exclusivist approach of the Israeli authorities in defining what constitutes the state of Israel is interesting because it is still dominated by a Zionist conception of nationality which prevents the country from becoming a republic *of and for* all of its citizens.<sup>4</sup>

We will begin by presenting an outline theory of patriotism, with an emphasis on its role in the processes of education and socialisation. This is important to understand, as the education system is an agent

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<sup>3</sup> Among the key scientific publications on patriotism in Israel we should mention: Kop (2003), Almog (2004), Ben Amos and Bar-Tal (2004), Branovsky (2008), Ya'ar and Lipsky (2008), Harshav (2009), Lewin (2011), Zamir and Horowitz (2013) Nets-Zehngut (2013) and Gorny (2013).

<sup>4</sup> Zionism as a movement was founded by Theodor Herzl in 1896. It is named after Mount Zion, where the Jewish temple stood. The term itself was coined by Nathan Birnbaum in 1890. Since Herzl, this term has become a synonym for a political movement whose goal is the return of Jews to Zion (Jewish Virtual Library 2014a).

of the state; thus, if it is allowed that the state uses that very system to produce sentiments in the populace which are designed to win consent for it, it thereby taints whatever consent it subsequently enjoys as being non-legitimizing (Brighouse 2005). We will then analyse the circumstances in which Israel was established as a state and how patriotism was instilled in minds of schoolchildren via textbooks and curricula. We will then analyse the trends in the field of patriotism in modern Israel, especially the questions of ethnic minorities and armed forces. We will conclude with a summary of our findings.

### **PATRIOTISM: FOR WHAT AND FOR WHOM**

Patriotism is an emotion, a phenomenon that is linked to one's environment. It is associated with the notion of a home or the closest members of the family. In this context, it can be attributed to each member of a community. The homeland as a semantic platform for patriotism should be understood in the broader context, as an expression of the main characteristics of the community and as a source of its identity. As such, it is the sum of the spatial and sociological components which form a living space and the essence of the nation. It is therefore essential to understand patriotism as an emotion that has a special place within the hierarchy of values, because loving the home and the homeland is something that is usually understood as a noble act that helps ensure the survival of both the family and the nation. As Sruk (1995, 72) argues, political statements often equate the homeland with the country. This can be problematic, especially in a multinational country such as Israel.

Patriotism is often thought of in the same context as nationalism, but the two concepts should not be confused (Nincic and Ramos, 2012). The widely accepted consensus is that patriotism implies mainly positive values that connect a group of people (the nation), while nationalism implies an aggressive and negative attitude towards other nations (Sruk 1995, 234; Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008, 8).<sup>5</sup> Tolstoy warned of the potential political abuse of patriotism. He wrote that patriotism

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<sup>5</sup> Nationalism has very different political and socio-moral implications and manifestations. From extremely positive to totally unacceptable, which can include all those forms that are imbued with undemocratic practices, extreme national chauvinism, extreme xenophobia and superior ideology based on the humiliation and subjugation of others, usually smaller nations (Prebilič and others 2013, 15).

is the origin of evil, because the state leadership would be able to 'programme' its citizens according to its own needs, so that they would become so unconditionally loyal to the homeland that they would be prepared to repress all foreigners (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 203).

In order to differentiate between different forms of patriotism, we must distinguish between constructive patriotism and blind patriotism. The former is modest and based on continuous questioning and restriction, while the latter is unconditional and rejects any questioning or criticism. It is also often associated with ignorance, a deliberate distortion of historical facts, a genealogical search for the 'pure blood of the nation' and a sense of being threatened by anything foreign (Lewin 2011).

If the classic view of patriotism emphasises loyalty to the state above all else, then newer conceptions seem to belong to a more encompassing political idea. This kind of perception follows the political thought of Abraham Lincoln (Schaar in Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008). The newer interpretations are consistent with Gellner's claims that two humans belong to the same nation only if they recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, people *make* the nation (Zand 2010). Some modern authors go even further. For example, Martha Nussbaum and Jürgen Habermas argue that we should replace affinity to the homeland and nation with a greater degree of belonging to cosmopolitan and broader humanistic values (Canovan, Markell and McClay in Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008, 8). Some authors are slightly cynical toward the issue of the nation. For example, William Ralph Inge (in Peña 2010) claims that the nation is a society united by a delusion about its ancestry and a common fear of its neighbours.

We can conclude that patriotism is an emotion that is related to perception, understanding and behaviour. Hence it is essential to know about the homeland, one's ancestors and compatriots, and about their achievements. Patriotism is repeatedly created, designed and reconstructed. Without the constant adaptation to social circumstances it is doomed to fail. This is especially true in the modern information age. According to Althusser's (2000) conception of the ideological apparatus of the state, the educational system creates a collective identity and the nation's collective memory. Patriotism is therefore a cultural construction which is strengthened through various symbols

and rituals (Hamilton 2012, 15). Instilling patriotism begins in early childhood; at all stages of the educational system, an individual is faced with direct and indirect patriotic messages – in textbooks, singing songs, on school trips, displaying the national flag and reciting an oath of loyalty (Dean in Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 205). Hence, the formation of nations should be seen as a politically motivated process – a process that fulfils political objectives which are often closely associated with the survival of both the state and the nation itself. Israel is such an example.

### **CONSTRUCTING A NATION AND PATRIOTISM DURING THE NASCENCE OF ISRAEL**

The first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion, advocated the construction of one united nation by the means of integrating all Jews who had immigrated to Israel since the declaration of independence in 1948. This approach was based on the idea that all immigrants, although coming from different cultural backgrounds, ‘should be made’ into loyal people of Israel, regardless of their origin.<sup>6</sup> The first twenty years of Israel’s existence were based on a melting-pot policy. The ‘fathers of the nation’ wanted to create a cohesiveness among newcomers from around the world and build ‘a new citizen for a new country’, a new Jew for a new Israel. The Holy Book offered a convenient context for this. Ben Gurion was a pious Jew who soon realised that the ancient Hebrew book can be read in a politically convenient way. Ben Gurion and his associates proposed a new interpretation of the Holy Book which turned it into a secular national text and thus redefined the collective memory through which hundreds of thousands of immigrants from all over the world could be moulded into a new nation. Together with other intellectuals, among them many military commanders, they portrayed themselves as reoccupying the biblical Canaan and rebuilding the Kingdom of David (Zand 2010, 158–159; Selfa 1998; Volansky 2007, 5).

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<sup>6</sup> Today, such an approach is problematic because the democratic framework of a modern country is not based on unification, but rather on pluralism and the equality of different groups. As such, it is the perfect antithesis of what the nation really is. Some Israeli authors (e.g. Gorny 2013) have questioned whether the founders of Israel understood or even wanted to understand what it really means to understand non-Israeli ethnic groups, let alone allow provide for decision-making on an equal footing for all citizens.

Ben Gurion questioned how the ancient Hebrews had preserved their language during their 430 years of exile in the 'Land of Pharaohs' and why, having been a united nation under Moses, they had fragmented into separate tribes. His conclusions corresponded to the official historiography and his explanations were formulated accordingly. Yet, despite an allegedly scientific approach, he usually resorted to the Doctrine of God whenever necessary. Furthermore, in reaching his conclusions he received help from the Jewish intellectual elite, both domestic and foreign (Ofer 2010). The holy trinity of 'Bible-nation-land of Israel' became a central icon in the formation of the new state. Civil servants were expected to adopt Hebrew names. Other citizens often followed their example. Old family names from the era of the Diaspora were changed; new-borns were named after Biblical heroes. Almost every village was given a Hebrew name (Harshav 2009; Zand 2010, 162–163).

### ***The curricula and textbooks in the first years after the creation of Israel***

Teachers told their students to look up to their predecessors, the Hebrew farmers and warriors, as role models. Patriotic feelings of belonging were instilled in several ways: preparing new historical patriotic studies; excursions to symbolic places that supported these quasi-scientific studies; and laic biblical teachings. After the establishment of Israel, these pedagogical practices became standard in all branches of the national educational system (Zand 2010, 164). Nets-Zehngut (2013) has observed that the Ministry of Education, as an institution that approves or rejects a particular textbook, has been the most important institution for building the collective memory. Teachers are considered to be partners in the ideological mission of creating a cohesive society and the state (Dror in Volansky 2007, 5).

To better explain how crucial the Ministry of Education has been, it is worth mentioning how vigilantly its experts approached writing the textbooks on the first Israeli-Arab war in 1948 which had resulted in the expulsion of some 650000 Palestinians from their homes. Palestinians call this great national tragedy *nakba*, the disaster.<sup>7</sup> The portrayal of the *nakba* in Israeli textbooks has varied significantly

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<sup>7</sup> Some historians, for example Ilan Pappé and Nur Masalha, even claim that the Zionists had a plan to ethnically cleanse Israel and it is no surprise that these historians became persona non grata in Israel and were threatened by right-wing extremists (Rikabi 2012).

from 1948 to the modern day. The early books were written explicitly in the Zionist spirit, since the first two decades of the new state was a period of great censorship; hence the *nakba* was a taboo subject. Over time, portrayal of the *nakba* was partially changed to accommodate perspectives that were more critical of the Zionists. The main reasons for this were, firstly, that students no longer believed the accounts of the nation's founding fathers; and secondly, the international community repeatedly criticised Israel and sympathised with the plight of the Palestinians. In recent times, especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the text books have become especially critical of Israeli actions towards the Arab population (Nets-Zehngut 2013).

The curricula in the Jewish sector of Israel during the 1950s and 60s of the twentieth century were explicitly intended to instil patriotism (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 205). The list of compulsory reading for the seventh and eighth grades is a good example of this. The texts abound in myths that serve as models, according to which an individual was expected to think, behave, live – and even die. Compulsory literature at that time contained overtly ideological matter. Let us consider some examples: *'From the Life of Yosef Trumpeldor'* is a metaphor for the fight of the few against the many (Israelis vs. Arabs)<sup>8</sup>; *'About the Slaughter'* by H. N. Bialik contains a discourse about (Jewish) sacrifice and (Jewish) victims; Schufman's *'Take off Your Shoes'* and Alterman's *'Silver Platter'* emphasise the superiority and importance of the collective over the individual; Yakov Cohen's *'We Sing and We Come to Israel'* depicts the return to the 'Promised Land', which is perhaps the most powerful symbol of the historical and political circumstances in which the children of Israel found themselves after World War II; Shlonsky's *'Facing the Wilderness'* and Tchernichovsky's *'You Were Right, Young Builders'* present a similar subject matter (Zamir in Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 205).

Let us consider some examples of how patriotism was fostered in the primary school textbooks during the 1960s. First graders learned excerpts of the well-known song *'In the Galilee'* ('Bagalil'), which extols the battle and the death of Josef Trumpeldor and his compa-

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<sup>8</sup> Yosef Trumpeldor was one of the first Zionists who organised the immigration of Jews to Palestine. He died in 1920 defending his settlement Tel Hai. At the time of his death he was an Israeli national hero, in his last breath he is supposed to have said that it is good to die for one's country (Zertal 2002/2010, 10).

triotis. In the second grade, they would read about the heroic Maccabees and participate in the theatre play at the feast of Chanukah. Third-grade textbooks described the heroism of the founders of the Jewish community before the advent of Israel. In the fourth grade, pupils were acquainted with the heroic deeds of Battle of Tel Hai, where Josef Trumpeldor heroically died. Students of the fifth grade cultivated a love for the homeland by reading one of the most famous duels from the Bible, namely the fight between David and Goliath.<sup>9</sup> Sixth grade history lessons taught the heroic uprising of the Jews against the Roman Empire, while in music lessons they sang *'Who Will Tell of the Heroism'*, a poem about Simeon bar Yohai, the founder of Cabalism and a harsh critic of the Romans. Sixth graders also read about the fearless Jewish fighters who resisted the Nazis in the Warsaw Ghetto, and the heroes of the Revolutionary War in 1948 (pupils were reportedly particularly enthusiastic about the companionship, that developed in the unified front against the Arabs). In the seventh grade, pupils learned about the Spanish Jews, who preferred death to religious conversion by the Spanish authorities. As Shimony (2003, 316) notes, the seventh grade was particularly important in terms of patriotism, for at thirteen years old students were just old enough to internalise their love of the homeland. In the eighth grade, in addition to excursions to Tel Hai, where Trumpeldor fell, pupils read about Hagana, a secret Jewish organisation during the British Mandate, a period which is nowadays considered to be the cradle of the Israeli armed forces.

In the 1960s, the school curricula, imbued as they were with patriotic interpretations of truths, half-truths and myths were undoubtedly the mainstay of Israeli patriotism. Pupils were expected to learn the Bible so as to instil love of their country and love of their entire nation in their hearts. Across all subjects, it was possible to find a sense of national values promoted by the Minister of Education, Ben-Zion Dinur, who believed that the curriculum should reflect the

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<sup>9</sup> David's victory over the much stronger Goliath strongly alludes to the Israeli-Arab wars won by Israelis by resorting to clever strategy and tactics. We should also mention that the Philistines were the predecessors of the Palestinians, thus the similarity between the Israelis as David, and the Palestinians as Philistine Goliath, are more than obvious. It seems that the roles in one of the fundamental myths of Israeli patriotism, the legend of David and Goliath, have been switched: nowadays, Israel can no longer claim to be David, but rather resembles the giant Goliath, while the Palestinians can claim to be the weaker David against the strong Philistine warrior.

intellectual unity and the crucial role played by teachers. Teachers were considered the ‘guardians of the country’, responsible for ensuring that the national heritage was transmitted from generation to generation (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 205–206).

In short, the Zionist pioneers were portrayed as strong people whose sacrifice created a collective and equal society. Such a vision was diametrically opposed to any kind of cultural pluralism. The new Israeli was a strong and secular Jewish Zionist, originally from Europe, committed to physical work – someone who had come to Israel to build a new country and defend it against the country’s enemies. Willingness to make sacrifices for one’s country is definitely the most radical expression of patriotism, and the creation of heroes is a characteristic common to autocratic and totalitarian countries.<sup>10</sup>

### *Some other aspects of taught patriotism in the early period of Israel*

When constructing patriotic feelings toward Judaism, Israel’s Zionist pioneers did not forget the cult of beauty and body. Zionist ideologues particularly focused on the young people, who were seen as the primary target group. Beauty contests organised in Mandatory Palestine were platforms for the Jewish population to celebrate symbols of (Jewish) beauty. There was also a commitment to sport through which Jews were to become more beautiful and healthier. Regular sports drills were promoted to increase the physical ability of the population, deemed a necessary means of defending Judaism. Beauty and sports were inextricably linked, as was evident in 1928 when Tzipporah Tzabari won a beauty contest; she was not only a winner of a beauty pageant, but also a successful athlete. Interestingly, some well-known Jewish rabbis took part in these processes, including Jewish communities in other countries, who promoted these activities (Stern 2006).

Women as well as men were glorified. The paratrooper Hannah Senesh (also known as Chana Szenes) was presented as a female version of Josef Trumpeldor – a kind of Jewish Joan of Arc. During World War II, she was one of the paratroopers parachuted into Yugoslavia by the

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<sup>10</sup>In Yugoslavia, the Bosnian miner Alija Sirotanović, and in the Soviet Union the famous miner Alexei Stahanov both set an absolute record in the excavation of coal. In both countries they were thus glorified. After Stahanov, the term “stahanovščina” illustrating the tedious and hard work came into general use. See Neumann (2011, 1–28) for more about the first Zionist pioneers in Israel.

British to save the Hungarian Jews who had been deported to Nazi concentration camps. Senesh was arrested, imprisoned and tortured, but refused to speak. She was shot dead by the Nazis in November 1944, aged 23 (Shimony 2003, 321; Abramson 2012). She has become a role model for Jewish freedom fighters.

The authorities tried to cultivate patriotism even on school trips. Students were exposed to historical relics whose place in ancient history was explained by the fact that the Jews had always been present in the territory of Israel. Excursions underlined the virtues of heroism and sacrifice. For example, tours of ancient Modi'in<sup>11</sup>, from which the Hashmoneian dynasty had originated, and visits to Tel-Hai in the northern Galilee, were intended to enable students to identify with Yosef Trumpeldor. Trips to the fortress of Masada, where the Jews had committed a collective suicide rather than surrender alive had the same objective (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 206).<sup>12</sup>

During the early years following the establishment of Israel, pupils also had to wear school uniforms. Some eminent sociologists, for example Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, define Israel as a 'nation in uniform'. The educational system conceived of today's pupil as tomorrow's soldier. This is also evident in the banal examples in textbooks of 'non-ideological subjects', such as hygiene and politeness (Shimony 2003, 312).

The early years of nation building in Israel are also interesting from the perspective of the Israeli fear of foreign influence – not only with regard to security, but also a matter of cultural survival. They were especially reluctant to accept immigrants from Middle Eastern countries and Eastern bloc countries. This was a period of negative

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<sup>11</sup> Modi'in is located between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. From this settlement, the Hashmoneians ruled Judea in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. Some historians regarded this political entity as the first independent Jewish kingdom (Wood and O'Brien 1986). In the so called Maccabean resistance between 167 and 160 BC, the Jews led by Judah Maccabee defeated the Seleucid invaders. This resistance is also connected to Hanukkah, one of the most important Jewish holidays, also called the Feast of Lights. Light symbolises the re-dedication of the Temple in Jerusalem during the rebellion against the Seleucids (Scherman 2007; Shimony 2003, 317). But the thesis (propagated in Israeli textbooks in elementary schools) that the Hasmonean Kingdom was Jewish is controversial and, as Zand notes (2010, 440), elicits a smile. Why? Because the society whose rulers would have spoken Aramaic, whose subjects mostly Hebrew and whose commercial trade was undertaken in Greek *koiné*, cannot be regarded as Jewish.

<sup>12</sup> In the 1st century, the Romans were supposed to have exiled the Jewish people from the territory of modern Israel. Historians have never found sound evidence for this claim. Zand (2010, 443) states that all experts in ancient Jewish history know that the Romans did not deport the population of Judea.

stereotypes and the idea that ‘barbaric’ immigrants would corrode Judaism from within. There were fears of a cultural invasion which would destroy the economic, cultural and social achievements of Israel’s early years. The attitude towards immigrants from Western countries was entirely different: they were regarded as members of developed cultures that were worth emulating (Zamir 2011).

We can conclude this section by saying that the bond of Jewish history with the modern state of Israel was clearly expressed in school curricula and textbooks. The Jewish identity, based on half-truths, myths and legends, has clearly shaped the social discourse, and this can prove to be problematic. Although Jews had not occupied ‘their’ land for centuries, the Land of Israel remained a myth in the consciousness of every Jew as something abstract (a collective memory) and even as the last location where a Jew can fulfil God’s commandments. Such an approach glorifies Jewish history and idealises the bond between the past and the present. It asserts that Israelis are the direct descendants of the ancient peoples of thousands of years ago (Ya’ar and Shavit in Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 205–206). This type of discourse forms the identity of the individual in accordance with the identity of the society. Such a discourse, managed according to the ideology of the ruling class, legitimises the existing social order built by the state leaders.

## **CONSTRUCTING A NATION AND PATRIOTISM DURING THE NASCENCE OF ISRAEL**

General trends in patriotism indicate that the love for one’s country in modern Israel remains stable. Approximately two-thirds of Israeli Jews are considered to be Israeli patriots (the number has remained similar in recent years). Researchers from the Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya use the so called Expressions of Patriotism Index to measure this phenomenon.<sup>13</sup> The survey also included the Israeli Arabs (i.e. Arabs with Israeli citizenship), as a special segment of the Israeli public which has a distinctly different identity and perception of the Israeli state.

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<sup>13</sup> The survey was conducted in December 2007. The random sample included approximately 800 people. See Ya’ar and Lipsky (2008) for more information on the index.

The results showed that patriotism slightly decreased in 2008, but nevertheless remains high. Willingness to fight for one's country remains high: nine out of ten Israeli Jews would be willing to put themselves in danger if it was necessary to defend their country in the case of war. It is also interesting to observe that Israeli Jews, though generally disappointed with many things about their country, still regard their country as better than other countries. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note that Israeli Jews living in the peripheral regions of Israel are more patriotic than the inhabitants of the central part of the country (Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008).

Religious Israeli Jews identify themselves as 'very patriotic' (76 points out of 100 on the scale), while secular Jews feel less patriotic. The group of ultra-orthodox Jews is also interesting, as they do not fit into this group of very patriotic citizens. The age structure is relevant, as well: older Israelis are more patriotic than younger citizens. There is also a difference between men and women, although not a significant one: men on average rank 66 (out of 100) while women rank 64 (out of 100). Patriotism depends on the level of income: the richer feel more patriotic compared to their poorer compatriots (Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008).

What aspects of Israel are its citizens most proud of? For many years, national pride has been reserved for the technological and scientific achievements of Israel (more than four-fifths of Israelis cited this as a major reason for their patriotism). The armed forces follow in the second place, while cultural and ethical heritage of the country ranks third. Israel's economic achievements rank fourth. Among the institutions, the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) ranks lowest: less than one fifth of respondents thought that Israeli parliamentarians are a reason to feel patriotic. Only 10 percent of those who declared themselves as Jewish are proud of the Knesset; 90 percent of Israelis are not proud of this institution (Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008).

### ***Ethnic Minorities and Patriotism***

Israeli Arabs have a fundamentally different relationship towards the state they inhabit.<sup>14</sup> The main reason for this is the fact that Israeli

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<sup>14</sup> We refer to the Arabs who live on the territory of Israel and hold Israeli citizenship, and who enjoy the same *de jure* rights as the Jews of Israel. The Palestinians living in the West Bank or Gaza are a different group entirely.

authorities often consider Israel as a Jewish state, and such an exclusive identity is not welcomed by non-Jewish residents. Researchers have observed that it has been relatively difficult to persuade Israeli Arabs to take part in the survey. In order to poll them, specific questionnaires were prepared, asking about the three different forms of patriotism: Israeli, Palestinian and Arab. Unsurprisingly, Arab patriotism is the most important for them, while Israeli patriotism ranks the lowest (Ya'ar and Lipsky 2008, 46–49).

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who began settling in Israel en masse after the collapse of the communist state, present an interesting case. Although for the most part highly integrated into Israeli (Jewish) society, they have kept the Russian language as a part of their separate identity, together with their newly learned Hebrew. At least one-fifth of the population of Israel speaks fluent Russian, which in some regions has acquired the status of a quasi-official language. Preservation of the Russian language is particularly noticeable in print and electronic media. Many Israelis have reproached these 'Russian Jews' for persisting in their 'linguistic enclaves' and for deliberately isolating themselves from 'the real Israel'.<sup>15</sup>

Russian immigrants are also becoming an important political force. The influential right-wing political party, Yisrael Beiteinu, has its electoral base in the Russian-speaking population. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to say that immigrants from the former Soviet Union and their descendants are isolated since they feel a loyalty to the state of Israel and at the same time an affiliation with their own Russian language, art and literature. Language is the key to social integration and many immigrants from the former Soviet Union have never learned enough Hebrew. Thus, they are often unable to perform jobs on the level they previously held in their former homeland. Former professors have had to resort to lower-paid jobs (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 210–211; Reeves 2013).

Another group that should be discussed in this framework are the immigrants from Ethiopia who are supposedly the descendants of the lost Israeli tribe of Dan (Bardfield 1998). Upon arriving in Israel, many of them were deeply disappointed to find that their Jewish

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<sup>15</sup> When visiting certain cities, for example Ashdod and Beersheba (Be'er Sheva), foreigners are surprised to find the cities appear to resemble Russia more than Israel.

origins did not grant them equal status with the rest of the Israeli population.<sup>16</sup> Interestingly, the second generation of Ethiopian Jews, in contrast to immigrants from the former Soviet Union, have not tried to preserve their traditions (language, culture etc.). The main reason for this has been their relatively low command of their native language (the Amharic language in Israel is disappearing as the young Ethiopian Jews do not learn it at all). Their patriotism is not two-fold, but applies exclusively to Israel, as they are in this regard far less divided 'between two homelands' than those Jews who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 218; Mitchell 2012).

### *The Israeli armed forces and patriotism*

The Israeli armed forces are one of the central institutions for instilling patriotic feelings, so it is not unusual that Israeli armed forces are seen as the second most important source of patriotism among the Israelis, followed by the technological and scientific achievements of their country (Ya 'ar and Lipsky 2008, 35). Young soldiers know that greater prestige arises from a more rigorous military service. It is therefore not surprising that almost all the eminent Israeli politicians since 1948 have enjoyed a high-profile military career.<sup>17</sup>

In the first decades following Israel's independence, there was a particularly close association between the armed forces and the educational system; this kind of cooperation instilled patriotic feelings and ensured a capable defence force. In 1956, the head officer for education of the Israeli Armed Forces, Esther Kal, also supervised the publication of the text '*Father Joins the Reservists Again.*' The aim of this publication, which was distributed among pupils of the seventh grade, was to educate them about matters of national security, as well as to explain to pupils why their parents would have to respond to the call of their homeland (Shimony 2003, 314–315). Joining the armed forces remains an especially important route through which young immigrants may enter Israeli society – not only because of

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<sup>16</sup>The mass immigration of Jews from Ethiopia began in 1984 with The Moses Campaign. In the first seven weeks of this operation they managed to transport some 8000 Ethiopian Jews from Africa to Israel. The operation was carried out on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Rabbinate in 1975, according to which Ethiopian Jews, after three millennia of expulsion, should be allowed to return to Israel (Omer-Man 2010).

<sup>17</sup> For example, David Ben Gurion, Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Moshe Dayan. For more on the crossover between military rank and the political elites, see Peri (1983).

the reputation military service accords, but also because cadets are taught fluent Hebrew. Furthermore, the armed forces also provide an important method of forging life-long friendships (social network). Some also take advantage of military service in order to obtain a free driving licence (Harmelin in Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 210).

Since the armed forces have been an important means for Ethiopian Jews to climb the social ladder, it comes as no surprise that the interest in military service among them is 1.5 times higher than among other immigrant groups, although their suitability is relatively lower due to their poor education and lack of language skills (Zamir and Horowitz 2013, 218; Mitchell 2012).

Israel is a country with the highest number of people willing to take up arms to fight for their country. In 2006, 86 percent of Israeli respondents declared they were prepared to do so (if only Israeli Jews are taken into consideration, the percentage is as high as 94 percent). In comparison, only 16 percent of Japanese are willing to take up arms to defend their country, while in Germany the figure is still only 32 percent (Arad and Alon 2006, 10).

## CONCLUSIONS

Due to its historical circumstances and socio-political characteristics, Israel is a particularly clear example of a state, where patriotism was an important means of state-building. Patriotism has been one of the key adhesives for building a cohesive society. However, Israel is not an isolated example of a country where patriotism was deliberately grown, so it has to be understood in that context.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Jews throughout the world began to follow the Zionist idea of creating the state of Israel, some sacrifice was expected. This preparedness for sacrifice intensified after 1948, following the establishment of the state of Israel. This was due to the hostile environment in which it was established; not only the hostility of Arab resentment, but also a geographically hostile environment, for the Zionist pioneers often found themselves settling inhospitable desert lands. This often culminated in the concept of an armed nation ready for war, bound together by their love (patriotism) of their state. Israelis had to be willing to die for the country. Those who have become national heroes, like Josef Trumpeldor, David Ben Gurion and others, were particularly glori-

fied during the period of the state's birth. Later, when Israel had achieved strategic superiority in the region, the state-building strategies of these national heroes was criticised.

In this regard, some have argued even further, claiming that the trend of relativism, post-modernism and post-Zionism in Israeli academia as well as in public policy has eroded the basic ideas of Zionism and patriotism. At the same time, the opposite holds true: those who have not fulfilled their moral obligations to the state – for instance, avoiding military service – have been stigmatised. The result of these government policies, implemented primarily through educational institutions, has led to a greater social cohesion. In institutional terms, the armed forces have assumed the role of instilling patriotic emotions among the Jewish population.

The manipulative exploitation of patriotic feelings has often led to (aggressive) nationalism, which is primarily reflected in the uncompromising attitude towards the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and to a lesser extent against Arabs with Israeli citizenship. As such, Israeli patriotism, depicting Israel mostly as an exclusive Jewish state, contains a certain degree of destructiveness. However, if patriotism was a tool the Israeli authorities have used to build a cohesive society – often at the expense of non-Jewish population – they were successful in this regard. Namely, 90 percent of Israelis are still prepared to take up arms to defend their country. In order to persistently maintain such preparedness among the population, patriotism needs to be constantly constructed, reconstructed and nurtured.

As is the case in other modern countries, patriotism in Israel is often a politicised issue and as such is often misused. Therefore, some authors, for example, Lewin (2011) talk of the monopolisation of patriotism in Israel: a phenomenon where the boundaries of what is patriotic and what is not are drawn by those who claim to be ultra-patriots. These strategies are also pursued by political leaders who seek to dominate the discourse by defining 'us' and 'them'. Thus, patriotism – the love of one's country, a sentiment which is not a problem per se – has often been misappropriated. However, many things about patriotism have changed over time. Israeli society cannot be understood as a monolithic block, blindly oriented toward patriotism: not only academics but also ordinary citizens now recognise that the Palestinians have suffered injustices 'in the name of Israeli patriotism'.

For the future academic research and further democratization of Israel, it might be prudent to remember Shlomo Zand (2010, 37), who suggests that further historical research should be conducted, but in a pluralistic discourse, free from tensions and chronic anxieties about Israel's identity and national origin. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is no longer possible to deny the other peoples in the immediate vicinity of Israel or even within its borders which have often become the target of Israeli nationalism (in the guise of patriotism). The current Middle-eastern microcosm was not created by Israelis and Palestinians alone, but also by the other major powers with their own stakes in the conflict. Building patriotism in such a powder-keg environment creates fertile ground for uncritical nationalism which can quickly lead to xenophobia and racism.

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**European Communication Policy and Its Strategies  
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Model and Spreading of Security Culture in  
the Western Balkans**

*Olivera Injac*



# Attitudes of Slovenian Citizens Towards European Union 2004–2013

Miro Haček, Simona Kukovič<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

The Republic of Slovenia has - already at the time of promulgation of the independence - expressed the willingness and aim to become a full member of the European Union (EU). The official negotiations for the entry launched in March 1998 and in May 2004 Slovenia became a full member of the EU. Since then, Slovenia is represented in all EU institutions and it is involved in the decision making process within those institutions. EU law became part of the national legislation especially in areas where Slovenia transferred its sovereign rights to the EU. In the paper the authors put an emphasis on the attitudes of the Slovenian citizens towards the European Union and its institutions from the accession in 2004 until today; authors conclude that citizens' positive attitudes towards the integration have dropped significantly since the accession in 2004, and drops are especially visible in the last few years when Slovenian and also Union are facing not only economic, but also political crisis.

**KEY WORDS:** EU, Slovenia, membership, satisfaction, trust, citizens.

## POVZETEK

Republika Slovenija je že v času razglasitve državne neodvisnosti izražala pripravljenost in zavezo postati polnopravna članica Evropske unije (EU). Uradno so se pogajanja za vstop v EU pričela marca leta 1998, v maju leta 2004 pa je Slovenija postala polnopravna članica integracije. Od trenutka vstopa v integracijo je Slovenija aktivno

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vključena v proces sprejemanja odločitev v vseh institucijah Unije. Zakonodaja EU je postala del nacionalne zakonodaje, še zlasti na področjih, na katerih je Slovenija del suverenosti prenesla na EU. V prispevku avtorja analizirata odnos slovenskih državljanov tako do EU kot celote kot tudi do njenih institucij vse od vstopa v integracijo v letu 2004 do danes. Avtorja ugotavljata, da pozitiven odnos do EU vse od leta 2004 upada, kar je še posebej vidno v zadnjih nekaj letih, ko se tako Slovenija kot tudi EU soočata ne le z ekonomsko, pač pa tudi s politično krizo.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** EU, Slovenija, članstvo, zadovoljstvo, zaupanje, državljanji.

## **1. INTRODUCTION: THE ACCESSION PROCESS AND SLOVENIA'S ADMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION**

From the time of declaring independence, the Republic of Slovenia had expressed a willingness to become a full member of the European Union (EU), identifying this as an objective both in strategic development documents and at the highest levels of political engagement. As the relevant development documents<sup>2</sup> indicate, the optimal long-term development of Slovenia's economy is seen to be inextricably linked to the country's accession to full EU membership, and soon after the country's liberation, this became a key objective. Diplomatic relations between Slovenia and the EU were first established in April 1992, as Slovenia proposed finalisation of the Europe Agreement and asked for support with the restructuring and consolidation of its economy. In April of the following year, a co-operation treaty was signed, and later that year, the Slovenian Government requested commencement of negotiations on conclusion of the Europe Agreement. In June 1996, a treaty was enacted in respect of Slovenia's integration into the European Community. The signatories were Slovenia, all EU Member States, and the European Communities. Along with some other former socialist states, Slovenia then commenced negotiations on full EU membership. This European treaty<sup>3</sup> enabled

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, Slovenia's Economic Development Strategy, The Strategy of International Economic Relations of Slovenia, and the Strategy for Improving the Competitiveness of the Slovenian Industry.

<sup>3</sup> The EU is based on the rule of law. This means that every action taken by the EU is founded on treaties that have been approved voluntarily and democratically by all EU member countries. For example, if a policy area is not cited in a treaty, the Commission cannot propose a law in that area. A treaty is a binding agreement between EU member countries. It sets out EU objectives, rules for

political dialogue and closer commercial co-operation, and it established the grounds for technical and financial support from the EU as well as supporting Slovenian integration into the EU (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2005, p. 55). All political parties excepting one (the Slovenian National Party) supported integration and signed a joint treaty on co-operation for this purpose. The National Assembly passed a decree on the priority of discussing European legislation, thereby accelerating adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire*, and membership of the European Union became a national commitment (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2005, p. 56). In November 1996, Slovenia and the EU signed a provisional agreement on trade, which came into force in January 1997, enabling activation of the trade section of the Association Agreement defining the free trade area between Slovenia and the-then EU15. In May 1997, Slovenia adopted the fundamental points of initiation of its strategy on EU accession, confirming a desire to attain full membership of the EU, and in June that year the European Commission presented its views on candidate states (the so-called Agenda 2000). Because this opinion was favourable towards Slovenia, the country was allotted to the primary group of states entering negotiations, and talks officially opened on March 31, 1998. During several years of negotiations, an accord was arrived at detailing the conditions of Slovenia's accession. Slovenian legislation was harmonised with European provisions, and certain exceptions, together with transitional periods, were set down (Government Portal Life in the EU, 2012). Accession negotiations between Slovenia and the EU were completed in 2002, the Treaty of Accession of Slovenia to the EU was signed in April 2003 and, on May 1, 2004, Slovenia became part of the European family of nations. In consequence, the EU *Acquis Communautaire* became part of Slovenian legislation, and European affairs became internal affairs for Slovenia and its people.

It is crucial for Slovenia to represent its interests in a clear and efficient manner at the supranational level, and to do so uniformly and

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EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship between the EU and its member countries. Treaties are amended to make the EU more efficient and transparent, to prepare for new member countries and to introduce new areas of cooperation such as the single currency. Under the treaties, EU institutions can adopt legislation, which the member countries then implement. The main treaties are: Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1952); Treaties of Rome, European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community treaties (1958); Single European Act (1986); Treaty on European Union—Maastricht Treaty (1993); Treaty of Amsterdam (1999); Treaty of Nice (2003); and Treaty of Lisbon (2009) (for more information, see Europa.eu, 2012a).

in a coordinated fashion. So it is that Slovenia is represented at all of the Union's institutions<sup>4</sup> and takes part in all decision-making. The EU's legal order became part of Slovenian legislation, especially in respect of those matters within the scope of EU competences. In areas belonging to the exclusive competence of the EU, Slovenia has ceded part of its sovereign rights to the Union. Since decisions made at the supranational level are of great significance and exert a strong influence on every Slovenian citizen's daily life, the coordination of Slovenian representatives at EU level, and the formulation and coordination of Slovenian perspectives on European issues is of crucial importance. Today, Slovenia can participate in Community programmes designed primarily for social and economic progress and mutual integration. Slovenia now contributes part of its gross national product (GNP) to the joint EU budget and is granted financial support inter alia for agricultural and countryside development and for sustainable growth and more coordinated regional socio-economic development within the framework of the European Cohesion Policy. As a Member State of the EU, Slovenia has also participated in negotiations on financial policy, and Slovenian citizens have access to labour markets in other Member States, as well as to education and unrestricted travel throughout Europe and access to European funds (Government Portal Life in the EU, 2012).

### ***1.1 Key events influencing attitudes of Slovenians towards the EU***

In order to properly evaluate attitudes of Slovenians towards the EU and its institutions, it is vital to analyse key events that had a major influence on those attitudes.

#### ***Council Presidency***

In the first half of 2008, Slovenia took over the very important and responsible task of the Council Presidency—leading the community of 27 Member States and almost half a billion people. As this was the

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<sup>4</sup> The four most important institutions of the EU are the European Council, comprising heads of EU Member States and the EU itself, which determines general political guidelines for the EU; the European Parliament, composed of directly elected representatives, which represents the European people; the *European Commission*, whose members are appointed by the Member States' governments, which takes care of the interests of the EU as a whole; and the *Council of the European Union*, bringing together representatives of Member States' governments and defending individual countries' interests. Additionally, there is a whole range of other institutions, e.g. the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Auditors, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank, among others (for more information, see Europa.eu, 2012b).

first Presidency of a Member State from the 2004 enlargement, and the first ever Council Presidency of a Slavic state, Slovenians viewed this as an exceptional historical moment. It was a great acknowledgement of Slovenia's past work as well as a great responsibility, as Slovenia had to meet the high expectations of Member States, which had unanimously entrusted Slovenia with this task. The Council Presidency turned out to be one of the most demanding and complex tasks since achieving independence, and a challenge in both organisational and logistical senses. This was not just another project in the area of European affairs, involving as it did the entire country. A total of 2,775 civil servants worked on Slovenia's Council Presidency: 1,151 on tasks related to substantive content, and 1,624 on coordinating, organisational and logistical tasks. A majority (2,610) worked in Ljubljana, with 165 based at Slovenia's Permanent Representation at the EU in Brussels. The project also involved the cooperation of 133 external experts and 245 students. Of the 315 additional temporary employees approved by the Government during the Presidency, 289 of these later became full time. In addition to management and coordinating structures, the project required the close cooperation of all Ministries and Government Offices, as well as other state bodies, in preparing, convening and chairing Council meetings at all levels, ranging from working groups to individual sub-groups. There was also a lot of informal work in the form of lobbying, negotiations and informal meetings, with individual Member States, groups of states and European institutions. The formal events of the Presidency took place at meetings in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg, funded and logistically organised almost entirely by the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. Concurrently, Slovenia organised informal meetings of various configurations of the Council, conferences of ministers, and many other domestic events, as is standard practice. The organisation and funding of these latter events was the responsibility of Slovenia alone. The Presidency paid special attention to representation of the Council in its interactions with other EU institutions, with special emphasis on cooperation with the European Commission and the European Parliament; representation of the Council before the European Parliament, and close cooperation with the latter as the co-legislator in EU legislative procedures, is an important task of any member state holding the Presidency. The Slovenian Presidency also represented the EU in its ongoing relations with third countries and international organisations. At the end of

Slovenia's Council Presidency, it was considered that its six-month programme had been adequately prepared, as ambitious goals were achieved and the priorities of Slovenia's Council Presidency, both core and departmental, were successfully met (Report on Slovenia's Council Presidency, 2008).<sup>5</sup>

### ***Entry into the Schengen Area***

Slovenia became a Member State of the Schengen Area on December 22, 2007, when it ceased to implement control over internal land and maritime borders with EU Member States. On March 30, 2008, airspace border control was also abolished. On admission to the EU, Slovenia, like other new Member States, assumed responsibility for setting up a suitable new regime on the EU's external borders. In accordance with the European legal framework, this entailed the introduction of a new arrangement on the borders between the EU Member States and non-members (so-called third countries). Slovenia therefore established security, customs and inspection controls on its stretch of the EU's external border with the Republic of Croatia, providing for its implementation according to EU standards. Since entry to the EU on May 1, 2004, Slovenia had commenced partial implementation of the Schengen provisions in the areas of visa policy and prevention of illegal immigration. As citizens of the EU, citizens of the Republic of Slovenia had already enjoyed unrestricted travel to all EU Member States. Austrian, Italian and Hungarian border control authorities had only been checking the validity of those documents necessary for border crossing (i.e. basic control), and at airports in the EU Member States, Slovenians could pass through those sections of border crossings reserved for citizens of the EU (where only document validity is checked) without having to meet those conditions in force for citizens of third countries.

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<sup>5</sup> The Presidency organised 166 official events in Slovenia. Of these, 26 events were organised at ministerial or higher level: EU and United States of America Summit, 13 informal meetings of ministers, meeting of the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament, and meeting of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the European Commission, plus 10 troikas with third countries. 142 events took place at sub-ministerial level. During Slovenia's presidency, 173 preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU were operating, meeting at 2,089 sessions. Apart from Council's preparatory and formal meetings, Council of the EU's premises also hosted a range of meetings with third countries at all levels. In the Presidency rooms and the Slovenian delegation's room, more than 1,100 preparatory, bilateral and multilateral sessions, meetings with representatives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, European Commission, European Parliament and other EU institutions were held. Over 3,300 meetings were housed in the premises of the Council of the EU in Brussels and Luxembourg (Report on Slovenia's Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2008).

Evaluation of Slovenia's readiness for joining the Schengen Area—the assessment of land, maritime and airspace borders, police cooperation, data protection and visa policy—began in early 2006. The process of evaluating the establishment and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) was performed in 2007, and Slovenia commenced use of the SIS for everyone as of September 1, 2007. On November 8, 2007, the Council of the EU adopted a political decision that all nine candidate states for Schengen enlargement (including Slovenia) were ready for the abolition of controls on their internal EU borders, as regards both the physical protection of borders and the use of SIS. This decision was confirmed by the European Parliament at its Strasbourg plenary session in November that year. The enlargement of the Schengen Area from 15 to 24 states was finally confirmed at the meeting of EU interior ministers on December 6, 2007. By entering the Schengen Area, Slovenia abolished controls on its borders with Austria, Italy and Hungary, while intensifying control on the border with Croatia as it became a Schengen external border. This means is that Slovenia acts on behalf of the Member States of the Schengen Area in exercising controls on the external border with Croatia. In addition to the Schengen controls, external borders are subject to phytosanitary, customs and inspection control at specifically defined checkpoints. There are six such points in Slovenia, three on the land border (international border crossings at Gruškovje, Obrežje and Jelšane), one on a railway border crossing (Dobova), one at Jože Pučnik Airport in Ljubljana and one at the port of Koper (Government Portal *Life in the EU*, 2012).

### ***Adoption of the Common Currency***

Slovenia introduced the Euro on January 1, 2007 and was the first new Member State to join the Eurozone. The transition from Slovenian Tolar was swift and smooth, causing no major problems. Because the population had been informed well in advance about the new currency, people had a very positive attitude towards its introduction and anticipated mostly positive effects. The end of June 2007 saw the end of compulsory dual display of prices, although some traders decided to extend it (Government Portal *Life in the EU*, 2012).

## 2. SATISFACTION OF SLOVENIANS WITH EU MEMBERSHIP AND LIFE IN THE EU

The overview of statistical data on attitudes of Slovenian citizens towards membership and life in the EU extends back to 2004, detailing support for EU membership. Among the ten acceding countries in Spring 2004, the highest support for EU membership was recorded in Lithuania (52% of survey respondents saying it was good for their country to become a member of the EU), followed by Malta (50%). Slovenia, at 40%, was at the lower end, higher only than Latvia (33%) and Estonia (31%). However, the citizens of Slovenia, Hungary and Lithuania most often expressed expectations of certain benefits as a result of their country's membership: in Slovenia, 64% expected benefits while in Lithuania and Hungary the percentage was 58%, respectively). In the period 2003–2004 (measured from Spring 2003 to Spring 2004), the trend of support for EU membership in Slovenia reflected the average for new Member States at the time of the referendum on Slovenia's accession (Spring 2003), when support reached its peak (57%), followed by a trend of decreasing support to 40%—a drop of 17%. In the period 1999–2002, support in Slovenia was continuously below the average for new Member States (by between 5% and 11%). However, the percentage of inhabitants of Slovenia who maintained that EU membership would be detrimental to Slovenia was consistently lower as well, ranging from 7% to 17% (Eurobarometer 62, 2004, p. 18).

For the people of Slovenia, their worst fears related to increased difficulties for the country's farmers (67% of responses), which was a topic frequently promoted by opponents of Slovenia's accession to the EU, and the migration of jobs to countries with lower production costs (63%). The latter probably reflected previous similar experiences in the Slovenian economy—such as the case of Tobačna Ljubljana, which moved its production activities abroad to reduce production costs—and the fact that Slovenia has the highest labour costs of all new EU Member States, making other locations more attractive to foreign corporations. This was followed by fears of increased illegal drug trafficking and international organised crime (58%), based on Slovenia's strategic geographical position connecting Western Europe to the former Yugoslavia and south-eastern Europe. Concerns that Slovenia might become a net contributor to the European budget

(57%) were also frequently advanced by opponents of Slovenian entry to the EU. Even supporters of Slovenia's membership listed these same four problems. On the other hand, fears about declining use of the Slovenian language and the loss of Slovenian national identity and culture were relatively rare (Eurobarometer 62, 2004).

Subsequently, in the autumn of 2004, 52% of survey respondents said EU membership of Slovenia was a good thing, while only 5% thought it was bad. Only Slovakia, Luxembourg and Ireland had a higher percentage of favourable responses. At this time, most Slovenians were convinced that Slovenia had benefited from becoming part of the EU (58%), whereas 28% thought that it had gained nothing, which was slightly better than the average for the EU25 as it then was. Those who said that Slovenia had not benefited from EU membership were primarily the unemployed (40%), or those with primary-only education (32%), born in European states outside the EU (33%), the self-employed (39%) and those who were dissatisfied with levels of democracy in the EU (41%). The opinion that Slovenia had gained from membership was endorsed by a majority of survey respondents who were male (64%), students or highly educated (65%), to the right on the political spectrum (65%), managers (67%), civil servants (68%) or satisfied with democracy (68%) (Eurobarometer 62, 2004).

Data published in the spring of 2005 presented a somewhat altered picture of these attitudes. This time, EU membership of Slovenia was deemed a good thing by 49% of respondents while 9% said it was bad. By comparison with the preceding Eurobarometer survey, one can see a slight decrease in satisfaction and an increase in dissatisfaction. It could be argued that, after a year of membership, "Euro-optimism" had declined a bit as the initial enthusiasm dissipated. However, this decline might equally be attributed to high-profile pre-referendum campaigns against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in some EU Member States, which may have prompted a general increase of Euro-scepticism and Euro-criticism. There were still no signs of any dramatic change, though, as surveys conducted around the first anniversary of EU membership showed that it had brought about few if any major shifts in the life of the average citizen, which would only become tangible with the adoption of the Euro and the introduction of Schengen control of external borders. In other new Member States at that time, many people simply had no idea whether

their country's membership was to be considered good or bad. At the time, the most satisfied respondents were to be found in the Benelux countries and in Ireland (Eurobarometer 63.4, 2005, p. 17).

Table 1: Trust of Slovenians towards the EU and key EU institutions (%)

	European Union	European Parliament	European Commission
2004	60	66	64
2005	55	66	64
2006	70	73	73
2007	65	63	61
2008	60	62	61
2009	50	46	46
2010	48	49	51
2011	38	43	40
2012	39	48	47
2013	34	38	40

Source: Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2013 (Nos. 62, 63.4, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79), available at [www.ec.europa.eu](http://www.ec.europa.eu). Numbers represent percentages of respondents who expressed trust towards the European Union as a whole or towards specific listed institutions.

As of the Fall of 2010, data show that 48% of Slovenian respondents trusted the EU, while 46% did not. Across the EU at the time, 43% of respondents said they trusted the Union and 45% said they did not. By comparison with the previous survey, trust in the EU had increased slightly (by 1% in both Slovenia and the EU as a whole) while the level of distrust had decreased (by 2% in both Slovenia and the EU as a whole). It is also interesting to note that for more than half of Slovenian respondents, the EU meant freedom of travel, studies and employment (54%), and the new Euro currency (53%). More than a quarter of respondents associated the EU with wasting money (29%), bureaucracy and crime (both 26%), while 25% of Slovenians associated the EU with peace. As in earlier opinion polls, Slovenians demonstrated good knowledge of EU institutions: a majority responded they had heard of the European Parliament (96%), followed by the European Commission and the European Central Bank (both 92%), with the Council of the EU in last place (87%). The degree of trust in institutions increased with respect to the preceding survey and was somewhat higher for all the institutions than the average across all Member States. In 2010, more than half of Slovenian respondents said they trusted the European Commission (51%) while slightly fewer expressed trust in the remaining institutions, all three of which enjoyed 49% support (Eurobarometer 74, 2011, pp. 3–4).

Data published in Autumn 2011 show that 38% of Slovenian respondents trusted the EU, while 56% did not. At the same time, 43% trusted the European Parliament while 49% did not, and slightly fewer (40%) trusted the European Commission while 45% did not. Some 48% of Slovenians were satisfied with how democracy works in the EU while 46% were not satisfied. More than half (57%) of Slovenians understood how the EU works; higher than the EU27 average (42%). The great majority of Slovenia respondents (99%) said they had heard of the European Parliament, followed by the European Central Bank (93%) and the European Commission (88%). For more than half of Slovenians, the EU still represented freedom to travel, study and work (57%), and the Euro (56%). More than a third of respondents associated the EU with wasting money (36%), with lower figures for bureaucracy (33%), unemployment and crime (29%) and peace (28%) (Eurobarometer 76, 2011).

Table 2: Familiarity among Slovenians with key EU institutions (%)

	Council of the European Union	European Parliament	European Commission	European Central Bank	Court of Justice of the EU
2004	74	95	90	74	83
2005	79	95	92	76	77
2006	81	97	91	77	82
2007	86	96	91	88	84
2008	88	94	90	91	na
2009	88	96	91	91	na
2010	87	96	92	92	na
2011	83	99	88	93	na
2012	87	98	92	95	95
2013	88	98	94	95	95

Source: Eurobarometer survey from 2004 to 2013 (Nos. 62, 63.4, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79), available at [www.ec.europa.eu](http://www.ec.europa.eu). Respondents were asked "Have you heard of...?" Numbers represent percentages of respondents, who answered positively to the above question.

Data published in Autumn 2012 indicate that 60% of Slovenians included in the survey understood how the EU works, an increase of 3% from the previous survey. In the 2012 survey, we can see that 98% of Slovenian respondents had heard of the European Parliament; followed by the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice of the European Union (95%), the European Commission (92%) and the Council of the European Union (87%). Slightly more than half (51%) of Slovenian respondents were satisfied with how democracy works in the EU while 44% were not (2% fewer than in Autumn 2011). 51% said that for them personally the EU meant freedom to

travel, study and work, while 43% associated the EU with the Euro, 28% with waste of money, and peace (28%), bureaucracy (27%) and unemployment (23%). The data about trust in the EU and in European institutions are also very interesting, with expressions of distrust in the EU at 57%. Compared with data from autumn 2011, trust in the European Parliament and in the European Commission increased slightly (for the European Parliament an increase of 5%, to 48 %), as did trust in the European Commission (up 7% to 47%). Some 57% of Slovenian respondents trusted the Court of Justice of the European Union, followed by the Council of the European Union and the European Central Bank, both at 43 % (Eurobarometer 78, 2012).

And how satisfied are Slovenian citizens nowadays? The latest data, published in Spring 2013, showed that 63% of Slovenian respondents distrust the EU, which is 6% more than in Autumn 2012. Furthermore, 28% of survey participants said that in general the EU conjures up a fairly negative or very negative image for them, while 66% of Slovenian respondents did not agree with the statement that “EU makes the quality of life better in Europe” (the EU27 average was 49%). As to how satisfied Slovenian respondents were with how democracy works in the EU, for most part they were not. Data show that more than half of the survey participants (51%) said that they are not satisfied in this regard<sup>6</sup>, compared with the EU27 average of 46%. Moreover, 65% of survey participants disagreed with the statement “My voice counts in the EU”. On the other hand, 53% of Slovenian respondents disagreed with the statement “Slovenia could better face the future outside the EU”. This is consistent with data indicating that 48% see themselves in the near future as both Slovenians and Europeans (Eurobarometer 79, 2013).

Looking at some other data, published in spring 2013, we can see that 98 % of survey participants from Slovenia had heard of the European Parliament; followed by the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice of the European Union (both 95%), the European Commission (94%) and the Council of the European Union (88%). Some 61% claimed to understand how EU works.<sup>7</sup> In this survey, more than half

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<sup>6</sup> For comparison, in the survey conducted in Autumn 2012, 44% were not satisfied, and in the survey conducted in Autumn 2011, 46% were not satisfied.

<sup>7</sup> This is 3% more than in the survey conducted in Autumn 2011 and 1% more than in the survey from Autumn 2012.

of Slovenian respondents expressed distrust not only in the EU, but also in European institutions in general: 58% distrusted the European Central Bank, 56% distrusted the European Parliament, 53% distrusted the Council of the European Union and 52% distrusted European Commission. The only exception is the Court of Justice of the European Union, with only 41% distrusting this institution while 54% expressed trust (Eurobarometer 79, 2013).

As to the question of what the EU means to them personally, Slovenian participants highlighted freedom to travel, study and work (50%), the Euro (40%), bureaucracy (33%), waste of money (28%) and unemployment (28%), peace (26%), more crime (24%), cultural diversity (19%), and a stronger say in the world (18%). Only 13% of participants connected the EU with democracy, 13% with loss of national identity, 12% with economic prosperity, 11% with not enough control at external borders, and only 8% with social protection (Eurobarometer 79, 2013).

### **3. CONCLUSION**

After successful official negotiations for the entry in the EU on May 1, 2004, Slovenia became a full member of the European family. Since then, Slovenia has been represented in all EU institutions and is involved in the decision-making process within those institutions. EU law became part of domestic legislation, especially in those areas where Slovenia transferred its sovereign rights to the EU.

As has been noted here, Slovenia has hosted some very important events in the last decade since becoming a full member of the European Union—not only for Slovenia, but for the whole EU. First, in the first half of 2008, Slovenia was the first former socialist member state to take over the very responsible task of the Council Presidency. Second, on January 1, 2007, Slovenia (again as the first new member state from the 2004 accession) joined the Eurozone and introduced the common European currency, the Euro. Finally, on December 22, 2007, Slovenia became a member state of the Schengen Area and ceased border controls on international land and maritime borders within the EU.

The main objective of this paper was to analyse the first decade of Slovenian EU membership specifically in terms of citizens' attitudes.

We compared the results of public opinion surveys on satisfaction with the EU from the time of accession to the present. Support for EU membership reached its peak at 57% in Spring 2003—at the time of the successful referendum on Slovenia's accession to the EU—but after that period, support started to slowly decrease. Going back to Autumn 2004, one finds that 52% of survey respondents said EU membership of Slovenia was a good thing, and only 5% thought it was a bad thing. The latest data, published in Spring 2013, present a very different picture, as 63% of Slovenian respondents expressed distrust towards the EU. Of further concern is the finding that more than half of Slovenian citizens (51%) said they were not satisfied with how democracy works in the EU. As we can see, the satisfaction of Slovenian citizens with the EU is slowly decreasing, and the same observation can be made about trust towards the EU and its major institutions. Any definitive explanation of these declining levels of satisfaction and trust remains elusive, although we can probably find at least partial answers in recent events, most especially in the global economic crisis and its political and economic impacts, which hit Slovenia especially hard as a state of permanent political and economic crisis extends into a sixth straight year. There seems little doubt that the generally negative view towards the political sphere among Slovenia's citizens over the last few years must be taken into account. In general, we must conclude that Slovenian citizens are increasingly less satisfied with the EU and with the democratic processes in the EU, and certainly they do not express any degree of trust in the key EU institutions.

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# The Visa Liberalisation and the Republic of Macedonia: Two Sides of the Coin

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## ABSTRACT

The Schengen ‘wall’ that had kept the Western Balkans and the Republic of Macedonia casted out from the EU mainland was removed in 2009. Symbolically it coincided with St. Nicholas Day i.e. the celebration of the patron of children and travellers. The paper examines the effects of the visa liberalisation and the effects that may follow in case the newly adopted suspension mechanism is fully implemented. The basic assumption is that visa liberalization served as a ‘carrot’ to move forwards the EU integration process while the suspension mechanism is more of a disciplinary measure (the ‘stick’) but also an indication of a securitized migration policy. The paper underlines how visa liberalization has affected the governments’ treatment of the ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (mostly citizens of Roma and Albanian origin). The research question concerns the trade-off that national governments have made in order to preserve the visa liberalization and the impact in terms of human rights and discriminatory policies.

**KEY WORDS:** EU, free movement, visa liberalization, Macedonia, asylum seekers, human rights

## POVZETEK

Schengenski ‘zid’, ki je Zahodni Balkan in Republiko Makedonijo ohranjal zunaj ozemlja EU, je padel leta 2009. Simbolično se je to zgodila na dan sv. Nikolaja, zavetnika otrok in popotnikov. Članek proučuje učinek vizne liberalizacije in učinke, ki bi lahko sledili ob popolni uvedbi na novo sprejetega mehanizma za suspenz vizumske liberalizacije. Temeljna predpostavka se glasi, da služi vizumska liberalizacija

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kot 'korenček' za napredovanje procesa širitve integracijskega procesa EU, medtem ko je mehanizem za suspenz vizumske liberalizacije bolj disciplinski ukrep ('palica'), a hkrati tudi pokazatelj varne migracijske politike. Članek poudarja, kako je vizna liberalizacija vplivala na vladno obravnavno 'nepravih' prosilcev za azil (predvsem državljanov romskega in albanskega porekla). Raziskovalno vprašanje se ukvarja tudi z vprašanjem kompromisa, ki so ga nacionalne vlade sprejele, da bi ohranile vizno liberalizacijo in njegovim vplivom v smislu človekovih pravic in diskriminatorskih politik.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** EU, prost pretok, vizna liberalizacija, Makedonija, prosilci za azil, človekove pravice

## INTRODUCTION REMARKS

The human right to free movement and right to travel have been celebrated as a great achievement of any democratic society and the globalised world. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that 'everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country' (Article 13). Liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person and part of the 'liberty of man' (Jagerskiold 1981, 166). Freedom of movement is guaranteed by national constitutions and to some degree by a range of international legal instruments. It is believed that the scope of humans' mobility is a precedent to be found never in history of mankind. It was stated (*The Economist* 2010) that the citizens of rich countries have more freedom to travel than those of countries suffering from repression or war. While the former literally *enjoy* the right to movement (i.e. to travel for leisure or other reasons), the others *do so involuntarily* at high costs and life risk. Some argue that despite its wide recognition, in practice right to movement is still a rather 'inconvenient' human right (Juss 2004; Dauvergne 2004). However, there is also a view that migration has always been "the story of the human race":

Migration is an integral aspect of life on this planet. People move to survive. They move in search of food. They move away from danger and death. They move towards opportunities for life. Migration is tied to the human spirit, which seeks adventure, pursues dreams, and finds reasons to hope even in the most adverse circumstances. Such movement affects

the communities migrants leave and the communities that receive these migrants. This movement also impacts communities along the route of transit. (Parker 2007)

But the global economic crisis has turned the view on humans' great mobility from over-enthusiasm to fear-mongering, especially when it comes to 'uncontrolled' population flows (Isotalo 2009, 60-84). Paradoxically, the champions of freedom make this right subject to ever more restrictions. The most illustrative example is the US-Mexico border i.e. a series of physical barriers built in order to prevent illegal migration. The endeavour consists of operations with symbolic names - "Gatekeeper", "Hold-the-Line" and "Safeguard".

In practice the freedom of movement, including the right to travel, collides with the premise that a democratic polity has right and duty to control its borders to foreigners and to eventually close them when the authorities find it necessary. Yet the international law imposes certain obligations to states to open the borders and give protection to the vulnerable groups, especially refugees. This situation is explained as a fundamental tension between liberalism and democracy: while liberalism may require open borders, democracy requires a bounded polity whose members exercise self-determination, including control of their own boundaries (Abizadeh 2008, 37). Thus, the extended (cosmopolitised) human rights are viewed as constraints upon, and in tension with, the right of a democratic people to unilaterally control its own boundaries. Kymlicka (2001, 249) argues that state borders are 'a source of embarrassment for liberals of all stripes, at least if these boundaries prevent individuals from moving freely, and living, working and voting in whatever part of the globe they see fit'. Others describe borders as consequential condensation points where wider changes in state-making and the nature of citizenship are worked out on the ground (Sparke 2006, 152).

## **AMBIVALENT HOSPITALITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Free movement is at the heart of the European project. Its uniqueness lies precisely in the fact that the European Union (EU) has managed to tear down state borders among its member-states so that half a billion people enjoy full freedom of movement across a vast part of the continent. The EU has gone a long way in providing unprecedented freedom for the nationals of its member-states since its early

days when such an achievement had seemed more of anticipation than a realistic policy goal. The 1957 Treaty of Rome had cautiously set in this vision by mentioning 'abolition ... of obstacles for freedom of movement', although for merely economic reasons. Gradually the economic rationale of the freedom of movement had been overarched. The easier part was securing freedom *within* the borders of the emerging polity. The migration *into* the EU proved to be far more challenging. At first, 'guest workers' were welcome. The host countries were ready to turn their blind eye even towards the illegal immigrants; they have always been a very profitable asset for the businesses. Eventually as the conditions of the labour market changed so did the treatment of the 'guests'. According to Pazarkaya (2011) the changes in Germany went through various stages: years of acceptance (1961-1973), years of legal suspension of worker immigration (1973-1981); years of stability and commitment to integration (1981-1990), years of exclusion that followed the unification (1990-2000); and years of a renewed integration debates (2001-2011).

A set of European regulations has been enacted in order to protect *internal freedoms* from the external pressures. The Council Regulation 1612/68 differentiated between right of free movement of Member-states' nationals and those of third countries. When the Single European Act emphasized freedom of flow of capital, people and services, the immediate reaction was tightening of the movement of the 'Others'. The nucleus of the European immigration policy lies in the Maastricht Treaty: immigration became an area of 'common interest'. The Amsterdam Treaty provided for establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice; consequently visas, asylum, immigration and policies related to free movement of persons became part of the shared competences. The Council Regulation 539/2001 introduced 'black' and 'white' list of countries differentiating between nationals that had to be in possession of a visa and those who did not need one. A European Commission's proposal (October 2007) for a Council directive set the following objective: improvement of 'the EU's ability to attract and - where necessary - retain third country highly qualified workers so as to increase the contribution of legal immigration to enhancing the competitiveness of the EU economy by complementing the set of other measures the EU is putting in place to achieve the goals of the Lisbon Strategy'. The 'Blue Card' directive (2009/50/EC) was enacted two years later. The Lisbon Treaty abandoned the pillar structure but further steps towards a genuine European immigration policy are still to be made.

Some argue that there is no consistent migrant policy not only on the European but also on a national level. Van Houtum and Pijpers (2007, 292) argue that the member-states differentiate between *economically valuable and market-redundant immigrants*. The 'danger' comes from the bogeymen i.e. immigrants who are surplus (life) from the labour market point of view. They appear as undeserving rivals for the social welfare benefits and are allegedly difficult to integrate due to their cultural and other differences (van der Waal et al, 2010). Advocates of the tighter yet flexible migration regime find confirmation of their success in the lesser number of granted asylum status. The efficiency of such policy depends on the dichotomy between good and bad migrants which is made on the basis of a so-called profiling - a procedure that distinguishes people on the ground of race, age, social status, language proficiency, etc. Profiling helps making generalizations about a person and whether s/he may be classified in either group of migrants.

Finally the EU set itself up as 'gated community' in which the biopolitical control and management of immigration is, to a large extent, a product of fear (Van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). The role of gatekeepers has gradually been transferred to the countries in the European periphery that have membership aspirations (Vachudová 2000; Jileva 2003). Through its neighbourhood and enlargement policies the EU has stepped-up the territorial sovereign power of non-EU states, turning them into proxies of the EU border control through capacity-building in activities such as monitoring, intercepting or detaining immigrants so that these do not arrive to EU mainland (Balzacq 2009). Protection of the borders but also of the welfare provisions and cultural security has become a cornerstone of the complex migration system. This development could be interpreted as deepening of supranational elements of the EU but also as distinguishing between 'Us' and 'Them' in the international arena. Where 'Us' ends 'They' begin; 'They' are allowed to join or visit 'Us' only under our conditions. This could be a plausible interpretation if one sees the EU as a united entity or even as 'Fortress Europe' that protects its values and citizens in an unselective manner. Behind the façade there are still many invisible borders that differentiate between 'old' and 'new' Europe, rich and poor, white and coloured, Christians and Muslims, and even between the citizens and elites.<sup>2</sup> The disturbing pictures of

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<sup>2</sup> The Schengen Agreement includes provisions that permit re-installment of border controls in case a country feels domestic security is threatened. France applied this rule during the 2009 NATO

ill-treatment and expulsions of Roma in France, Italy or Hungary are hard to ignore (Cahn and Guild 2009; Benton and Petrovic 2013).

The EU external border protection is frequently questioned. The Danish decision to reinstate internal border controls (Schult 2011) is in line with the (former) president Sarkozy's proposal to 'reconsider' EU passport-free travel (Rettman 2011). The dominant public perception of immigrants is negative: they are seen as criminals or 'fortune-seekers' and as such they represent threat for welfare system and public order, and even for the national/European identity (societal security concern). Freeman speaks of welfare chauvinism towards outsiders, some of whom live in the EU for two-three generations (Freeman 2009). Solidarity principle becomes selective: people support the principle of a welfare state but they are unwilling to share the benefits with immigrants (Koning 2011, 2).

In spite of all liberal and cosmopolitan cries, no democratic state - and for the same reason the EU as a polity - is able to provide unrestricted freedom of movement. The EU's 'self-enlightened' interest is well-established with regard to the external actions *in situ* (i.e. in failed/failing states). Resolving problems where they originate seem to be the best migration policy measure. Yet the critics point out double-standards and unfair trade rules that EU applies to faraway countries, which not only allow their exploitation but increase impoverishment (arms trade being an adequate example). As long as the migration policy is based on political methods and if simultaneously it treats asylum from the human rights perspective - there is no reason for concern. But migration has been moved out from the political realm and has been securitized (Wæver 2008; Huysmans 2000). It is increasingly associated with the internal security policy, especially the one related to fight against terrorism, organized crime, etc. The security structures and instruments at play are not means of 'normal politics'. Since the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia till recent turmoil in North Africa and Middle East the influx of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers has been continuously affecting the migration policy. In some instances, such as Lampedusa, the price was paid with human lives.

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summit along the German border to prevent violent demonstrators from accessing the event. The same measure was taken by the Portuguese government that raised alert state to maximum level and deployed 7000 security personnel on the eve of the NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010. Another instance includes high-level meetings among politicians and large sport events. The latest instance took place during the G-20 summit in Cannes.

## MIGRATION FLOWS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MODERN TRENDS IN MACEDONIA

Unlike the people behind the 'iron curtain', many citizens of the post-Yugoslav societies have memories of times when they felt 'citizens of the world'. It looked as if Yugoslavia's red passport had a magical power to pass all border controls, including the ones that divided East from West. The freedom of movement across the federation was unhindered and, with exception of a short period in the WWII aftermath, the right to travel abroad was also fully guaranteed. Decent living standard enabled many to travel abroad, mostly for short trips to the neighbouring countries to visit relatives or for shopping tours. More exotic travels or schooling abroad were privileges of 'red bourgeoisie'.

Due to historical reasons most of the nations had remembrance of and relationships with many generations of economic and political immigrants; Diasporas are the best proof of that historical fact. Mass immigrations used to be well-known phenomenon with Macedonians, Croats, Albanians, etc. Although unskilled, Macedonians of working age were going abroad in the neighbouring or overseas countries by mid 19<sup>th</sup> century and during the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Uzunov 2011, 2). Leaving abroad was but a way of survival; yet it was not meant to be a permanent settlement. The immigration was almost exclusively related to male population, while the women took care of children and households. A vast part of the folklore is inspired exactly by the painful family separations and economic migrations. The Macedonian language has a specific word for this phenomenon - *pechalbarstvo*. In direct English translation *pechalbar* equals money-earner but its meaning is much deeper: the phenomenon became deeply intertwined with the traditions, mentality and cultural specificity of the population, a kind of a specific 'life style'; to an extent it is considered as such even today (Uzunov 2011, 2).

In the 60-70s, Yugoslavia witnessed a peak of a new wave of economic immigration in western Europe: domestically the unemployment rate grew higher, while the Western economies needed cheap labour force. Macedonia, the least developed republic, had a highest rate of emigration (5.2 per cent) in comparison to the Yugoslav average of 3.9 per cent (Gaber and Jovevska 2004, 100). For years these people were known under a bizarre name - 'our folks on a temporary work abroad'. Most of them have eventually integrated into the host societies. However, this trend is somewhat different with the Mace-

donians. Unlike the immigration to Australia and Canada, the Macedonians who have immigrated to Europe rarely become citizens of the host countries. Within Macedonia, the Albanian-populated areas witnessed huge wave of immigration abroad due to both economic and political reasons. Most of them have stayed in their new host countries but kept close ties with their families at home.

The wars (1991-2001) caused different waves of mass immigration: many became refugees (or internally displaced persons), while military deserters became asylum seekers. By 1992, visas were introduced by all Western as well as by the neighbouring countries, and in most cases have not been lifted for 18 years (Uvalic 2005, 5). For a long time Macedonia was the only miraculous exception as the only Yugoslav republic to gain independence in a peaceful manner. The people of different nationality - including retired or active military personnel - became citizens of the newly independent state. But many people have been gradually leaving the country in search for a better living. In the first decade the migratory trends reached the highest peak since 60s (Janeska 2001, 172-175). The data available from the State Statistical Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not provide for a credible picture due to administrative incapacities and citizens' disrespect for the legal acts that require them to report longer residence abroad. On the basis of the available sources the estimation was that the total scope of immigration during the transition reached a figure of 150,000 people (MARRI 2009). The World Bank (2005) operated with a number of 400,000 people (20 per cent of the total population). The present-day outbound migration flows from the country are characterized by significant changes in the demographic and socio-economic features of immigrants. These are manifested in the increased immigration rate from urban areas, growing share of women in the overall contingent, enormous brain drain, continued inclination of immigrants from particular parts of the country towards the same receiving countries, indicating the existence of migration links.

Those who stayed had much more serious problems to resolve so the visa issue was not a priority - except for those who had to travel. During the period that preceded normalization of the war-ravaged region, the most frequent travellers (apart from the old *gastrabeyers* and migrants' families) were scholars, journalists and NGO activists. Although very welcome on international forums that dealt with the Yugoslav conflicts, still they had to go through unprecedented visa procedures. The intellectual elite of ex-Yugoslavia could write

volumes of anecdotes that took place at various consular offices and border controls. Gradually, the circle of (possible) passengers started to widen, encompassing people from all walks of life. A verse from a popular pop-song said it all: 'it is easier to get infected by AIDS than to get a visa.' Neil Campbell (2005) of International Crisis Group referred to the excruciating visa procedure as to 'consular sadism'. Financial costs of obtaining a Schengen visa were significant: a short-term tourist visa costs varied between 40-200 Euros, depending on the applicant (travel to the capital city, number of visits to the embassy, etc.). It was quite beyond the capacity of most people whose salary in average was between 200-300 Euros. There is a rough estimation that Macedonians, who could have visa-free travel only to 12 countries in the world, spent 2.5 million Euros a year on visa fees (Analytica Brief 2007). The cumbersome procedures helped erecting new barriers and led to alienation of the former 'free movers' from ex-Yugoslavia. Even the states not affected by wars, such as Macedonia, became increasingly isolated: economically, socially and culturally. In order to get out from the Western Balkan 'ghetto' (as they saw the situation) a big number of Macedonians applied for Bulgarian citizenship (over 42.300 people from 2002-2011).

It is believed that very high per cent the youngsters from the post-Yugoslav societies have never travelled abroad. Their parents' stories of unrestricted travel abroad are often met with disbelief as one of the many myths about former Yugoslavia. According to Doris Pack, member of the European Parliament, the visa regime especially as it was applied to the Balkans was counterproductive both for the region and for Europe:

Migration is an integral aspect of life on this planet. People move to survive. They move in search of food. They move away from danger and death. They move towards opportunities for life. Migration is tied to the human spirit, which seeks adventure, pursues dreams, and finds reasons to hope even in the most adverse circumstances.

### **MEETING THE CRITERIA FOR VISA LIBERALIZATION: MACEDONIA'S SUCCESS STORY**

The 2003 Thessaloniki Summit ended with a vision of Visa Free Balkans. Three years later the optimism almost faded, but in November 2006 the European Commission (EC) was finally authorized to open negotiations with the Western Balkan countries; Visa Facilita-

tion Agreements and Readmission Agreements started concluding between the EU and each country. The round was closed in April 2007. The EU officials (Joint statement of Franko Frattini and Oli Rehn 2006) had already stated:

This step reflects the commitment by the EU to promoting people-to-people contacts between the Western Balkans and the Union. It is really good news for the citizens in the region and a tangible proof of what the European perspective can offer.

Except for the 'oasis of peace' attribute (applied during the Yugoslav bloody turmoil), Macedonia had not had many successes since 1991. However, the reforms concerning the visa regime are a shining result. The Visa Facilitation Agreement entered into force on 1 January 2008. Its goal was limited in terms of lifting some burden from the visa application process, such as: unification of the visa fee on 35 Euros, fee waiver for certain group of applicants (scholars, artists, sportsmen, businessmen, close relatives of EU citizens, etc.) and deadline of ten days for the authorities to respond to the application. There was also a possibility to get a short-term multi entry visa. Visa liberalization dialogue began in February; in May the government was handed the Roadmap for Free Visa travel, i.e. tailored-made document to address specific tasks for the state institutions. On 15 July 2009, the EC recommended visa free regime for Macedonia, which was adopted by the Council and got in effect on St. Nicholas' day. The government did not miss to exploit this for internal purposes, especially in response to the opposition's claims that it had impeded the integration process and endangered everything that the previous government had achieved (i.e. the candidate status in 2005).

The roadmaps were almost identical for all countries but they 'took into account the specific situation in each country, in terms of existing legislation and practice' (ESI n.d.). They consisted of four blocks of benchmarks to be met. The first three had security-related importance for the EU, while the last one concerned the status and the rights dimensions of citizenship: freedom of movement of nationals, conditions and procedures for the issue of identity documents and citizens' rights including protection of minorities. While the scrutiny over the implementation of the first three blocks (dealing with the security of documents, migration and the fight against organised crime) was evident, the issues of citizens' status and rights were downplayed. The decision to assess compliance in the fourth block was made on the basis of the reports that the countries sent to Brussels and

without on-the-ground peer mission assessments (Kacarska 2012, 9). Macedonia was seen as a frontrunner but still it failed to adopt a framework law on anti-discrimination with satisfactory compliance with the EU *acquis*.

The impact of visa politics on the minds of both the public and political elites is an undeniable fact (Luedtke, Byrd and Alexander 2010, 1). No wonder that both the EU and the domestic officials tried to gain from the visa-free regime: the EU could prove its best intention and open-door policy, while the domestic elites could deliver a success to the citizens. If in the case of Serbia, the prospects for a visa-free travel served as ‘carrots’ and something to smooth the dissatisfaction over Kosovo’s independence, the Macedonian public believed that the gift was earned after hard and honest work (Kostovska and Nikolovski 2008, 30). The belief was not groundless: the visa liberalisation process was the most detailed benchmarking process employed by the EC and as such it is an exceptional example for evaluating the role of external actors in the domestic transformations. According to the EC (2010), the visa liberalisation process has demonstrated the effectiveness of an approach which set concrete, specific reform requirements thus allowing the countries to better focus their efforts. At home it was seen as a great political achievement of the consistent pro-European policy, but also something that could have significant social and economic effect. It was supposed to be a sign that the country has made it into the European club. The Macedonian public failed to see the real motivations behind decision to lift the Schengen barrier: it was a carrot for the unjustified delay in the integration process due to the ‘name issue’. Macedonia got candidate status in 2005 but not the date for the start of the negotiation process. The ‘White Schengen’ was supposed to be a consolation prize and a stimulus to keep up the reforms.

### **ST. NICHOLAS’ GIFT TO MACEDONIA: NOT USED OR ABUSED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT?**

At first it seemed as the ‘White Schengen’ finally added so needed realistic component to the EU integration process. Visa free travel was met with overwhelming joy. It was supposed to diminish the growing EU scepticism but also to encourage the overall reform process. The President of the Republic greeted the EU decision (Ivanov 2009):

Today is a big day for Macedonia. The European Council decision on visa liberalization for a long time has been an expected welcome for our citizens within the community of equal and free citizens of Europe. The visa liberalization represents a huge step closer to the EU and increases the feeling of common belonging within the big European family.

The official statement on Government's web-site (2009) read:

While Europe was celebrating the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Union destroyed the Schengen Wall between itself and the Macedonian citizens... With this, the Republic of Macedonia opened a new chapter in its history – a chapter of perspectives, achievements and opportunities for its citizens. This is an excellent sign that we continue to move forward, that our country is achieving progress, and that we are on the right way. The Republic of Macedonia has turned a new page in its European chapter. We proved that only strong determination and hard work can lead toward success.

The Macedonian Chambers of Commerce welcomed the decision on behalf of the companies and businessmen because two thirds of the export goes to the EU market. The visa free travel was over-optimistically seen as a factor to speed the dynamic of the economic cooperation - regardless the fact that the trade deficit with the EU is due to the low quality of the products. The population was uplifted with the good news, but some analysts were sceptical. In the words of a university professor, visa free regime would encourage migration flows, which would have negative impact on the development process: 'With no war, Macedonia would be dying; she will get emptied and deserted.' Behind such rhetoric one could recognize nationalistic fear of disturbed ethnic balance in case the ethnic Macedonians leave in greater numbers.<sup>3</sup> But the brain drain had taken a dramatic curve far prior to 2009. Macedonia had already been a case where brain drain was significant but with no public awareness of its repercussions for

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<sup>3</sup> According to the 2002 census, ethnic Macedonians have 65per cent share of the population, The Albanians represent 25 per cent but have a significantly higher birth rate and younger population in average. Due to the consociational political system, the figures have great importance in the public sphere and the decision-making process. The census of 2011 failed amidst accusations of irregularities on both sides. Actually, both communities fear that the actual figures on citizens who de facto live in the country is much lower than estimated. So far, nobody insists on a new census.

the country's prospects (Horvat 2004). According to the 2011 Brima Gallup survey as reported by Radio Free Europe one fourth of the ethnic Macedonians expressed wish to leave. Yet two thirds of the respondents opted only for a temporary stay rather than permanent settlement. Less than one third of those willing to leave had had any realistic chances to immigrate. Namely the free visa regime assumes fulfilment of certain conditions (in addition to the biometric passport), such as sufficient financial means, proofs for the aims and conditions of the travel, proofs that the passengers are not potential threat for the public order, public health or internal security of the country of destination.

According to the Ministry of Interior, in the first months of the visa liberalisation as many as 200,000 citizens had crossed the EU borders. A survey conducted by Skopje-based Centre for Research and Policy Making in the period February 2010-March 2011 provided initial data on the effects of the visa liberalisation on the citizens' mobility along with the graphs on its findings (CRPM 2011). It showed that 39.5 per cent of the respondents travelled abroad in the year that followed visa liberalisation. In terms of their ethnic affiliation, 50 per cent of the travellers were Albanians, Serbs and Roma. Only 33.9 per cent of the ethnic Macedonians travelled to EU. Through the prism of age and professional background, the most frequent travellers were the students (59.5 per cent) and employed citizens (50.6 per cent), while on the bottom of the list (quite expectedly) were unemployed (33 per cent) and retired citizens (20 per cent). In terms of the educational background, over 56 per cent the respondents who travelled had higher education in comparison to only 28.4 per cent of those with lower education. The majority respondents (over 61 per cent) travelled to the Schengen zone countries, but it is indicative that Greece is on the top of the visited countries (37.7 per cent), followed by Germany (16.8), Switzerland (16), Italy (15.3) and Austria (11.25). Apart from Greece, obviously the other countries are the ones in which there are family ties. As main reasons for not travelling, the other group of respondents listed lack of financial means (over 50 per cent), and no possession of biometric documents (15.3 per cent). According to this survey, the respondents with higher income (higher than 300 EUR which is approximately the average salary in Macedonia) are among those who travelled the most (53.9 per cent). But it is also indicative that even people with income of 100-200 EUR or less travelled to a significant percent (32.7 per cent and 34.2 per cent respectively).

The fear that a huge mass of people would leave did not prove credible. But among the major countries of origin of asylum-seekers, significant increases were registered from Macedonia (+599%) and Serbia (+54%) (UNHCR 2011, 11). Continuously, the number of asylum seekers (both from Macedonia and Serbia) grew and so did the concerns of the most popular countries of destination (Germany, Sweden, and Belgium). A year later they articulated this tendency as a security threat and the visa liberalization was questioned. In March 2010 the Belgian Prime Minister (who would otherwise hardly pay official visit) went directly to the Lipkovo village where the most asylum seekers had come from in order to urge the authorities to make greater efforts to prevent mass immigration. According to the media, in January-March 2010 as many as 410 citizens had sought asylum in Belgium, which meant doubled increase of such application in comparison to 2009, and even more in comparison to 2008 (only 122 asylum seekers). The asylum seekers have been applying on the basis of a range of reasons starting with the economic situation and the claims that Macedonia is a partially free country with regard to human rights protection. Such data were astounding especially for the ethnic Macedonians who had not been aware of the ongoing process in the Lipkovo region and the Shutka municipality populated by Roma (Stankovic 2010). The surprise on the part of the public refers more to the Albanian claims than with the Roma ones. Lipkovo, once a hotbed of the UÇK battles during the 2001 conflict, has been governed by the representatives of the Albanian ruling party. A few analysts interpret the immigration as a signal of general disappointment of the people who achieved nothing from the alleged military 'victory': the ex-military leaders became members of the political elite while the everyday life for the peasants and former combatants remained all the same.

The EC proposed a safeguard clause to be inserted in the EU visa legislation, which would allow for a temporary reinstatement of visas for third countries, as it reads 'only in exceptional circumstances.' The officials tried to put it mildly by stressing that the mechanism would have been activated only as a 'last resort' and that it was not directed against any specific country. However, the proposal was a result of what was seen as 'serious visa abuses with the visa-free regime by Serbian and Macedonian citizens' (Topalova 2011). By the end of 2011, the Western Balkan countries became aware that visa reintroduction was imminent. It had been confirmed number-

less times by the EP rapporteur Fajon and other EU officials. The government swiftly formed a special monitoring committee which included high ranking officials (vice prime ministers for Euro integration and for implementation of the Framework agreement as well as the ministers of foreign affairs, justice and interior). The initial measures were directed towards the tourist agencies that organized bus transport. They were put under stricter control, in some cases sanctioned with financial fines or temporal suspension of work while some were closed down. The border controls also became tighter: in the period of 29 April-19 May 2011 as many as 447 Macedonian citizens were not allowed to travel to the European countries and charged for a criminal offence. Despite a certain decrease of the number of asylum seekers by the end of 2011, the preservation of the visa liberalisation was still priority. Prime minister promised to intensify economic and social measures that would improve living conditions of the people in the regions that witnessed more asylum seekers. However the punitive measures were easier to introduce than to increase employment rate and quality of life.

Although there is no legal definition of the abuse of the visa-free regime, neither in the national law of the countries of origin of the asylum seekers nor of the countries of destination, Macedonia is an exception. A questionable amendment was made in the Criminal code, targeting travel companies and tour operators. Having criminalised 'abuse of the EU visa-free regime and of the Schengen agreement', the new legislation stipulated that those who have been forcibly returned as fake asylum seekers could have their passports temporarily confiscated, pay fines up to 50,000 Euros or go to prison up to eight years. A few persons were jailed under this charge during 2013. The amendments to the Law on travel documents stipulated a possibility of taking away one's passport or denial of a new one in case a person had been forcefully sent back or expelled from a foreign country in case s/he broke host country's regulation for stay of foreigners. The Ministry of Interior started using the method of risk analysis and profiling. As quoted by *Dnevnik* on 19 March 2013 during the visit of her colleague from the German province of Saxony, the minister of interior announced that since April 2011 as many as 8322 citizens had not been allowed to leave the country with charges for abuse of visa liberalisation. The German official informed that not a single Macedonian citizen was granted asylum. The German press notifies that by imposing huge pressure on Belgrade and Skopje,

minister Friedrich pushes these countries back to 'real-socialism' disregarding the fact that during the socialism the citizens of ex-Yugoslavia enjoyed right to free travel unlike the people from the Eastern bloc.

The protection of visa liberalisation comes at high cost both. It is paid by violation of human rights and growing hostility towards the groups that give highest number of asylum seekers.

### **ASYLUM SEEKERS** *Ante Portas*

Trying to deal with the increased number of asylum seekers from the Western Balkans, portrayed as a security threat, the EU institutions and the specific governments showed clear disrespect for international law. The principle of freedom of movement includes the right of an individual to leave any country including his or her own and it may only be restricted for serious reasons, but lack of sufficient resources or inability to justify purpose of one's travel in a way to convince border guards of its legitimacy or because a person may want to apply for asylum - are not among such reasons. The international legislation is an intrinsic part of the Balkan states' constitutions and legislation. But upon overt or covert pressure from the EU, the countries of the Western Balkans have transferred arbitrary power to border guards to decide on right to travel.

This approach has a strong impact on the minority rights in post-conflict and divided societies. Despite the rhetoric that usually refers to Macedonian citizens (or Serbian, for the same reason) no doubt that the focus has been put largely on the Roma and Albanians. The EU representatives keep claiming that no measure is meant to target minorities but also often point out that the abuse of the right of visa free travel does not provide a solution to the integration of Roma. It is explicitly said that 'the poor level of integration of local communities, in particular of Roma origin, continues to be a push factor for the vast majority of unfounded asylum applications' (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2010, 14). The statements of the governmental representatives show that Roma and members of other minorities are held responsible for the threat on the free visa regime. For instance, on the "Salzburg Forum" (November 2011) Jankuloska informed her colleagues that the Ministry of Interior had established a 'profile of false asylum seekers'.

Also she explained that the Ministry had launched a public information campaign on the 'proper use of visa-free regime benefits' together with the Roma Information Centres so there is no doubt over the clear definition of who are main 'false asylum seekers'.

The safeguard clause was adopted by the European Parliament in September 2013 and the Council did the same on 5 December 2013 (Council of EU 2013). This new "suspension mechanism" allows temporary reintroduction of the visa requirement for nationals of a third country who can normally travel to the European Union without a visa - in specific circumstances, such as a substantial and sudden increase in the number of irregular migrants, unfounded asylum requests or rejected readmissions applications. The EU measures intended to suppress so called 'poverty tourism' or 'welfare tourism' as well as the measures undertaken by the respective Balkan governments have met strong disapproval with those concerned with the human right dimension of the problem. Thomas Hammarberg, High Commissioner on Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2011), for instance, reminded that the pressures on the respective countries to prevent free travel of their citizens jeopardize the right to leave as an already established human right. The European Convention on Human Rights (Protocol 4, Article 2) stipulates that 'everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own,' which is also a right protected by the constitutions of the Balkan states. The rigorous exit procedures and the risk of penalties on return have imminent negative effect and *de facto* represent violation of a guaranteed human right. These developments were noted by the members of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly and some members of the European Parliament. There have also been strong reactions also from NGOs who deal with the rights of Roma population, such as Chachipe - Right & Justice. In response the EC argues that measures reported by the western Balkans countries and by the Member States are equally applicable to all travellers regardless of their origin and therefore do not discriminate one or the other group. The fact that the majority of the asylum applicants from the Western Balkan countries are of Roma origin does not in itself mean that measures to tackle abuse of the visa-free regime are discriminatory (Parliamentary questions 2012). Yet, the EU officials conveniently forget about the profiling-procedures. Also having in mind all measures undertaken in order to prevent people leaving, one can only remind on Balibar's point (2003) that borders are no longer at the borders.

The EU indirectly compels such measures and turns its blind eye on another layer of discrimination particularly against Roma. They are the easiest to be recognized. The profiling procedure has already produced new corruption and intimidation at the borders. This is further amplified by the notion in public discourse that the visa-exempt status may be withdrawn because of these people. The Western media often imply that the rising numbers of asylum seekers are indications for the failure of national states to govern their territories authoritatively. The media focus on Roma, thus deepening the negative stereotype that already exists within EU borders when it comes to this population. Nevertheless, when the respective Balkan states impose stricter rules on their own citizens in order to prevent them leaving the country (and at the same time to please Brussels) it is said that their tactics teeter on the racist and the illegal. It seems as if the governments often find themselves between rock and hard place. But this situation gives them an opportunity to cover their wrong and discriminatory policies in European veil.

## CONCLUSION

Migration is influenced by a combination of economic, political and social factors either in a migrant's country of origin (push factors) or in the country of destination (pull factors); the relative economic prosperity and political stability of the EU are thought to exert a considerable pull effect on immigrants (Eurostat Yearbook 2011). As for the push factors there are plenty of them, ironically enough, in countries that allegedly step boldly towards full membership in the EU. Behind the façade of the relatively positive and stimulating reports of the EC there is a picture of a region of weak states whose stability is maintained by the promises from the European and national elites. Those in greatest need and those with highest qualifications are probably the most rational citizens: they have nothing to lose and something to gain by travelling towards the West. Although the West is not as rich as it used to be yet it can still provide at least temporary social security for these people. The deep economic crisis and the austerity measures have direct effect on the more restrictive freedom of movement and asylum policies. The outsiders are welcome only if they can offer something in return (financial means, knowle-

dge or skills). The others are seen as social competitors and 'enemies' that should be excluded. Asylum seeker becomes a social enemy.

The rather exaggerated 'asylum crisis' brought about by the people from the Balkans and articulated by the European elites is a two-way street. It diminishes the credibility of the EU enlargement policy and induces frustration (with Europe and with fellow-citizens who are 'guilty' for the eventual loss of the free visa regime) and euro-scepticism (disbelief that Europe is truly devoted to accepting the poor people from the Western Balkans). On the other hand, the political and media fuss over the hordes of asylum seekers translates itself into a threat to European liberal values. The rise of welfare protectionist or ethno-centric nationalism and racism is evident. To make things worse, these currents take the central position in the rising popularity of the centre-left and far right parties. The increase in asylum applications is a symptom of failure on both sides of the equation. But the end result is an ever-lasting cycle of discrimination and marginalisation of minority and marginalised populations. The EU fortress sends ambiguous signals to the aspirant countries: while demanding the Balkan countries to embrace international human rights as part of the conditions for joining the EU, it implicitly agrees and even asks them to breach these very principles in a way to control immigration.

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# European Communication Policy and Its Strategies Tackling the Democratic Deficit in the Eu

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## ABSTRACT

The European Communication Policy is a direct link between the European Commission and the »European public«. Use of various communication strategies reflects the possibility of public to participate in democratic processes and therefore reflects the legitimacy of the system as well. European Communication Policy has undergone many changes. The dominant models of public communication in the European Union are persuasive models (Brüggemann 2005, Grunig and Hunt 1984). The goals of the European Communication Policy are ambitious and reflect the objectives of the elite. The implementation deficit occurs because of the uncompleted political and communication integration in the EU, the structure of the EU and the globalization.

The case studies confirmed the hypothesis that due to the lack of democratic processes and the European public sphere, communication strategies dominated by the persuasive models are used.

**KEYWORDS:** European Union, Democratic deficit, European Public Sphere, European communication policy, Communication campaigns.

## POVZETEK

Evropska komunikacijska politika je neposredna povezava med Evropsko komisijo in evropskimi javnostmi. Uporaba različnih komunikacijskih strategij odraža možnost vključevanja javnosti v demokratične procese in je izraz legitimnosti sistema. Ta politika se je zelo spreminjala, vendar je prevladujoči model komuniciranja z javnostmi v Evropi

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ski uniji prepričevalni (Brüggemann 2005, Grunig in Hunt 1984). Cilji politike so ambiciozni in izražajo cilje vladajoče elite. Implementacijski primanjkljaj je posledica nezadostnih političnih in komunikacijskih procesov, strukture EU in globalizacije. Na primeru študij primerov smo potrdili hipotezo, da zaradi pomanjkanja demokratičnih procesov in evropske javne sfere, v EU prevladujejo prepričevalni komunikacijski modeli.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** Evropska unija, demokratični manko, komunikacijski manko, evropska komunikacijska politika, evropske volitve 2009

## INTRODUCTION

As a former employee in the EP at the General Directorate for Communication, I have encountered various questions and later decided to seek the answers to those questions in the academic field. The present paper is a result of practical experience and academic research, which, later has opened many new questions and new research ideas.

The present paper is based on Master's research (Zagajšek 2013). The approach is interdisciplinary, covering mainly the field of Political Science and Communication. The scientific literature in the field of the European communication policy is quite limited, as well as the availability of the key strategic documents.

The aim of the paper is to present the main factors affecting the policy-making and the implementation of the European communication policy in the period 1958 to 2009. It is an overview of the discussions in the field.

In research (Zagajšek 2013) two hypotheses were tested:

1. European communication policy changes incrementally and persuasive communication prevails.
2. The policy objectives cannot be achieved with the information and persuasion communication models.

We focused on three research questions:

- »How has the European communication/information policy transformed in time, based on its past experience?«
- »What are the main factors that affect the democratic deficit in the EU?«
- »How the actual effects coincide with the objectives?«

## RESEARCH METHODS

The research was methodologically diverse, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Elitist as well as the institutional models were used. Elitist model was used to describe the circumstances and processes in which public policy is primarily an expression of preferences and values of the ruling elite.

New - institutional approach was appropriate because “...the study of stable patterns of behavior of individuals and groups may to some extent, contribute to the understanding of the process of the policy making and the implementation, although it cannot explain the origin of political institutions.” (Fink Hafner 2002, 175). Combining both methodologies and models was necessary for the accurate overview of the complex and vast topic of the research.

Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) two-way symmetrical communication model<sup>2</sup> was used as an “ideal model” in researching the implementation and reaching the stated goals.

The following research techniques were used:

Content Analysis of primary and secondary sources (from 1958 to 2012), analyses, comparison and synthesis.

Basic documents:

De Clercq’s report (1993), Adonnin report (1985),  
Action Plan (Commission of the European Communities 2005),  
Plan D (Commission of the European Communities 2006), White  
Paper (Commission of the European Communities 2006b),<sup>1</sup> 2010  
- Annual Information Society Report 2007 (2007), European  
Treaties with a focus on the Lisbon Treaty. Interviews were  
conducted in 2008 (April to August), 2009 (March, April, May, July),  
2012 (January, February, June) and are unstructured.

Official statements (quotes) were acquired at the following seminars:

“The end of democracy? Possible new paradigm”. 2009. 28 - 30 May,  
Portorož, Slovenia. Political Science Association.

“An introduction to the European Elections”. 2009, 2 - 3 March,  
Brussels. European Journalism Centre, Maastricht.

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<sup>2</sup> Grunig and Hunt (1984) have later added a model of mixed models. A two way symmetrical model in the paper is used as a normative model only.

“The communication strategies for informing the Croatian public about EU membership”, 22 - 23 May 2008, Ljubljana.

»How to tell a story of the EU”, 5 - 7 June 2012. Brussels. European People’s Party (EPP).

## **DEFINITION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION POLICY**

European Communication Policy is a direct link between the European Commission (hereinafter the Commission or EC) and the »European public«. From the EC’s DGCOM (before 2004 the Directorate of Information and Communication) there are vertical communication channels that transmit information intended for the general public. Its goal is to enhance a debate between the EU institutions and EU citizens. The primary purpose of this policy is to improve communication image of the EU (Commission of the European Communities 2005a, 2).

There isn’t any available document coming from the Commission, which would provide a definition of the European Communication Policy. It is also not a classical field of policy and it is not “a priori” obvious why we should talk about Communication policy rather than public relations. We concluded that the Communication Policy is a broader concept as public relations, because in policy making and implementation it is necessary to resolve the key issues of information and communication with the EU citizens and take decisions that are of the political nature. Bearing in mind that the communication is based on the same concept that we use in thinking and acting (Lakoff and others, 1980), the goals reflect the objectives of the elite. The Communication policy is implemented “top down”. The executive actors are in the Directorate - General for Communication (to 2004 DGINFO and after 1.7. 2012 DG for Communications Networks, Content, and Technology) in the European Commission.

## **DEFINITION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION POLICY**

The European communication policy is an indicator of legitimacy of the system. The Communication theories determine the state of democracy in the EU by the functioning of the European public sphere, the Political science theories – by the support and participation of citizens in the making and implementing European policies.

There is a link between the Communications policy and its strategies and the democratic governance (Scharpf 1999). Scharpf (ibid.) linked the use of different communication strategies to the possibilities of public participation in democratic processes and the legitimacy of the governance. In his theory of democracy he divides the “input” (“of the people”) and “output” (“for the people”) democracies. In the latter, the democratic government justifies decisions that should achieve the goals that citizens collectively care about. While both types of democracy coexist and complement each other, only “input” aspect inhibits the rise of democratic deficits in the long run. Sharpf’s model enlisted EU among the “output” democracies where in the long run, democratic deficit does not decrease. The table 1 presents the various concepts of democracy in the EU.

Table 1: Comparison of the concepts of democracy in the EU from the Political Science and the Communication Studies approach

Political Science	Communication Studies
<p>EU is an international organization, economic association and free trade area according to Moravcsik (2002). Decisions are taken without the participation of the public and are not questioned, if they bring the desired economic effects. “With favorable economic conditions, people will be on your side”. (Haas in Höreth 1998, 6).</p> <p>EU is an international organization that acquires more powers in areas that are usually governed by a sovereign nation state, stated Kunelius and Sparks (2001).</p>	<p>The single European public sphere does not exist, believe many scholars among them Shore (2006), Eriksen (2005), Basinée (2007), Gerhards (1993) Koopmans and Erbe (2003), Schlesinger (1999), Grimm (1995), Brüggemann (2005). Habermas ( in Basinée, 2007) confirms thesis that “the concept, which was introduced in the early 60th years, does not apply to the EU and the European public sphere does not exist”. (Habermas 2006 in Baisinée, 2007).</p> <p>The existence of a European public sphere is possible when there are certain conditions met, such as simultaneous communication in the different countries on the same subject in the same context (Kantner et al. in Brüggemann 2005 and Habermas in Jeffries 2010.). Discursive democracy or dialogue democracy in the EU exists only in a limited form.</p>
<p>Majone (1998) believes that the EU is a regulatory state, so the decision-makers should be neutral and professional. As a result in policy-making the domination of the European Parliament or directly elected European Commission is not desirable.</p>	<p>Gerhards (in Koopmans and Erbe 2003, 58) considers that the lack of the European public sphere is in direct relation with the democratic deficit, which is a result of the lack of opposition to the "European" government. There is a lack of a direct responsibility of the decision makers to the electorate.</p>
<p>EU is, according to Mair (2005), a regulatory state, which is not responsive to the procedures of the popular democracy. It is a political system that was constructed by the national political leaders and the result of the integration process in which democratic processes are constantly changing.</p>	<p>Moravcsik concludes that "lack of salience, not lack of opportunity may impose the binding constraint on European political participation". (Moravcsik 2002 in Peters 2004).</p>

<p>Dahl's opinion (1999) is that international organizations are not and cannot be democratic. "Without a European demos there is no democracy in the EU".(Eriksen 2005, 344).</p>	<p>Due to the lack of a European public sphere, decision-makers resort to persuasive communication models. To a lesser extent as before 1990s, arcane and informative communication strategies are applied. (Brüggemann 2005).</p>
<p>The EU is moving towards a more loosely organized public policy networks and interest groups. The number of the stakeholders in the decision-making process is increasing and the interplay of different practices can be observed. "The resulting structure of political opportunities contains a number of access points through which individuals or groups are putting pressure on politicians or bureaucrats". (Cerny 2002, 3).</p>	<p>Changed political relations have been one of the reasons for the weakness of National and European public spheres. (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007). Number of participants involved in the decision-making is inversely to the difficulty of the decision-making that would affect more than a small percentage of the population. (Dahl 1999).</p>
<p>Participation of citizens on the European Union level is problematic, because they still identify themselves with their political rights within the national states. (Ward 2001).</p>	<p>The lack of identification of citizens in the EU according to Ward (2001) is associated with communication, which is linked to a common communication space.</p>
<p>Scharpf (1999) believes that EU is an "output democracy". The basic mechanism in the output democracies are free elections, which do not express the will of the people, but the "infrastructure for the political responsibility of features". (Scharpf 1999, 14).</p>	<p>At the onset of the financial and economic crisis in the EU Habermas (2010 in Jeffries 2010) said that it had a positive side effect on the European public sphere. "At this moment, when the European Union is experiencing one of its weakest moments it was pushed into the discussion, which relates to a central problem which is its future development". (Habermas 2010 in Jeffries).</p>
<p>Habermas (in Jeffries 2010) believes that economic integration is the key to political integration in the EU. "On the Continent, we have already experienced it in the 19th century, at the time of the unification of the nations, which is in stark contrast to the EU integration, which is a project of elites" (ibid.).</p>	<p>The public sphere in EU is differentiated and selective. "Paradoxically, the groups that are most involved in the European public sphere are those that are not the most frequently mentioned - farmers and fishermen for example are much more involved in the EPS than most of the population. (Baisinée, 2007, 501).</p> <p>Eriksen and Fossum (2002, 420) divide the public to "strong public" and "general public". Public sphere should be the bearers of democratic legitimacy and force the decision-makers into the discussion.</p>

Source: own, upon quoted bibliography: Baisinée (2007), Brüggemann (2005), Cerny 2002, Dahl (1999), Eriksen and Fossum (2002), Haas (in Höreth1998), Habermas (2006 in Basinée, 2007), Majone (1998), Mair (2005), Scharpf (1999), Ward (2001).

Whether there is a democratic deficit in the EU or not depends on the definition of the EU. If authors perceive it as an international organization, then the democratic deficit is a myth. Dahl (1998) believes that the international organizations are not and cannot be democratic.

Academics who believe that EU is a federal system (in the making) see democratic deficit as a problem of legitimacy. Follesdal and Hix (2005) stated that the dominance of the national's executive actors, ministers in the Council and government's representatives in the Commission, is a possible cause for the democratic deficit. Like many authors we concluded that the political system in the EU is not undemocratic, it is just not democratic enough. According to the Dahl's model (1971) EU demonstrates the lack of a direct participation of citizens, their influence on policy-making and lack in the field of competition for the key EU public functions. The EU is also not responsive enough to the needs of citizens. A few would oppose the argument that EU has been an elite driven project since its beginnings. The integration tendencies of the EU elite lean towards a federal model and since the 1990s there is a growing interest towards closer political integration. EU is not a "mere" international organization, nor is it a State. It is entity "sui generis".<sup>3</sup>

Public sphere is a key element when studying the democracy of political systems. Habermas' (1997) concept of a public sphere, which is developed "bottom up" and starts at the micro level in civil society, has been applied as a normative model. Public sphere cannot be induced "top down". Brügeman (2005) states, that the public sphere is characterized by a dialogue, cooperation, and discussion among its stakeholders. Public sphere "... is something that usually develops into voluntary discourse of citizens" (Brügeman 2005, 58).

Shore (2006) believes that the lack of common language, history and traditions in the EU hampers the development of the European public sphere as a common ground for public debate and political engagement. European mass media, European parties, interest groups (other than in a business area) and the European public have not been developed yet. "There is no popular European consciousness that would compete with national or support the economic and legal decisions. What are the cultural elements that combine and link existing national identity, are precisely those elements that divide more than connect European citizens". (Shore, 2006, 3). The lack of identification of citizens with the EU, according to Ward (2001, 77) is associ-

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<sup>3</sup> European Union (EU) was at the beginning an economic and international organization, which has gained more and more powers in areas that are usually governed by a sovereign nation-state. EU is *de iure* still an international organization.

ated with communication which is linked to a common communication space. Calhoun (Calhoun 2004, 1) like many authors, agrees that up to present the European elite have failed to establish the European Public Sphere. The absence of it does not exclude transnational public spheres and the europeanization of national public spheres.

At the EC they do not deny the existence of the European Public Sphere, although the definition is not indicated. There are EC documents which underline the inadequate development of a European public sphere as one of the causes for the “alienation of Europeans from Brussels” and express “room for the improvement” (European Commission, 2010a). It is becoming increasingly apparent that the elites can no longer continue the process of the European integration without communicating it to the public.

Democratic deficit and the lack of the European public sphere have become problematic for the executive actors at the EU in the beginning of the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the tendencies towards closer political integration have occurred. The problem was recognized for the first time in 1994 when the European Parliament pointed out the low turnout at the European elections.<sup>4</sup>

At the empirical level democratic deficit is reflected in a low turnout at the EP elections, the lack of knowledge about the activities in the EU institutions, the lack of confidence in the European institutions and their laws, the perception of the Brussels’ administration as remote and the lack of transparency. In the national media, the democratic deficit is reflected as a primary focus on national issues neglecting the European topics. Democratic deficit is “...a set of common arguments used by academics, the public, media commentators, and laity” (Weiller and others in Follesdal and Hix 2005, 4). Despite increased powers of the European Parliament, the enhanced involvement of people in direct and representative decision-making (instruments introduced by The Lisbon Treaty)<sup>5</sup>, changes of the Directorate-Generals for Information/ Communication of the European institutions, the increased number of communication actions,

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<sup>4</sup> The term democratic deficit was first used in 1979 by the British Labor Party David Marquand. In 1995 the European Parliament adopted a report by MEPs Jean-Louis Bourlanges and David Martin in which the MEP highlighted the democratic deficit as a problem in the EU (Bourlanges and Martin 1995, 66).

<sup>5</sup> Few examples are: European Citizens’ Initiative, enhanced powers of the EP and national parliaments, qualified majority voting is extended to new policy areas.

personnel and many other measures, the democratic deficit in the EU persists. Even the increased amount of money and resources seem to have very little affect on it. According to research the structural changes and furthering the integration processes will be more effective.

Table 2: Indicators of uncompleted political and communication integration in the EU

Uncompleted political integration	Uncompleted communication integration
There are no the presidential elections in the EC and the competition for political positions. Some changes towards political competition were introduced in 2014 elections.	The absence of a single European public and pan - European debates.
The primacy of the EC in delivering legislative proposals.	The communication is limited to specific public.
The dominance of Ministers in the Council of the EU and national representatives in the policy making.	There are no popular transnational European media, publications, radio, and TV stations.
The European institutions are not under direct control of the citizens.	Non-transparency of the decision-making process.
The number of MEPs in the European Parliament in relation to the number of deputies in the national parliament are disproportionatel to the size of the population.	Lack of transparency / inaccessibility of key documents of the EU Council and the European Council.
EP Members of the larger countries are "responsible" for a large number of the population in his country as EP Members of the smaller Member States <sup>4</sup>	There is not a two-way symmetric communication between the sender and receiver of the messages and rarely two –way asimmetric communication (Grunig and Hunt 1984)
Weak powers of the European Parliament compared with the powers of the national parliaments in the national states.	Lack of European issues in the national media.
Lack of the citizens' influence on policy making and lack of transparency.	Non transparent communication venues to the decision-makers.

<sup>6</sup> For example Germany has after the 2014 elections 96 deputies and 82 million inhabitants. The ratio is 854,16 people per member. Slovenia has 8 Members and approximately 2 million people. The ratio is almost three times less inhabitants per EP Member than in Germany.

Executive players in the EU institutions are not responsible to electorate and decisions are taken by the unelected representatives of national governments, which largely are not directly elected. As set out in the Declaration 11 to the EU Lisbon Treaty on the election of the President of the European Commission the next Commission President, who will succeed Jose Manuel Barroso, must have the support of both a qualified majority of EU leaders, and be able to command a large majority in European Parliament.	Identification with the actualization of rights within the nation-state.
Loose regulation of access venues to the decision makers.	Weak responsiveness of the key players to the information needs of the citizens of the EU.
The gap between aspirations and expectations of the citizens and public policy effects of the European Union policies.	The dominance of the national topics in the European elections campaigns in the Member States.
Policies that have the greatest impact on the citizens (education, health, taxes ...) are the domain of the national policies.	Non-transparency of the decision-making process.

Sources: own, upon quoted bibliography : Follesdal and Hix (2005), Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) Grunig and Hunt (1984),Shore (2006),Ward (2001).

## INTEGRATION POTENTIAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION POLICY

According to Calhoun (2004) the public communication in the EU is in fact intended for the construction of the European public sphere and it is an underestimated aspect of the European integration processes.

*“From this perspective, the Commission’s role is that it is always under construction and reconstruction in line with the rest of social reality. The Commission’s task, therefore, is to help construct the future social ‘realities’ in its favor and of the European integration, but also to discern what the realities in the form of the formal and informal constraints on its power are at various points in time. It must then cut its cloth accordingly so as not to overreach itself and thereby set back its chances of achieving its future goals”.*(Andersen and Price, 2008, 43-44 ).

The furthering of the integration processes authors foresee in different ways.

The possibility of setting up a public sphere in the future is formulated by Habermas. He predicts the fulfillment of his thesis from the nineties on the existence of so called “post-national identity” based

on solidarity among strangers and mutual respect (Habermas, 1996). Peters sees the potential for europeanization of public spheres in “expansion of the imaginary collective “we” across national borders / ... / and increasing disassociation of East-South and probably America”. (Peters 2004, 4). Other theorists see the cause of weaknesses of both national and European public spheres in the changed political relations, because “...economic relations in society are increasingly taking the form of interest - oriented policies. Open and public consultations are according to Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) not a priority. Political issues are decided behind the closed doors and in the inter - institutional negotiations “(Fossum and Schlesinger 2007, 11). Without European demos only kratos (gr. power) remains.

Table 3: Strategies of public communication in EU

Propaganda	Marketing	Justification	Dialogue	Persuasive communication
Persuasion ignoring basic communicative norms	Using symbols in order to appeal to emotions	Explaining policies and giving reasons	Discussing politics	
Agenda setting				
Raising awareness for issues				
Arcane Policy		Transparent Policy		Information
Silencing the public sphere		Direct access to comprehensive information		
Asymmetric communication		Symmetric communication		
Authoritarian governance		Deliberative governance		

Source: Brüggemann (2005, 64)

Due to the lack of the European public sphere, which the decision-makers in the EU are aware of, they are looking out for various communication strategies to reach the public. »The lack of the identification of citizens with the EU is associated with communication, which is linked to a common communication space« (Ward 2001, 77). According to the Dahl's definition of democracy the citizens should have the opportunity to formulate their preferences, share them with the others and the government, and their preferences should be treated equally and without discrimination (Dahl 1971, 5). Accordingly, we can conclude that the European Union, despite tendencies towards legitimization remains an elitist project up to present. Brüggemann (2005) has identified seven communication strategies (Table 3) used in the European communication policy which differ in relation to whether create opportunities for the creation of the public sphere or hinder its development. The extremes are "propaganda" and "hidden" (arcane) policy on the one side and "dialogue" and "transparency" on the other.

Persuasive models (Brüggemann 2005, Grunig and Hunt 1984 models) are the dominant models of public communication in the European Union and only exceptionally these models are replaced by the Information ones. Anderson and Price (2008) stated that a short period of Information strategy has followed the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 ( Anderson and Price 2008).

The comparison between the strategic documents (1958 – 2009) especially De Clercq's document (1993) and 2005 – 2009 Commission's documents revealed the continuation of the persuasive and marketing strategies. Actions and strategies in the controversial De Clercq's report (1993) have reappeared in one way or another in various communication policy's documents, action plans and EP electoral campaigns<sup>7</sup> even up to present, despite its rejection by media and public. A good example of the implementation of the persuasive communication strategies is the use of metaphors. The metaphors occur more frequently where decision-makers anticipate difficulties

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<sup>7</sup> The so called "De Clercq's report" (Reflection on the Information and Communication Policy of the European Community, 1993) stated that the European identity should be "positioned in the minds of the people as a good product" and that "certain social categories, especially women and children, have to become the priority target groups and continues that journalists and reporters are also an important target group to become enthusiastic supporters" (1993, 8). Some of the proposals originated in the De Clercq's commission, while others had been taken from Adonn's "ad hoc" group (1984).

at implementing policies or procedures. Metaphors used in political terminology used in the EU institutions, are often ambivalent and confusing even for those who use or “invented” them (Shore, 1997) which is no coincidence. Ambiguity is intentional. “They are a tool for domination and therefore politically and strategically important in the management” (Shore and others 1997, 130).

In a two-year ethnographic research of the “European quarter “in Brussels, Shore drew some interesting conclusions. He observed that the “Eurocrats” (servants/administration of the European institutions) see their mission in “building Europe” and the metaphors that relate to the journey. European integration processes are called “a journey”, “continuation of association” and “a path”, which is characterized by peace, progress, and prosperity and refer to the federal model of the integration (Shore et al. 1997). The Commission has been designated as the “engine of European integration”, “the heart of the association process” and “the guardian of the European treaties”. Shore has also studied their perception of themselves and has found out that they do not see themselves as bureaucrats, but as “pioneers”, “intellectuals” and “architects”.

A specific terminology is used for the newly employed, such as “recruits”, “winners in competitions”. Shore (1999) has in a study of organizational culture in the Commission, concluded that among the staff in different hierarchic positions, as well as among the new recruited ones, prevails “...sense of mission and commitment to the continuation of the European ideals (Shore 1999, 58). Although I did not use scientific method of the direct participation during my working time in the EP, I can confirm that these observations are valid for many European Parliament’s employees as well.

Specific wording is used in the process of EU expansion such as “candidate”, “acceding country”, “the successful adoption” of the legislation, “signing” of the Treaty, “accession ceremony”, etc... There are metaphors that are commonly used and related to the functioning of the European institutions, such as: “subsidiary”, “comitology”, “the rapporteur”, “acquis communautaire” etc... The tendency of the European institutions to “come closer” to the EU citizens is reflected in expressions such as “institutions with a face”, “local approach” and “European citizenship”.

It seems that the “ill fit” or “misfit” European policies that could affect the sovereignty of nation states, are often expressed in metaphors. Policies or sectors where EU does not have much power are often burden with the metaphors. For example term “lifelong learning” and “flexicurity” are expressions that are vague enough to mean anything and therefore not threatening for the Member States.<sup>8</sup> The use of metaphors in the official language of the EU according to Shore (1997) can raise concern and suggest a growing tendency to use persuasive communication strategies.

Another field which has a considerable effect on policy-making are the recruitment procedures, especially for the heads of EP offices and EC Presentations in Member states. According to the information from the European Commission (Ares (2011) 658207. 20.6.2011) recruitment procedures of the Head of the European Commission Representation in Slovenia in 2004 when Mihaela Zupančič was appointed in Slovenia, there haven't been any professional and other criteria defined for filling this vacancy. The same (non) criteria have been applied for the selection of heads of missions of other “new” Member States.

Since 2002, the establishment of EPSO - European Personnel Selection Office<sup>9</sup>, hiring the staff for the positions lower than Head of Units is more regulated. Nevertheless, the open competitions are still problematic in many respects.<sup>10</sup> Also often non-transparent recruitment procedures within the EU institutions.

Member States are mostly aware of the importance and role of the national administration in higher ranking positions in the European institutions and within existing national administration train potential employees. The program “Fast Stream” was based on the British education system and was launched in Slovenia in 2000 (Golob, 2004). In Slovenia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

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<sup>8</sup> The translations make them even more unclear. In the Slovenian media two expressions for the “flexicurity” appeared meaning “save flexibility” and “flexible safety”, but without any explanation when to use the first or second form, if any. According to experts (I. Svetlik, and S. Mandič, July 2012, written response), both expressions were equivalent.

<sup>9</sup> European personnel selection office (EPSO) was established in 2002 with the aim to select personnel for the European institutions, coming mainly from the “new” Member States. “EPSO tests” measure general cognitive abilities and knowledge.

<sup>10</sup> Tests measure cognitive abilities and knowledge and are nick-named “a lottery” among administration. They seem to neglect communication skills and cross-cultural communication and often test abilities and skills that are not necessary for the job performance. They seem more elimination than selection orientated.

Kadrovska služba vlade RS<sup>11</sup> from 2000 to 2002, conducted selections of candidates, which were, after the successful completion of “concour” asked to occupy the posts in the European institutions. The first - generation of the candidates were chosen among the national administration according to the criteria of education, age (up to 33 years ) and »others« criteria. The transparency of the procedures, the legitimacy of the selection procedures and the results will not be discussed in length, but there are indicators which show non-transparent selection procedures and misuse of public money.

### POLITICAL AND COMMUNICATION PRIORITIES 1958 - 2009

In the analysis of the historical development of communication/information policy and its strategies from 1958 to 2009 we confirmed the hypothesis that communications policy changes are incremental and the persuasive communication strategies as dominant communication models have remained in use since its beginnings (Zagajšek, 2013).

Despite the use of persuasive models in the European Communication Policy the stated political and communication goals in different periods, varied. In the table 4 we compared the political and communication priorities in the EU integration process.

Table 4: Comparison between political and communication priorities in 1958 – 2009

Period	Political priorities	Communication strategies
1958-1984	<p>Supranational regulation is a way to preserve peace in Europe and a response to the malfunctioning of the national countries in the years 1918 -1939. Political integration was not a priority and it should have been followed as a result of the economic integration.</p> <p>Problems solved in the European institutions are of a technical nature, and are resolved by decision-makers without media attention.</p> <p>In 1974, Member States have reached an agreement to formalize the European Council and Heads</p>	<p>According to Basinée (2007) already in the early days of EU, the information policy was planned strategically.</p> <p>Brüggemann (2005) stated that most research agree that the technocratic approach to European integration was initially successful without the participation of the public, but started a vicious circle of no communication. (Brüggemann 2005).</p> <p>Until 1993 the arcane models dominated. Persuasive communication models were also present, although to a lesser extent.</p>

<sup>11</sup> Government Office for European Affairs and Government Human Resources Department

	<p>of State meetings three times a year.</p> <p>1979 were the first direct elections to the European Parliament.</p>	<p>Adonin's report from 1984 is a strategic document in which European identity and European public sphere are one of the key priorities. Persuasive and arcane models are present in it.</p>
1985-1992	<p>According to Shore (1999), the European Commission has started to actively build a strategy for the European public sphere since Adonin report. This was almost 8 years before the Maastricht Treaty (1992) offered a legal basis for such action.</p>	
1993-1999	<p>In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty entered into force and an agreement on the single currency, which was a step forward to political integration.</p>	<p>The communication / information policy in the European Commission was perceived as less important or unimportant. Information policy has become relevant at the problematic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. De Clerq's report followed in 1993 and set guidelines for a persuasive, marketing strategy. In the 90s of the last century, information policy was a mixture of all strategies.</p>
2000-2004	<p>Globalization, further enlargements, and increased powers of the European institutions caused changes. Decentralization of leadership is in the forefront of theory of multilevel government. Trans nationalism and intergovernmentalism have an impact on policies and traditional players. "There is an increased dynamics of the interactions among national decision-makers and the newly established European agencies, such as the European Central Bank and Europol". (Wallace and others 2006).</p>	<p>The resignation of the Santer's Commission, followed by the reorganization of the Directorate - General for Information. The strategy of communication policy is oriented towards service and professionalism.</p> <p>"The European Commission is taking the matters more seriously than before. Its explicit aim is to create a public forum for the discussion "(Brüggemann 2005).</p>
2005-2009	<p>Tendency to further political integration continue. In times of economic crisis Habermas (in Jeffries 2010) in May 2010, noticed that the latter has also affects on the debate on the European integration and Single market.</p> <p>In the case of the developments in the field of European fiscal policy in the euro area, we can observe federal decision making process that increases the distance of the citizens from the European institutions in policy-making. Communication strategy has become a priority and this time they were also Member States that were willing to cooperate.</p>	<p>White Paper on the European Communication Policy (2005) stressed the need to develop a more personal relationship with the European institutions and citizens.</p> <p>The use of metaphors, blurred messages and other marketing strategies were more frequent than in previous strategies.</p> <p>Its primary purpose was to persuade (one-way) communication. It applied marketing and arcane strategy. Communications policy in this period failed to achieve its objectives. Implementation of the normative model of symmetric, two-way communication in the circumstances was not possible.</p>

Source: own, upon bibliography: Adonin's report (1984), Basinée (2007), Brüggemann (2005); De Clerq's report (1993), Shore (1999), Wallace et al. (2006), White Paper on the European Communication Policy (2005), Habermas (2010 in Jeffries 2010).

The pressures of globalization, enlargements and aspirations for political integration have enhanced the tendency of the executive actors to aim at the closer participation of the citizens in the EU project since 1990s. As noticed in the Table 4, this trend has increased the use of advertising and marketing strategies in the European Communication Policy. On the other hand, the Communication policy objectives cannot be achieved with the persuasive communication models (Brügeman 2005, Grunig and Hunt 1984 classification). Two-way symmetrical communication (Grunig and Hunt 1984) as a normative model is in a given EU context not possible due to the “output democracy”, which prevails in the EU.

Many wonder in which way the EU will develop, what is its identity and how the European elite has imagined its further development. Will the European Union disintegrate or will in crisis be even more united? The European Elections 2014 will provide some answers. Among “eurocrats” I have often heard the opinion that the elite in the European Union regulates first and then tests the legislation in practice. If we accept Dahl’s thesis (1971) that in times of economic growth the hegemonies are threatened and during the economic crisis the democracies, then the outcome is not promising for the democratization of the EU.

Dahl (1971) said that in times of high unemployment or inflation the tendency towards central guidance of the political systems is generated, which is more true in the EU with each passing day. European Union is led by the political elite and communication policy is a reflection of its vision. The use of the European communication policy and its strategies is to be further researched upon two case studies.

In the case study of the Electoral Campaign in 2009 European elections, we confirmed the hypothesis, that policy objective cannot be achieved with the persuasive models of communication.

To evaluate the policy making and implementation of the communication campaign it is necessary to put it in a political context. The recession in the EU has just started and its full consequences were yet to come. The citizens were most concerned about the unemployment and economic growth. 23% of the population in the EU in 2009 was considered to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion. A lack of legitimacy of the institutions, the absence of a European public sphere and

the lack of interest of the citizens for the European themes persisted. Difficult ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and declining voter turnout in European elections<sup>12</sup> since the nineties was a further indicator of the lack of legitimacy and the support for the system.

Since the EU's support largely depends on economic indicators, also due to harsh economic situation, there was a declining public support at that time. The theory of Follesdal, Hix (2005) that in less democratic or undemocratic regimes, citizens transferred the blame for the crisis on the system and in democratic systems, on the current government (Follesdal, Hix 2005, 154)<sup>13</sup>, showed a grim picture of public trust in EU institutions.

The decision makers (with the help of the outsourced agency which was Sholtz&friends from Berlin, which prepared a strategic documents), have decided that the campaign would not be designed to appeal to citizens' civic duty, but to highlight that major policy choices confronting the EU, which would affect people's lives. It was "an issue orientated" at pointing out the topics that the citizens were most concerned about. "...simple messages with a direct link to the citizens" were used and it should have appealed to "all shades of political opinion". (EC, April 2010). The cost was 21 million euros and seven times higher than in 2004.

The objectives of the campaign were based on the data from Eurobarometer 71 and should have highlighted areas of interest and concern of the citizens and improve their knowledge/notion about the impact of the European Parliament in everyday life. The campaign should have encouraged citizens to make choices. The motto: "By using your vote, you decide on the most important issues of your future" (EC, April 2010), it should have enhanced their notion of the influence they have on policy making. Parliament also adopted, for the first time ever, a common communication strategy for all the Member States, emphasizing the need for a single campaign with a single logo and a set of activities, tools, and messages deployed across 27 Member States. The campaign had over 1000 various events and

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<sup>12</sup> 1979 63%, 1984 61 %, 59 % 1989, 57% 1994, 49 % 1999 and 45.3% in 2004 (in the new Member States around 30 %) and in 2009 only 43%.

<sup>13</sup> In March 2009 45 % (51% in October, November 2008) of respondents answered that they trusted the European Parliament, 36 % (51% in October, November 2008) the European Commission and 39% (48% in October, November 2008) the European Central Bank.

used various communication tools. Media strategy included all types of media – even the most “yellow” ones. (interview Venerge Žaneta, 2009). The aim was to achieve at least 50% of the average turnover and justify the legitimacy. The result (43%) did not reach the policy goal. Participation in the 2009 European elections has reached a new low. It contained several characteristics of a marketing and arcane strategy (Brüggemann 2005) and press Agency/publicity model (Grunig and Hunt 1984).

A good example of the marketing/ arcane approach is the application of the objective “simple messages”, which has been changed into “unclear messages”.

Picture 1: Example of the jumbo posters in EP 2009 campaign



The application was intentional. “The lack of clarity enables an individual to understand the message, depending on the predisposition and susceptibility. In this way the message can reach the target group and subgroups. “Strategic ambiguity is particularly useful in short television messages, where the target audience is undefined”. (Rice and Atkin 2001, 65-66). It is “arcane” strategy (Brüggemann, 2005) because it deliberately misleads. It is based on the notion that ambiguity during processing the messages results in increased introspection and elaboration.

Other marketing and persuasive models were used in the 2009 electoral campaign and from the standpoint of the marketing approach there were no apparent mistakes. The application of the marketing

strategy into the political process is possible due to a changed nature and function of the media from the 60s onwards. It allows and even encourages this type of approach. The capitalist system requires competition in the field of advertising and politicians are no exception. "Herbert Schiller observes that in contemporary capitalism politicians are sold to public, much like soap and automobiles". (McNair 2003, 42)

The analysis of the Electoral campaign in 2009 showed that the leap towards democratization and transparency in the EU, has not yet been reached.

If a turn out at the elections has a decreasing (thou in 2014 elections there was 0,09% increase, but still a falling since 63% in 1979), due to changed historical, political circumstances and changed habits of the electo-rate, then the marketing/arcane strategies in the campaign cannot redirect this trend and even have a contra - productive effect.

The analysis of the Croatian pre-accession campaign is interesting due to the elements of the "arcane" strategy (Brüggemann, 2005), which in that form has not been seen very often.

Though the circumstances of the Croatian accession to the EU, which took over ten years and were encountered with several problems including border disputes, corruption affairs, refugee returns issues and war crimes prosecutions, on July 1st 2013 Croatia finally became the EU Member. The process of accession in Croatia has been strongly supported by the political elite, but the public opposed. Therefore, an arcane communication strategy has been applied.

*"Since negotiations began, almost all Croatian parliamentary political parties, and Croatian governments, have been strongly in favor of EU accession. In contrast, since 2004, between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of Croatian citizens have been against joining the EU. Nevertheless, Croatian politicians have continuously ignored this part of public opinion. This willful ignorance has meant that there has been very little public debate about EU membership, and there has been no comprehensive and concrete information about the possible consequences of joining the EU. As a result, Croatian citizens' knowledge of the EU has been quite low. For example, a survey from as recently as 2011 showed that about 87 per cent of citizens considered that they were not informed enough about the EU, while more*

*recent data (collected after the referendum) showed that only 15 per cent of citizens considered themselves to be well informed about the EU.” (<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/04/02/croatia-euroscepticism/>)*

We can presume that the deliberate lack of the information and communication among citizens on EU topics was not unintentional. Karp et al (2003) researched the correlation between knowledge and the satisfaction with the democracy and concluded “...those with political knowledge are significantly less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU. (Karp et al. 2003, 18).

The assessment of the printed materials, however, showed a slightly different picture. The brochures were “information friendly”. Brochure with “Q&A” presented in the “user friendly” form the issues that Croatians were most concerned about. The research was conducted on the limited number of the printed material and therefore we have not enough information for the evaluation of the effects of the implementation of the information strategy in the pre – accession campaign.

## **CONCLUSION**

The hypotheses that the European communication policy and its communication strategies have been changing incrementally and the persuasive communication models prevail, have been tested and confirmed.

In the research (Zagajsek 2013) Scharpf’s (1999) and Dahl’s (1971) models were applied.

We concluded that EU is an »output« democracy (Scharpf 1999) and in the long-term the democratic deficit does not decrease. Dahl (1999) stated that the international organizations cannot be democratic thou EU it is not a (mere) international organisation and not (yet) a federal state. It is “sui generis” entity.

Lack of the European demos, common language, culture and identity hampers the establishment of the European public sphere and therefore maintaing the democratic deficit.

However, the participation of citizens in the EU project is necessary if the elites wish to follow their aspirations to pursue political integration and further enlargement processes.

In tackling democratic deficit and constructing the European Public Sphere the Communication policy and its strategies have been applied, but the implementation deficit is present and its goals haven't been reached.

Dominant models in public communication in the European Union have been, since 1958 persuasive (Brüggemann 2005) and asymmetric models of communication (Grunig and Hunt 1984).

We concluded that the democratic deficit cannot be overcome by the information and persuasion models, but the models which would come as close as possible to the normative symmetric, two-way communication model (Grunig in Hunt 1984).

On the other hand, the implementation of the normative model is limited by the "output democracy" which prevails in the EU.

Using marketing and persuasive communication models in the EU campaigns have not been effective and have not contributed to the legitimacy and credibility of the EU institutions.

The question whether the persuasive models should be replaced by the information ones until the structural changes take place and upon the completion of the integration process, remains unanswered by the European institutions and the present practise remain unchanged.

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# Searching for the Sustainable Security Cooperation Model and Spreading of Security Culture in the Western Balkans

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## ABSTRACT

The concept of regionalization as a new paradigm can verify the ability and capability of the countries to cooperate and participate at the international relations in many fields (politics, economy, security, etc.) within the region and beyond. Well established and efficient regional security cooperation can be described as an important precondition for development of the region, especially for the post-conflict one such as it is the case of Western Balkans. The aim of this article is to examine so far initiated and developed security cooperation model that was built in last two decades, and to discover its advantages and disadvantages. In that sense, here is discussed a theoretical framework of the most wanted models for security cooperation („security community“ and „regional partnership“) and explained how community of the Western Balkans is functioning in practice. Also, the purpose is to stress how important is the concept of security culture with it's specificity for stabile security cooperation in the Western Balkans.

Methodological tools that have been used in the article are analysis and synthesis method as well as the method of description of current circumstances and assumptions about theoretical and practical aspects of searching for sustainable security cooperation model and spreading of security culture in the Western Balkans.

**KEY WORDS:** security cooperation model, security community, regional security partnership, security culture.

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**POVZETEK**

Koncept regionalizacije kot nova paradigma lahko preveri pripravljenost in sposobnost držav, da sodelujejo v mednarodnih odnosih na številnih področjih (politika, gospodarstvo, varnost itd.) tako v regiji kot tudi širše. Vzpostavljeno in učinkovito varnostno regionalno sodelovanje je pomemben predpogoj za razvoj v regiji, še posebej v tistih postkonfliktnih, kot je to Zahodni Balkan. Cilj članka je preveriti model varnostnega sodelovanja, ki je bil spodbujen in razvit v minulih dveh desetletjih, ter ugotoviti njegove prednosti in pomanjkljivosti. V tem smislu razpravljamo o teoretičnih okvirih najbolj zaželenih modelov varnostnega sodelovanja (varnostna skupnost in regionalno partnerstvo) in predstavimo, kako varnostna skupnost na Zahodnem Balkanu deluje v praksi. Prav tako poudarjamo, kako pomemben je koncept varnostne kulture, s svojimi specifikami, za stabilno varnostno sodelovanje na Zahodnem Balkanu. V prispevku uporabljamo metode analize in sinteze ter deskripcije in sklepanja o teoretičnih in praktičnih vidikih iskanja trajnostnega modela varnostnega sodelovanja ter uveljavljanja varnostne kulture na Zahodnem Balkanu.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** model varnostnega sodelovanja, varnostna skupnost, regionalno varnostno partnerstvo, varnostna kultura

**INTRODUCTION**

The concept of security has changed in last few decades what was affected by occurrence of new security challenges, which request new measures for securing of the contemporary security. That new trends require from all states and the international community to search for new models, mechanisms and instruments that can be sustainable and efficient. Searching for the most appropriate model is a very complex activity, associated with the security policy, and that also includes other dimensions (political, economic, social, cultural, etc.).

In theory and practice of providing modern security after the Cold War three models are dominant: a) national – state relies on its own security system, b) multinational – covering international agreements (bilateral and multilateral) in the field of security and defense, c) international – assuring security through the membership in organizations and institutions.

Cooperation in the field of providing modern security, in practical terms, is achieved through several key concepts, such as cooperative security, the security communities, regional programs or other partnerships and others, where is the crucial common interest and orientation of all actors to search for peace and prosperity.

The most important assumption on establishment and functioning of the security community is based on the importance of cultural congruence institutions and policies, values and norms, procedures and systems. This thesis confirms the view of Attina, who points out that the differences in the functioning of cultural systems, institutions and policies, can cause instabilities and conflicts or can defect cooperation and integrations (Attina, 2004). Searching for the most efficient model is especially present within the regions that have undergone dramatic experiences of conflict, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization as well as political and economic transition, and which particularly try to establish a functional system based on cooperation in providing security. Such is the situation with the Western Balkans since mid 1990's, where in two decades so many attempts were going on to make safe and stable region, through the launch of a number of sustainable models, ranging from initiatives to restore peace to the formation of institutions for security cooperation.

If we go through the analysis of many aspects of cooperation, it indicates that there has not been yet established a sustainable model that would have characteristics of the security community or some kind of the regional partnerships in the most optimistic form. However, crucial for understanding the complexity of the situation in the Western Balkans is the knowledge that region suffers from lack of certain components on which security communities are based. Contemporary models of providing security are challenging and request compatibility of many aspects. For building of security communities, it is believed, the necessary preconditions are trust, belongingness, and reconciliation, along with internalizing the notion of resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner (Grillot, Cruise and D'Erman, 2007).

The purpose of this article is to highlight a few aspects that influence the search for a sustainable model of security cooperation, relating to the Western Balkans, which are important for the understanding of problems in establishing a sufficient model of community. That is why we want to start with a few issues important for understanding

the need to seek sustainable regional security cooperation model and for investigating arguments why process doesn't go faster. In addition to that, following research questions and statements are going to be starting points for investigation:

- How security cooperation was initiated, what were the reasons and from whom what it was initiated? The cooperation was mainly initiated by international actors (organizations or states) and it was mostly improved through their initiatives (e.g. membership in NATO, EU; regional initiatives as Adriatic Chapter, SELEC Center, RCC, etc.).
- Are the countries in the region more interested in joining larger security communities (NATO, the EU) than for establishment of community in Western Balkans? Some of the countries are already integrated into NATO and the EU (e.g. Croatia) or only into NATO (e.g. Albania), while the others are in different phase of integration (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro).
- Is it realistic to expect soon the establishment of the security community in the Western Balkans, because of the lack of the necessary preconditions (political, economic, social, etc.) and an inadequate level of confidence?
- Is "regional partnership" (Attina, 2004) sufficient cooperation model that doesn't request demanding conditions, such as is the case with the security community, and whether there are intensive contacts and collaboration between security agencies through various forms of cooperation, sufficient enough for regional cooperation?
- Could the increased number of initiatives for security cooperation in the Western Balkans contribute to the establishment of adequate and permanent cooperation model in a long-term perspective and how cooperative initiatives will be implemented in the regional context, after accession of Western Balkan countries into NATO and the EU?

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY MODEL – SECURITY COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP IN SECURITY CULTURE**

For reaching a sustainable security model in the Western Balkans, theoretical framework could be built around two cooperation models that are represented over this issue. These two models are Deutsch's

„security community“ and Attina’s „regional partnership“ cooperation models. For the last few decades one of the security cooperation models that is theoretically considered is Karl Deutsch’s model, which is recognized in practice through the effective action of the dominant international security actors, the NATO and the EU, both recognized as mature security communities (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).

Security community, as a model for providing security, became remarkable significant with the change of security paradigm and with applying comprehensive approach to security. This concept is based on the premise that security is pursued by individuals and states as one of the main common objectives on which depend many other values (well being, prosperity, satisfaction, etc.). But the main interest of states for turning to system of international security was caused by the inability to overcome such large range of security challenges and provide protection (Deutsch, 1957). The main characteristic of the security community, as a model of joint provision, is to perceive security as a common goal and interest of all countries that are part of the community. According to the initial meaning of this concept, it refers to the region or group of countries, which have no possibility for occurrence of war (Deutsch, 1957). Modern interpretations, which are akin to the arguments of our discussion, point out that basic notion of security community, is promoting the idea of integration and the “sense of unity” (Kay, 2006).

The greatest advantage of this concept is the pursuit to set aside war, determination to preserve peace and willingness to solve possible conflicts within the community by peaceful models and to refrain from using force to resolve disputes. This characteristic of security communities is particularly important in the post-conflict regions. Deutsch has considered preconditions for construction of a security community and stressed the importance of congruent system of values within the community for solving social problems in a peaceful manner (Deutsch, 1957). Within the security community, some other aspects should be developed and comprehensive cooperation established in different fields (economic, ecologic, cultural, etc.) in addition to achieve deeper mutual relations and trust, encouraging economic development, promoting common values and ideas, improving political systems and establishing law enforcement and rule of law, etc. Theorists, who promoted security community model, underlined this as being of essential existence of cultural and insti-

tutional compatibilities within the community (Attina, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Two forms of security communities are recognized in Booth and Wheeler's analysis:

1. Joint community-created by two or more states that has common institutions (e.g. United States),
2. Pluralistic community – created by formally independent states (e.g. the European Union).

The European Union is considered as the most prosperous example of security community and the reason for that is democratic peace that exist within the EU (Goodby, Buwalda and Trenin, 2002; Cohen and Mihalka, 2001).

There is a list of measures that Union has undertaken in the last few decades with the aim to establish an efficient cooperation within the security community (Attina, 2004):

- Construction of the concept of cooperative security and strengthening of trust, in order to prevent any need for use of military force;
- Engagement of the states in building resources for rapid intervention and prevention of military actions and aggression;
- Construction of military and civilian capacities for crisis management;
- Providing economic assistance to countries and the support for establishment of economic integrations, with the aim to improve economic balance in development and well-being;
- Political assistance in establishing democracy and insisting on democratic procedures, with the aim to eliminate violent aspirations of individuals or social groups;
- Encouraging civil society and the promotion of social pluralism, with the aim to improve transnational relations.

It is a challenging issue whether or not the model of the „regional security partnership“ developed by Attina in 2004, may serve for the implementation of cooperation and could it be more realistic and more suitable for the Western Balkans in this actual phase when the region is focused on cooperation and integration. By the definition and explanation of Attina, the concept of the regional security partnership covers all aspects of the security arrangements in region and it is build „with the consensus of the states to cooperate on the

reduction of violence and enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements and mechanisms, such as formal security treaties, international security organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy measures, and also measures for influencing the domestic structures and processes of the countries at risk of internal violence“ (Attina, 2004, p.4).

The main similarity between these two models is they are committed to peace and stability in the region, and enforce multilateral cooperation of security agencies. The difference between them is that regional security partnership covers the entire defense and security cooperation and for that kind of cooperation it is not necessary to have congruence of national security concepts and institutions, as well as social and cultural conditions, unlike to the security community model where it is important (Attina, 2004). The advantage of the regional security partnership can prevent potential violence and establish peace and stability in a certain region, what is particularly important in post-conflict regions and regions that are in a transitional period of integration in the larger security communities (NATO, the EU).

Theorists suggest that security community model depends on its evolution due to the different purpose and level of progress of the region. States use this model for cooperation in security manners but also over the time members can identify and socialize with the community or commonly solve social and other problems (Grillot, Cruise. and D’Erman, 2007). It’s also important to highlight that the evolution of the security community has three phases: 1. “nascent” phase – dynamic but precipitating relations and cooperation, 2. “ascendant” phase – tighter and deeper relations, 3. “mature” phase – completely developed and stabilized security community (Adler and Barnet, 1998). Due to the Adler and Barnet phase’s assessment, in our opinion actual level of security cooperation in the Western Balkans, confirms that evolution of the security community is in the first phase.

Security culture has become an integral part and condition in contemporary approaches to assure security, because of the role it plays in terms of establishing an efficient security system for providing

security. And it is of great importance for establishing a sustainable security cooperation model in the Western Balkans. Security culture covers set of values, norms, attitudes, behaviours, identities and other aspects, which have an impact on security (Stajić, Mijalković and Stanarević, 2005, p.34). Also, it refers to general beliefs, opinions and attitudes on security what is right, good and desirable and they are formed within different social groups. The role of security culture is to rise awareness about self-initiative and self-consciousness in performing security functions in order to protect societal values, while respecting the legal and ethical norms. As it is stated by Gheciu, security culture of international security is a common system of mutual, socially constructed meanings and attitudes of what is important and what is challenging in international politics (Gheciu, 2008).

### **BUILDING THE COMMUNITY OF COMMON INTEREST**

There has been a lot of discussion on security cooperation in the Western Balkans, but everyone agrees it represent common interest within the region and beyond. We should not forget the region went through a difficult and turbulent period after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the emergence of ethnic conflicts, but since the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) was signed, a lot of work has been done in its stabilization and promotion. Region itself has carried negative connotations in a sense of being one of the major causes of security threats in Europe. Such assessments were inevitable and justified for some time, having in mind the turbulent past of this region, especially during the 1990s. For more than two decades, the Western Balkans was a synonym for ethnic conflicts, civil wars, violation of fundamental human rights. For years, the Western Balkans was facing various turbulences and became one of the challenging parts for the security of the world.

Nevertheless, that opinion has been changed and it seems that region has managed to evolve from that stage. Countries of the region became a part of the various regional cooperation initiatives and institutions such as SEE Law Enforcement Center (SELEC), the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECF), the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), RACVIAC, the US-Adriatic Charter and many others. The Western Balkans is considered to be a region in transition, putting its violent past behind, where cooperation has,

at least at the first sight, become obvious choice of political elites. Such change in the setting is primarily motivated to start investigating whether recent cooperation between the Western Balkan states and some of their institutions reached the phase, where armed conflicts have been left behind.

In the following theoretical framework, we shall investigate security cooperation aspects in order to see what and whether any type of security community has been developed in the Western Balkans so far.

Regional security cooperation was socially constructed in the context of certain needs of the region and was mainly initiated by the international community, at very first place by NATO and the EU. These two actors had a crucial role in stabilization of the region and capacity improvement and they are responsible for the progress, which has been made in last two decades. According to some opinions, crucial goal of all Western Balkans countries is membership in one or both organizations (the EU and NATO) and it has „motivated a series of actions towards structural reforms in each of the countries“ (Grillot, Cruise and D’Erman, 2007, p.33). The essential promotion of regional cooperation within the Western Balkans was encouraged and requested from both the EU and NATO, primarily through the membership requirements. Undertaken processes were oriented through the EU and NATO strategies based on the following aspects – first, building bilateral relations with each country and giving support for political, economic and other development, and second, regional policies and relations in the Western Balkans with an aim to challenge regional responsibility of every country and to show that their role depends on capacity to cooperate with neighbours and to participate in some kind of community.

In charge of building and recovering systems of the Western Balkans, the most active role is played by the European Union, which constantly highlights that proven readiness to promote good neighbouring relations as one of the main precondition for all regional states in terms of membership in the EU. This idea was institutionalised in the specific document called Stabilization and Association Agreement signed by all Western Balkan countries that constitutes the framework of relations between the European Union and the Western Balkan countries, but agreements are adapted to the specific situation of each partner country.

All countries of the region from the beginning had prospects for membership in the EU and it was the binding element for them to have greater or smaller interest in fostering regional cooperation. Currently, the main challenge is how to cross from actual level of security cooperation and materialize it through the specific security community of common interest. Region is confronted with the phenomenon of a large number of initiatives and institutions from the area of cooperation in defence, police and border issues as well as security oversight sector (parliamentarian and civilian cooperation) and other fields of cooperation. The fact is a large network has been created, but it became an obstacle and a burden for regional institutions. Some of initiatives and institutions have similar missions or goals, very often do the same tasks and it shows that certain reforms in cooperation framework need to be done with respect for both the interest of the countries and of the region. Regarding that, it is possible that countries in the region feel fatigue from regional perspectives and reforms and that is why they are more interested in joining into larger security communities (the EU and NATO) than in the establishment of own security community in the Western Balkans.

The Euro-Atlantic integration has contributed during last years to the stability and development of the whole region, but the Western Balkan countries need to act together in establishing common interest, regardless of the fact that each of them will get integrated according to its own will or progress. Over a longer period of time, the countries of the Western Balkans have been facing numerous challenges, from resolving some constitutional issues to problems related to reinforcement of their state institutions (e.g. slow political reforms and democratic promotion, socio-economic incompetence, delay in security sector reforms, etc.). States are suffering either from the problems of transition or postconflict reconstruction, and they are able with varying degrees of success to overcome challenges of transition and to achieve standards for integration into international organizations (Tatalović and Cvrtila, 2010, p. 29). During the year 2013 and at beginning of 2014, some positive movements towards accession of the region into the European Union were achieved - Croatia became a member of the EU and Montenegro started the negotiation process. Serbia has started with the negotiation process in January 2014. Albania and Kosovo are looking forward to improve the status of their respective countries in relations with the EU after successful election and the agreement with Serbia. On the other

side, Bosnia and Herzegovina awaits restructuring of the federation in order to proceed on the way to the European integration, while the Republic of Macedonia is faced with a difficult compromise with Greece on 'the name issue' as a precondition for the NATO and the EU membership.

The future of the Western Balkans countries will depend on whether the states will be successful in overcoming these challenges. The Western Balkan countries are facing obstacles such as meliorating and concealing old problems with a new approach, assessing strengths and weaknesses of the regional cooperation mechanisms. Regarding this, in the following years the challenge for regional states and international organizations will be to find space in which the regional organizations will be able to develop and provide support for maximizing security cooperation and to arrange community of common interest.

As the concept of community of common interest, the Katzenstein's vision could be applied, which highlights that organization and functioning of formal security institutions need to include wider fields and dimensions, and to be based on something that could be called „security identity“ (Katzenstein, 1996). The author supports his approach with the example of NATO as a security community that over the past few years expanded its effects through a partnership, rather than through expansion.

## **SECURITY COOPERATION AND COMMUNITY IN PRACTICE**

Regional security cooperation in the Western Balkans in practice has been realized mostly in parallel with the process of post-conflict development of the region and we can say these were two compatible processes. Some of the aspects that marked the whole process and have oriented the formation of security community, were ethnic tensions and intolerance, political tensions between the states, economic development, security risks.

Security risks in the Western Balkans have different roots and causes (socio-economic uncertainty, ethnical tensions, ecologic hazards, political impacts, etc.) and sometimes they are mixed as well as securitized and politicized, depending on current needs of politi-

cians what provokes social distrust and sense of desperation about the future. Very important fact is that the most of the security risks have spillover effects on the region. During the preparation of this article, a huge problem started to shake Bosnia and Herzegovina, what can also have some impacts all over the region (e.g. support to Bosnian demonstrators has been shown in some other states within the region).<sup>2</sup>

One should also point out that the issue of human security was unfairly neglected in the Western Balkans because it has an important role for internal stability and security what shown demonstrations in Bosnia.

Some of the economic security challenges and obstacles in the Western Balkans that slow down the integration processes, both on regional and international level, are poverty, unemployment, corruption and property transfers, fall of foreign direct investments and inter-regional trade caused by institutional and administrative weaknesses, political instability, organized crime and corruption. Regional economic situation can be regarded as having important security dimensions or implications. By some theorists, most of the conflicts just happen in the poorest parts of the world (Collins, 2007, pp.93). Economic cooperation and integration may be driven by the desire to reduce the human security risks as it is one of the new obstacles for the regional improvement of the establishment of community in practice.

The importance of economic prosperity and development of the region is stressed in the SEE 2020 Development Strategy prepared by RCC (*SEE 2020 Development Strategy*, Sarajevo, Regional Cooperation Council, 2013). Also, Strategy focuses on corruption as a security risk that influences governments and national institutions, and which request the regional response, as it is stated in document: „The overall objective of this dimension is to formulate coordinated regional measures that seek to reduce corruption in public administration, so as to improve government effectiveness, enhance the business environment and support the implementation of the other pillars. The need to counter corruption is essential to the broad

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<sup>2</sup> Political and social demonstrations began in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early February 2014. Demonstrators requested political shifts and better economic and social conditions for the citizens.

goal of promoting growth, since corruption is a major deterrent to investment; but there is also a need to ensure that the work carried out in the SEE 2020 Strategy specifically is not undermined by corruption.“ (SEE 2020 Development Strategy, RCC, 2013, p. 31).

Another important issues are democracy and human rights in the region, which could increasingly come to be viewed as a part of the security agenda. These are important issues that shape the regional security complex in the Western Balkans and it seems crucial to solve them because of their security implications which shape regional security community in practice. In the region so far there has not been readiness to improve human security capacities, but raising protests are a sign that something in practice has to be done very soon.

One of the thesis which jeopardizes the community in practice is building communication and relations between the countries and impact of problematic nature of post-conflict societies, where many security concerns come from internal ones. This idea is a basic obstacle for stimulating the development of the security community in practice, which has to create rather a stable peace not simply a stable order (Grillot, Cruise and D’Erman, 2007).

Analyses of security community in the Western Balkans also do not pay too much attention on the way in which community was created or encouraged in practice by international subjects. Beside that we have to emphasize some positive indicators of the regional security community that exists within the Western Balkans, mostly in an independent context or, on the other hand, main source of commonality is the effort to become the European Union member. Because of the previous reason, each country has articulated some recognition of community building, but it was done only in response to prodding of the international society, and thus we estimate variation among the countries in their commitment to regional stability.

Due to the importance of adequate cooperation in practice for building of the security community and stabilization of the region, one of the positive examples is military cooperation in Western Balkans. Reason for that could be professional heritage from the period of Former Yugoslavia and Yugoslav People’s Army, which were the best evidence of the mature and developed security community such as its grade on the Adler and Barnet scale (Adler and Barnet, 1998).

## SPREADING OF THE SECURITY CULTURE

Security culture concept that is going to be applied here is based on the Peter Katzenstein's framework of analysis, which stresses at least three directions of development of international relations in which culture has important role (Katzenstein, 1996). And some other theorists try to show that security culture manifests itself in the behavior of states, societies and international security organizations (Williams, 2007).

Models of Peter Katzenstein highlight few dimensions of security culture at the multinational level (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 37):

- a) Culture is incorporated into functioning of formal security institutions such as NATO, OSCE, WEU;
- b) Culture is represented through the existence of political culture in international politics, which includes components related to the construction of identity as well as international law and respect for the sovereignty of states, the standardization of social and political institutions and models of economic policy, political discourse of transnational organizations and movements (e.g. Amnesty International, the Green Movement, etc.);
- c) Cultural dimensions of different forms of friendship and enmity that exist in international society.

This three culture dimensions will be analyzed with an aim to prove that they determine the Western Balkans security culture.

Spreading of security culture in the Western Balkans has restarted in mid-1990's with peace and stabilization creation and was guided with idea to find possibilities for reconciliation of the nations that took part in conflicts. It is obvious that certain achievements were accomplished in spreading of security culture in the Western Balkans through three main dimensions that qualify that process and from them this process depends on: firstly, reconciliation, secondly, socialization, and thirdly, building of trust.

First, explanations of the reconciliation in divided societies show it is the only possible way of transformation along with self healing. The proper formula for mediation into divided societies doesn't exist and it is difficult to build relations and measures among the neighbors locked into long-lasting hostile interactions with deep-rooted animosities. But elements and tools on which the efficiency

of the process of reconciliation and healing depends, are some that comes naturally with rebuilding of the confidence and relations after the conflict (such as justice, truth, mercy, peace, etc.). In some specific cases, intentions for reconciliation and nation building in post-conflict societies should be based on teaching and learning common history. However, it does not simple mean that the same reconciliation tools should be used in each single case of the Western Balkans, which don't have consensus about that topic. Investigating of the security culture in the Western Balkans definitely reveals the issue of the regional identity based on strong commitment to ideas, values, and norms inherent in developing security community. Some authors qualify this process as socialization, but in the region it geared towards a shared identity of being „European“ rather than „Balkan“ (Grillot, Cruise and D'Erman, 2007). The third aspect of spreading security culture that traces the potential development of security community in the Western Balkan region is local trust, which continues to be rather weak and there is a various kinds of evidence that demonstrates effects of lack of mutual trust and collective identity. The Western Balkans has some specifics of Booth and Wheeler's explanation of contemporary security dilemma, which consists from three components – fear, trust and cooperation, and which rely on two main characteristics: material – based on physical characteristics (arms, weapons, etc.) and psychological (related with behavior of the politicians) (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).

Interethnic tensions could be a problem for all three mentioned aspects (reconciliation, socialization and trust), which are necessary preconditions both for spreading security culture within the region and for improving security community in practice. The basis of the security culture approach is in the idea that security is built and clearly viewed through emancipation, based on a development of culture of security. The purpose and goal of this approach is to contribute to the emancipation of thinking about security, and it is a particular way of thinking about security system, through the principle of self-perception and decision-making in security matters of all stakeholders. Some of the basic characteristics of security culture are: encourage thinking about security, affect the security assessment and affect decisions on security approach. Security culture is a tool that allows security actors to make a decision on access and activities in providing security, depending on ways, in which they understand security culture (as interest, need or value).

Taking into account the last two explanations on the security culture approach, we want to highlight two important elements for spreading security culture in the Western Balkans: first, human (individuals and societies), and second, institutional (different form of cooperation). Security culture of individual and society depends on the social values, attitudes, behaviours, etc., and it is based on some of the previous mentioned elements (reconciliation, socialization and trust). On the institutional level, security culture mostly depends on norms, but its spreading also depends on the social elements from the first level (e.g. social values, attitudes, behaviours, etc.), because trust, for example, as a main element for cooperation, can't be built without this elements within the region and beyond.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

A lot of efforts have been undertaken in last two decades in the Western Balkans to make the region stabilized and secure as well as to establish the most efficient and prosperous model of security cooperation, based on trust, tolerance and collaboration, with the idea that security is a precondition for development, such as it is stated in the official document of the EU Security Strategy from 2003 (European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in the Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003).

It took a lot of time and energy both for the international society and for local stakeholders (states and regional institutions) for initiating, establishing and developing security cooperation in practice. The region is still facing lack of the sustainable model of cooperation that would be built on the elements of trust and stabilization and would show prospect of the well-established, oriented and sustaining security community. There is no doubt that there is a strong will in the Western Balkans for achieving that sort of community, but some obstacles still exist (political, social, cultural, etc.) and it has inhibiting the process of implementation security community in the region.

It can also be estimated that too many security initiatives, organizations and treaties have been established in the Western Balkans so far, but the issue is, could it be relevant for building of the security community in the region or it makes some kind of counter-

productive effects. So far achieved level of security cooperation in the Western Balkans has characteristics of the regional partnership, but for achieving the appropriate level of security community, there must be some improvements of other aspects of cooperation within the region (economic, political, cultural, etc.). Additionally, also willingness and readiness must exist – or in particular awareness – that would be beneficial for all actors in national and international level to be able to establish this concept in practice and improving it from day to day.

Therefore, it can be concluded that security culture, as an important premise for the security cooperation, still has not reached an adequate level among the Western Balkans countries. Spreading of the security culture in the region depends on sets of values, norms and attitudes, and its main goals, necessary for the security community model to be established, are mutual trust and tolerance for the reconciliation as well as socialization or recognition of the regional identity. Objective approach and analysis of this issue proves that process of searching for the sustainable security cooperation model in the Western Balkans will last for some time.

But there is another challenging topic to be challenged in the Western Balkans, together with the engagement of the international society, namely to intercept or solve some potential security risks that can cause new obstacles for building stable peace. It is a wide spectrum of risks, which can come from the area of the political instability, socio-economic uncertainty, cultural intolerance, ecological hazards, human security and others, as well as from the area of still unresolved problems and disputes (unsolved border issues, ethnic tensions, unfinished peace, minority position, etc.) between the Western Balkan countries that can have impact on the regional security, stability and prosperity.

Research questions and statements listed at the introduction are investigated in the article and have shown that international society both initiated and insisted on persistence of regional security cooperation in the Western Balkans. But countries are rather willing to become members of mature security communities (the EU and NATO) than to establish security community in the region. In the article we have identified reasons for this, which are based on lack of necessary preconditions and non-built security culture. That leads to multiplication of different security cooperation initia-

tives, which still don't contribute to the establishment of a sustainable cooperation model in the Western Balkans. Therefore, either a security community or a regional partnership model need to be established in the Western Balkans very soon. This is important not just because of the institutional framework, but also because of the stabilization of the region and security culture improvement as well as for reconciliation and building the trust between the nations. Also, we shall not forget that conflict emerges when people have difficulty dealing with differences that matter (LeBaron, 2003).

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# book reviews

## **What is Terrorism?**

Bakir Alispahić

*Sara Jud*

## **Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, 1453 to the Present**

Brendan Simms

*Eva Goričan*

Sara Jud

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**Bakir Alispahić**  
**WHAT IS TERRORISM?**

Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and  
International Law, Sarajevo, 2009, 259 pages  
ISBN: 978-9958-740-55-8

In his book »What is terrorism?« Bakir Alispahić adds new dimensions of understanding infamous phenomenon of terrorism. Already so far disputed theoretical, legal and political definition of terrorism Alispahić challenges with social realities and presents terrorism as a separated social phenomenon. He argues that a thorough definition of terrorism must besides so far known theoretical, legal and political dimension involve also wider social context. In a clearly organized structure of the book the author analyses different factors influencing terrorism and our mere perception about it.

As a society expert Alispahić combines different general society components and features and explains their relation to terrorism. Leaving all legal definitions and etymologic questions aside the book highlights so far forgotten aspects of terrorism which made us define almost each controversial action of a disputed group of people as terrorism. Parts of the book where the author exposes the best known definitions

of 'terrorism' and its various classifications might resemble short and succinct encyclopedia. However, it offers a great review of different types of terrorism according to their means and aspired goals. Although such classification might be by some considered as odd in a monograph dealing with wider context of terrorism, it is eventually needed to enable coherent discussion on the topic and prevent miss-usage of certain terms. Special attention is given to the relation between terrorism and Islam. Alispahić (2009, 127) reminds us that "extremism, terrorism and violence are in no way related to Islam." Additionally he stresses out the efforts of the Council for Islamic Faith to introduce common definition of terrorism which would be in compliance with Islamic perspectives and positions and would emphasize the opposite from so far generally thought: that Islam prohibits terrorism and aggression. Thus Alispahić's book offers balanced view on terrorism which is in most cases defined by the dominant West. In the end, the list of 37 terrorist

organizations from all around the world enriched by short description of each organization, their activities, strength, areas of operations and sources for their performance is more than welcomed to get a general overview of the field and break the picture of terrorism as just the performance of well-known al Qaida.

Starting point of the further arguments presented in the book is the chapter dealing with differences between ‘terrorizing’, ‘terror’, ‘violence’, ‘force’ and ‘coercion.’ Those terms are all included into the derivation of the ‘terrorism’ and therefore necessary for its explanation. ‘Terrorizing’ is considered as an act of delivering ‘terror’. Being the major component of terrorism and of the most relevant ones ‘terror’ represents “an act of randomly carrying out violence in order to sustain or fortify governance” (Alispahić 2009, 13). Thus it is implied that the crucial component of terrorism is actually ‘violence’, which due to its complexity – constitution by numerous factors, various qualities, forms, directions and consequences – cannot be defined by a single definition. For a better explanation of terrorism and understanding it as a social phenomenon Alispahić (2009, 20) defines ‘violence’ as “use of force to coerce people into unintended and unwanted behavior or certain results. The force which is used in primarily physical force, but can be

otherwise defined, too.” He equals the meaning of ‘violence’ with ‘coercion’ although he emphasizes the difference that ‘violence’ is reserved for illegal, not allowed and in particular illicit use of force, while ‘coercion’ refers to allowed and permissible use of force. Subsequently the author deals with four different meanings of ‘force’ and thus basically dissects all terms which are combined in the meaning of terrorism. The following helps him by the composition of his own definition in the end of the book, after analyzing the given social context which influence the operation of terrorism and our understanding.

Alispahić argues that social context in most cases predicts that terrorism has a special ‘social structure’ and is not performed randomly and spontaneously. Its actions are directed toward a certain aim and organization’s goal. Therefore he explains that terrorist action cannot be regarded as mere behavior or simple activity, but should be understood as a result of a complex and interconnected system of actions, which are precisely planned and coordinated. Including those criteria terrorism might be described also as a ‘social process.’ Another Alispahić’s assumption is that terrorism corresponds to a specific “sub-system in the system of the global human society” in a particular time period and stage of its development. ‘Social structure’, ‘social process’

and 'social system' as analyzed by Alispahić are briefly described below. Afterwards his completed definition of terrorism is cited with the following comments.

Alispahić defines 'social structure' of terrorism with its subjects, potential causes and reasons, activities, actions and acts of terrorism and its particular methods and means. Special attention is drawn to various conditions in which terrorism can flourish. His explanation of terrorism causes originates in inferiority of individual needs in comparison to social needs, which are satisfied by state organizations. Thus the author looks into mere individual psychology, which is faced and obliged to cope with the given society structure. Of course the later explanation is possible only when based on the prediction that individual needs do not fall in with social needs but are mostly in contradiction.

As an effective 'social process' terrorism has emerged and developed into an organized process. It is "directed by organization and with strong role of organized activity" (Alispahić 2009, 60). Besides, the organization owns special features that ease the identification with the organization, its role and actions. Initial organization role is the articulation of the 'existing' problem, which is followed by programming and planning of specific actions.

Defining terrorism as one of global sub-systems in a given period Alispahić analyses manifest and latent dysfunctions, which appear in the dynamics of all systems. Due to a system complexity and interactions between sub-systems in various levels he believes that some dysfunctions can appear in the system itself, second type of dysfunctions appear in the way how functions are achieved and the third type in the process of developments, which consist of many changes. According to Alispahić terrorism is combined of more sub-systems, which are social, action-based, organized and political.

In the end, it would not be another comprehensive book on terrorism if the author would not compose his own definition of terrorism. However, before composing it, the author analyses difficulties and factors, influencing the type of a final definition. He admonishes of the power of the definition makers who decides whether a single movement and their operations will be considered as terrorism or liberation fight. He recommends that a good definition of terrorism should be sufficiently broad and objective. The result is more than 10 lines long definition proposed by Alispahić. It defines terrorism as "a historical, socio-political action-based phenomenon, which is created and developed in conditions of a conflict of sufficient depth and intensity, and carried

by subjects – actors of terrorism that are specifically organized, less powerful and smaller socio-political groups of subjects or states, fighting, in a systematic, organized manner, against the existing socio-political international order, by applying illegitimate and illegal measure, cruel and hardly foreseeable criminal violence, using available methods and means which cause massive and individual, severe, unjust and unnecessary targeted and random victims and cause major harm, without, as general rule, reaching the achievement of the ultimate socio-political aim as an effect” (Alispahić 2009, 236).

It is worth mentioning that the definition as part of terrorism recognizes only fight against the existing socio-political international order and omits fight against the existing socio-political internal order. Being meticulous we could find also the examples of the later – Islamic Armed Group fighting against the secular Algerian regime, Communist Party of Philippines – New people’s Army aiming to overthrow the government or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia striving to defend autonomous Communist-controlled rural areas. However, on the assumption that smaller units, states, and their internal dynamics affect and drive broader international system, we can approve the above given definition. The connection is clearer in cases of Basque

Fatherland and Liberty Organization (ETA) in Spain, Hamas in Palestine/Israel, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and Irish Republican Army in Ireland. Those groups perform their operations in a territory of one country, trying to achieve succession of a part of its territory as their final aim. Herewith the existing socio-political international order would change. Therefore we might consider their internal operations and fight as a fight against wider socio-political international order. Moreover, the inclusion of state as one of the subjects-actors of terrorism in Alispahić’s definition is something still disputed and therefore a daring author’s step. Even though we might welcome that completion the author fails to further elaborate this issue and provide us with some examples of state terrorism. Terrorism itself being such a disputed issue let alone state terrorism the omission is not surprising. However, on the other side this contributes to the difference between Alispahić’s serious expertise on terrorism and controversial studies which are taken only half seriously. But in the end we can still ask if states’ monopoly over the use of force assures that it is not applied illegitimately and illegally which are two of terrorism characteristics as defined by Alispahić.

Eva Goričan

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**Brendan Simms**  
**EUROPE: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY,**  
**1453 TO THE PRESENT**

Penguin Group Ltd,  
London, 2013, 689 pages  
ISBN: 978-0-713-99427-8

With the year 2014 commemorating the 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the beginning of the World War I Brendan Simms' *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy 1453 to the Present* in times of remembrance and re-evaluation offers a 'stand back and analyse' approach to the most important occurrences of the last half of the millennium. More than 550 years and almost as many content pages are already a statement of its own. Statistics is a lie; nevertheless, summing up the events of one year's time on a roughly one A5 page is a task for the gods considering the filter one must adopt to truly grasp the essentials.

Brendan Simms took on a challenge hardly any current historian would dare to, precisely because our today's knowledge of the past is not only broader but

more profound; what Simms did is prioritizing in the choice of the aspects focused on throughout the last 500 years. Many argued he is dealing too much with the *Mitteleuropa*, especially with Germany, while thematically considers mainly geopolitical dimensions and fails to discuss other areal and cultural contexts. Nevertheless, due to the fact he opens his preface with some strong realist quotations, one should expect nothing else than *realpolitik*. Moreover, it is what undoubtedly adds the internal coherence to the obviously solid outer structure in terms of the division of time periods and chapters. The sole idea and intent behind the book resulted in a work that elaborates on a Hitler's statement (1943) which Simms (2013, 307) quotes at the first page of the chapter Utopias, 1917–44: "Whoever controls Europe will thereby seize the

leadership of the world. It must therefore remain the objective of our struggle to create a unified Europe, but Europe can only be given a coherent structure through Germany.”

The book is more than a plain list of historical facts, it is a story, and the narrative character of it is a loyal companion leading us through the periods of majestic individuals, great empires, unified peoples and diversified ideas. The narration begins with the 1450s when the collapse of the Byzantine Empire paved the way for the Holy Roman Empire to open the floor for the European territorial prevail since, as Simms (2013, 11) presupposes in the introduction, “at some point or the other interests of all the major protagonists intersected there.” He puts the Germany or its emperor predecessors at the core of the interactions and developments on the European grounds, in some aspects even worldwide. As in Simms’ previous book *The Struggle for Mastery in Germany: 1779–1850*, the idea of centrally crucial role of Germany embodies the whole spirit of the book: “In short, it has been the unshakeable conviction of European leaders over the past 550 years, even those

who had no imperial aspirations themselves, that the struggle for mastery would be decided by or in the Empire and its German successor states” (Simms, 2013, 5). Whether or not one agrees with the latter notion – that is continuously, although at times subtly, advocated – it is admittedly the major factor contributing to the book’s coherency. And coherency is one of the book’s best features; it is consolidated by the almost obsessive focus on Germany in assessment of the geopolitical situations with supporting quotations of the IR’s finest that are opening every single chapter.

Overall, the book has a good structure, an intriguing introduction and one should be careful in blaming the author for overindulging in the studies of Germany; after all, Germany had and still has an important role locally and globally, moreover, it has a rather decisive role, especially in the region; regardless of how strongly the liberals would like to believe in the equal membership principle of the European Union (EU), “/s/ome things, however, never change /.../” as Simms points out in the preface (2013, XXVII). European organization has maybe changed

the methodology of direct, cruel and violent conquests for prevalences of individual religious, political, economic, and ideological values, and softened its way of taking on and integrating the surrounding areas; nevertheless, “the principal security issues faced by Europeans have remained remarkably constant over the centuries” (ibid.). Regardless of the continuously emphasized inability of collective action of the EU, sophisticated structural power seems to work rather effectively. Profound realism once again; interests stay the same, only means of their acquisition adapt with time. As author indicates in the conclusive stages of the book, finally, Germany’s calmness due to being “the centre of Europe without direct threats to [their] border /.../” has much to do with the further success and development orientation of the EU since “Europe’ had now served its purpose,” and Germany prefers to “/.../ rest secure in their fortress,” (Simms, 2013, 513).

As a theory enthusiast, and also in the line with author’s conclusive (rhetorical) questioning, there is a point I feel it is necessary to raise: while I sincerely believe strong consolidated structure of

the academic text is of essential importance, and it is honest to say the author more than fulfils it, I cannot help but wonder whether it is appropriate, beneficial and relevant to, firstly, establish the model, the structure, the narrative and then fill it with the facts, the data, the events, or should they speak for themselves and we should be merely distance ourselves and seize the pattern? Same model with different titles could be, thereon, used in the context of liberal institutionalism, Marxism or any other IR theory. As always, the unarguable point one can draw from the notion of the ‘big picture’ perspective regardless of one’s theoretical orientation is: history is subjected to interpretation. And Simms’ is, at least seemingly, convincing.

The comendable characteristics about the book are author’s courage, prioritization in the areas and topics, and, in the largest portion, external and internal cohesiveness. Needless to say, the work targets its audience already with the title, and if not with it, then definitely with the preface; realist conviction of the reader is almost a precondition, however, you may still enjoy it as a hobby historian or else since it takes the

form of a narration, especially in the beginning setting mood, and the ending's 'non'-prophesies. Possibly one could find it a bit stretchy in the middle; however, the historic facts cannot be mould to the preference of the story. Or can they? Whereas the excellence of coherency is pointed out by the reviewer on so many occasions, one cannot overlook the fact, it can be at times perceived as forced.

Half of a millennium is ridiculously hard – and time-consuming as the long list of references suggests – to describe in details; therefore, the focus on formation of states, wars, dissolution of states and treaties leaves out other aspects, and results in the continuous emphasize on the primacy of foreign policy, yet is at times ignorant of the life outside the European instant domain such as the Central Asia. One may resent Simms as well the presupposition of autonomous development of European countries, with respect to the above mentioned disregard of the indirectly influencing outer variables, and failure to take into consideration the importance of European success in use of new technological advancements while, ironically, triumphs the

development of progressive political thought in Europe over the less eccentric legacies of the Ottoman and the Chinese Empire.

However, every coin has two sides, one usually shinier than the other. Nevertheless, as Simms' overview of European history, it is of a substantial matter, and definitely worth picking it up. The rest is up to interpretation.



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**A Reflection on Diplomacy as an Activity in the Case  
of Literary Works from Southern Europe**

*Mira Delavec Touhami*



# A Reflection on Diplomacy as an Activity in the Case of Literary Works from Southern Europe

Mira Delavec Touhami<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

The article is based on the case study of five literary classics of Southern Europe. To study individual literary works and to determine a reflection of diplomacy as an activity in the chosen works in specific details, we created a matrix for the study. In the matrix, the items we were looking for in the literary works, are listed. Based on their presence and frequency, there are two goals we had set. Firstly, to what extent each work contains diplomatic elements, and secondly, to what extent they are present in all of the selected works. Like this, we were making an attempt to generalize characteristics for the selected group of literary works, both for the individual periods as well as during the entire period represented by the selected works. In this way we were trying to determine if and to what extent we can confirm that diplomacy reflection is a permanent feature of literary works, and to what extent such a presence can also be a starting point for understanding the process of creating customary international law norms, motivated by literary works and their reflection of diplomatic reality in a specific historical context. The results are interesting for those following a similar analysis of literary works.

**KEYWORDS:** diplomacy, Southern Europe, literature, diplomats, consuls, international customary law customs.

## POVZETEK

Članek predstavlja študijo primera petih del literarne klasike iz Južne Evrope. Navedena dela smo analizirali z namenom poiskati v njih

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vidike diplomacije kot dejavnosti. V ta namen smo oblikovali matrico, s katero nazorneje prikažemo prisotnost in pomembnost teh vidikov za posamezno delo. Zanimalo nas je, do katere mere sega ta prisotnost v posameznem delu in obenem v vseh, s čimer smo skušali ugotoviti splošen trend pojavljanja in pomena, torej, ali lahko govorimo o refleksiji diplomacije kot o stalni značilnosti teh del. Obenem nas je zanimalo, ali lahko tako pojavljanje povežemo s procesom oblikovanja mednarodnega običajnega prava in ali morda pojavnost diplomatskih elementov v literarni fikciji kot odraz konkretnega zgodovinskega obdobja in okolja spodbuja to oblikovanje.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** diplomacija, Južna Evropa, literatura, diplomati, konzuli, mednarodno običajno pravo, običaji

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In this contribution the analysis of five selected works of literary fiction from Southern Europe that emerged in the various historical periods are presented. The first selected work is called *The Chronicles of Travnik* and it is also the only one in the analysis written by a diplomat, a Bosnian writer Ivo Andrić (1945). *Lonely Travelling to Distant Lands: A Tragedy of a Women* is a novel by a Slovenian writer Alma Maksimiljana Karlin (1969). The work is interesting mainly because it comes from a writer of personal experience with the world of diplomacy. Completely different are drama *Badger on Tribunal* by a Serbian writer Petar Kočić (1904) and drama *Messrs. Glembay* written by a Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža (1928). It turns out that both literary works include several elements of criminal law but not elements of diplomacy. The last of the five chosen works is a very interesting book for diplomatic analysis titled *The Mountain Wreath* (1848) written by a Montenegrin writer Petar Petrović Njegoš.

## 2. THE PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCHED LITERARY WORKS

### 2.1 *The Chronicles of Travnik, Ivo Andrić (1945)*

Ivo Andrić was a writer, a diplomat and a Nobel Prize winner for literature, whose works are well known in classic literature.

The story takes place in 1806 when Napoleon opens the French Consulate in the Bosnian Meadow<sup>2</sup> and French Consul General Jean Baptiste Etienne Daville moves to Bosnia with his family to develop trade relations with France and watch over the movement of Turkish serfs in Bosnia and Serbia, in Travnik, where pro-western government Vizier Mehmed Pasha Husref, works as a consul. Before the Consul comes with his wife, the house with a large garden is renovated and refurnished with the “coat of arms and a flag, which will always be visible and hung on the building of a foreign consulate” (Andrić, 1989: 38.) At first, the consul comes alone, without the rest of the family. Due to bad weather, the parade does not attract much attention. Most of the people are “conceived consuls or other high dignitaries wear shiny uniforms, full of sequins and decorations, riding horses being taken around in carriages” (Andrić, 1989: 40). The Consul also has his translator and in addition has to follow the rules of their country and know those of Bosnia. He has great difficulties with getting used to the new food “(...) it was because of the spicy oriental food that he suffers from stomachaches. So he often gets up at night and drinks cold water that cools his painful stomach” (Andrić, 1989: 40). The French consul Jean Daville is closer to forty than thirty years, “he is tall and blonde, has an upright posture and a sincere gaze. A notebook of poems and two or three bold drafts of historical social dramas were left in a box; he refuses a modest position of a clerical trainee and becomes a journalist. He publishes poems and articles on literature, his main concern is a constituent assembly” (Andrić, 1989: 40). Daville is a conscientious consul and besides his main task “to open a consulate and organize and develop trade relations with the Turkish places, help the French occupying authorities in Dalmatia and observe the movement of non-Muslim Turkish serfs in Bosnia and Serbia,” literature has also been had an important part in his life (Andrić, 1989: 40).

Finally, the day when a reception into the vizier follows, everything is carefully prepared and gowns are of special importance. At admission a specific protocol takes place, followed by a ceremonial, for

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<sup>2</sup> In the novel, the following terms are used: Consul and Consul General and the Consulate and Consulate General, even when it is clear that there is a Consul General and the Consulate General. DKKO states four classes of heads of consular posts in the 9th Article (consuls general, consuls, and consular agents vice-consul), from which it follows that four types of consulates are distinguished (consulate general, consulate, vice-consulate and consular agency), whereby a general name for two categories of uses Consul and Consulate is both the jargon as well as the colloquial usage.

which both sides have spent quite some time to coordinate and talk about issues around the protocol. Immediately after, when he comes back to his room, he has to write a report to the Minister and the Ambassador in Paris and Istanbul. The task is even more difficult, as it is without officers and employees, so he has to write, rewrite and perform all the office work. He does not know the language, neither the country and the situation, so he remembers and calls an interpreter consul into his service. In addition to all, the French consul has a problem with the Austrian Consul-General, Colonel Joseph von Mitterer, who fiercely fights for the benefit of his own country. In 1808, the vizier is replaced by Ibrahim Halim, who is more favourable to the French than the Austrian consul. In the meantime, the war between Napoleon and Vienna Royal Court breaks out, and the two consuls in Travnik do not stay in touch. "Consuls are visiting and accepting people who in other circumstances would never talk to the them; they are giving gifts and spending bribes. They both work day and night, having no difficulties strength" (Andrić, 1989: 284).

On the other hand, Daville as des Fosses (young translator for the Turkish language) is very different, particularly in relation to literature. Literature is the thing for which he is particularly sensitive of. Ever since he was aware of himself, he started writing various types of literary works, versified and conceiving situations. It is an interesting relationship between a consul and literature which is of great importance and which is realized as an upgrade of his work. There is actually no dividing line between private and public, as the consul as a person is entirely in the public eye and has no other choice. Literature as such, therefore, in the world of diplomacy also appears as a means for the wording of their views because consuls and diplomats usually have to write tedious and short reports where there is no open space for what they have to say and therefore a lot of things remain tacit, hidden, lost. Meanwhile, the Austrian consul is very busy writing reports being aware that most of them remain "intact without anyone having a look at them or read them" (Andrić, 1989: 158): "A feather is squeaking, candles are crackling, he is writing line by line, word by word, number by number; but still the pile grows." (Andrić, 1989: 158).

At the end, the French consulate in Travnik resigns, so Daville returns home after eight years. Soon after, Austrian Consul leaves Bosnia too and "people are satisfied that both the consuls have left Travnik." (Andrić, 1989: 457).

## **2.2 *Lonely Travelling to Distant Lands: A Tragedy of a Woman, Alma Maksimiljana Karlin (1969)***

The author was a very unusual lady who was born in 1889 in Celje. After the First World War, she bravely went on a study trip around the world, because she wanted to become a researcher.

In this autobiographical book she describes her way from Italy to South America, Peru, Panama, California and then to Hawaii, Japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. She was away for eight years when she came back to her home town Celje, physically and mentally broken. She managed to pass such a trip around the world almost without any money, which had never been done before by her male peers. Nobody helped her and she did not have any support from the political magnates. She spoke ten languages and served as a teacher of foreign languages, as a translator and as a reporter, especially for German and Austrian newspapers as well as a newspaper *Cillier Zeitung* from Celje. When she arrived to Japan in 1922, she associated with the intellectuals in order to promote cultural and scientific integration. It is precisely because of those ties that she managed an incredible service at the German embassy, which is a kind of a paradox since she was a Yugoslav citizen. It was in that service specifically that she got acquainted with the “real form” of diplomatic service for the first time.

It is interesting to view how Karlin had represented this work before she accepted a job at the German embassy and got to know it: “The embassy! Even now it makes me laugh when I remember what I imagined under this term. Half the Kingdom of Heaven! Secrets, magic, intrigues, danger, ladies wrapped up to their noses and foreigners in disguise, magical wardrobes and their wisdom. Luckily, politeness was an important part of this magical world, for only the best of the best were able to work at the embassy. That is what added credence to my work. A German man who initiated me into the work, suppressed my enthusiasm by saying that everything in the world – therefore the embassy as well – has a bright and a dark side” (Karlin, 2007: 247).

Karlin was a well-known official at the embassy; she was aware of the fact that her work requires concentration and consistency and that consequences follow in case of making mistakes. It was defined what to do and how to act at the protocols; she knew how important it was in the diplomatic world to know when to talk, what to talk about, how

to express her opinion or when it is better to remain silent. "Silence is golden: do not reply to people who are not employees or co-workers of the embassy, not even your principals. You remain silent even at conversations and since I have been a great waster of this gold, they asked me to stay three months longer than it had been agreed" (Karlin, 2007: 249) This confirms the fact that Karlin coped well with her work at the embassy and was aware of the importance of the work that she was performing. She admitted working in the diplomatic world was not easy and she recognized it required the whole man since in her view, people in the diplomatic world decide about the fate not only of individuals but of the whole nation or even several nations. It is interesting to have a look at her diplomacy: "There is a widespread opinion that there is an unbridgeable precipice between the aristocracy and people that originated on account of machines on one side and diplomacy on the other. It seems as even hat-racks at the embassy have their say: I kindly ask for a preferential right to take your hat!" (Karlin, 2007: 249).

According to Karlin, diplomacy is too isolated from people. She also complains about specific behaviour that is too artificial in the diplomatic world and that the diplomacy leaves her the impression the work itself is not done for the people. She was the only one who had complaints about the diplomacy and in this case she was mainly focused on political diplomacy as a special kind of diplomacy.

Karlin mastered many languages, including diplomatic English, French, Russian, Spanish, Chinese, Latin, Italian, Norwegian, Danish, Finnish, Japanese, Persian and Sanskrit. Such knowledge of languages had many advantages. She did not want to get married as was the wish of her mother. At that time every mother wanted to marry his daughter into a rich family which would enable her a better life in the future.

In this piece of work a different approach of describing diplomacy is seen. The author describes diplomacy namely through the eyes of a person who worked at the embassy. Karin wrote about diplomacy through her experiences as a secretary. She came into those circles with completely different experiences and views. Due to her personal experience she was able to achieve many things, which is still amazing today – she was not sent there by her mother country and she did not work on behalf of it, but she worked at the embassy of a foreign country although she did not have their nationality nor she ever lived

there. If one had a lot of experiences, one could also become a diplomat in case they knew foreign languages, know different countries and continents, were interested in ethnology of the countries and therefore enjoyed a high reputation. The suggestions for a new type of diplomats emerged; those who stood out with their abilities and achievements, not only with the diplomatic service as such, could become diplomats. In doing so, we note that from 19th century on, in the field of diplomacy, the focus becomes the individual and their skills, their personal qualities and credits and gender is no longer as powerful and important as before.

### **2.3 *Badger on Tribunal, Petar Kočić (1904)***

Petar Kočić was a Bosnian-Serbian writer. He was active in the Serbian Orthodox National Organisation which was tied to the Young Bosnian revolutionaries, but laws later seceded with his closest supporters under his leadership.

The short story *Badger on Tribunal* (*Jazavec pred sudom*) is not a novel, but it is written in a form of a play. It is an excellent satire on the political and social life of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The story begins when David Štrbac, a Bosnian farmer, comes to the court carrying a badger in the bag with the intent to sue it for eating his corn. His life changes a lot, most often consciously, sometimes unconsciously, but always with a specific purpose. He mocks the representatives of the Austrian government. He is strong in character and possesses inner strength. For those reasons he is not only a representative of peasants of Stričić and their rebellion, he symbolizes all the farmers in the conquered Bosnia who definitely are less educated than the invaders, but were higher as people who are spiritually weak. David Štrbac does not speak only for himself, but on behalf of all the Bosnian peasants. David places himself far above the ordinary peasant with everyday troubles like taking care of themselves, droughts, floods, suffering and their pain and he manages to mock the entire public with his words and facial gestures. Kočić uses short sentences to show the fate of the Bosnian farmer through David Štrbac. He says: "The Turkish Court is above everybody: the most powerful. A badger, that robber is not important as David or a farmer is" (Kočić, 1963: 25).

David is determined to fight against occupation. He has been talking

in the courts his entire life and although being sometimes shy, sometimes cruel, sometimes pleading and quiet as a lamb, he is always ready to attack the enemy with his hand.

The story does not address the subject of diplomacy, as is discussed in the article. On the other hand, the political satire is very interesting for the analysis of criminal law and at the same time it raises the question of state law.

#### **2.4 Messrs. Glembay, Miroslav Krleža (1928)**

A drama in three acts from the life of an aristocratic family is a play. It is divided into three acts dealing with the events and the rift within the family Glembay. Messrs. Glembay is the first of three plays in the Glembay cycle which includes the dramas *In Agony* and *Leda*. The drama is considered a classic of Croatian literature.

The characters are: Naci (Ignjat, Jacques) Glembay, a banker, the owner of Glembay Ltd. Company; first secret adviser (69 years old); Baroness Castelli–Glembay, his second legitimate wife (45 years old); Dr. Phil. Leone Glembay, Ignjat's son from his first wife Basilides–Danielli (38 years old); sister Angelika Glembay, Dominican, a widow of Glembay's son Ivan; Baroness Zygmuntowicz Beatrix (29 years old); Titus Andronicus Fabriczy-Glembay, Glembay's cousin; Emeritus (69 years), a bishop; Dr. Iuris Puba Fabriczy-Glembay, a lawyer; the company's law adviser, his son (28 years old), Dr. Med. Paul Altmann, a physician (51 years old), Dr. Theol. et Phil. Alojzije Silberbrandt, baroness's confesseeur and her son's advisor (39 years old), Oliver Glembay, Baroness Castelli's son; Glembay (17 years), a banker; Ulanski Oberleutenant Von Ballocsanszky, an army lieutenant (24 years old).

Ignjat Glembaj (known by nicknames Nazi and Jacques) is a man in his sixties. He is the sovereign head of the family and the owner of Glembay Ltd. Company. His first wife is of a Greek-Venetian origin Basilides-Danielli. Ignjat has two children, Alice and John, with his first wife. Both of them are killed. He has two more children, Oliver and Caddy with his second wife Baroness Charlotte-Castelli Glembay. After eleven years, a neurotic intellectual and also a painter named Leon Glembay, is forced to return to a successful business of the mentioned company. However, relationships between members

are tenser than expected. The basis of the conflict lies in the ancient tradition according to which the first member of the family killed and robbed the church jewellers in the woods in 1790 and built himself a large palace and therefore raised his social status and built himself a career. It is very unusual for an ordinary family that is occupied with agriculture, to turn into an unfriendly, unconscionable and anxious family whose members, by all means, have a tendency to climb the social and intellectual level using inevitable dose of hedonism and trying to scramble for wealth. They never succeed in their goals due to their low level of humanity and morality.

Leone has a major conflict with his father and in the act of rage and anger he kills his father's second wife.

Almost the entire drama takes place in the lounge, where they talk about art, literature and painting. The criminal law is at the forefront while the drama does not include diplomacy, except when Fabriczy mentions "Honorary Consul of Virginia and Cuba, where negotiations take place including accompanying fanfares to the chamber of trade" (Krlježa, 2005: 166). Social prestige of higher elites is also very important.

### ***2.5 The Mountain Wreath, Petar Petrović Njegoš (1848)***

The Mountain Wreath is a political-historical drama that expands into a wreath of author's epic descriptions of Montenegrin life, including feasts, gatherings, customs, beliefs, and the struggle to survive the Ottoman oppression.

The basic theme of The Mountain Wreath is the struggle for justice, freedom and dignity. The characters fight to correct a local flaw in their society, but they are at the same time involved in a struggle between good and evil. Njegoš expresses a firm belief in man and in his basic goodness and integrity. He also shows that man must fight for their rights and for whatever they attain, for nothing comes by chance.

The most interesting part of the drama is a decision made by Montenegrins about willingness to negotiate with the Turks. The main leader of this idea is a bishop ("vladika") Danilo. First, they send their messenger to agree when to be met and to exchange the prisoners. "The whole meeting was in favour of the Turks that were clear about

not being prepared to withdraw” (Petrović Njegoš, 1947: 20). When it comes to negotiations between them, the first thing they do is sit in a circle and start exchanging opinions and arguments. And vladika Danilo says: “We may now turn off the bloody fire” (Petrović Njegoš, 1947: 36). Vladika Danilo has a powerful speech, but nevertheless leaves the Turks cold. The power of words in a diplomatic negotiation is one of the central or main elements. In doing so, the Duke of Batrić is warned to refuse pretending ignorance. When Mustaj Kadi started to talk, the Turks were no longer so polite and friendly. He says: “What is wrong with you? You are push the thorns into a healthy leg! And you are insulting the only true religion! Allah is here!” (Petrović Njegoš, 1947: 45). Negotiations grow into a hate speech and Serdan Ivan Petrović says: “It will be difficult, Turks, for your soul! How much longer will your country suffer in blood?” (Petrović Njegoš, 1947: 50).

Unfortunately, negotiations are not concluded at the end of the truce. They almost start fighting. This event is a good example of how important it is to prepare well for diplomatic negotiations. Vladika Danilo receives a letter from the Turkish side under false pretences, but it turns out that the Montenegrins rely on the right of their people, while the Turks rely on the use of force. It turns out that the written mode of communication is not successful if the starting point of diplomatic communication is not well designed.

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Jazbec (2009: 19) the following elements form a definition of diplomacy:

- Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation.
- Diplomacy is a method used by ambassadors and envoys to regulate and manage relationships.
- Diplomacy is the art of business of diplomats.
- Diplomacy is the capacity and performance in the implementation of international dialogue and negotiations.

Feltham (1993: 1) writes: “... that is the foundation of diplomatic communication of thoughts and ideas between different governments and, increasingly, between governments and international organizations.”

Diplomacy is an expression of the concrete historical situation and is also in its function; therefore it is a dynamic social process. In this article, diplomacy is treated as an activity, and thus it is perceived both as a diplomatic as well as a consular activity, and therefore the term diplomat is understood as a diplomat as well as a consul.

Since international law resulted and is still transforming from social needs and changes in society, customary international law, being one of the three formal sources of international law, in addition to international treaties and general principles of law, has changed over the centuries as well. Thus, the role of customary international law in which we focus on several key theoretical views that influenced the formation of the law and its components (subjective and objective), are presented in this article.

Because the rules of customary international law reflect in treaties and conventions, only the works of literary classics that were written until 1961 were taken into the analysis, because in that year The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was adopted and two years later The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations came into existence. At the same time it has to be stressed that the codification of diplomatic law had already started in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, which clearly indicates the path of customary international law to international contract law. Although the rules are modest, they are strong enough to trigger the desire for a common interest for a precise codification of international law. With the development of codification of international law, customs had not disappeared, but they supplemented the international law and influenced the impact on its development, since it is in treaties and conventions that the rules of customary international law reflect most. The existence of customary law norms can be established only if they match countries' permanent practice. In such a manner we were trying to show that there are parallels between the development of customs in the field of diplomatic activity and its reflection in literature of the time. Customary international law is still being in the process of development since the fifth maxim of the preamble to Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states that the rules of customary international law continue to govern questions not explicitly regulated by the provisions of this convention.

With the development of society the law has got the dominant role and customs remain only as a means to fill the legal gaps or as a

means to refine the rules of law in a more precise way. A long way that started first with customs and their subsequent transition to customary international law had to be done in order to codify the international law. Still, it is very important for the countries to adjust to each other, since they have practiced different customs and there are different ways how some of these customs become part of customary international law.

### ***3.1 Classical Diplomacy***

Classical diplomacy has developed a variety of forms and was – during the period of three centuries, from 16<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> century – becoming increasingly codified. Its basic characteristics are as follows (Jazbec, 2009: 37-38):

- The existence of a permanent organization and permanent diplomatic missions in other countries.
- Those missions are almost the only institutionalized forms of international communication and show the existence of a military factor as the only form of the countries in the international area trying to fulfil their interests.
- Diplomatic missions are diplomats' core activity. Their ability is focused on political issues and on conducting negotiations, while conversations about more serious economic issues, or to other areas of social life have not begun yet.
- During that period, traditional diplomacy became deeply engaged in exercising the functions of representation as well as the functions of observation. Presentation passed beyond ceremonial appearances, so diplomats began to participate in social events more.

### ***3.2 Modern Diplomacy***

The First World War destroyed the balance of power and the liaison of large forces with their diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson who emphasized “community power” which would operate in all the countries that share common principles and objectives, and would be willing to provide total security, played a major role at Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Wilson rejected the old system of diplomatic relations a great distinction between diplomacy and politics had existed. At the conference the number of participants in international relations increased significantly and the ratio in world politics has also

increased. The former relationships, historical traditions, cultural and religious connections between noble families were no longer as important as before. (Vukadinović, 1995 : 26).

Modern diplomacy is characterized by the following key features (Jazbec, 2009: 39-40):

- The existence of permanent diplomatic organizations and permanent staff dealing with diplomacy, the existence of permanent diplomatic missions in other countries as well as international organizations.
- Creation and development of multilateral diplomacy, which manifests itself in particular with the emergence and development of international conferences (ad hoc and permanent) and international organizations (permanent staff and the specific rules of engagement).
- The extension of the original political diplomacy with new, additional themes (military, economy, culture, science, etc.). In comparison to the original, the difference is exclusively political, both in media and in other activities as well as in diplomats' individual sphere of activity within the diplomatic service.
- New themes dealing with a reflection of the characteristics of modern international community (global security, ecology and related topics) are entering into diplomatic practice because of their universality and complexity of being savable only at the global level.
- Modern diplomacy does not normally sign secret treaties anymore, due to the obligation of the Member States by the provisions of the UN Charter (as well as former DN) to register all the international treaties at the Secretariat of the United Nations. Otherwise, such contracts cannot be referred to in front of UN.
- Modern diplomacy, in particular through its multilateral dimension reflects the universal and global contemporary world events and offers approaches for solving the problems. In this context, it is certainly developmental extension of classical diplomacy, which was created and formed over a period of Eurocentric view of international relations.

It is clearly that literature and the law have been connected throughout the history. It is necessary to point out the role of the law in literature, namely, how literary texts describe the legal relationship,

more precisely, in our case, the diplomatic activity and its development to codification in 1961. Above all, we want to show that fiction can help us think about the law, in our case about diplomacy. Our main purpose is not to analyse all literary works, but a selection of them. The presented literary works serve as illustrations what the reality was like then and how it was reflected in literature. The view from “the other side” can also enable diplomats a different insight into the development of diplomacy over time.

Benko (2000: 242) argues that the ancient Greeks saw the possibility of developing intellectual and cultural groups in literary works and having the knowledge of those works enabled them to be better at international cooperation and development of those relations. Based on this, we would like to highlight the role of literary works that we have studied.

#### **4. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

Our main purpose is to analyse a selection of literary works. The chosen works serve as illustrations about real life and how it was reflected by the authors in their writing. Also, the view from the other side can show additional insight into the development of diplomacy over time. It is interesting to learn about literature through literary works and to watch how characters react in society, what the society expects from them and how such a character could actually exist, which is surely possible. “Literature reflects the endless complexity and wondrous diversity of its subject, but also “the spirit of time and place”, in which it originated. Both the law and literature are therefore “dealing” with the gap between the actual (in the framework of the average) and another sphere which on the contrary rejects all the limitations. Although both practically share the same problem, a new tension between them comes into existence due to their different engagement with the problem” (Jager, 2012: 229).

The analysis of literary works was based on the assumption that there is a strong connection between literature and the law. Different comparisons were made with the intention of finding out:

- if the selected individual characters are in diplomatic relations;
- how they imagine their work and if their role is formal or informal;
- which are the strongest character traits in diplomatic relations;

- the development of diplomatic protocol;
- if we can say that certain literary characters are typical of a particular country or within countries;
- what norms brought into the literature can be affected by the fact that were found as part of the codification of international law and if it is possible that they were a part of the common law from the beginning;
- if literature reflects reality and therefore the law becomes a part of fiction.

## 5. METHODS

Methods used in the research are the causal model method, the experimental method, the synthetic method, the interdisciplinary approach (Diplomatic Studies and Literary History), the inductive and deductive approaches, the historical method, the analysis, and the comparison.

The causal model method and the experimental method were chosen in order to show the existence of legal rules, norms and practices by means of the selected examples. On this basis, we evaluate the potential impact of literary works to understand the development of diplomacy. The synthetic method was used to verify the hypotheses with the obtained results and to review the written sources. The method of synthesis was helpful in making suggestions. The historical method was intertwined throughout the thesis, as it allows inspection within the meaning of the historical development of the field. In this way more comprehensive overview of the topic is possible. The method of analysis and the comparison method were used in order to help us determine the role of diplomacy over time and its occurrence and function, the personalities of the characters, customs, etc. through literary works.

Thus, the very heart of the matter is based on the author's independent critical thinking who applies to a critical-analytical, descriptive-analytical, historical and literary interpretation.

## 6. THE USE OF A MATRIX

To study individual literary works and to determine a reflection of diplomacy as an activity in the chosen works in specific details, we created a matrix for the study. In the matrix, the elements we were looking for in the literary works are listed. Based on their presence and frequency, there are two goals we had set. Firstly, to what extent each work contains diplomatic elements, and secondly, to what extent they are present in all of the selected works. Like this, we were making an attempt to generalize characteristics for the selected group of literary works, both for the individual periods as well as during the entire period represented by the selected works. In this way we were trying to determine if and to what extent we can confirm that diplomacy reflection is a permanent feature of literary works, and to what extent such a presence can also be a starting point for understanding the process of creating customary international law norms, motivated by literary works and their reflection of diplomatic reality in a specific historical context.

The presence of different sets of diplomatic elements, divided into five groups, based on the characteristics of classical diplomacy, were searched for in the selected literary works. In the first three groups we were looking for the elements referring to protocol (dress code, behaviour, atmosphere), diplomatic events (visits, receptions, travels) and diplomatic attributes (flattering, cold-bloodedness, intriguing, cautiousness, courage, discretion, in/directness and reputation). In the fourth group we observed the central literary protagonists, who may be either ad hoc diplomats or professional diplomats and/or even persons who are not diplomats but they nevertheless behave like ones and therefore by them, acting that way, they show what diplomatic work is about. In the last, the fifth group, we considered other elements, such as negotiation, secret diplomacy and court and their appearance in the diplomatic context of the literary works.

The presence of the diplomatic elements in the selected works was observed, respectively measured by five levels: none, little (up to one tenth of all the presence of these elements in a literary work), medium (up to one third), a lot (two-thirds) and entirely. It has to be emphasized here that we have tried to determine both the presence as well as the importance of the presence of the diplomatic elements, as, for example some literary works show little presence of diplo-

matic elements but are at the same time of great importance for the understanding of their presence and the importance of diplomatic elements in such works. We did not study randomly selected literary works in order to look for the eventual presence of diplomatic elements, but we carefully planned the list of literary works, for which we knew in advance that they contained diplomatic elements (we were looking for the level of presence of those elements in individual works and the trend over longer periods of time).

## 7. COMPARISON

Table 1: Matrix for the study of literary works.

Diplomatic elements 19 <sup>th</sup> and 20 <sup>th</sup> centuries						
		1. <sup>3</sup>	2.	3.	4.	5.
<b>Protocol</b>						
1.	Dressing	4	1	1	1	1
2.	Behaviour	4	4	2	0	4
3.	Atmosphere	4	4	1	0	4
Events						
4.	Visits	3	1	2	0	2
5.	Receptions	3	1	2	1	2
6.	Travel	3	1	1	1	4
<b>Properties</b>						
7.	Flattery	3	1	1	0	3
8.	Cold-bloodedness	3	1	1	0	3
9.	Conspiracy	4	1	1	1	1
10.	Precaution	2	1	1	0	0
11.	Courage	2	1	1	0	3
12.	Tactic	2	1	2	1	2
13.	Indirectness / directness	2	2	2	0	1
14.	Reputation	3	3	3	0	1
<b>Person</b>						
15.	Ad hoc diplomat	1	1	0	0	1
16.	Professional diplomat	3	3	0	0	0
17.	Not diplomat	1	1	0	0	1
<b>Other</b>						
18.	Negotiations	3	1	1	0	2
19.	Secret diplomacy	4	4	1	0	1
20.	Salon / mansion	3	0	3	0	1

Legend: Grade: zero (0), a little (up to tens presence of these elements in a literary work - 1), medium (up to a third - 2), large (two-thirds - 3) and overall (4).

<sup>3</sup> Number 1 is *The Chronicles of Travnik*, Ivo Andrić (1945); number 2 is *Lonely Travelling to Distant Lands: A Tragedy of a Woman*, Alma Maksimiljana Karlin (1969); number 3 is *Badger on Tribunal*, Petar Kočić (1904); number 4 is *Messrs. Glembay*, Miroslav Krleža (1928) and number 5 is *The Mountain Wreath*, Petar Petrović Njegoš (1848).

When examining selected works of literature, their analysis have ascertained that it is mostly oral form that had influenced the formation of customary international law, but written form was not at all negligible, though it was usually formed on the basis of an oral agreement. Diplomatic activities were therefore derived from the oral form that everybody had to follow, though it was given emphasis in the written form as well, which is evident in most works that appeared until the end of the nineteenth century. Diplomatic activity thus slowly evolved, based on the customs that were already present, and also on the basis of practice, which yielded new challenges and innovations into diplomatic activity.

Furthermore, the study shows that the literary works reflect the spirit of a given time (for example values, norms, customs) and that on the basis of those values, norms and customs a parallel with realistic development of diplomacy as an activity that was influenced by the development of customary international law can be pulled. Taken into consideration and presented are only those parts of chosen literary works, where dialogues, negotiation processes, behaviour and protocol reflect reality, which was later on the subject of codification of international law. Like this, we were trying to prove that the analysis of literary works can also help with the interpretation of the formation and understanding of customary international law and, indirectly, its passage and impact on subsequent codification of international law. For this purpose, we analysed diplomats and consuls' ways of acting, individuals' personalities, the performance of their work, the level of communication, clothing, attitudes to such individuals, the way the authority treats them and how they treat the authority, the role of women and the differences between female and male performance.

The analysis also points to the relation between a custom and a legal rule that have already come into existence or a legal norm or its adjustment to it. The custom can exist by the side of the law ("praeter legem") or it can supplement the law ("secundum legem") or the rules. The resulting list of rules for diplomatic activities have therefore formalized a custom ("consequetudo") and caused the formation of the opposite custom ("desuetudo"), which, in practice, can be understood as the formation of new customs through environment and historic time because the old ones were no longer in accordance

with the stated social norms. Despite the written rules and the law, customs have always been changing, and they will surely be changing in the future as well, accommodating and adapting to evolving changes in diplomatic and consular activities.

We started our research with an interest how and in what manner diplomacy is reflected in great dramas from the Balkans. Here, we have chosen the famous work of Andrić - *The Chronicles of Travnik*, knowing that it deals substantially with diplomacy. On the other hand we have chosen three other novels for which we do not know if the same is the case. We could speculate it should be the case to a certain extent, having in mind the fact that those three dramas deal with bourgeois world and life in Croatia (Krlježa), with common perception of the rule of law in the 19<sup>th</sup> century countryside in Serbia (Kočić) and with the statesmanship in Montenegro (Njegoš).

There are some important conclusions that have been made based on the performed analysis and generalization through comparisons between the literary works.

Firstly, hardly any traces of diplomacy can be found in those three dramas. What does this mean? Why this absence? Or, is it really an absence? Why should great novels also deal with diplomacy as a skill, an activity, or a protocol? Or, why is it important for the fable in a novel to include those aspects as well? We see messages of those dramas in their literary strength, in their encapturing of life, its aspects, dilemmas and perspective. All three novels have a connection with the law, but more with criminal law as with diplomacy. The reason may lie in the fact that nations in the Balkans still need time to develop international law and diplomacy in this way. Or weren't there any possibilities for this subject to come into the literature work? Or it is only possible that only novels and not dramas deal with it because it is easier to express feelings? To find the real reason we would need to examine more novels and short stories from the Balkans.

On the other hand, we came to many important conclusions.

Firstly, the protocol is an element that often occurs in all those novels. Clothing is in the foreground, mainly women, rather than men (not even delegates), are being described participating in social events. Women, having a special place in saloons and at dances – in social

life, are described. Male delegates should be nicely dressed. Descriptions mainly refer to a particular type of material, which has to reflect the quality, and thus publicly celebrates their status.

Secondly, the way one should behave at receptions, at the court and in the saloons was specifically defined and had to be followed. It has to be pointed out that none of the selected literary works mentions the code of practice, but they often refer to customs that had to be followed. The reader gets a feeling that they were passed “from generation to generation”, and were constantly upgraded. The protocol atmosphere is strongly present, and is usually very tense due to different expectations of different parties, when no one knows what to get from either the conversation, the negotiation or the diplomatic context as a whole.

Thirdly, events such as receptions, travels and visits are not in the foreground, although they are present in the literary works in different ways, especially in the twentieth century. On the other hand, sometimes specific descriptions are not necessary because it is generally known how such events take place.

## CONCLUSION

Characteristics of diplomats have held an important and visible position in almost all periods of time. Among them, flattery, cold-bloodedness, in/directness and the reputation that diplomats enjoy all the time, stand out. Reputation is one of the features which indirectly provides diplomats with the power for all the other activities that take place in the diplomatic service. Due to their reputation, diplomats, regardless of their rank, are always welcome at social events, and the profession itself is very attractive to people of other professions or statuses. Nevertheless, flattery never passes the limits of “a normal taste”, as diplomats want to maintain their own degree of “sovereignty” and do not want to be completely subordinate to their co-speakers. They use intrigue and cold-bloodedness primarily when they want to achieve their goal or finish their task at all costs, which is most strongly present in the works of the nineteenth and the twentieth century, while diplomats did not have to do that in the ancient times, because their task was delivered from God and everybody had to obey and respect that, intentionally or unintentionally.

This study would like to show that a connection between literary works and the law, also diplomacy, do exist. Also, it is necessary to make more analysis in this area which would new questions, for example: Where's the line between literature being fiction and the law being its reality or the law becoming fiction because it is reflected in literature?

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## CROQUIS



GAVRILO PRINCIP

2014: The 100. Anniversary of the beginning of First World War – merely every school student knows about the name of Gavrilo Princip.

Gavrilo Princip was a Bosnian Serb, who assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his pregnant wife, Sophie, on the Latin Bridge in Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914. This act was used as a cause of Austria-Hungary's invasion of Serbia, which then led to World War I.

A mistake is made by those historians, who say that Princip supported Serbian nationalism and that the region of Balkan in this regard should be led by an enlarged Serbian state. This is not entirely true. Princip was a Yugoslav nationalist and a member of the movement "Mlada Bosna" ("Young Bosnia"), which mostly consisted of Serbs, but also of Bosnians and Croats. In the assassination plot he received help from Serbian nationalists (the special role of Colonel Apis and the Black Hand Gang – secret society dedicated to promote Serbian interests by terror). Colonel Apis was a part of Serbian military intelligence that had planned and taken part in previous assassinations, including his own sovereign, King Alexander I, in 1903. Mysterious was also a role of the other conspirator, Danilo Ilić.

Therefore, we could not presume that Princip was the only and the main historical figure that would be to blame for the beginning of the First World War, which brought down four empires and cost more than 15 million lives. It is also hard to judge, whether to blame Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and his chief military advisers or Austro-Hungarians or the Russians for the actual outburst of the war. The fact is that the governments of all the main powers preferred war to diplomacy. It was about the firm belief that the Central Powers could not lose. But that was obviously a wrong thought.

Gavrilo Princip, a very poor boy from a small village Obljaj in Bosnia, was too young (19 years) for the Habsburg law for the death sentence. Instead, he was sentenced to 20 years in jail. He died in 1918, shortly before the end of the war. His body had become racked by skeletal tuberculosis that destroyed his bones and his right arm had to be amputated. The two young men, who attacked Franz Ferdinand together with Princip, shared nearly the same destiny (death in prison in their fresh youth ages) as their companion. Their fatal acts were in a style of *kamikaze*, because they both took a deadly poison shortly after the attacks, but they failed.

Still, the history mainly simplifies the facts and in popular narrative, we see only one person as a main actor for the beginning of the First World War.

Of course we are aware of the great role of personalities when speaking about world's history; but Princip was merely the naïve young Bosnian boy, maybe a sacrificed one, of the other more important and invisible figures. From this point of view the young assassinator is a tragic symbol, reminding us how historical circumstances should not and could not be covered up by what he symbolises. It would be far too simple, whatever the period and context.

Nowadays, the sympathy for God and devil is nearly almost the same as it used to be before hundred years ago. The question of who is who is not the ethical one, neither political. It is a tribal one, which roots in differentiated historical backgrounds. And this is not a good sign. As it was never.

Anja Fabiani

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
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